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Abstract 
 
The Situationist International (1957-1972) was a small group of communist revolutionaries, 
originally organised out of the West European artistic avant-garde of the 1950s. The focus of 
my thesis is to explain how the Situationist International (SI) became a group able to exert a 
considerable influence on the ultra-left criticism that emerged during and in the wake of the 
May movement in France in 1968. My wager is that the pivotal period of the group is to be 
found between 1960 and 1963, a period marked by the split of 1962. Often this is described as 
the transition of the group from being more concerned with art to being more concerned with 
politics, but as I will argue this definitional shorthand elides the significance of the Situationist 
critique of art, philosophy and politics.  
The two axes of my thesis are as follows. First, that the significant minority in the group which 
carried out the break of 1962, identified a homology between the earlier Situationist critique of 
art — embodied in the Situationist ‘hypothesis of the construction of situations’ — and Marx’s 
critique and supersession of the radical milieu of philosophy from which he emerged in the mid-
1840s. This homology was summarised in the expression of the Situationist project as the 
‘supersession of art’ (dépassement de l’art). Secondly, this homology was practically embodied 
in the resolution of the debates over the role of art in the elaboration of the Situationist 
hypothesis, which had been ongoing since 1957. However, it was the SI’s encounter with the 
ultra-left group Socialisme ou Barbarie that would prove decisive. Via Guy Debord’s 
membership, the group was exposed to both the idea of a more general revolutionary criticism, 
but also ultimately what was identified as the insufficiently criticised ‘political militancy’ of this 
group. Indeed, in the ‘political alienation’ found in Socialisme ou Barbarie, a further homology 
was established between the alienation of the political and artistic avant-gardes. This identity 
would prove crucial to the further elaboration of the concept of ‘spectacle’.  
By way of an examination of the peculiar and enigmatic ‘Hamburg Theses’ of 1961, and the 
relationship between these ‘Theses’ and the Situationist criticism of art and politics worked out 
over the first five years of the group, I will argue that the break in 1962 should be conceived as 
one against politics as much as art (rather than just the latter, as it is more often represented). 
Additionally, I will outline how the SI, through the paradoxical reassertion of their artistic 
origins, attempted to synthesise their criticism of art with the recovery of the work of Marx 
beyond its mutilation as Marxism. Indeed, it was the synthesis of these critiques that enabled the 
considerable development of the concept of ‘spectacle’, opening the way to the unique influence 
the SI exerted in the re-emergence of a revolutionary movement at the end of the 1960s.  
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Introduction: Gambling on the passage of time 
[A]ll the hypocrites on the artistic side feign to treat us as politicians, and, on 
the political side, reassure themselves by reproaching us for being artists and 
dreamers. Their common point is that they speak in the name of artistic or 
political specialisation, the one as dead as the other. 
— Situationist International, 19631 
The Situationist International (1957-1972) was a small group of communist revolutionaries, 
originally organised out of the West European artistic avant-garde of the 1950s. The focus of 
my thesis is to explain how the Situationist International became a group able to exert 
considerable influence on the ultra-left criticism which emerged during and in the wake of the 
May movement in France in 1968. My wager is that the pivotal period of the group is to be 
found between 1960 and 1961. It is in this period that the project of cohering an avant-garde 
‘within and against art’ gave way to the project of ‘realising art’ through its ‘supersession’ as a 
distinct practice in everyday life. The recovery of Marx’s work against Marxist orthodoxy was a 
crucial part of conceptualising this ‘supersession’. Such a perspective was summarised in the 
enigmatic “work” composed by some of the Situationists, known as the ‘Hamburg Theses’.  
The struggle against political alienation in the group from around 1961 was an extension of the 
earlier conflict over the artistic and anti-artistic elaboration of the Situationist hypothesis. In 
1957, Guy Debord’s ‘hypothesis of the construction of situations’ (what I also call the 
Situationist hypothesis) was offered as the solution to the impasse of the active and repetitive 
decomposition of culture. However, often lost in the secondary literature is that Debord’s vision 
of the ‘constructed situation’ was a hypothesis regarding the possible organisation of life on the 
basis of the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism. Thus, he suggested that Situationist practice 
in the capitalist present (as opposed to the communist future) would be limited to the 
elaboration of experimental practices that entailed the critique of the capitalist use of urban 
                                                     
1 Internationale Situationniste, 'Sur l’exclusion d’Attila Kotànyi [1963],' in Guy Debord : Œuvres, Paris: 
Éditions Gallimard, 2006. 
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space-time — what Debord called ‘unitary urbanism’. By means of unitary urbanism, the SI 
would elaborate the Situationist hypothesis, to the end of establishing conditions conducive to 
its realisation; however, such ‘realisation’ was, perforce, only possible in a hypothesised 
communist future. Thus, the movement of the SI from its first to second period should not be 
conceived as the movement from an artistic to a political problematic, but rather the movement 
from posing the supersession of art, to a more general sense of supersession, aimed at an 
entailed philosophical and political supersession. Invoking Marx, this perspective was pithily 
expressed in the ‘Hamburg Theses’ as ‘now, the SI must realise philosophy’.2  
A persistent opinion regarding the periods of the SI, has been to consider its first period as one 
more clearly focused on artistic practices (1957-1961) and the second period as being more 
clearly focused on political practices (1962-1968). In a crude way, the ‘surpassing’ or 
‘supersession of art’ (dépassement de l’art) is seen as one of movement from the first, artistic 
period to the second, political period. But this is to misapprehend the Situationist notion of 
‘supersession’ altogether. Common to much of the secondary literature on the SI available in 
English, is an undue emphasis on the so-called ‘artistic’ SI. As already mentioned, this view fits 
in with the common doxa of splitting the SI into two distinct phases (at least up until 1968): the 
so-called artistic SI of 1957-1961, and the political SI of 1962-1968. Certainly, such a divide 
exists, and was even accepted by Debord, among others. However, the shorthand 
‘artistic/political’ obscures, rather than clarifies, the nature of the break, its causes and its 
aftermath. Put simply, this perspective misunderstands the non-, or rather anti-artistic nature of 
the so-called artistic phase, as much as it misapprehends the anti-political nature of the so-called 
political phase. Indeed, it appears to be motivated by an undue concern with elements of the 
Situationist hypothesis, particularly such ‘para-artistic’ practices like urban drifts (dérives) and 
psychogeographical research, at the expense of Debord’s and others attempt to unify these 
practices in an overarching theory and practice: namely the Situationist hypothesis of the 
construction of situations. To some extent this can be seen as a result of the distrust of ‘master 
                                                     
2 Guy Debord, 'Les thèses de Hambourg en septembre 1961 (Note pour servir à l'histoire de 
l'Internationale Situationniste) [1989],' in Internationale situationniste : Édition augmentée, Paris: 
Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1997. 
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narratives’ that has been fostered in recent decades. But usually it is manifest by simply 
ignoring or bracketing the hypothesis as too abstract or irrelevant (much like Constant did at the 
time — cf. chapter three, below, in this regard).  
Nonetheless, there are real differences among the pro-art critics of the SI. At its worst, it 
manifests in the work of Stewart Home, whose account of the ‘specto’ Situationists and the 
break in 1962 is, at best, mythological.3 More recently, McKenzie Wark has unfortunately 
shown some sympathy for Home’s fictions; but at least Wark appears to more clearly reckon 
with the work of the Situationists, and pay them some due.4  Better, by far, is the historical 
approach of scholars like Tom McDonough, whose attention to detail is only undermined by his 
inability to reckon with the Marxian turn of the SI.5 Indeed, this tendency to focus almost solely 
upon the artistic SI also undermines the work of Simon Ford and Simon Sadler. In the case of 
Sadler, he is mostly concerned with the artistic and architectural exegesis of unitary urbanism, 
so perhaps it is understandable.6 In the case of Ford, his general history of the SI suffers from 
his failure to clearly understand the nature of the 1962 break, and his inability to treat the post-
1962 SI in the same detail he lavishes on the pre-1962 SI (a fault Wark suffers from to, despite 
his claim of offering an account of the ‘glorious times’ of the SI).7 Mikkel Bolt Rasmussen and 
Jakob Jakobsen have offered accounts focusing upon the artist-members of the SI, and, in 
                                                     
3 Cf. Stewart Home, The Assault on Culture: Utopian Currents from Lettrisme to Class War, Edinburgh: 
AK Press, 1991. 
4 McKenzie Wark, 50 Years of Recuperation of the Situationist International, New York: Princeton 
Architectural Press, 2008; McKenzie Wark, The Beach Beneath the Streets: The Everyday Life and 
Glorious Times of the Situationist International, London: Verso, 2011; McKenzie Wark, The Spectacle of 
Disintegration, London: Verso, 2013. 
5 Thomas F. McDonough, 'Rereading Debord, Rereading the Situationists,' October, no. 79 (Winter 
1997); Tom McDonough, 'Introduction: Ideology and the Situationist Utopia,' in Guy Debord and the 
Situationist International: Texts and Documents, ed. Tom McDonough, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The 
MIT Press, 2004; Tom McDonough, The beautiful language of my century: reinventing the language of 
contestation in postwar France, 1945–1968, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007; Tom McDonough, ed. 
The Situationists and the City (London: Verso, 2009). McDonough has noted that conceiving of the SI in 
terms of the artistic versus political wings — among other things — simply ‘hinder[s] any understanding 
of this group’. Whereas he is surely right about such a reductive perspective, he makes this move in order 
to denounce what he sees as an unnecessary exceptionalism regarding the SI. However, such an 
exceptionalism really exists, if we mean by it the difference between the SI’s plans to put into practice the 
radical demands of the artistic and political avant-gardes of the 19th and 20th centuries, and the various 
perspectives of then contemporary political and intellectual life — even, and especially, what passed for a 
‘leftism’ dominated by the large French Stalinist Communist Party. Cf. McDonough, 'Introduction: 
Ideology and the Situationist Utopia,' p. xvii. 
6 Simon Sadler, The Situationist City, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1999. 
7 Simon Ford, The Situationist International: A User’s Guide, London: Black Dog, 2005. 
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particular, the Scandinavian sections of the SI, the German Spur group, and the so-called 
‘Second Situationist International’.8 Rasmussen and Jakobsen seem to be more engaged with the 
political dimensions of the Situationists critique, but less so with the anti-political and anti-
artistic dimensions. Their translations and publication of hard to find documents are to be 
applauded; however much of the material that is labelled ‘Situationist’, particularly that 
pertaining to the Second Situationist International and its avatars, is so tangentially related to the 
Situationist hypothesis, that one is tempted to agree with Debord, Vaneigem, et al., when they 
accused many of the artist members of the group of being primarily interested in the label as a 
mark of artistic distinction rather than critical engagement.  
The flip side of the ‘pro-art’ commentators are what, with some caution, we can call the ‘pro-
political’ commentators. Two works in particular come to mind in this regard: Sadie Plant’s The 
Most Radical Gesture, and Richard Gilman-Opalsky’s Spectacular Capitalism.9 Plant’s work is 
perhaps the better of the two as her account gives a lot of space to the avant-garde antecedents 
of the SI. However, she appears to be overly concerned with the postmodern issue of the SI, and 
the debt owed the Situationists for this parentage. Whereas it is true that post-structuralists like 
Jean Baudrillard, Jean-François Lyotard and even Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari derive 
aspects of their work from the SI (though largely unacknowledged), it is questionable that their 
work constitutes a continuation of the SI. Considering her thesis, Plant appears more 
comfortable with the Nietzscheanism that appears in some of the SI’s work, particularly Raoul 
Vaneigem’s. However, she is less sure when dealing with Marx, definitely the more important 
reference for the SI. Gilman-Opalsky, on the other hand, sets out to address what he considers to 
be the problem of those that ‘ignore [the] political core’ of the SI.10  However, like Plant, he is 
less sure about the anti-political nature of this ‘political core’. And, more bizarrely, he takes up 
the entire, long, first chapter of his book considering the work of Jean Baudrillard, though it is 
                                                     
8 Mikkel Bolt Rasmussen and Jakob Jakobsen, eds., Expect Anything Fear Nothing: The Situationist 
Movement in Scandanavia and Elsewhere (Copenhagen: Nebula, 2011); Mikkel Bolt Rasmussen and 
Jakob Jakobsen, eds., Cosmonauts of the Future: Texts from The Situationist Movement in Scandanavia 
and Elsewhere (Copenhagen: Nebula, 2015). 
9 Richard Gilman-Opalsky, Spectacular Capitalism: Guy Debord and the Practice of Radical Philosophy, 
London: Minor Compositions, 2011; Sadie Plant, The most radical gesture: The Situationist International 
in a postmodern age, London: Routledge, 1992. 
10 Gilman-Opalsky, Spectacular Capitalism: Guy Debord and the Practice of Radical Philosophy, p. 23. 
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never clear how Baudrillard figures in Gilman-Opalsky’s desire to ‘rescue’ Debord, let alone 
contribute to the reinvigoration of a revolutionary movement. Indeed, in the middle of this 
chapter he asserts, as if from nowhere, and incredibly, that ‘Baudrillard makes, in a very general 
sense, a wrong turn’, leaving one wondering why he even set out on this particular diversion 
(the subtitle of his work is ‘Guy Debord and the Practice of Radical Philosophy’).11 In this 
regard, one would be better off reading the short article by Anselm Jappe, ‘Baudrillard, 
détournement par excès’, in which Jappe demonstrates that Baudrillard’s key “insight” into the 
modern organisation of appearances is taken almost entirely from Debord.12  
Nonetheless, there are signs of a more just appreciation of the SI, particularly with regard to the 
nature of the break with the artists. Frances Stracey (2014) has pointed out the fallacy of the 
neat division of the SI, drawing attention to the ‘first […] collective exhibition of so-called 
“Situationist” works within a gallery context’ was made in 1963, more than a year after the 
break with the artists, and some two years after the debates over what constituted ‘anti-
situationist’ art.13 Indeed, Stracey goes some way to drawing out the continuity across the divide 
of 1962, and putting forward a thesis of the entailed political and artistic nature of the SI from 
the outset. Unfortunately, missing from her account is a more considered reckoning with the 
Situationist sense of the supersession of art and politics.  
Readers of my thesis will notice certain lacunae, even and especially for the time I am dealing 
with. The most notable is the almost complete absence of a discussion of Henri Lefebvre and 
                                                     
11 John Lepper, in his 2012 review of Gilman-Opalsky’s work similarly noted this non-sequitar, pointing 
out that if one concludes that we should ‘selectively’ forget about Baudrillard after spending so much 
time remembering him, as Gilman-Opalsky does, why not rather cut to the chase and ‘just completely 
forget him?’ John Lepper, 'The Situationist International: Forty Years On,' Socialism and Democracy 26, 
no. 1 (2012), p. 163. 
12 Anselm Jappe, 'Baudrillard, détournement par excès,' Lignes, no. 31 (février 2010). I hope to make 
available an English translation of this article in the near future. 
13 Frances Stracey, Constructed Situations: A New History of the Situationist International, London: Pluto 
Press, 2014, pp. 3, 44. For a detailed account of the Situationist exhibition, cf. Mikkel Bolt Rasmussen, 
'To Act in Culture While Being Against All Culture: The Situationists and the “Destruction of RSG-6”,' 
in Expect Anything Fear Nothing: The Situationist Movement in Scandanavia and Elsewhere, ed. Mikkel 
Bolt Rasmussen and Jakob Jakobsen, Copenhagen: Nebula, 2011. Stracey, unfortunately believed that the 
“Destruction of RSG-6” was the ‘first and last’ collective anti-art exhibition of the SI. There was another, 
Ny-Irrealisme [neo-irrealism], in 1967. Cf. J.V. Martin et al., 'Neo-Irrealism: The Decline and Fall of the 
Fourth Reich (1967),' in Cosmonauts of the Future: Texts from The Situationist Movement in 
Scandanavia and Elsewhere, ed. Mikkel Bolt Rasmussen and Jakob Jakobsen, Copenhagen: Nebula, 
2015. 
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Georg Lukács. To deal with Lukács first. There are two works that are presently available in 
English, both of which deal with the question of the SI’s relations to Lukács (among other 
things), and his brand of ‘Hegelian-Marxism’. These works are Anselm Jappe’s critical 
biography, Guy Debord (1999), and the forthcoming work of Tom Bunyard’s, Debord, Time 
and Spectacle: Hegelian Marxism and Situationist Theory (Brill, 2018). Both of these works I 
heartily recommend; in the case of Jappe’s, it remains the standard work for an understanding of 
the influence of Lukács upon Debord’s concept of spectacle. If it is to be faulted, it is that Jappe 
tends to downplay Debord’s rediscovery of a Marxian critique of Lukács’ more Hegelian 
inflected sense of alienation (i.e. objectification as alienation) — a fault shared by Bunyard. 
However, Jappe and Bunyard are not unaware of this problem. And, without doubt, both of 
these works are by far the best accounts so far of the often complex question of the theoretical 
debts of the SI. Nonetheless, I will leave the argument regarding Lukács and the SI up to a 
future author who chooses to once again focus upon this rewarding subject. To return to the 
question of the lacunae in my thesis, I have bracketed the question of Lukács only so that I can 
better address the question I have set myself with regard to the SI. No doubt, Lukács’s work 
played a role. However, the more important role he played was as a conduit of sorts for the 
Situationists to reach the source: Marx. And, indeed, the early Marx that the Situationists leant 
upon in particular, contained material which critically led beyond the overly Hegelianised Marx 
that Lukács presented in History and Class Consciousness (something that Lukács came to 
understand himself some years after the publication of that work — cf. Bunyard’s work in 
particular for more on this). Thus, Marx plays a much more significant role in my thesis than 
Lukács.  
In the case of Lefebvre, I have avoided what is again a rich and rewarding topic for two main 
reasons. First, Lefebvre’s relationship has been thoroughly addressed by other writers, and even 
Lefebvre himself.14 However, many of the current works on Lefebvre which deal with his 
                                                     
14 Of the two most recent critical biographies on Lefebvre, Stuart Elden’s Stuart Elden, Understanding 
Henri Lefebvre: Theory and the Possible (2004) and Andy Merrifield’s Henri Lefebvre: A Critical 
Introduction (2006), Merrifield’s contains the better, and more just account of Debord and Lefebvre’s 
encounter. Elden’s account is exceedingly brief, which, considering the importance of Debord and the 
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relationship to the SI are deficient, particularly with regard to their conceptions of the influence 
Lefebvre exerted upon the SI, as opposed to the little understood and even less investigated 
Situationist influence upon Lefebvre. Second, in general, I have tried to focus on the SI itself, 
and the arguments had by Situationists. Though at times relatively close to the SI, and certainly 
influential upon the group, Lefebvre was never a member. One need only consider the last 
section of the final chapter of his work, Introduction to Modernity (1961) to gauge the 
extremely important influence that Debord and the SI exerted upon Lefebvre, not to mention 
Lefebvre’s wholesale adoption of the SI’s critique of urbanism as his central theoretical project 
throughout the rest of the 1960s and into the 1970s.15 Lefebvre fitfully acknowledged this 
influence, though at the time and in the immediate aftermath of the end of his relationship with 
the SI he emphasised the debt they owed to him.16 However, and despite Lefebvre’s unfortunate 
plagiarism of Debord, Kotányi and Vaneigem’s theses on the Paris Commune in what was the 
detestable (to the Situationists) journal Arguments in late 1962, he was not a significant “player” 
in the pivot under discussion in my thesis. Thus, for the sake of brevity and clarity of argument, 
I have decided to mostly leave Lefebvre aside.  
This brings me to the relations between the SI and Socialisme ou Barbarie (which I deal with in 
chapter seven of my thesis). With notable exceptions — in English, the work of Not Bored! and 
Stephen Hastings-King — this relationship has received little attention. However, even in 
French the accounts are few, and in the cases in which the relationship is dealt with in some 
detail, such as in Phillipe Gottraux (1997) and Bernard Quiriny (2003), the authors suffer from a 
                                                                                                                                                           
Situationists at this point in Lefebvre’s life, does little to help one understand why Lefebvre made such a 
concerted turn to the question of the critique of urbanism.  
15 Other mutual influences abound. For instance, in the second volume of the Critique of Everyday Life 
(1961), Lefebvre speaks of the ‘poetics’ of everyday life in a remarkably Situationist register. Cf. Henri 
Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, Volume II: Foundations for a Sociology of the Everyday, trans. John 
Moore, London: Verso, [1961] 2002, p. 106. 
16 This is particularly the case in a work of Lefebvre’s from 1967, Position : contre les technocrates. 
Here, his acknowledgement is clear though filtered through an emphasis on the importance of his work 
for the SI. In any case, the comment is backhanded, as he described the group as possessing a ‘neurotic 
intelligence’ (p. 195). Additionally, he accused the group’s notion of a revolutionary revolt against 
modern urbanism as an impossible, ‘abstract utopia’: ‘Do they truly expect that on one beautiful morning 
or night, the people will see and say “Enough! Enough of toil and boredom! Let’s end it!” and then they 
will enter into the immortal festival, into the creation of situations?’ (ibid.). Needless to say, when the 
May 1968 events erupted less than a year after the publication of Lefebvre’s comments, the SI could not 
help but point out their maladroit quality (cf. Internationale Situationniste, 'Le commencement d'une 
époque,' Internationale Situationniste, no. 12 (Septembre 1969), p. 6. 
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relatively poor understanding of the SI’s contribution to Socialisme ou Barbarie, and, in the 
case of Quiriny’s account, what appears to be little more than outright mendacity.17 However, 
because I have limited my account to the pivotal period of the SI, a period that I do not pursue 
beyond early 1963, but mostly not beyond 1962, I have unfortunately left out of account what 
can be considered the pivotal period of Socialisme ou Barbarie, i.e. the period in which the 
group split in two. Certainly, this period overlaps somewhat the pivot of the SI, if we consider 
that the split in Socialisme ou Barbarie took place over the last half of 1962 and the first half of 
1963. However, its most interesting “issue”, in terms of theory, would be Castoriadis’ long 
article ‘Marxisme et théorie révolutionnaire’, published in five parts over 1964 and 1965. 
Indeed, I believe that this article reveals interesting aspects of the possible influence of the SI 
upon Castoriadis’ work — previously unacknowledged — particularly with regard to 
Castoriadis’ discovery of Marx’s original sense of ideology criticism (a sense, moreover, 
Castoriadis appears to be largely oblivious to before 1963). Unfortunately, a more generous 
engagement with this is beyond the limits of my current work. I hope to return to this question 
in more detail in a future article. 
Finally, a word on my influences. Apart from the Situationist themselves, and, in particular, the 
work of Guy Debord and Raoul Vaneigem, Karl Marx is almost certainly the central figure in 
this thesis. However, my Marx — and there are so many Marx — is based on a long if often 
sidelined interpretation (that goes back to Marx himself, of course!).  
An outline of the argument 
1. The Situationist hypothesis and the supersession of art 
The central idea of my thesis is that the Situationist International, must be understood as an 
attempt at acting in the mode of supersession (dépassement) — i.e. the supersession of art, 
research and political contestation, as they exist in capitalist society. Without doubt, it is 
possible to understand the Situationist International as more or less ‘artistic’ or ‘political’. 
However, one should still proceed cautiously in the process of exhuming their still radioactive 
                                                     
17 Cf. ‘Whose Spectacle?’ in the appendices to this thesis, for more detail on Bernard Quiriny and 
Cornelius Castoriadis’ claims regarding the provenance of the concept of spectacle. 
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fallout — despite the now general prevalence of practices inspired by the Situationists, for 
instance so-called ‘culture jamming’.  The Situationists not only advised their contemporaries 
on the immediate possibilities for revolution, but also the virtues of waiting. To rush in and 
claim the Situationist International for either the artistic or the political, as is too often the case, 
is to misapprehend or ignore the significance of acting artistically, politically or philosophically 
in the mode of supersession. For the SI, ‘supersession’ was considered in terms of the 
supersession of politics as much as art. Indeed, the chief lesson of Debord’s brief dalliance with 
the ultra-left political group, Socialisme ou Barbarie, over 1960 and 1961, was that despite the 
advanced theoretical critique this group made of modern capitalism, its internal organisational 
regime mirrored the very capitalist hierarchy it sought to criticise.  
The Situationist ‘realisation of art’ was not the realisation of art objects, but rather the 
realisation of the art of living, of the ‘self-management of everyday life’ as Vaneigem has put it 
(pointedly mashing up Socialisme ou Barbarie and Henri Lefebvre, in a Situationist 
détournement and critique).18 Such ‘realisation’ was not a move against representational forms, 
or even art objects, as it is often misunderstood (for instance, by Jean Baudrillard, Jacques 
Rancière and Jean-Luc Nancy). Rather it was a question of the subordination of art-objects, or 
any element of the ‘dead past’ to the art of living the present, i.e. the re-use, or détournement of 
the past objectifications of human activity. Debord first outlined the Situationist idea of the 
‘realisation of art’ in his hypothesis of the construction of situations (what I will also call the 
Situationist hypothesis).19 Debord’s Situationist hypothesis was offered as the solution to what 
he identified as the impasse that had resulted from the active and passive ‘decomposition’ of art 
and culture.  
For the purposes of the introduction, I will only discuss the ‘active’ phase of decomposition (c. 
1870-1930), and the ‘repetitive’ phase that has emerged in its wake (c. 1930/1937 to the 
                                                     
18 Raoul Vaneigem, 'Raoul Vaneigem: Self-Portraits and Caricatures of the Situationist International 
[2014],' (Translated & détourned by Not Bored from the French Rien n’est fini, tout commence [2014]: 
2015). http://www.notbored.org/caricatures.pdf. 
19 Cf. G.-E. Debord, 'Rapport sur la construction des situations et sur les conditions de l'organisation et de 
l'action de la tendance situationniste internationale [1957],' in Guy Debord Œuvres, Paris: Éditions 
Gallimard, 2006. 
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present).20 By ‘decomposition’, Debord meant that writers and artists had problematised the role 
of art, the art-object and even the artistic process itself, through the ‘decomposition’ of the art-
object, in particular calling into question the mimetic or representational function of art and 
literature. Such decomposition was ‘active’ insofar as it was consciously posed in opposition to 
past conceptions of the role of art, and anticipated a new state of affairs, up to and including the 
dissolution of art itself.21 Debord identified the phase of repetition as the direct consequence of 
the failed revolutionary wave of 1917-1937. Cultural repetition — the multiplying variations of 
“new” and “neo” versions of abstraction, Dada, surrealism, and realism — was a part of the 
price of this failure; of the artistic and political avant-gardes becoming unstuck in the wake of 
the final defeat of the Spanish Revolution in 1937, buried by the Stalinists “allies” as much as 
its Fascist enemies.22 
The period 1917-1937 corresponded almost exactly to the high point of the politico-artistic 
avant-gardes of Dada and Surrealism. Debord’s wager from the outset, was that Dada and 
Surrealism — insofar as they signified the apotheosis of the active phase of decomposition — 
must necessarily be understood with reference to the contemporaneous revolutionary 
contestation. Dada and Surrealism signified not only the confluence of the longer lived active 
phase of decomposition with the revolutionary insurgency of 1917-1937; they also signalled the 
end of a solution to ‘decomposition’ in purely artistic terms. By Debord’s reckoning, the 
inability of the Dadaists and Surrealists to successfully complete their desired escape from the 
                                                     
20 Debord first noted 1930 as the beginning of the phase of repetition, dating it from around the time the 
Surrealists briefly adhered to the Stalinist French Communist Party (i.e. from around 1929). Later he 
would date it from around the time of the end of the 1930s, associated with the defeat of the Spanish 
Revolution by the Stalinist accession to the effective leadership of the Republican forces (c. May 1937). 
By the 1980s, Debord seemed to have pushed the date forward to the early 1950s, congruent with the 
International Letterists experiments that he was involved in. Under this revised schema — from around 
1954 — Debord’s ‘repetitive phase’ is almost exactly coincident with what many now call the 
‘postmodern’ phase of culture, post-avant-garde culture from the 1950s and on. Thus, it is hard not to 
detect a distorted echo of Debord’s theory of decomposition in Jean-François Lyotard’s report on the 
postmodern condition.  
21 ‘Decomposition’ also came to refer, in The Society of the Spectacle (1967), to a longer period 
commensurate with the progressive development of the modern sense of art as the product of 
“independent” artists, i.e. from the period of art’s emergence from its religious apprenticeship in early 
modernity. In this sense, we can, perhaps, pose the ‘passive’ decomposition of artistic production, from 
its emergence from its entailment in religious practices, up until the 19th century. Such a phase would be 
‘passive’, only in the sense that ‘decomposition’ was not posed consciously, or ‘actively’, but would 
nonetheless be implicit insofar as art’s “independence” vis-à-vis the rest of everyday life, remained 
ambiguous. 
22 As opposed to the Civil War that raged on until the defeat of the Republican government in 1939.  
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confines of an artistic horizon, was intimately related to the failure of the contemporaneous 
revolutionary contestation. In the absence of a revolutionary movement, the experimental works 
of these avant-gardists were ultimately compatible with the commodity-fetish of an advanced 
capitalism that could ‘recuperate’ (or recover) such works for a rapidly expanding market in 
commodity ‘spectacles’, while effectively ignoring or obscuring the more radical practice of 
living from which such works often emerged (for instance the anti-work ‘bohemianism’ 
favoured by much of the artistic avant-garde).  
The Situationist hypothesis was proposed as the solution to the impasse reached by these avant-
gardes. Rather than trying to either repeat or continue the merely formal experiments of these 
avant-gardists, Debord argued that everyday life itself must become the field of 
experimentation. In this sense, the object of transformation must be the art of living itself. 
Following on from the results of the urban drifts (dérives) carried out by the Letterist 
International, Debord came to believe that the creation and transformation of the ‘geography’ of 
the space-time of everyday life was the only way to move on from the artistic impasse of the 
avant-gardes.23 Such a project, perforce, required the revolutionary transformation of the 
enclosing capitalist society. And, in keeping with the critique of art, and the need for its 
supersession, Debord came to pose the art-object in problematic terms. No doubt the 
Situationists would and did make use of such objects; but the priority was given to experimental 
living. To fall back into prioritising the “works” of the group — apart, that is, from their 
theoretical ‘proselytising’ — was to risk the shoals of the burgeoning cultural ‘spectacle’, that 
appeared to be an increasingly important aspect of the capitalist recovery after the Second 
World War. 
The idea of supersession contained in the Situationist hypothesis, was not initially phrased in 
Marxian terms. Debord described the SI as being ‘with and against’ art in 1957.24 He would 
later conceive of this, in a more Marxian register, as the ineluctable outcome of the Dadaist 
                                                     
23 Cf. Debord, 'Introduction à une critique de la géographie urbaine [1955].' 
24 G.-E. Debord, 'Encore un effort si vous voulez être situationnistes : L’I.S. dans et contre la 
décomposition [1957],' in Guy Debord : Œuvres, Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2006. No doubt the 
formulation of ‘with and against’ is also Marxian in influence. Nonetheless, the ‘dialectical’ register was 
less nuanced in the early work. 
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desire to destroy art, and the Surrealist desire to realise art in everyday life: ‘The critical 
position later elaborated by the Situationists has shown that the abolition [suppression] and the 
realisation of art are inseparable aspects of a single supersession of art [dépassement de l’art].’25 
However, already in 1957, as we can see in the idea of the ‘decomposition’ of culture, Debord 
conceived of going beyond the impasse of active and repetitive decomposition. Indeed, the 
experimental practice of ‘unitary urbanism’, which would figure prominently in the group 
between its foundation and 1960, was precisely an attempt to pose such a beyond, on the basis 
of the appropriation of the theory and practices of the capitalist present. Later, in the wake of the 
experience of repetitive decomposition within the SI itself, Debord, Vaneigem and other 
Situationists would emphasise the moment of being ‘against’ art, but only insofar as it entailed 
the project of its ‘realisation’ (for instance, as outlined in the Situationist hypothesis). Indeed, 
the emphasis on the negative moment was conceived as necessary on the face of the artistic 
positivity of many artist-Situationists. However, this was a relative gesture, rather than an 
absolute negativity (as it is often misapprehended). As Vaneigem has noted recently, against the 
political alienation the Situationists found in Socialisme ou Barbarie, the SI emphasised the 
artistic dimensions of the project of supersession, of what could be fruitfully taken up amidst 
such political alienation. For the SI, supersession always entailed abolition and realisation; to 
valorise one over the other was to risk the dangers of nihilism and capitalism recuperation.  
2. Political and philosophical supersession 
The supersession the group came to speak of should be understood in what is known as the 
‘Hegelian-Marxist’ fashion. However, I prefer to call this ‘Marxian’, in the sense that the 
supersession Marx posed was not a transcendental law of historical progression, as it is in 
Hegel, but was rather clearly aimed at describing the revolutionary practices which had emerged 
along with, and were implicated in, capitalism and the revolutionary classes associated with it 
(‘petty bourgeois’ burghers, artisans, peasants, and the fitful emergence of an urban 
proletariat).26 As Debord would note, in The Society of the Spectacle (1967), ‘[t]he only two 
                                                     
25 Guy Debord, La Société du Spectacle, Third ed., Paris: Éditions Gallimard, [1967] 1992, thesis 191. 
26 For instance, Marx in his early writing described historical development in terms of the successive 
‘alienations’ of private property. By the time of Capital, Marx still spoke of such alienation, but more 
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classes which effectively correspond to Marx’s theory, […] the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, 
are also the only two revolutionary classes in history’.27 In this sense, the problematic of 
dialectical supersession is strictly delimited to capitalist modernity. The development of 
capitalism, then, was seen in terms of the way the human subject is produced, Marx’s social 
individual, the very embodiment of the antagonistic binary of the individual and the social, 
under the conditions of alienation as capital, the commodity labour-power and the capitalist 
state. This development is a ‘dialectic’, in the Hegelian sense, insofar as the perspectives of 
capital and labour, which become predominant in the industrial societies of the 20th century, 
struggle for recognition. However, unlike orthodox Marxists, the SI — following the insights of 
some ‘Left Communists’ from the 19th and 20th centuries — called into question the positive 
valorisation of ‘labour’ as commensurate with the revolutionary working class. Following the 
early Marx, Debord came to conceive of the ‘revolutionary proletariat’ as the self-organised 
negation of human capacity to mere labour-power for capital. The moment of ‘realisation’ in 
this sense, is a revolutionary proletariat as the possibility of ‘free activity’ beyond the impasse 
of labour-power and capital, i.e. a revolutionary proletariat as the process of superseding capital 
and labour. A revolutionary proletariat is both a break from the reduction of human to mere 
labour-power for sale, and the immanent critique of this reduction (of people reduced to labour-
power becoming a revolutionary proletariat). Thus, the possibility of a revolutionary proletariat 
is implied in the alienated life of humans under conditions of capital, labour, and generalised 
commodity production — albeit negatively — as the solution to these alienated forms of 
everyday life. In this sense, the revolutionary proletariat comes to be, it does not pre-exist as the 
‘essence’ of labour so much as it is a possible constitution of labour, albeit in a ‘conscious’ 
fashion as self-negation, as the abolition of labour. Such a negative constitution of labour is at 
odds with positive conceptions, whether of the social democratic ‘labourite’ varieties, or 
revolutionary positivists like Lenin. However, what is remarkably singular about the SI was the 
way they rediscovered this negativity through the emergence of a radical artistic avant-garde 
                                                                                                                                                           
circumspectly. Thus, it appears as the ‘commodity-fetish’, and the associated idea of the alienation of a 
worker’s ‘peculiar commodity, labour-power’. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 
1, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, [1867] 1976, p. 274. 
27 Debord, La Société du Spectacle, thesis 88. 
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and the ‘dissolution’ and ‘decomposition’ of the art-object and practice in the later 19th and 20th 
centuries.  
For Debord, the ‘phase of cultural repetition’, signalled by the defeat of the Spanish Revolution, 
was itself a symptom of the effective suspension, rather than end, of the dual revolutionary 
project — i.e. of the workers’ movement and the artistic avant-gardes. As the Situationists later 
put it, the failure of the project of the most advanced moments of artistic supersession, of the 
Dadaist destruction and the Surrealist realisation of art in everyday life, was rendered inevitable 
with the defeat of the mass, revolutionary means of securing such a realisation.28 In some ways, 
this situation mirrored what Marx criticised among his Young Hegelian confreres, though “in 
reverse”. Marx had posed the possibility of realising and abolishing the philosophical critique of 
emergent capitalism in Germany in the 1840s. Such a ‘supersession’ was posed in terms of 
realising the theoretical critique of philosophy in the similarly emergent practical critique and 
contestation of proletarians. Marx saw such ‘realisation’ as a lever for abolishing the separated 
existence of philosophical critique, suspended as it were above the concerns of everyday life. In 
the case of the development of artistic negativity in the first half of the 20th century, the most 
advanced artists found themselves effectively isolated insofar as the revolutionary movement of 
1917-1937 was defeated and dispersed. Thus, the position these artists found themselves 
mirrored, to an extent, that of the radical philosophers of the 1840s, however, in the former case, 
in the wake of the defeat of the 1930s; whereas in the latter case, on the verge of the constitution 
of the revolutionary movement of 1848. Thus, “in reverse”, as it were. 
If we recall the idea of active decomposition, Debord believed that the negativity Marx 
identified in the constitution of a revolutionary proletariat — a negativity largely lost in 
orthodox Marxism’s positive conception of working class politics — had been posed more 
forcefully in the 20th century among the artistic avant-gardes. For Debord, this re-emergence of 
negativity, albeit in (anti) artistic terms, was a consequence of not simply the developments in 
artistic decomposition, but also the latter as an expression of the immanent negativity in the 
                                                     
28 Cf. Mustapha Khayati, 'Les mots captifs (Préface à un dictionnaire situationniste),' Internationale 
Situationniste, no. 10 (March 1966). 
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movement of capitalist history. In this sense, the negativity of the artistic avant-gardes was a 
more fitting complement to, and expression of the revolutionary insurgencies of 1917-1937, 
than their Stalinist and social-democratic “leadership”, which not only participated in the 
material destruction of the most advanced moments of this insurgency (for instance in Germany 
in 1919, China in 1926 and Spain in 1937), but in so doing also contributed to the rise of 
fascism in the 1920s and 1930s. Indeed, this is the key lesson of what the SI meant by their 
continued adherence to the project of the ‘realisation of art’ — even after the break with most of 
the artist members of the group in 1962. That is, it was in the artistic avant-gardes of the first 
half of the 20th century that the importance of negativity was rediscovered as the thought and 
practice of a revolutionary movement.  
Debord would come to see the significance of these events as something other than “betrayals”, 
in the sense that Trotskyists and some other Marxists have represented them.29 Rather, Debord 
argued that the Stalinist and social democratic destruction of the revolutionary insurgencies of 
the German, Russian, Chinese and Spanish proletarians signified that counter-revolutionary 
forces now appeared under the banner of anti-capitalist revolution itself, in which ‘the 
spectacular organization of the defence of the existing order’ came to prominence, and in which, 
consequently, ‘no “central question” can any longer be posed “openly and honestly”.’30 The 
significance of this insight proved decisive for the SI; the rise of the dissimulation of the rule of 
capital — in this case, “communism” apparently in the service of the hierarchy of capitalist 
production and consumption — marks out the ‘commodity-spectacle’ from the rule which 
preceded it. However, Debord’s assessment of this ‘spectacular organisation of the defence of 
the existing order’, was first made with regard to the idea of the ‘repetitive phase’ of cultural 
production, in which the ‘spectacular’ function of such cultural spectacles, was related not only 
to their repetitive form and content, but crucially to their presentation as commodities for 
consumption. Thus, the results of previous avant-garde experimentation, for instance 
                                                     
29 Such a defence of Marxism is often made in the name of the “real tradition” of Marxism, as opposed to 
its Stalinist deformation. However, such “real traditionalists” rarely look into the questionable origins of 
“Marxism” itself, and so end up conflating the distinct, albeit related issues of Marx’s intellectual project 
extended over 40 years, and its relationship to Marxism. 
30 Cf. Debord, La Société du Spectacle, theses 101. 
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Surrealism’s quest to ‘impassion life’, were reduced to so many objects for consumption or 
largely passive contemplation. This hierarchy, what Debord initially described as that between 
‘actors’ or ‘heroes’ of cultural production, and ‘spectators’ who contemplated, was the principle 
object of negative criticism of the Situationist hypothesis.31 Later, under the impact of his 
encounter with Socialisme ou Barbarie, Debord would extend his critique of the cultural 
spectacle to the political spectacle of ‘militancy’, and the hierarchy of leading ‘militants’ and 
rank and file militants within Socialisme ou Barbarie. Indeed, it was the latter that would prove 
crucial to the development of Debord’s mature critique of the spectacle, as contained in his 1967 
work, The Society of the Spectacle.  
Around the time of Debord’s encounter with Socialisme ou Barbarie, 1960-1961, the question 
became for the SI not so much one of who possessed the “correct” theory, but rather the 
appropriation and correction of already existing theories in the light of the development of 
spectacular relations across the first half of the 20th century. In this sense, the ‘theory’ of the 
spectacle is also the story of Debord, Vaneigem and others’ reappropriation and correction — 
and thus ‘détournement’ — of Marx’s conception of ‘ideology’ and the ‘commodity-fetish’.  
What was significant about the appellation ‘spectacle’ and ‘spectacular’, was the idea of 
representations becoming opposed to, or ideally hierarchised as superior to the object so 
represented, rather than the vulgar misunderstanding that associated ‘spectacle’ with 
representation as necessarily false. 
3. The pivot of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ 
My account of this period of transition in the SI focuses upon the ‘Hamburg Theses’. As far as I 
can ascertain, apart from the original Situationists who composed this enigmatic work, I am the 
first commentator to go into detail regarding its form, content and import for the group. No 
doubt others, if not oblivious to the real existence of these ‘Theses’, have been put off by the 
absence of a document to investigate. Such purely formal considerations have merely spurred 
                                                     
31 Cf. Debord, 'Rapport sur la construction des situations et sur les conditions de l'organisation et de 
l'action de la tendance situationniste internationale [1957].'; P. Canjuers and G.-E. Debord, 'Preliminaires 
pour une definition de l'unite du programme revolutionnaire [20 juillet 1960],' in Guy Debord Œuvres, 
Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2006. 
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me on, such that I have felt at times much like the Bellman in The Hunting of the Snark, who, 
upon presenting the ‘large map […] without the least vestige of land’ to the crew, declares that 
the captain’s map is certainly the best because it is a ‘perfect and absolute blank!’32 The 
‘Hamburg Theses’ in their absence are the perfect and absolute Situationist “document”, 
impossible to find and thus beyond the travails of recuperation. Indeed, even my efforts at 
outlining their import still leaves them beyond such a fate, beyond the reach of all the collectors 
and intellectual undertakers, unwitting or not, whose hobbies and obsessions are just so many 
symptoms of an era in which ‘the products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures 
endowed with a life of their own’.33 
It is the sense of transition that has been most badly served by many past commentators. By 
addressing this period by way of the ‘Hamburg Theses’, and so addressing the transition itself in 
Situationist terms, I believe we can gain an important insight into this transition itself. This 
approach offers a singular insight into this pivotal, albeit confusing and often misunderstood 
period of the SI. Nonetheless, I have found the process of entering into the work and “works” of 
the SI, long after the fact, in order to, in some case, reconstruct the Situationist sense of process 
and collaboration against the ever-present prospect of recuperation, an extremely difficult 
endeavour. In this sense, the greatest problem I have faced, apart from the obvious and 
unavoidable temporal displacement, has been in my attempt to remain faithful to the 
revolutionary thread of the Situationist criticism of their contemporaries, whether friend or foe, 
while being painfully aware that I ran the risk of simply adding to the misapprehension of their 
project. 
4. Conclusion of the Outline of an argument 
By examining this period of the SI, we are better able to understand the development of 
Debord’s concept of the spectacle. It is important to recall, at this point, that Debord’s critique 
of spectacular representation was not a general critique of representation as the falsification of 
                                                     
32 Lewis Carroll, The Annotated Snark, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, (1876) 1977, pp. 55, 56 (Fit the 
Second). 
33 Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1, p. 165. 
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reality (as Jacques Rancière and Jean-Luc Nancy have asserted against Debord).34 Rather, the 
spectacle signifies the falsification of representations, the ‘becoming ideological’ of material 
representation. In this sense, the critique of the spectacle was the détournement of Marx’s 
notion of ideology, insofar as Marx originally deployed it to describe the false autonomy of 
cognition and ideas from the social-material relations in which they are embedded and are 
expressions of. By Debord’s reckoning, insofar as modern capitalist society valorised the 
representation of reality over reality itself (which, perforce, ‘contains’ such representations), 
representations had been rendered spectacular. 
With the association of the ‘spectacle’ with Marx’s original conception of ideology, ideology 
critique and the associated conception of the ‘commodity-fetish’, I reach the end of my 
argument regarding the SI. In the year after the Debord’s encounter with Socialisme ou 
Barbarie — 1962 — most of the remaining artists had resigned or been expelled from the 
group. In a way, the ‘Hamburg Theses’ had fulfilled their dual purpose, i.e. as the formal 
summation of the Situationists struggle with the impasse of cultural decomposition, while 
outlining the broader project of contesting alienating practices, whether artistic, political, 
philosophical, etc. However, the significance of the development of the concept of the spectacle 
through the encounter with Socialisme ou Barbarie was, perhaps, the most important result for 
the immediate future. The détournement of Marx’s critique enabled Debord, Vaneigem and 
others to supersede the critique of the spectacle of culture and move toward a conception of 
modern capitalism as instantiating a commodity-spectacle, in which commodities as the reified 
results and representation of human activity operate like synecdoches, i.e. via the presentation of 
the ‘wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails […] as an “immense 
collection of commodities”’, capital tends to reduce life as such to the production and 
consumption of commodities.35 The idea that the spectacle falsifies life, not by virtue of 
mimesis, but rather via rendering the commodification of life apparently autonomous of, and in 
opposition to the life so commodified — ‘the autonomous movement of the non-living’ — is 
                                                     
34 Cf. Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. O'Byrne, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, [1996] 2000; Jacques Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, trans. 
Gregory Elliott, London: Verso, [2008] 2009. Cf. chapters six and seven, above. 
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crucial to differentiating Debord’s concept of spectacle from such notions as Cornelius 
Castoriadis’ ‘simulacrum’ and Jean Baudrillard’s ‘hyperreality’.36 The significance of the 
spectacle, insofar as it marks the apparent ‘distancing of all that was directly lived into 
representation’, is not an indictment of representation (or the possibility of representation), so 
much as it is the calling into question of the nature of this retreat and the seemingly autonomous 
“realm” of the commodity-spectacle.37 What is egregious regarding the spectacle, in Debord’s 
estimation, had nothing to do with any purported defects in mimesis as such, but rather the uses 
to which representations are put in the service of capital’s use, and its falsification of everyday 
life. Thus, we can see the kernel of the early critique of artistic and cultural decomposition 
which remains in the later critique of the spectacle.  
A question of methodology and focus 
It is impossible to talk of the SI without direct and constant reference to Guy Debord. Without 
doubt Debord was the central figure of the SI, and perhaps worked hardest to cohere the group 
around a set of ideas and practices from the outset. However, in the secondary literature on the 
SI, Debord is often represented in a polarised fashion: either, as the most important Situationist 
at the centre of a collaborative project, or as the petty dictator of a largely small and 
insignificant group — and often both! Certainly, my sympathies lie with the former 
representation of Debord. However, if we emphasise the singularity of Debord we risk 
obscuring the collaborative relations and friendships which determined and enabled his work — 
a “work” which was in many respects the result and embodiment of such collaboration. I believe 
it is best to situate Debord’s role as the producer of much of the literary and theoretical 
expression of Situationist practice, within the context of the Situationist project as one that was 
irreducibly collaborative in its outlook and direction.  
It was the practice of the SI to publish articles which resulted from collaborative discussions 
under the name of the group itself. When an article did not represent the results of collaborative 
discussion, for instance an article that was an individual contribution to an ongoing debate or 
                                                     
36 Debord, La Société du Spectacle, thesis 2. 
37 Ibid., thesis 1. 
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discussion, then such articles would usually have the authors name appended. However, and 
keeping the latter exception in mind, in most cases, we can consider the editorial committee for 
a particular issue of the Internationale Situationniste as possessing authorial responsibility for 
the articles contained within. Nonetheless, Debord’s role as the ‘editor in chief’ of all 12 issues 
of the journal, placed him in a central position of responsibility, a task he was charged with 
from the founding of the SI.38 Debord placed a great deal of importance in synthesising the 
collaborative discussions of the group. For instance, some of those who have collaborated with 
him have noted that he would often synthesise collaborative discussion afterward into a written 
form.39 And his correspondence has revealed that he worked hard to find ways to integrate the 
often disparate members of the group (this is particularly notably with regard to the artists that 
constituted the majority of the German section of the SI up until 1962). I believe that the best 
way to conceive of Debord’s role in the SI is to consider him a central ‘node’ of the 
collaborative work of the group, in which he was simultaneously responsible for the ‘the 
ideological coherence’ of the journal, while committed to fostering and participating in the 
collaborative elaboration of the Situationist project. 40  
Those accounts of Debord and the SI that place an undue emphasis on Debord’s singularity and 
centrality, without attending to the idea of Debord as a participant in a collaborative project, 
tend to replicate the very perspective of individualism and proprietary concerns that the SI 
aimed to call into question and overthrow. Such accounts can be more or less hagiographic — 
for instance, respectively, Vincent Kauffmann’s and Andrew Hussey’s biographies of Debord.41 
But they are of a kind insofar they tend to undermine the Situationist critique of the substantial 
bourgeois individual in favour of focusing on the genius of Debord (evil or otherwise). 
                                                     
38 Cf. Guy Debord, 'Letter to Piet de Groof (aka Walter Korun), 16 June 1958,' in Correspondence: The 
foundation of the Situationist International (June 1957-August 1960), Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2009, 
p. 125. 
39 Notably, Gil J Wolman and Raoul Vaneigem. 
40 Debord, 'Letter to Piet de Groof (aka Walter Korun), 16 June 1958,' p. 125. Vaneigem has recently 
noted that Debord would often ‘take notes that he later synthesized’ from his discussions with Vaneigem 
and others. Cf. Vaneigem, 'Raoul Vaneigem: Self-Portraits and Caricatures of the Situationist 
International [2014]'. 
41 Andrew Hussey, The Game of War: The Life and Death of Guy Debord, London: Jonathan Cape, 2001; 
Vincent Kaufmann, Guy Debord: Revolution in the Service of Poetry, trans. Robert Bononno, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, [2001] 2006. 
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McKenzie Wark has attempted to address such an undue emphasis on the singularity of Debord 
by attending to members of the SI who have been obscured in Debord’s shadow.42 However, in 
doing so, Wark effectively presents an incoherent picture of the SI, emphasising the differing 
visions and competing singularities at the expense of what was conceived, even by the most 
reluctant Situationist, as a collective endeavour. For instance, the central role of Debord’s 
Situationist hypothesis of the construction of situations tends to recede into the background of 
Wark’s account, despite being the touchstone of the collaborative debates and individual 
contributions to the group in the period with which Wark deals. Indeed, the Situationists 
anticipated Wark’s strategy, at a time when the group was less well known than today. In 1964, 
while drawing attention to one of the peculiar aspects of the silent treatment given to the group 
among the ‘leftist’ French intelligentsia, the SI commented, ‘one speaks most willing about 
situationists as individuals in an attempt to separate them from the [group’s] collective 
contestation, without which — among other things — they would not even be “interesting” 
individuals’.43 By sidelining Debord, rather than addressing the significance of Debord as both 
collaborator, and advocate and enabler of collaboration, Wark perversely affirms the brute 
facticity of the malodorous ‘cult of Debord’, as if it were a natural phenomenon, unavoidable 
and only deserving of adulation or despair. By such a reckoning, one can be more or less “for” 
Debord, while failing to understand that Debord the “exceptional individual”, interchangeably 
mummified, hailed and vilified alongside other “greats”, is more a product of the failure of the 
Situationist project than its ambiguous success.  
In order to address the consequences of this largely unacknowledged cult, I will speak of the 
‘SI’ or ‘Situationists’ as the agents or authors of the group’s “works”, unless I need to draw 
attention to the perspective of a particular Situationist. By doing so, I will draw attention to the 
collaborative nature of the SI, something that the Situationists themselves were singularly 
attached to via its effacement of individual authorship for much of its output. Sometimes I will 
refer to ‘Debord’s circle’; however, in doing so I do not intend to imply that Debord was the 
                                                     
42 Wark, 50 Years of Recuperation of the Situationist International; The Beach Beneath the Streets: The 
Everyday Life and Glorious Times of the Situationist International; The Spectacle of Disintegration. 
43 Internationale Situationniste, 'Le questionnaire,' Internationale Situationniste, no. 9 (Août 1964), p. 26. 
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sole, significant member, but rather use it as a shorthand for the faction Debord helped 
constitute within the group, particularly before the final break with most of the artist members 
in 1962. And, of course, I will often refer to Debord simply because much of the written 
material left to us was either written by him, whether solely or as the synthesiser of discussions. 
As we will see, Debord was, nonetheless, the crucial elaborator of the Situationist hypothesis 
and the concept of spectacle.  
Because the focus of my thesis is on what I consider the pivotal period for the SI, particularly 
that between 1960-1962 — though such a pivot necessarily takes in the entire period 1957-1962 
— I will focus almost exclusively upon the primary, Situationist sources. No doubt I am 
engaged in a debate with those who have emphasised, usually with little or no justification, the 
so-called political turn of the SI at the expense of its purportedly artistic origins (e.g. perhaps 
most notoriously by Peter Wollen in his 1989 article).44 However, common to all of these 
accounts, at least those written originally in English, is a poor command of the original 
documents — even of those that were accessible at the time (for instance, the Internationale 
Situationniste journal). Except where it is warranted, I have generally avoided setting out to 
debate with those who, by reason of poor scholarship or bias, have rendered only the most 
impressionistic accounts of the SI during this period. It is for this reason I believe that we must 
attend to the SI, and let the Situationists speak for themselves. Such a focus, today, has been 
greatly aided by the wider availability not only of the original journals, but additionally by the 
more recent availability of Debord’s correspondence, and his collected works in 2006. Again, 
this raises the question of the focus on Debord. However, so far, the correspondence of other 
members, most notably Raoul Vaneigem, remains inaccessible. Thus, there are real limitations 
that remain in place for understanding the work of the SI. Nonetheless, and with due attention to 
the idea of Debord as the chief ‘node’ of collaboration, the greater access to his work helps us to 
better understand precisely this role and its import for the group.  
                                                     
44 Peter Wollen, 'The Situationist International,' New Left Review, no. 174 (March/April 1989). 
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A summary of the chapters 
Chapter one examines the enigmatic “document” of the SI, the ‘Hamburg Theses’. As already 
intimated, the most peculiar aspect of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ is that they were never written 
down. I will demonstrate that both the form and content of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ allows one to 
better understand the SI as contesting both artistic and political alienation, rather than the more 
vulgar understanding of the SI as successively an artistic then political group.  In the first half of 
the chapter I will examine the context of the “composition” of the ‘Hamburg Theses’. As a 
direct result of the argument over the role of artistic practice in the group at the 5th conference 
in Göteborg, in August 1961, the ‘Hamburg Theses’ were simultaneously an attempt to resolve 
this issue, and the capstone to the extended debate over art conducted within and around the 
group since its founding four years before. From a consideration of the historical context of the 
‘Hamburg Theses’, I move in the second half of the chapter to an examination of their form and 
content. The form of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ is perhaps the easier of the two to deal with, in the 
sense that the absent ‘Theses’ were meant to be an expression of the Situationist project of the 
‘realisation of art’ as the abolition of the fetish of the art-object. On the other hand, the content 
of the ‘Theses’ is perhaps even more elusive, requiring a certain amount of reconstruction, 
based on the scant references, and the undoubted influence they exerted on later written works 
of the Situationists. By examining the ‘Hamburg Theses’ in this way — an examination that has 
hitherto not been attempted by any critics of the SI — I lay the basis of a more thorough 
examination of the Situationist critique of art that was not dispensed with in 1962, but rather 
was sublated in the more general Situationists critique of politics and philosophy. 
Chapter two, three and four deal with aspects of the four years prior to the composition of the 
‘Hamburg Theses’. This will enable us to understand the ‘Theses’ as both an attempt to embody 
the core critical conceit of the Situationist hypothesis of the construction of situations, as 
outlined by Debord in 1957, and as the attempt to resolve the debates over art which had beset 
the group from 1957.  
In chapter two, I explore in more detail the early, ‘pre-Marxian’ Situationist critique of art. The 
chapter will begin with an account of the ‘impasse’ reached by the Dadaists and Surrealists 
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before moving on to a more detailed account of this ‘impasse’ in the context of Debord’s theory 
of ‘cultural decomposition’. The latter will be examined, not only in terms of what Debord 
called the ‘active’ and ‘repetitive’ phases of decomposition, but also his later sense of 
decomposition by which he accounted for the longer-term “independence” and emergence of 
artistic practices in early capitalist modernity from their domination by feudal-religious 
concerns. Debord identified this ‘active’ phase from around the time of the middle of the 19th 
century, though more obviously congruent with the work of Isidore Ducasse (aka the Comte de 
Lautréamont) and Arthur Rimbaud, before, during and immediately after the Paris Commune of 
1871.45 Debord contrasted this active phase of artistic decomposition, that lasted roughly from 
around 1870 through to 1930, with the ‘passive’ phase, ‘a phase of [artistic and cultural] 
repetition that has prevailed since that time’.46 I conclude the chapter with an examination of 
what has been considered, both within and without the SI, as the ‘signature style’ of the group, 
namely the practice of ‘détournement’.  
Chapter three examines the early attempts to cohere a distinctly Situationist practice. First, I 
outline the nature of the Situationist hypothesis, and its significance in the arguments regarding 
the nature of Situationist practice in the capitalist present, particular with regard to the 
experimental elaboration of ‘unitary urbanism’. I then turn to an examination of how the attempt 
to cohere the SI around the Situationist hypothesis and unitary urbanism unravelled over the 
course of the first three years of the group, particularly with regard to an ongoing debate 
between Debord and Constant Nieuwenhuys over the uses to which artistic practise could be put 
in such a project. The results of this debate, most obviously Constant’s resignation in 1960 and 
the effective cessation of unitary urbanist experimentation, would precipitate a protracted crisis 
in the group that was only resolved with the ‘Hamburg Theses’ in 1961 and the final break with 
the artists in 1962.   
                                                     
45 Nonetheless, we can chart a longer prehensile tale of artistic negativity scattered among the more 
extreme Romantics, like Hölderlin, William Blake, and Gerard de Nerval Cf. (Guy Debord), 'Le 
Surréalisme : une révolution de l’irrationnel,' in Cahiers de l’encyclopédie du monde actuel (Lausanne: 
Editions Rencontre, Septembre 1968); Jean-François Martos, Histoire de l'internationale situationniste, 
Paris: Éditions Ivrea, [1989] 1995; Timothy Clark et al., 'The Revolution of Modern Art and the Modern 
Art of Revolution,'  (1967). 
46 Internationale Situationniste, 'Définitions,' Internationale Situationniste, no. 1 (Juin 1958). 
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In chapter four, the sad end to which the debate over art led becomes the focus. In contrast to 
the debate between Debord and Constant, the debates between Debord’s circle and the artists in 
the German section of the SI, appear as the pathetic denouement to the former — the farcical 
continuation beyond the real tragedy of 1960. Indeed, it is the obviously inferior quality of these 
debates that necessitate discussion, because too often they are understood by virtue of their 
termination rather than their content. In 1962, in the wake of the 5th conference and the 
‘Hamburg Theses’, the majority of the Spur group were expelled from the SI. Soon after, they 
were followed by Jørgen Nash and Jacqueline de Jong. It has become a doxa, particularly 
among those critics who favour these artist members over Debord and his circle, to decry this 
expulsion as a political move of an almost Machiavellian character. However, if one pays 
attention to the inferior quality of the arguments that preceded the expulsions, at least on the 
part of the Spur artists, not to mention the almost complete disengagement of many of the Spur 
artists from the Situationist hypothesis of the SI, we can begin to understand the growing 
frustration of Debord and others. The so-called break with the artists in 1962 is too often 
represented as the victory of the political over the artistic. I will demonstrate that in fact the 
debate was about resolving an impasse that had been, in many respects, born alongside the 
group in 1957: the question of realising art through its supersession. 
In my last three chapters, what I consider the critical content of the pivot of the group from its 
first to its second period comes to the fore: the investigation of the different dimensions in 
which the ‘supersession of art’ came to be understood in the SI 
In chapter five I begin with the turn to a more identifiably Marxian problematic with regard to 
the Situationist notion of the ‘realisation of art’, by way of an examination of ‘poetry, in the 
Situationist sense of the term’. In chapters two and three, the Situationist critique of the impasse 
of Dada and Surrealism, as embodied in Debord’s conception of the movement from the active 
to the repetitive phase of cultural decomposition, was used as the basis for the formulation of 
the Situationist hypothesis. The hypothesis, via the attempts to ‘experimentally verify’ it in 
unitary urbanist practices, was conceived of in terms of the use of artistic and other practices 
beyond the merely artistic. In this sense, the Situationist hypothesis was envisaged as both the 
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hypothetical solution to the impasse of the ‘traditional arts’, and a projection of what would be 
possible via the ‘integration’ of disparate arts in the creation of everyday situations. In this 
sense, the ‘arts’ would no longer exist, but artistic practices would be taken over and elaborated 
on the grander canvas of the everyday. When Debord, Vaneigem and other Situationists 
intensified their engagement with Marx, as well as contemporaneous expressions of Marxist 
political practice, they ‘revalorised’ their ‘artist past’ (in Vaneigem’s words) because of what 
they identified as the insufficiencies of the Marxist critique of human activity as ‘labour’ and 
‘labour-power’. In opposition to the orthodox Marxist reduction of human activity as such to 
‘labour’, the SI, and Debord and Vaneigem in particular, attempted to reclaim Marx’s early 
conception of ‘human activity’ and ‘free activity’ under the idea of ‘poetry, in the Situationist 
sense of the term’. Indeed, the idea of a ‘new type of free activity’ superseding labour, not only 
resonated with the earlier Situationist hypothesis, but further enabled the critique of political 
alienation which Debord found under the sign of ‘political militancy’, during his time in the 
influential group, Socialisme ou Barbarie (a question more fully taken up in chapter seven). 
Thus, in chapter five, I set out the SI’s conception of ‘poetry’: what in effect became a 
shorthand for the ‘new type of activity’ they proposed against capitalist labour, against the more 
orthodox conception of the self-management of labour proposed by Cornelius Castoriadis and 
the Socialisme ou Barbarie group.  
In chapter six I turn to a consideration of the emergence of more obviously ‘Marxian’ 
problematic, with Debord and Vaneigem’s (re)discovery of Marx’s conception of the 
‘realisation and abolition’ of philosophy. It is important to note, that the Marxian problematic in 
this regard was the discovery, by Debord and Vaneigem in particular, of the ongoing 
importance of the young Marx’s ideas with regard to labour, revolutionary praxis, ideology 
criticism, and the way these remained concerns of the older Marx. Indeed, the SI’s wager in this 
regard was not only against Marxist orthodoxy, but also against the more orthodox conception 
of Marxism that the SI had previously embraced. From around 1959 Debord’s engagement with 
a problematic borrowed from the early Marx, namely the ‘realisation and abolition of 
philosophy’, began to appear in the discussion over what constituted the ‘realisation of art’ in 
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the Situationist hypothesis. This soon gave way to such ‘realisation and abolition’ being 
summarised as the ‘supersession of art’ (dépassement de l’art). By examining the way Marx 
came to pose the ‘realisation and abolition of philosophy’ against his milieu of philosophical 
radicals — aka the Young Hegelians — we can better understand how the Situationists took up 
this in their criticism of the artistic impasse that the SI continued to confront. Thus, the 
Situationists critique of art began to be phrased increasingly in terms of its ‘realisation and 
abolition’, i.e. as the ‘supersession of art’. However, the resonances with the young Marx did 
not end there. His consequent “discovery” of a mass, proletarian subject as the potential agent of 
this ‘realisation and abolition’ — i.e. its supersession — was mirrored in Debord and 
Vaneigem’s posing of a ‘new proletarian’ subject, identifiably a product of the new 
‘spectacular’ conditions, as the real agent of the ‘supersession of art’. Such a turn marked the 
definitive end of the merely cultural research of the SI and the beginning of a revolutionary 
practice aimed at surpassing artistic and political alienation. 
The final chapter, chapter seven, brings us to the culmination of this process, namely the rapid 
development of the concept of spectacle under the impact of Debord’s encounter with 
Socialisme ou Barbarie. The two most important aspects of this chapter are as follows. First, the 
concept of spectacle is brought fruitfully into relation with Marx’s original conception of 
‘ideology’ and ‘ideology’ critique. This is done by way of (i) the already existing Situationist 
critique of the separation of the art-object from the process of its production (summarised under 
the pejorative term ‘situationism’ by Debord); and (ii) by taking over Marx’s conception of 
‘ideology critique’ from its reduction to the vulgar sense of ‘ideology’ as a neutral term for a 
system of ideas. At its pithiest, Marx used the term ideology to denote ‘thought separated from 
life’.47 In this sense, ‘ideology’ was the positing, on the basis of a practical division between 
mental and manual labour, of the idea of practice in opposition to, or autonomous from, the 
material conditions of practice itself. It is based on this recovery of ideology criticism that we 
can understand the second important aspect of this chapter. During his brief membership of 
Socialisme ou Barbarie, Debord found that despite the advanced state of this group’s theoretical 
                                                     
47 Vaneigem, 'Raoul Vaneigem: Self-Portraits and Caricatures of the Situationist International [2014]'. 
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critique, particularly of the hierarchy of ‘directors’ and ‘executants’ in modern, bureaucratic 
state capitalism, the group nonetheless functionally instantiated just such a division. Perhaps 
most interesting in this regard is that, despite using elements of Socialisme ou Barbarie’s 
theories in the development of his concept of spectacle, Debord’s recovery of ideology criticism 
was made through recourse to Marx, not Socialisme ou Barbarie. Indeed, and despite patently 
false claims that Debord ‘forged’ his concept of spectacle from a reading of Cornelius 
Castoriadis, Castoriadis at this point held to an orthodox conception of ideology, as opposed to 
the original sense which Debord recovered. Thus, the encounter with Socialisme ou Barbarie 
was both important and ambiguous; in the former case, for the development of the concept of 
spectacle, and in the latter case because Debord, while finding much of theoretical worth, found 
a defective conception of revolutionary practice. 
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Chapter one: Now, the SI must realise philosophy 
The project of realised poetry is nothing less than creating simultaneously          
and inseparably events and their language.  
— Guy Debord, 196348  
The realisation of art, of poetry (in the situationist sense), signifies that one cannot 
realise oneself in a “work”, but on the contrary one realises oneself — full stop.  
— Mustapha Khayati, 196649 
 
In early September 1961, Guy Debord, Attila Kotányi and Raoul Vaneigem spent a few days in 
Hamburg ‘in a series of haphazardly chosen bars’.50 Members of the Situationist International 
(hereafter ‘SI’), the three were returning to France and Belgium from the just concluded Fifth 
Conference of the SI held in Göteborg, Sweden. This conference was marked by heated 
arguments between, on the one hand, the Scandinavian and German sections of the SI, and on 
the other, the Belgian and French sections. These arguments centred on the role of art amongst 
Situationists, whose group had up until that time been known, when it was known, as primarily 
an avant-garde group of artistic origins. 
What was significant about the pub crawl in Hamburg, what to a passing stranger may have 
seemed like just another group of men on a drinking binge, was what the three Situationists 
discussed and composed during these few days.51 The fruits of these discussions came to be 
                                                     
48 Internationale Situationniste [Guy Debord], 'All the King's Men,' Internationale Situationniste, no. 8 
(Janvier 1963), p. 31.  
49 Khayati, 'Les mots captifs (Préface à un dictionnaire situationniste),' p. 51. 
50 Debord, 'Les thèses de Hambourg en septembre 1961 (Note pour servir à l'histoire de l'Internationale 
Situationniste) [1989],' p. 703.  
51 If I occasionally emphasise drunkenness in this project of surpassing or supersession it is only because 
the Situationists, like Baudelaire, believed that drunkenness was a necessary not optional component of 
the drift across days and years against capitalism: ‘Il faut être toujours ivre’ (‘It is necessary to always be 
drunk’, from Baudelaire’s prose poem Enivrez-vous [Get Drunk]). Debord would late in life speak of how 
he quickly grew to ‘like what lies beyond violent drunkenness, […] a terrible and magnificent peace, the 
true taste of the passage of time’ — Guy Debord, 'Panégyrique - tome premier [1989],' in Guy Debord 
Œuvres, Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2006., p. 1669 (part III). For Debord the unfolding becoming of being 
in time was the quintessence of ‘surpassing’ and what he called the ‘necessary alienation’ — Debord, La 
Société du Spectacle, thesis 161. Perhaps more importantly, for him ‘writing should remain rare, since it 
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known as the ‘Hamburg Theses’ in the SI, and though a direct consequence of the arguments at 
the Fifth Conference, their aim was more general. Indeed, they were directed at resolving the 
impasse the group had reached as a whole, what Debord would later describe as ‘a theoretical 
and strategic discussion that concerned the totality of the conduct of the SI.’52  
The conjuncture that produced the ‘Hamburg Theses’ is central to the history of the Situationist 
International. Coming, as they did, only a few days after the bitter arguments of the Fifth 
Conference of the SI, the ‘Hamburg Theses’ became the central ‘document’ of the group.53 As 
Debord would write many years later,  
the “Theses of Hamburg” marked the end of the first era of the SI — that is research 
into a truly new artistic terrain (1957-61) — as well as fixing the departure point for the 
operation that led to the movement of May 1968, and what followed.54 
What will become apparent, and indeed crucial for consideration of the ‘Hamburg Theses’, is 
that they were never written down. As we will see, the Situationists left the objectification of the 
‘Hamburg Theses’ in the ephemeral act of their sometime drunken ‘composition’ on purpose; 
not only to ridicule the increasingly specialised and bureaucratic practice of even the most 
apparently critical intellectuals, but more importantly to draw out the intimate relation between 
means and ends in their revolutionary practice. In the latter sense the ‘Hamburg Theses’ can be 
considered a leitmotif of Situationist practice, an attempt to conjure the ephemeral Situationist 
‘work’ of a future communist society in the midst of capitalism and the fetish of the 
                                                                                                                                                           
is necessary to have drunk for a long time before one can find what is excellent’ — Debord, 'Panégyrique 
- tome premier [1989],' p. 1670 (part III). 
52 Debord, 'Les thèses de Hambourg en septembre 1961 (Note pour servir à l'histoire de l'Internationale 
Situationniste) [1989].' 
53 The exact timing of the production of the Hamburg Theses is hard to establish. Additionally, it appears 
that the discussions, mostly taking place in Hamburg, also continued back in Paris and possibly elsewhere 
— but almost certainly all around the summer-spring of 1961. We will return to this question below in the 
section ‘Reading the Hamburg Theses as supersession’.  
54 Debord, 'Les thèses de Hambourg en septembre 1961 (Note pour servir à l'histoire de l'Internationale 
Situationniste) [1989].' 
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commodity-object. Indeed, the ‘Hamburg Theses’ are almost certainly the key instance in the 
practice of the group of what was called the ‘surpassing of art’ (dépassement de l’art).55  
I argue that the ‘Hamburg Theses’ is the central “document” of the SI. In this chapter I will 
examine the ‘Theses’ as the pivot upon which the SI turned toward the ‘realisation of [their] 
philosophy’, namely the ‘supersession of art’.56 Rather than signifying the end of the artistic 
phase of the group, or the turn away from art (what we will find is unfortunately the most 
common doxa regarding this period of the SI) the ‘Hamburg Theses’ signified, partly, a return 
to the Situationist project as it was outlined in the founding document, the Report on the 
Construction of Situations (1957) — the proposed use of artistic means for non-artistic ends. As 
Debord would later phrase it, ‘for a poetry necessarily without poems’.57 In this sense, the 
‘Theses’ signified what Raoul Vaneigem has recently called the need to ‘revalorise the artist 
past of the SI’ at precisely this moment.58 Such a revalorisation was made necessary for two 
reason: first, the tendency of many Situationists to subordinate the elaboration of the Situationist 
hypothesis to their own artistic practice; and secondly, as an artistic inflected critique of the 
political alienation that Debord and others found in ultra-left groups close to the SI (most 
notably Socialisme ou Barbarie). In chapter two to four, I will look at how ‘Hamburg Theses’ 
rather than signifying a break with the early Situationist critique of art, emerged precisely from 
                                                     
55 The idea of ‘surpassing’ is somewhat complicated by the terms used in the original French and the 
words used to translate this. For instance, the SI, after 1960, tended to use ‘dépasser’ and ‘surpasser’ (and 
their derivative nouns ‘dépassement’ and ‘surpassement’) to indicate the positive, revolutionary 
surpassing or overcoming of the alienated conditions of capitalism, whereas they would use the noun 
‘transcendance’ to indicate the alienated and ideological posing of powers separated from people and 
society (i.e. the hierarchical and religious positing of transcendent powers over society and life). 
However, some translators have chosen to translate ‘dépasser’ and ‘surpasser’ and their derivatives as 
‘transcend’ and ‘transcendence’, without paying attention to the negative connotation that the SI 
attributed to the French word ‘transcendance’ — a connotation moreover that is also associated with the 
English word ‘transcendence’.  
 Additionally, I will note that there are Hegelian associations with ‘dépasser’ and ‘to transcend’. 
For instance, Jean Hyppolite translated Hegel’s ‘aufheben’ as ‘dépasser’ which has been, in turn, 
translated as ‘transcend’ in English (though this is controversial). Cf. Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and 
Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Samuel Cherniak & John Heckman, Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, [1946] 1974.  
 It is a controversial question whether or not ‘to transcend’ and ‘transcendence’ continue to be 
redolent with their religious and otherworldly (and thus ‘alienated’) senses in English. Without doubt the 
SI avoided using the French ‘transcendance’ to indicate the revolutionary surpassing of alienated 
conditions. I believe we should try and follow their lead and reserve the English equivalent for the 
religious and hierarchical associations that it most certainly has.   
56 Debord, 'Les thèses de Hambourg en septembre 1961 (Note pour servir à l'histoire de l'Internationale 
Situationniste) [1989],' p. 703. 
57 I.S. [Debord], Debord], 'All the King's Men,' p. 31. 
58 Vaneigem, 'Raoul Vaneigem: Self-Portraits and Caricatures of the Situationist International [2014]'. 
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this criticism. In this sense, they were artistic to the extent that they signified the use of art in the 
mode of supersession. In chapters five to six, I will look in more detail at Marx’s ideas of 
‘revolutionary practice’ and the ‘realisation and abolition of philosophy’, in order to gauge 
Marx’s influence upon the group, particularly with regard to the SI’s turn to a critique of 
Marxist orthodoxy. And finally, in chapter seven, I will examine how Debord’s encounter with 
Socialisme ou Barbarie lead to one of the least understood aspects of the ‘Hamburg Theses’, 
namely that the SI ‘no longer [needed to] pay the least importance to any of the [organisational] 
conceptions of revolutionary groups’ that then existed.59  
During the life of the Situationist group — 1957 to 1972 — Situationists engaged in a variety of 
practices. Apart from their cultivation of play, indolence and drunkenness in the face of work-
obsessed capitalism (and the so-called ‘communist’ East), Situationists were also painters, 
poets, playwrights, musicians, architects, film makers, sculptors, critics, revolutionists, 
pataphysicians, students and teachers.60 However the Situationist project, from its beginnings as 
an organised venture was presented in opposition to all of the various separated and alienated 
activities of capitalist society. Crucial to such a project carried out under the (then) present 
conditions of capitalist social relations and their general dominance, lay the Situationist 
hypothesis.  
The idea of Situationist practice, as conceived by the SI, had two distinct but interrelated 
meanings. First, Situationist activity, strictly conceived, lay in a future classless society. 
Members of the SI hypothesised the ‘construction of situations’ in such a future. However, a 
necessary component of the Situationist hypothesis was the idea that general conditions would 
prevail enabling such constructed situations to be carried out by the vast majority of people (as 
opposed to, say, the present specialised activity of artists). Such future ‘constructors’ would, 
perforce, be the true Situationists. Nonetheless members of the SI were Situationists, but in an 
anticipative sense. They were Situationists because they were, (1) members of the SI; (2) they 
were engaged collectively and collaboratively in developing and experimenting with the 
                                                     
59 Debord, 'Les thèses de Hambourg en septembre 1961 (Note pour servir à l'histoire de l'Internationale 
Situationniste) [1989],' p. 703. 
60 This is not an exhaustive list of the various ‘specialities’ of particular Situationists. 
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Situationists hypothesis; and (3) they advocated the overthrow of capitalist society to the end of 
realising the Situationist hypothesis. As Guy Debord would write some years after the founding 
of the group, ‘[t]he SI is still far from having created situations, but it has already created 
Situationists, which is a lot.’61 
Soon after the founding of the SI, the group adopted the term ‘pre-situationist’ to define their 
present activity. Such a term was deployed to make absolutely clear the social implications of 
the Situationist hypothesis, and the general transformation of society that would be necessary in 
order to bring about the ‘construction of situations’. Thus, the practice of Situationists (as in 
members of the SI) in the capitalist present were ‘pre-situationist’ to the extent that their aim — 
the Situationist hypothesis — was yet to be realised.62 
The Situationist hypothesis, more commonly known as ‘the hypothesis of the construction of 
situations’, was the closest that the group came to producing a distinctive Situationist work in its 
early years; and yet at the heart of such a ‘work’ was the clear rejection of alienable products. 
For the Situationists, increasingly so after 1961, the only work worthy of the name was the work 
of bringing about the end of capitalism and the establishment of a social order conducive to the 
construction of situations. Indeed, the Situationist hypothesis embodied the SI’s notion of the 
‘surpassing of art’, both as critique and as hypothetical projection.  
For the SI, in opposition to contemporary artistic and political practice, the practice of being a 
revolutionary was necessarily more important than the objectifiable, and thus alienable, results 
of such a practice. Which is to say that to the extent to which such practices become objectified 
as so many ‘works’, ‘manifestoes’, ‘theses’, etc., is the extent to which the apparent results of 
such activity can be separated from the process of their production, and alienated as cultural 
commodities. In the refusal to set down the ‘Hamburg Theses’ for all time the SI were taking a 
stand against the increasing complicity — consciously or not — of critical intellectuals in the 
development and consolidation of the ‘commodity-spectacle’. However, such formal 
considerations do not exhaust the importance of the ‘Hamburg Theses’. In the letter to Levin, 
                                                     
61 I.S. [Debord], 'L’avant-garde de la présence,' International Situationniste, no. 8 (Janvier 1963), p. 22. 
62 We will return to the question of ‘pre-situationist’ below. 
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Debord revealed the one remaining fragment of the discussions that constituted the ‘Hamburg 
Theses’, their summarised conclusion: ‘Now, the SI must realise philosophy’.63 As he pointed 
out the words are derived from a ‘celebrated formula’ of Marx’s: the realisation and abolition of 
philosophy.64  
In an article co-written with Gil J Wolman in 1956, one year before the SI’s founding, Debord 
and Wolman had spoken of détournement as often ‘marking […] our indifference toward an 
original emptied of meaning and forgotten’.65 Certainly the ‘Hamburg Theses’ fulfilled this 
criterion. However, this is not to say that the Situationists were uninterested in the ‘original’; 
indeed, Debord and Wolman distinguished such interest, but not on the basis of aesthetic value 
or scandalous innovation. Instead they proposed the ‘literary and artistic heritage of humanity’ 
being ‘used for the purposes of partisan propaganda’ as sufficient criterion of judgement — and 
so use, whether disinterested or not, was marked as superior to aesthetic respect.66 For instance 
Debord and Wolman valued Bertolt Brecht’s practice of making ‘cuts in the classics of the 
theatre in order to make the performances more happily educative’ over the Dada scandal of 
Duchamp’s moustachioed Mona Lisa.67 And yet détournement was closer to the spirit of 
Duchamp’s ready-made than Brecht’s ‘misplaced respect for culture, as defined by the ruling 
class’.68 Debord and Wolman were not interested here in defending a particular ‘tradition’ but 
rather arguing for a ‘revolutionary orientation’ for the use of culture, and the need to follow the 
anti-artistic gestures of Duchamp and the Dadas ‘up until the negation of the negation’.69 
Indeed, this idea of surpassing the negation of Dada, and its resonance with Marx’s thought, 
was flagged in Debord’s pointed ‘summary’ of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ by way of Marx’s pithy 
                                                     
63 Debord, 'Les thèses de Hambourg en septembre 1961 (Note pour servir à l'histoire de l'Internationale 
Situationniste) [1989].' 
64 Karl Marx, 'Contribution to Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction [1843-44],' in Karl 
Marx & Frederich Engels Collected Works Vol. 3, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 181. Such a 
formula would become common amongst Situationist writing in the years to follow; indeed it served as a 
type of shorthand for the SI’s critique of art, politics and all other specialised and ‘separated’ activity 
under the ‘commodity-spectacle’. 
65 Debord & Wolman, 'Mode d’emploi du détournement [1956],' in Guy Debord Œuvres, Paris: Éditions 
Gallimard, 2006, p. 223. For more on this see the section ‘How not to misunderstand the Hamburg 
Theses’ below. 
66 Ibid., p. 221.  
67 Ibid., p. 222. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., pp. 221-22. 
47 
 
formula of the realisation and abolition of philosophy. Of course, crucial to such détournement 
is both an ‘indifference toward an original’ and an acknowledgement that the significance of the 
original is only preserved in its correction and adaptation to altered circumstances.70 In the 
1840s the practice of philosophy proved to be an important moment of the theoretical 
radicalisation in the German states, which accompanied the ‘practical’ radicalisation throughout 
Europe and the United Kingdom in the decade before 1848. In 1961 the role of dissident 
intellectual life, within and outside the academy, was once again accompanying and even 
announcing the radicalisation of the 1960s. However, the important difference here is precisely 
within and outside the academy. Unlike Marx’s circles in the 1840s, many of the radical 
intellectuals in France in 1961 (and the rest of the ‘advanced’ industrial world) operated within 
the state sector of a transformed ‘bureaucratic’ state capitalism. This is not to judge such 
individuals in a moral sense, but rather point to the marked difference in relations between 
Europe in 1848 and 1961. Here I will only mention the idea of ‘realisation and abolition’ in 
passing, and its relationship to the ‘surpassing of art’, in order to return to this important 
question in chapter five. 
The ‘Hamburg Theses’ were a response to two of the main practices within the group. On the 
one hand the ongoing debate over artistic practice and the SI’s relation to such; on the other the 
increasing engagement amongst some SI members with ‘ultra-left’ revolutionary groups 
(notably Socialisme ou Barbarie) and the related possibilities and actualities of insurrectionary 
proletarian activity (notably during the General Strike in Belgium over the Winter of 1960-61).  
Hitherto most commentary on the ‘Theses’ has reduced their importance to the question of art 
and their role in the upcoming break with the artist members of the SI.71 Not only do such 
perspectives make such a reduction at the expense of their critique of political specialisation, but 
can overlook and ignore the real general import of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ for the SI, and indeed 
for the reconstitution of a revolutionary movement. Thus, the ‘Hamburg Theses’ are dismissed 
                                                     
70 Ibid., p. 223.  
71 For instance, in Christophe Bourseiller (1999), Andrew Hussey (2001), McKenzie Wark (2011) and 
Jakob Jakobsen (2011). We will return to the question of the various interpretations of the Theses below.  
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as being merely a peculiar and needless to say sectarian result of an arcane dispute that is of 
little or no consequence. 
In an article written around the time of the break with the artists, one that is obviously 
influenced by the ‘Hamburg Theses’, the SI wrote that ‘Situationist theory is in people like fish 
are in the sea.’72 The point of such a claim, carefully drawn out over the course of the article, 
was the rejection of the perspective that conceived of the SI as bringing a radical perspective 
from without. Thus Debord’s point about the significance of the ‘Hamburg Theses’: on the one 
hand they were aimed against the perspective of those ‘ultra-leftist’ groups close to them, like 
Socialisme ou Barbarie, who were then tending to become lost in the arcane and scholastic 
elaboration of a theory to explain the apparent quiescence of the working class; and on the other 
hand against those Situationists (primarily the artists) who believed that workers had ceased to 
be potentially revolutionary through their ‘incorporation’ — via the dubious benefits of work 
and commodity ‘satisfaction’ — into bourgeois society.  
Common to both perspectives was the belief that capital had triumphed to such a degree that an 
autonomous revolutionary perspective on the basis of the experience of capitalist alienation was 
no longer possible. What those Situationists who composed the ‘Hamburg Theses’ offered 
instead was the argument that the apparent ‘victory’ of capitalism, manifest in the burgeoning 
commodity abundance, was in fact a deepening of the process of alienation, not its alleviation; 
thus, the ground was being more thoroughly prepared for a revolutionary insurrection. Indeed, 
the ‘Hamburg Theses’ offered a stark alternative to those artists and political radicals who 
retreated in despair into their respective ‘ghettoes’: the realisation and abolition of art, politics, 
and wage-labour, i.e. of all alienated and separated activities. Needless to say, such a 
revolutionary task was and must be the task of the alienated masses themselves.73  
                                                     
72 Internationale Situationniste, 'Du rôle de l’I.S.,' Internationale Situationniste no. 7 (Avril 1962), p. 17. 
73 Karl Marx had written ‘[t]hat the emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by the 
working classes themselves’ (from 'Provisional Rules of the [International Workingmen's] Association 
[1864],' in Karl Marx & Frederich Engels Collected Works Vol. 20, Lawrence & Wishart, 1985, p. 14.). 
The IWA, or ‘First International’ was later cited as the actual foundation of the Situationist International. 
The SI was attracted to its anti-Leninism avant la lettre. 
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As we will see the ‘transition’ from the first to the second phase of the SI that was enacted over 
1961 and 1962 is not so much a movement from art to politics but a movement against artistic 
and political specialisation in favour of a distinctive conception of revolutionary practice — 
what the SI conceived of as the realisation and abolition of art, politics, philosophy — which is 
to say their surpassing (dépassement).74 The ‘Hamburg Theses’ have a crucial role to play in 
understanding such a pivotal change as well as to disabuse the common misconception of the 
second phase (1962-1968) of the SI as political in opposition to the earlier so-called artistic 
phase. Such misconceptions lie at the root of the ignorance, misunderstanding and indeed 
deliberate falsification of the ‘Hamburg Theses’, as well as the admittedly subtle notion of 
‘realisation and abolition’ which the SI borrowed from Hegel by way of Marx and their 
experience of the artistic avant-garde. 
We are left with the elusive nature of the ‘Hamburg Theses’. This need not prevent a 
reconstruction of the general lines of the argument of the ‘Hamburg Theses’, by way of 
examining those debates that produced it and crucially the practice that the ‘Hamburg Theses’ 
informed in the following years. What is most remarkable about the ‘Hamburg Theses’ is how 
much can be derived from their absent form — indeed their absence is crucial to understanding 
their importance. Further the ‘celebrated formula’ of Marx’s evoked by the ‘Hamburg Theses’ 
also points us to the significance of this particular work of Marx’s. 
To this end, I will first consider other accounts of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ before turning to an 
examination of the immediate background to the ‘Hamburg Theses’: the arguments at the Fifth 
Conference in Göteborg in August 1961. The point of briefly examining the background is to 
draw out the nature of the continuity and break which the ‘Hamburg Theses’ represented in the 
SI. On this basis, I will turn to an examination of the form and content of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ 
                                                     
74 Debord and the SI were not opposed to all specialisation, rather what they considered alienating 
specialisations that reinforced an ideological worldview and practice. Thus their opposition to specialised 
philosophy, politics and art was motivated by the limitations of these specialisations, in particular their 
susceptibility to reinforcing hierarchical divisions in society on the basis of the separation of theory from 
its practical, everyday uses. Thus technical specialisations were not the target of their criticism — for e.g. 
the knowledge required to build bridges, deliver babies, etc. 
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in order to demonstrate that they were an attempt to embody the idea and practice of the 
supersession [dépassement] of art and philosophy. 
How not to misunderstand the ‘Hamburg Theses’ 
In a private letter to Raoul Vaneigem in 1962 Debord wrote ‘we agreed not to write the 
Hamburg Theses, so as to impose even better the central meaning of our entire project in the 
future. Thus, the enemy cannot feign to approve them without great difficulty.’75 In his 1989 
letter to Thomas Levin Debord reiterated this, while publicly admitted the ‘Hamburg Theses’ 
for the first time: ‘[d]eliberately, with the intention of leaving no trace that could be observed or 
analysed from outside of the SI, nothing concerning this discussion and what it had concluded 
was ever written down.’76 It appears that Debord and the other authors had been strikingly 
successful. In the 1960s the true nature of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ was hidden in order to impose 
their significance, i.e. to insist upon the Situationist struggle against the spectacular reification 
and alienation of their ‘work’ — and human practices considered generally — and to deny those 
who would aid in this reification and fetishisation an object to work upon. So successful was 
this move that nothing of significance was written until Debord revealed the truth of the 
‘Hamburg Theses’ to Levin in 1989. 
Debord’s letter did not gain a larger audience until it was reproduced as ‘Annex 3’ in the Fayard 
republication of the facsimile edition of the entire run of the SI’s journal in 1997.77 However, if 
we turn to a representative sample of commentary on the ‘Hamburg Theses’ since 1997 we are 
struck, in the main, by the misunderstanding of the commentators.78 
                                                     
75 Guy Debord, 'Lettre à Raoul Vaneigem, 15 février, 1962,' in Correspondance volume II septembre 
1960 - décembre 1964, ed. Patrick Mosconi, Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2001, p. 127. 
76 Debord, 'Les thèses de Hambourg en septembre 1961 (Note pour servir à l'histoire de l'Internationale 
Situationniste) [1989],' p. 703. 
77 Internationale situationniste, International situationniste: Édition augmentée, Paris: Librairie Artheme 
Fayard, 1997, pp. 703-04. 
78 Even though there are a few elusive references to the ‘Hamburg Theses’ in the works of the SI, I limit 
my brief survey to those works published after 1997 simply because of the difficulty faced by the 
investigator before this time.  
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The majority of commentaries fall into the following categories. Most simply do not mention 
the ‘Hamburg Theses’, raising the possibility that they are unaware of them. 79 The most 
unfortunate example of these is to be found in Vincent Kaufmann’s 2001 work, in which he 
admirably draws attention to Debord’s early ‘art without works’ among the Letterists and the 
Letterist International, and its impact on the later SI.80 Of those that do mention the ‘Hamburg 
Theses’, commentary ranges from more to less awareness of their nature.81 For instance among 
these commentaries it is often unclear if the ‘Hamburg Theses’ were written down or published 
in any form.82 More rare are commentators who understand the unwritten nature of the 
‘Hamburg Theses’, but attribute little or no importance to them vis-à-vis the SI’s practice.83 
Rarest of all are those commentators who understand both the formal nature of the ‘Hamburg 
                                                     
79 Thus, Kaufmann, Guy Debord: Revolution in the Service of Poetry; McDonough, 'Introduction: 
Ideology and the Situationist Utopia.'; Ford, The Situationist International: A User’s Guide; Andy 
Merrifield, Guy Debord, London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2005; Gilman-Opalsky, Spectacular Capitalism: 
Guy Debord and the Practice of Radical Philosophy; Stracey, Constructed Situations: A New History of 
the Situationist International.  
80 For instance Kaufmann correctly identified the Letterist ‘dérive’ as the ‘art without works’ which 
formed the core of the later Situationist practice of ‘unitary urbanism’ (Kaufmann, Guy Debord: 
Revolution in the Service of Poetry, p. 115, 127). However, he ultimately laments the SI’s turn away from 
the ‘beautiful’ elaboration of unitary urbanism, as embodied in Constant’s New Babylon, and the SI’s 
more consistent embrace of an ‘art without works, an art of idleness, an art of pure critique, and of 
destruction and self-destruction’ after 1961 (ibid., p. 147). We will return to the question of unitary 
urbanism, the dérive etc. as being ‘art without works’, and thus ‘pre-situationist’, below and in chapter 
three. 
81 For instance, Christophe Bourseiller acknowledges that they were ‘unpublished’, but he places them 
before not after the 5th conference, and shows more interest in incidental details tenuously related to the 
‘Hamburg Theses’ — such as Alexander Trocchi’s heroin addiction and association with Leonard Cohen 
—  than in the ‘Hamburg Theses’ themselves. Cf. Christophe Bourseiller, Vie et mort de Guy Debord 
1931-1994, Saint-Malo: Pascal Galodé éditeurs, [1999] 2012, p. 195. 
82 Andrew Hussey believes the ‘Hamburg Theses’ was ‘a text for internal circulation’. However, more 
bizarrely he attributes a quote that does not exist to Debord in his 1989 letter to Levin about the 
‘Hamburg Theses’ (perhaps a stab at homage?). Additionally, he associates the ‘Hamburg Theses’ with 
Debord’s purported drive to oust the artists from the SI, despite Debord’s denial that this was the purpose 
of the ‘Hamburg Theses’. Cf. Hussey, The Game of War: The Life and Death of Guy Debord, pp. 171-72. 
83 Similar to Hussey, McKenzie Wark and Jakob Jakobsen associate the ‘Hamburg Theses’ with Debord’s 
purported drive to expel the artists. Cf. Wark, The Beach Beneath the Streets: The Everyday Life and 
Glorious Times of the Situationist International; Jakob Jakobsen, 'The artistic revolution: On the 
Situationists, gangsters and falsifiers from Drakabygget,' in Expect Anything Fear Nothing: The 
Situationist movement in Scandinavia and elsewhere, ed. Mikkel Bolt Rasmussen & Jakob Jakobsen, 
Copenhagen: Nebula, 2011.Of the three, Jakobsen has the best grasp of the longer term nature of the 
argument over the role of art in the SI group. However, this is mitiagted by his erroneous beliefs that 
‘Debord’s circle’ moved to impose a hierarchical division in the group around the poles of ‘theory’ and 
‘practice’; that the ‘experimental attitude’ of the earlier group was dispensed with by Debord et al.; and 
that Asger Jorn’s Pour la forme (1958) was ‘the first theoretical work to delineate a radical experimental 
attitude […] in the Situationist movement’, despite the existence of the long founding document written 
by Debord in 1957, which, moreover, foregrounded just such an ‘experimental attitude’. Ibid., pp. 244, 
217. 
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Theses’ and the singular importance they held for the group at this pivotal moment in their 
development.84    
Of recent commentaries on the ‘Hamburg Theses’, that of Jean-Marc Mandosio’s stands out. In 
his work In the Cauldron of the Negative (trans. 2014, orig. 2003) Mandosio is sensitive to the 
form and content of the ‘Hamburg Theses’.85 He quotes extensively from Debord’s 1989 letter 
to Thomas Levin, and leaves no one in doubt of the stated intent and method of composition of 
the ‘Hamburg Theses’. Indeed, he clearly sides with the idea of the importance of the ‘Hamburg 
Theses’, going so far as to single them out as containing ‘the only “truly vital conclusions” of 
situationist theory’ — even if his is wrong in attributing this claim to Debord.86  
The most interesting claim put forward by Mandosio is with regard to the way he connects the 
‘Hamburg Theses’ to an earlier work of Debord’s, and thus to both the early SI and the late 
Letterist International: ‘[T]he late — and even posthumous — insistence on the importance of 
the ‘Hamburg Theses’ would tend to place the entire situationist enterprise in the category of the 
“parodic-serious”, to borrow an expression coined by Wolman and Debord’.87 Whereas 
Mandosio is wrong about the ‘late […] insistence on the importance of the Hamburg Theses’ 
(consider, for instance, Debord’s 1962 letter to Vaneigem cited above), he has, perhaps 
inadvertently, stumbled upon an aspect of their real significance — the attempt to push 
détournement so far that there is literally nothing left to détourn (or, more importantly, 
recuperate). 
                                                     
84 Positive signs of perhaps a more general change for the better can be found in two recent PhD theses: 
Tom Bunyard, 'A Genealogy and Critique of Guy Debord's Theory of the Spectacle' (University of 
London, 2011), p. 76; Alastair J. Hemmens, 'The Radical Subject: An Intellectual Biography of Raoul 
Vaneigem (1934 - Present)' (University of London Institute in Paris, 2013), pp. 169-72.  
85 Jean-Marc Mandosio, 'In the Cauldron of the Negative,' (Translated by Alias Reclus: [2003] 2014). 
http://libcom.org/library/cauldron-negative-jean-marc-mandosio. 
86 Ibid. Unfortunately Mandosio mangles his citations in his presentation of the vital nature of the 
Hamburg Theses. Debord never wrote that ‘the only “truly vital conclusions” of situationist theory were 
contained in […] the Hamburg Theses’ (ibid.). If we consult Debord’s letter to Levin which Mandosio 
quotes from we find that Debord is writing about the ‘truly vital conclusions’ not of the Situationists but 
of agents of Nation States in which ‘the procedure [of the Theses] had encountered a bizarre success at 
the highest levels’ (Debord, 'Les thèses de Hambourg en septembre 1961 (Note pour servir à l'histoire de 
l'Internationale Situationniste) [1989],'). Indeed if we were to agree with Mandosio here, we would run 
the risk of nullifying all of the critical work of the SI after the Hamburg Theses. Indeed, the idea of such a 
reversal is the theme of Mandosio’s work, i.e. the reversal and abandonment of earlier Situationists 
perspectives by the later, post-SI Debord and Vaneigem.  
87 Mandosio, 'In the Cauldron of the Negative'. 
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In the document Mandosio cites, ‘Instructions for the use of détournement’ (1956), Debord and 
Gil J Wolman contrasted the mere parody of literature to the ‘parodic-serious’ détournement of 
culture, which ‘far from wanting to arouse indignation or laughter by referring to the idea of an 
original work, mark[s] on the contrary our indifference toward an original emptied of meaning 
and forgotten’.88 Via this definition Mandosio interprets Debord’s revelation in 1989 as an 
attempt to recast the entire work of the SI between 1957 and 1972. One could perhaps follow 
Mandosio if the ‘Hamburg Theses’ were in fact an invention of Debord’s, post festum.  
Debord’s and Wolman’s model in the 1956 article was Lautréamont, whose plagiaristic 
technique was aimed even more at the transformation of the original ‘sources’ then merely 
plagiarism: 
[i]t goes without saying that one is not limited to correcting a work or integrating 
diverse fragments of out-of-date works into a new one, but also to change the meaning 
of these fragments and fix them up in any appropriate manner — what fools obstinately 
call citations.89 
In his letter to Levin, Debord noted that in the 1960s the ‘Hamburg Theses’ ‘were evoked 
several times in Situationist publications, but a single citation was never given’.90 Indeed, unlike 
many of the more artistic productions of Situationists, the ‘Hamburg Theses’ cut to the core of 
the notion of détournement, eschewing cheap gags and parodies for a ‘parodic-serious’ 
composition which was in fact sui generis, despite being composed of the assorted detritus of 
critical theory and drunken drifting through the streets of Hamburg. Although Mandosio 
misunderstands Debord’s intention, even so far as to represent the ‘Hamburg Theses’ as a mere 
gag or literary hoax, he unwittingly draws attention to the ‘Hamburg Theses’ as an exemplar of 
détournement and thus, perhaps, being the most Situationist ‘document’ of them all.  
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Combatants caught between two worlds 
At the Fifth Conference of the SI in late August 1962 an argument erupted over the status of art 
and more specifically the results of artistic practice and their relationship to Situationist 
practice.91 The immediate cause of the argument was the reaction of some Situationists to 
comments made by Raoul Vaneigem in his orientation report.92  
Vaneigem’s report made suggestions for Situationist activity on the basis of a developing 
hostility to the Situationist project in capitalist society. In essence he argued that those 
Situationists engaged in artistic work (primarily the painters concentrated in the Scandinavian 
and German sections) ran the risk of elaborating ‘the spectacle of refusal’. His worry was that 
the creation of artistic works, under conditions of an expanding global market in cultural 
artefacts, risked reifying the work necessary for elaborating a radical and critical Situationist 
practice. He wrote, ‘[i]n order for their elaboration to be artistic in the new and authentic sense 
defined by the SI, the elements of the destruction of the spectacle must precisely cease to be 
works of art.’93 Vaneigem was clear that Situationist practice would entail defending all that was 
best about artistic production.94 Primarily this entailed the prioritising of the creative relations of 
artistic production over the resulting objects that were susceptible to the fetish of commodity 
logic; i.e. art-objects were easily alienated from the process of their production for potential 
sale. However, the attribution of the importance of such a defence was made on the basis of the 
present predicament of the Situationist: ‘that of combatants between two worlds: one that we 
don’t acknowledge, the other that does not yet exist.’95  
In the following conference session Jørgen Nash of the Scandinavian section of the SI 
responded by posing a question in relation to film-work he was engaged in with other 
                                                     
91 Internationale Situationniste, 'La Cinquième Conférence de l’I.S. à Göteborg,' Internationale 
Situationniste, no. 7 (Avril 1962). We will return to the subject of the Fifth Conference in chapter four, 
below. 
92 Ibid., pp. 26-7. 
93 Ibid., p. 26. 
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95 I.S. 'La Cinquième Conférence de l’I.S. à Göteborg,' p. 27. 
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Situationists: what constituted a Situationist film?96 Following on from Nash, Dieter 
Kunzelmann of the German section expressed doubts regarding the ability of the Situationist 
group to engage in the far reaching critical activity outlined by Vaneigem. By way of a response 
to Nash and Kunzelmann, Attila Kotányi suggested that the term ‘anti-situationist’ should be 
appended to any artistic work or production by members of the SI.97 However, Kotányi clearly 
drew out that such a description did not mean that Situationists ‘should stop painting, writing, 
etc.’ or that such activity was without value.98 Rather Situationist activity lay in the elaboration 
‘of certain truths which have an explosive power’.99 Such truths lay primarily in the Situationist 
critique of the capitalist use of work-time and free-time, such as their critique of the then rapid 
transformation of cities around the needs of the production and consumption — i.e. of ‘mass’, 
‘consumer’ commodities.100  
Kotányi’s suggestion of the term and use of ‘anti-situationist’ was accepted by the conference, 
almost unanimously; notably Nash objected alone. However, this near unanimity belied the 
tensions at the conference, which frequently exploded into argument ‘not without violent 
agitation and uproar’.101 What was made clear was that differences that had emerged at the 
previous conference, the Fourth in 1960, still remained. At the Fourth Conference the German 
section had argued that that in the absence of a revolutionary proletariat the SI must ‘realise its 
program on its own by mobilizing the avant-garde artists’; at the Fifth conference they reiterated 
their belief that the proletariat as a potential revolutionary force was effectively disarmed by the 
‘comfort and conveniences’ of modern capitalism and that ‘the SI systematically neglects its 
real chances in culture’.102 However it was precisely this cultural perspective that would provide 
the main breaking point at the Fifth conference. For even as Heimrad Prem of the German 
section argued that the ‘real chances’ for the SI ‘in culture’ were in opposition to the apparent 
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sterility of ‘theoretical power’, he nonetheless admitted that he found Situationist theory 
‘incomprehensible to say the least’.103 Needless to say there was general uproar that a 
Situationist of two years could admit to finding the theoretical elaborations of his organisation 
‘incomprehensible’.  
From ‘pre-situationist’ activity to art as ‘anti-situationist’ 
To Nash’s seemingly innocent question regarding the criteria for what constitutes a Situationist 
film, Guy Debord mordantly pointed out that despite the films he had made while a member of 
the SI he had yet to make a Situationist film.104 Debord’s point harked back to an earlier 
Situationist concept: ‘pre-situationist’. The term ‘pre-situationniste’ appeared a handful of times 
in the group’s publications, from shortly after its formation until the 5th issue of its journal in 
December 1960. However, the term does not appear in the founding document of June 1957. It 
is almost certain that the term ‘pre-situationist’ was introduced on the basis of confused 
interpretations of what Debord called ‘the hypothesis of the construction of situations’.105  
In the founding document of the SI, Report on the Construction of Situations and on the 
Conditions of Organization and Action of the International Situationist Tendency, Debord wrote 
that ‘[o]ur central idea is the construction of situations, which is to say the concrete construction 
of momentary ambiences of life and their transformation in a superior passionate quality.’106 In 
the first issue of the journal this definition was further elaborated as ‘a moment of life, 
concretely and deliberately constructed through the collective organisation of a unitary 
ambience and play of events’.107 However the hypothetical nature of the ‘the construction of 
situations’ was emphasised from the outset. Such a ‘construction’ was projected as a possible 
and desirable organisation of human activity on the basis of the revolutionary transformation of 
the capitalist mode of production. Crucial to such a hypothesis was the belief that the present 
capitalist use of the city and social life more generally already contained and at the margins 
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expressed critical, ‘alternative’ uses. Thus, the initial activity of the group was directed toward 
the experimental verification of such a hypothesis via the development of critical practices 
already pioneered under the aegis of the Letterist International — e.g. the urban ‘dérives’ and 
psychogeographical criticisms of the capitalist city. The ‘construction of situations’ was a sort 
of negative image of capitalist urbanism; where capital reorganised ancient cities, and built new 
ones in the name of productive efficiency and the flow of commodities, the Situationists 
proposed the playful elaboration of life.  
The construction of situations was opposed to the phenomenal results of previous artistic avant-
gardes: painting, poetry, prose, sculpture, cinema, etc.; indeed, the production of any object that 
could potentially be isolated and fetishized as a commodity for sale. This was not to say that the 
Situationists were opposed to the production of artistic objects as such; rather they saw the very 
artistic techniques as necessarily being appropriated by the future Constructors of Situations, 
reappropriating such diverse practices and others in order that they would be combined in new 
totalities, new ‘ambiances’ for living as opposed to objects solely for spectatorship or sale. Such 
a hypothetical construction could not be reduced to present artistic activity, even if the results of 
the present-day experimental elaboration of such a hypothesis were (for instance Constant’s 
architectural models and plans of ‘New Babylon’). Implicit in the hypothesis, though explicitly 
drawn out in numerous articles in the SI’s journal, was the alienation and ghettoization of 
creative activity under capitalist conditions.  
The term ‘pre-situationist’ was introduced in order to clarify both the present hypothetical 
nature of ‘the construction of situations’ as well as the difference between Situationist and other, 
so-called avant-garde artistic practices amongst their contemporaries. The term first appears in 
the article ‘Encore un effort si vous voulez être situationnistes’ (One more effort if you want to 
be Situationists) published in Potlatch no. 29 in November 1957 shortly after the founding of 
the group.108 In the article Debord wrote that the principle danger faced by the SI was twofold: 
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‘the pursuit of fragmentary works combined with naïve proclamations of a so-called new 
stage.’109  
This brings us to a central though often misrepresented aspect of the idea of the ‘construction of 
situations’.  Most often it has been conceived as a type of artistic ‘happening’ or, to use a term 
favoured by art criticism, a type of Gesamtkunstwerk or ‘total work of art’. One could perhaps 
envisage the Situationist notion of unitary urbanism under such a term, but not the Situationist 
hypothesis.110 In the early years of the SI an argument emerged precisely over this question: was 
the Situationist hypothesis reducible to unitary urbanism? Debord, during the extended 
argument and discussion with Constant in 1959 argued that unitary urbanism was an 
‘instrument’ of the Situationist hypothesis and thus could not be reducible to it.111 Unitary 
urbanism, insofar as it proposed the ‘integral’ use of artistic and other techniques, was 
conceived as the experimental means for the investigation of the Situationist hypothesis in the 
capitalist present. The Situationist hypothesis of the construction of situations is best understood 
as at once the overarching theoretical criticism of the situations of capitalist life and a 
hypothetical projection with regards to their ‘solution’. Unlike unitary urbanism — which was a 
direct engagement with the problems of contemporary ‘urbanism’ — the Situationist hypothesis 
could not be practiced short of the attainment of general conditions for the construction of 
situations (i.e. a post-capitalist, ‘communist’ society). 
As befits a ‘hypothesis’, the construction of situations projected a solution to the criticism of the 
ephemeral ‘situation’ of everyday capitalist life. Certainly, this critical practice was a 
                                                                                                                                                           
further issue (no. 30, no. 1 in the new series, 15 July 1959). No other issues of Potlatch appeared after this 
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109 Debord, 'Encore un effort si vous voulez être situationnistes : L’I.S. dans et contre la décomposition 
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component of contemporary, Situationist practice. But here we begin to approach the 
peculiarities and paradox of the notion of ‘pre-situationist’ activity. Insofar as the Situationist 
hypothesis was both criticism and proposed solution to the problem of the situations of capitalist 
life, it was ‘pre-situationist’. The problem the SI faced was the question of transforming their 
critical means to the end desired. Thus, to reduce the Situationist hypothesis to a 
Gesamtkunstwerk would be akin to rejecting the possibility of its central conceit: ‘the concrete 
construction of momentary ambiences of life and their transformation into a superior passional 
quality.’112 The Constructed Situation, as envisaged by Debord, was not to be understood 
vulgarly as the mere construction of things, no matter how expansively understood — for 
instance, cities — but rather the conscious construction of the passage of one’s life in 
collaboration with others. Thus, the construction of life, insofar as it is considered a social-
natural complex. Such ‘constructions’ put a premium on the ephemeral, never to be repeated 
qualitative aspects of living. Indeed, central to the Situationist hypothesis was the rejection of 
the fetish of the finished ‘object’ abstracted from unrepeatable ‘unities’ of time (i.e. Constructed 
Situations).  
Debord accepted that Situationist practice in the capitalist present was doomed, after a fashion, 
to being recuperated. Indeed, he was clearly aware and accepted the fact that some of the critical 
activity of the SI was specialised, artistic activity (for instance his own film work, ‘botched 
tracking shots’ and all).113 Insofar as such activity was guided by the critical orientation of the 
Situationist hypothesis, and conceived and carried out under such an ‘orientation’, it was 
Situationist, even as the alienable results of such practice were ‘pre-situationist’ or ‘anti-
situationist’. Here lies the paradox of Situationist practice in the bourgeois present, gesturing at 
a future yet to be fashioned, caught in the passing present of the inherited, historical, natural and 
gloriously artificial ‘constraints’ of capitalist social relations.  
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As Debord put it in the founding document, ‘[t]he construction of situations begins beyond the 
modern ruins of the spectacle’.114 Certainly such a conception is different from Jean Paul 
Sartre’s ontological conception of the ‘situation’, precisely because it eschews the invariant 
notion of ‘situation’ in favour of a historical one.115 In fact we can consider the Situationist’s 
theory of the ‘construction of situations’ as both a critique of and an inversion of Sartre’s idea of 
the situation. For the SI, the ‘situations’ of everyday capitalist life were endured rather than 
created, imposed by the logic of the invading market rather than freely determined or 
experienced; thus the ‘construction of situations’ was implicitly a critique of a life determined 
by capitalist social relations and explicitly a hypothetical projection of the free construction of 
everyday life beyond such relations.  
Because the SI operated ‘within and against’ the present cultural milieu it suffered the danger of 
its activity falling back into the mere production of art-objects for sale, or its reduction to one of 
the many escalating but largely empty proclamations of novelty in the arts. Indeed, in 
opposition to the repetitive recasting of the formal discoveries of the recent past under such 
titles as the ‘new novel’, the ‘new poetry’ or the ‘new wave’ in cultural production considered 
more generally, the SI proposed that the only true novelty in the cultural realm must be directed 
toward the revolutionary surpassing of capitalist social relations; and thus, the establishment of 
conditions conducive to the construction of situations.116 Debord proposed that, 
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61 
 
[t]he awareness of our real possibilities requires both the recognition of the pre-
situationist character (in the strict sense of the word) of all that we can attempt, and the 
rupture (without the thought of return) with the division of artistic labour.117 
Simply put any present experimental work in the elaboration of such a hypothesis perforce 
meant that such work was necessarily ‘pre-situationist’. Not only did the SI hypothesise, but it 
practically worked toward the establishment of conditions conducive to the construction of 
situations by breaking with the present ‘division of artistic labour’. An early example of such a 
practice was unitary urbanism. Defined in the founding document as ‘the use of all arts and 
techniques as means contributing to the integral composition of a milieu’, unitary urbanism was 
the organising principle for the experimental elaboration of the construction of situations.118 As 
such it was like a ‘bridge’ between the hypothetical aim of the group and its current activities. 
Unitary urbanism encompassed the SI’s critique of contemporary capitalist urbanism and the 
practice of experimenting with alternatives. In proposing the integration and unification of the 
practice of the individual arts at the level of entire cities the SI argued that unitary urbanism ‘no 
longer correspond[ed] to any of the traditional definitions of aesthetics’.119 Unitary urbanism 
was ‘the rupture […] with the division of artistic labour’ Debord wrote of; it was the ‘pre-
situationist’ practice of members of the Situationist International ranged within and against 
capitalist society. Indeed, it was the present practice that aimed at the experimental verification 
of the hypothesis of the ‘construction of situations’ short of a full scale anti-capitalist 
revolution.120 
Seven months later, on the eve of the first full year of the Situationist International, ‘pre-
situationist’ was further elaborated in the first issue of the SI’s journal, in the collectively signed 
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article ‘Preliminary Problems in the Construction of a Situation’.121 The SI argued that the 
construction of situations would not merely consist of the ‘unitary use of artistic means [which] 
contribute to an ambience’ but also, and at the same time they must be ‘a unity of behaviour in 
time.’122 The point of this emphasis appears twofold: to caution the reduction of experimental 
unitary urbanism and the construction of situations to merely artistic means and techniques; and 
to draw attention to the total transformation of human life that is implicit in such practices. In 
opposition to contemporary ‘new’ avant-garde practices that proposed to ‘integrate art’, the SI 
wrote, 
We are not going to settle for empirical tests of environments in which we wait for 
mechanically provoked surprises. The really experimental direction of Situationist 
activity is the establishment — based on desires more or less clearly recognized — of a 
field of temporary activity favourable to these desires. […] 
Such research only has meaning for individuals practically working toward a 
construction of situations. Thus, they are all, either spontaneously or in a conscious and 
organised manner, pre-situationists, which is to say individuals who have sensed the 
objective need for this construction via the very state of empty culture and through 
similar expressions of experimental sensitivity […].123 
Debord was keen to differentiate between general trends in the cultural milieus and the social 
field more generally. ‘Pre-situationists’ are not only members of the Situationist International, 
they are all people whose practices entail a sensitivity to the need for a revolutionary ‘beyond’ 
to capitalist society, and so for conditions suitable for the construction of situations. Perhaps 
what is more interesting is the implication that such a critical attitude to the present constrained 
conditions of artistic activity and activity more generally necessarily implied the construction of 
situations as their ‘solution’. Here is the hypothesis at its most expansive, never the sole 
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property or invention of the SI but rather the clarification of tendencies present in capitalist 
society, and all those attempts that have projected a beyond — hitherto primarily by artistic 
means.124  
As mentioned earlier the term ‘pre-situationist’ was still used by the group — at least in 
published form — as late as December 1960. Significantly 1960 marked a pivotal transition in 
the group. In June, Constant Nieuwenhuys, perhaps the most single minded advocate and 
elaborator of unitary urbanism, resigned from the SI. His resignation had come after the 
expulsion of members from his Dutch section as well as other Situationists from the Italian 
section. Both expulsions had followed on from extensive discussions within the group and on 
the basis of, on the one hand, the Dutch members collaborating in the construction of a church, 
and on the other hand the Italian members who had become more closely associated with the 
very artistic milieus the SI was attempting to distinguish itself from. However with Constant’s 
resignation the practical elaboration of unitary urbanism began to wane in the group, despite the 
continued presence of the Bureau for Unitary Urbanism as an arm of the SI.125 Concurrent with 
this resignation, the French and Belgian sections began to become more closely involved with 
the ultra-left political milieus, notably the Socialisme ou Barbarie group and its political 
organisation, Pouvoir Ouvrier.126 Artists continued to be involved in the group, mostly based in 
the German and Scandinavian sections, but their activity was overwhelmingly determined by 
the very ‘individual arts’ that the hypothesis of the construction of situations and the practice of 
unitary urbanism were aimed at overcoming. By the time of the Fifth Conference in August 
1961 ‘pre-situationist’ artistic activity as components of experimental unitary urbanism was a 
moot point. Such was the environment in which ‘anti-situationist’ was proposed as the term to 
describe those works produced by Situationists practicing the individual arts. In some ways, 
‘anti-situationist’ is a marker of the retreat of the group from the earlier conception of ‘pre-
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situationist’ associated with the practice of unitary urbanism. Debord had warned the young 
Situationist group in 1957of the danger of ‘the pursuit of fragmentary works combined with 
naïve proclamations of a so-called new stage [in the arts]’.127 With the end of collaborative 
unitary urbanist experiments, such ‘anti-situationist’ ‘fragmentary works’ had come to dominate 
in the German and Scandinavian sections of the group.  
And so, returning to Jørgen Nash’s question of what constituted a Situationist film at the Fifth 
Conference, we can see that such a question was far from innocent. Debord’s hostile response 
and Kotányi’s suggestion of describing artistic activity carried out by Situationists as ‘anti-
situationist’ was more than an elaboration or ‘rebranding’ of the earlier ‘pre-situationist’; it was 
offered in opposition to what they perceived as the actual fragmentation or even dissolution of 
the Situationist project.  
Looking back on the 1962 break with the artists from the vantage point of 1963, the SI in the 
collaboratively written ‘Counter Situationist Operation in Diverse Countries’ wrote that the 
emergence of perspectives like those of Nash, Prem, Dieter Kunzelmen and Jacqueline de Jong 
in the group ‘expressed an objective tendency resulting from the ambiguous and adventurous 
politics for which the SI had to take the risk, by accepting to act within culture while being 
against all of the current organization of this culture and even against all culture as a separate 
sphere’.128 Conceived as such, the break with the artists in February and March of 1962 was 
made in order to protect and defend what was revolutionary about the Situationist project as it 
was originally conceived. It was not so much that ‘[a]rt was now anti-situationist’ as McKenzie 
Wark has remarked about the Fifth Conference and the break of 1962.129 Rather, art had always 
been anti-situationist, insofar as the practice of the ‘individual arts’ had been conceived from the 
outset as falling outside of strictly Situationist activity. All that had changed in 1961 were the 
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terms of the debate within the organisation and the consequent invention of the term ‘anti-
situationist’.  
On the form of the Hamburg Theses 
In a private letter to Raoul Vaneigem, written five months after the ‘composition’ of the 
‘Hamburg Theses’, Debord wrote:  
As a profound theoretical justification of our laziness on certain issues since [the 
conference at] Göteborg, we agreed not to write the Hamburg Theses, so as to impose 
all the better the central meaning of our entire project in the future. Thus the enemy 
cannot feign to approve them without great difficulty. Moreover, one cannot dispute 
that this is the height of the avant-gardism in the formal presentation of ideas, perhaps 
opening the way for the explication of Lautréamont’s Poesies by schoolboys?130 
Twenty-seven years later Debord reiterated the same point in his letter to Levin: ‘the intention 
of not leaving any trace’ was so that nothing of the ‘Theses’ ‘could be observed or analysed 
from outside of the SI’.131 Such concern raises the spectre of recuperation — the adaptation or 
‘partial annexation’ of aspects of the SI’s critical practice.132 However before turning to a 
consideration of such concerns it is worth noting the subtle changes in Debord’s emphasis 
between 1962 and 1989. In his 1989 letter to Levin, Debord wrote: 
The “Hamburg Theses” have had a considerable importance, in at least two respects. 
First, because they mark the most important choice made [qu’elles datent la principale 
option] in the history of the SI. But also as an experimental practice: from the latter 
point of view, the “Theses” were a striking innovation in the succession of artistic 
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avant-gardes, who hitherto had all given the impression of being eager to explain 
themselves.133 
Clearly different is the understanding of the historical content of the ‘Hamburg Theses’. Debord 
looks back from 1989 with the hindsight of the events of 1968 and after, and the role the SI 
played in them; in 1962 the break had only just been enacted and the future of the SI was 
anything but certain. However, the continuity is more striking.  
Debord drew attention to the ‘the height of avant-gardism’ and the ‘striking innovation’ of the 
‘Theses’ across the years. He is even more keen to point out that it was precisely the form of the 
‘Theses’ that allowed the SI to also protect itself from those enemies who ‘feign to approve’ the 
SI’s published statements; thus, the need to take aim at the ‘succession of artistic avant-gardes, 
who hitherto had all given the impression of being eager to explain themselves’. By precisely 
reducing the published evidence Debord and the other “authors” (in the sense that the concept of 
authorship can apply even without concrete tokens) did more than make it difficult for mere 
approval of the ‘Hamburg Theses’. They clearly posed that the avant-garde practice they were 
advocating was not commensurate with the passive consumption of radical manifestoes, theses, 
etc. 
Primarily such a criticism was aimed at an ‘internal audience’ as much as the small but growing 
audience for the SI on the margins of the artistic and political milieus of the day. Directly this 
concerned the artists in the group and the informal division of labour which located the bulk of 
the work of elaborating the theory of the SI in the hands of members of the French and Belgian 
sections (primarily Debord, Vaneigem, Kotányi and Michèle Bernstein in 1960 and ’61, and 
less often Alexander Trocchi). What Debord was driving at in his letter was not only the 
fragmentation of experimental unitary urbanism since 1960 and the tendency of the artists to do 
little more than fetishize their own production of art-objects, but the further reduction of the 
development of Situationist practice to the status of an object for mere contemplation by those 
refusing to participate in its distinctive elaboration.  
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This brings us back to the idea that the initial work of the SI, via such practices as experimental 
unitary urbanism, was directed at the overcoming of the art-object to the end of a society 
conducive to the ‘construction of situations’. Thus, the SI, even when it resulted as it often did 
in art-objects, articles, journals etc., prioritised its activity such that the practice of being a 
Situationist was subordinated to those results that were easily reified. As Debord put it in 1960 
at the very point that the practice of unitary urbanism had begun to fragment, 
[t]he previous avant-gardes presented themselves by declaring the excellence of their 
methods and principles, which were to be immediately judged on the basis of their 
works. The SI is the first artistic organisation to base itself on the radical inadequacy of 
all permissible works; and whose significance, success or failure, can only be judged 
with the revolutionary praxis of its time.134  
This is a difficult idea to accept as long as we do not attend to the specific practice of the SI. As 
I outlined above, the SI’s practice insofar as it was directed toward the elaboration and 
experimental verification of the Situationist hypothesis (aka ‘the hypothesis of the construction 
of situations’) emphasised the practice of being a Situationist as opposed to the production of 
“Situationist” objects; thus, it rejected the latter, ultimately describing the production of artistic 
objects by Situationists as ‘anti-situationist’. Certainly, the SI produced objects; primary 
amongst them was their eponymously named journal. The journal, however, was necessitated 
precisely because the Situationist project was incomplete; indeed, its primary purpose was for 
the diffusion of the Situationist critique and also their claim that the avant-garde must disappear 
in its revolutionary practice.  
Perhaps this is most clearly drawn out in an article written by Debord in February 1961: ‘For a 
revolutionary judgement of art’.135 In the article Debord takes issue with the film criticism of a 
comrade in the Socialisme ou Barbarie group.136 For our present purposes the most important 
aspect of the piece is Debord’s correlation of the impasse of the artistic avant-garde with the 
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aftermath of the defeat of the workers movement in the 1930s. Central to this defeat is the 
abstraction and reification of the workers movement itself in its organisations and ‘leadership’: 
primarily the unions, parties and even the so-called ‘workers state’ of the Soviet Union.137 To 
those who called on the Situationists to fashion a ‘positive’ project, as much as those who 
located the questionable ‘success’ of the revolutionary working class movement in trade unions, 
parties and state power, Debord wrote, 
[…] if one truly insists on finding something positive in modern culture, it must be said 
that its only positive character appears in its self-liquidation, its movement of 
disappearance, its testimony against itself.138 
This sense of the ‘positive’ project of ‘self-liquidation’, of the negation of modern capitalist 
culture, lay at the heart of the SI’s project. Debord argued that the ‘decomposition of culture’, 
i.e. the devaluation of all the received values of bourgeois culture, was an achieved fact in the 
time of the SI. To the present imitators and practitioners of ‘neo-Dada’ and other “new” art 
forms Debord wrote, ‘[i]t is no great thing to be contemporary: one is only more or less 
decomposed.’139 As Khayati remarked about the literary experimentation of the first half of the 
twentieth century, in the face of the collapse of the revolutionary contestation of 1917-1937 
‘there has not even been its abolition, since after [Marcel] Duchamp, Dada and [James] Joyce, a 
new “spectacular” literature continues to proliferate.’140 The question the SI posed, in opposition 
to the various repetitions of “anti-art” art, was how to use the decomposition in order to go 
beyond it — ‘victory will be for those who make the disorder without loving it’.141 One way we 
can summarise the Situationist attitude toward the use of art is by looking at it as an attempt to 
push the cultural decomposition to the point of undermining the possibility of re-establishing an 
‘anti-art’ aesthetic — or at least to call such a project into question by drawing out the 
                                                     
137 Thus, by the late 1950s if there was such a thing as a revolutionary workers movement it existed 
outside those groups who claimed its leadership, such as the Stalinist communist parties in the East and 
West. 
138 Debord, 'Pour un jugement révolutionnaire de l’art [février 1961],' pp. 558-63. 
139 Debord, 'Encore un effort si vous voulez être situationnistes : L’I.S. dans et contre la décomposition 
[1957],' p. 347. 
140 Khayati, 'Les mots captifs (Préface à un dictionnaire situationniste),' p. 51. 
141 G.-E. Debord, 'Thèses sur la révolution culturelle,' Internationale Situationniste, no. 1 (Juin 1958), p. 
21. 
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immanent and explicit revolutionary perspectives in the earlier anti-art avant-gardes. 
Nonetheless we must be clear of the positive dimensions of such negation.142 As I have outlined, 
the Situationist hypothesis proposed the appropriation of all of the techniques of human artifice 
to the ends of creating new ensembles, new situations. Short of such conditions, which is to say 
short of the establishment of a classless society beyond the horizon of capitalist social relations, 
the constitution of a merely positive project (such as the ‘anti-art’ aesthetic of the “neo” avant-
gardes of the 1950s and 60s) would simply be in danger of being absorbed by the vast capitalist 
market.  
Indeed, this project of ‘self-liquidation’ in art was the pivot by which the Situationists identified 
both the resonance between their critique of art and Marx’s of philosophy, but perhaps more 
crucially the limits of Marx’s criticism (a ‘limit’ I will turn to in chapters five and six below). 
Under the rubric of ‘surpassing’ or ‘supersession’ [dépassement], the Situationists would adopt 
Marx’s critique of the ‘realisation and abolition’ of philosophy. Indeed, more than anything this 
was the ‘meaning’ that Debord spoke of imposing in his letter to Vaneigem. The ‘Hamburg 
Theses’ as an attempt to evoke the project of supersession via its form was as important, 
possibly more so than the content of the discussion which made up the ‘Theses’.  
The ‘Hamburg Theses’ as content and as supersession 
The ‘Hamburg Theses’ as a non-document is its most important “content”. As we will see more 
clearly in the chapter six, for Marx the realisation of philosophy is also its abolition. The SI also 
spoke of ‘surpassing’ or ‘supersession’ — dépassement, the French word used to translate 
Hegel’s ‘aufheben’.143 The ‘Hamburg Theses’ were realised (as so many theses) in their 
abolition (in their non-redacted existence). As a formal manifesto, they existed only in their 
supersession. For instance, as so many concepts immanent to the ephemeral nature of their 
production.144 There is nothing here apart from the concepts and the passing, historical practice 
through which they emerged. This is not, however, to say that even still the practice which 
                                                     
142 Such a conception resonated with Marx’s early conception of ‘communism [a]s the positive expression 
of the abolition of private property’ — cf. Karl Marx, 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844),' 
in Early Writings, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975, pp. 345-46. 
143 For instance, in Jean Hyppolite’s translation of The Phenomenology of Spirit. Cf. footnote 54 above. 
144 And as a title, a signifier whose signified has vanished into the “beyond” of their past signification. 
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constituted the ‘Hamburg Theses’ cannot be reified — my thesis, among others, is more than 
enough proof against that. Rather it is both the analogical and literal existence of the ‘Hamburg 
Theses’ that are important. The ‘Hamburg Theses’ are a unique work of art that barely leaves a 
trace; the ‘Hamburg Theses’ are more than a name, and yet we barely have more than that. 
Where is this work? The point of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ is precisely this shadow existence, this 
phantom objectivity, this ambiguity of the becoming of being and not being.  
When Debord revealed the truth of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ to Thomas Levin in 1989, he revealed 
the single remnant of the discussion, ‘the simplest summary of its rich and complex conclusions 
could be expressed in a single phrase: “Now, the SI must realise philosophy”.’145 However, no 
matter that Debord apparently presented for the first time a literary fragment of what had 
previously ‘remained hidden’, some of the remnants of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ were in truth on 
public display in the works of the SI from 1962 and onwards. However, the chief ‘remnant’ of 
the ‘Hamburg Theses’ was its existence as the restatement of the revolutionary project of 
‘surpassing’ or ‘supersession’ [dépassement] of capitalism. The authors of the ‘Hamburg 
Theses’ ‘agreed not to write’ them ‘so as to impose even better the central meaning of our entire 
project in the future’.146 But nonetheless they were still faced with the task of imposing their 
meaning. To utterly bury the ‘central meaning’ of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ would have been as 
effectively disabling as to publicise them directly.  
So, should we reconstruct the ‘Hamburg Theses’ even if we could? The good news is that the 
‘Hamburg Theses’ are gone for ever. Nonetheless we know their general conclusions thanks to 
Debord’s letter to Levin in 1989. Additionally, he wrote in the same letter that the ‘Hamburg 
Theses’ were mentioned directly in two articles, and indirectly in one.147 However, the best 
                                                     
145 As we have seen the source of the détournement was Marx’s ‘celebrated formula’. Cf. Debord, 'Les 
thèses de Hambourg en septembre 1961 (Note pour servir à l'histoire de l'Internationale Situationniste) 
[1989],' p. 703; Marx, 'Contribution to Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction [1843-44].' 
146 Debord, 'Lettre à Raoul Vaneigem, 15 février, 1962,' p. 127. 
147 In fact, he wrote that it was directly mentioned in three articles in the seventh issue, but he is wrong. 
For instance, on one of the pages cited in the letter to Levin the dérive to Hamburg after the Fifth 
conference is mentioned, but not the Theses which resulted. Cf. Debord, 'Les thèses de Hambourg en 
septembre 1961 (Note pour servir à l'histoire de l'Internationale Situationniste) [1989],' p. 703; I.S., 'La 
Cinquième Conférence de l’I.S. à Göteborg,' p. 31. 
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place to start is with Debord’s pithy rendering of what the conclusion of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ 
— “Now, the SI must realise philosophy” — meant in the “present” context:  
The summarised conclusions evoked a celebrated formula of Marx in 1844 (in his 
Contribution to the Critique of Hegel Philosophy of Right [— Introduction]). At that 
moment, it meant that we should no longer pay the least importance to any of the 
conceptions of revolutionary groups that still survived as heirs of the old social 
emancipation movement destroyed in the first half of our century; and therefore that we 
should instead count on the SI alone to relaunch as soon as possible a time of 
contestation, by revitalising all of the starting points which were established in the 
1840s.148 Once established this position did not imply the coming rupture with the 
artistic “right” of the SI (who feebly wanted to continue or only repeat modern art), but 
rendered it extremely probable. We can thus recognise that the “Theses of Hamburg” 
marked the end of the first era of the SI — that is research into a truly new artistic 
terrain (1957-61) — as well as fixing the departure point for the operation that led to the 
movement of May 1968, and what followed.149  
As we will see more clearly in chapter seven, below, not ‘pay[ing] the least importance to any 
of the conceptions of revolutionary groups’ was aimed squarely at the old conceptions 
revolutionary organisation based upon the figure of the political militant. Thus, Raoul 
Vaneigem has recently noted that in the case of Socialisme ou Barbarie, it was not the theory 
                                                     
148 The second clause of the forgoing sentence has been particularly hard to translate accurately in 
English. Earlier English translations have rendered it the opposite of my translation — i.e. ‘therefore that 
we should instead no longer count on the SI alone to relaunch as soon as possible a time of contestation’. 
I had used such renderings unquestioning (for instance in my article, 'Three Situationists walk into a bar: 
or, the peculiar case of the Hamburg Theses', Axon: Creative Explorations, no. 8), and indeed the fault of 
this use lies only with myself. Thanks to Tom Bunyard I was alerted to my error. Nonetheless I have not 
been able to shake off completely the ambiguity of this sentence. It makes sense that after deciding ‘that 
we should no longer pay the least importance to any of the conceptions of the revolutionary groups that 
still survived’, the SI would ‘count on’ itself ‘alone to relaunch as soon as possible a time of contestation’ 
[my emphasis].  I believe that my confusion in this regard was produced by the corollary belief that the SI 
also began to see its project as emerging directly from the lived experience of alienated, everyday life — 
i.e. that ‘Situationist theory is in people like fish are in water’ — I.S., 'Du rôle de l’I.S.,' p. 17. Thus I 
thought it was reasonable that the SI would no longer count on itself alone. However, upon reflection this 
conclusion makes no sense; further, the comment of Debord was pointedly aimed at what he perceived as 
the failure of other ultra-left groups like Socialisme ou Barbarie and to a lesser extent the Arguments 
group. 
149 Debord, 'Les thèses de Hambourg en septembre 1961 (Note pour servir à l'histoire de l'Internationale 
Situationniste) [1989].' 
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which was lacking, but rather the practice of the group based on the idea of ‘political militancy’ 
which it had inherited from its Trotskyist and Leninist progenitors.150 Additionally, soon after 
the ‘Hamburg Theses’, the Socialisme ou Barbarie group moved into its final crisis, namely the 
split carried out over 1962 and 1963, that weakened both sides and led to their eventual demise.  
What’s more, by Debord’s lights the SI was proved correct by the May movement of 1968. And 
indeed, it is hard to disagree. Not only did the PCF prove to be one of the main impediments to 
the surpassing of the May 1968 movement into a revolutionary situation, but also the SI became 
better known and influential in the student movement after the Strasbourg scandal of November 
1966.151 On the basis of the influence of their radical critique and the patent influence it exerted 
on the revolutionaries of 1968 and after, we can argue that in the French context the SI alone 
‘relaunched’ a ‘time of contestation’.152 
However, Debord’s letter is not the only source for information on the ‘Hamburg Theses’. I 
have already mentioned another letter Debord wrote to Raoul Vaneigem in 1962 regarding 
‘impos[ing] […] the central meaning of our entire project in the future’.153 This letter confirms 
Debord’s latter comments regarding the central meaning of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ lying in the 
project of ‘supersession’ — in particularly of art, philosophy, politics and the economy. In 
doing so Debord invokes the ‘Hamburg Theses’ as the ‘height of avant-gardism’ — the latter-
day progeny of Rimbaud’s silence and Malevich’s white square on white.154 However there is 
                                                     
150 Vaneigem, 'Raoul Vaneigem: Self-Portraits and Caricatures of the Situationist International [2014]'. I 
will return to this question in more detail in chapters three and six, below. 
151 Although the claim that the SI helped launch the movement of May 1968 is controversial for some 
(mostly for those who had successfully given up working for revolution by 1968 and their latter-day 
disciples) it is undoubtedly true that the SI deeply influenced much of the student “trigger” of the 
movement of May 1968. For instance, the Situationist pamphlet, De la misère en milieu étudiant, and the 
resulting scandal around its publication at the University of Strasbourg in 1966 became a touchstone for 
the marked spike in student radicalism in France in 1967 and 1968. Additionally, Situationist ideas were 
well represented among those students who sparked the May 1968 events, in particular the Situationist 
inspired Enragés, as well as many of the participants in the March 22nd Movement, at the University of 
Nanterre.  
152 Although this is far from saying that the SI was alone responsible for the movement of May 1968, just 
that in the face of the Stalinist PCF and a dissident far-left that either retreating into the academy or 
ideally fought the battles of the past, the SI alone turned to the project of relaunching a revolutionary 
movement on a new basis.  
153 Debord, 'Lettre à Raoul Vaneigem, 15 février, 1962,' p. 127. 
154 Ibid. 
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another source of (in)direct information on the ‘Hamburg Theses’, namely two articles by the 
Situationist Attila Kotányi, written in 1962 and 1963. 
In the seventh issue of Internationale Situationniste Kotányi penned the article ‘The Next 
Stage’, which included one of the few direct references to the ‘Hamburg Theses’:  
What in the original program of the SI is the most disturbing, that keeps people from 
sleeping? Responding to this question in philosophical terms is clearly absurd. And yet, 
as present-day philosophy situates itself entirely within the theme of ‘abandoning 
philosophy’ (cf. the Hamburg Theses) […].155  
Why is it absurd to attempt to render the most disturbing aspect of the SI’s original program in 
philosophical terms? Kotányi’s reference to the ‘original program’ is, without doubt, that 
outlined in the Report on the Construction of Situations (1957) and what I have called the 
Situationist hypothesis. On the basis of the ‘original program’ he believed it was absurd to 
render the Situationist hypothesis in philosophical terms, because in its crucial attitude toward 
bourgeois culture, the hypothesis had already outlined a project effectively coterminous with 
Marx’s ‘realisation and abolition of philosophy’. Indeed, one of the results of the ‘Hamburg 
Theses’ was precisely the drawing together of the earlier Situationist project of surpassing art, 
summarised in the ideas of ‘pre-situationist’ and ‘anti-situationist’ works, with that of Marx’s 
idea of the supersession of philosophy as the theoretical content and opening gambit in the 
revolutionary overcoming of capitalism. 
How then should we understand Kotányi’s idea of the entirety of present day philosophy being 
situated within the theme of ‘abandoning philosophy’? Kotányi did not mean ‘supersession’, in 
the sense of either the Situationist hypothesis or the SI’s discovery of Marx’s notion of the 
‘realisation and abolition’ of philosophy (what they would call ‘supersession’ [dépassement], 
harkening to the Hegelian tone of Marx’s argument). Rather he was arguing that present day 
philosophy had abandoned the perspective of Marx, which is to say that philosophy can only be 
realised by being abolished as a separate practice. Thus, the abandonment of philosophy and its 
                                                     
155 Attila Kotányi, 'L'Étage suivant,' Internationale Situationniste, no. 7 (Avril 1962), p. 47. 
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supersession is not the same thing. Indeed, the deeper importance of Kotányi’s statement is that 
the only possible philosophy that can be practiced in the present is one that acknowledges its 
movement toward supersession, i.e. a philosophy whose realisation is immersed in a 
revolutionary surpassing of capitalist everyday life.  
The corollary of this is that those philosophers engaged in philosophy — whether academic or 
not, Marxist or otherwise — who do not acknowledge the ‘suspended’ nature of present 
philosophy — suspended that is between its ‘separate’, ‘alienated’ existence in capitalism and 
its ‘realisation’ in everyday life — have ‘abandoned philosophy’. One could, like Theodor 
Adorno, argue that the supersession of philosophy missed its moment of realisation, and so its 
supersession turns into a philosophical one (which is to say a primarily reflective, contemplative 
one).156 However the SI eschewed such a perspective. The end of philosophy announced by 
Marx in 1844 has not been rendered obsolete in turn by the force of its incompletion. Instead, 
the continued existence and development of bourgeois society has suspended its supersession, 
and this suspension is embodied in the apparent “development” of philosophy in the intervening 
century and more. This, of course, is not to say that philosophy has not developed since 1844. 
Rather, the condition of philosophy’s realisation in Marx and the Situationists’ reckoning is its 
overcoming as an activity apart from the transformation of everyday life. Thus, the project of its 
“realisation” had been thwarted even as philosophy continued in its official capacity as the 
“critic” of everything that exists.   
If we turn to other parts of the seventh issue of the Internationale Situationniste, the issue in 
which Kotányi’s article appeared (quoted above), we can clarify further this idea of ‘abandoning 
philosophy’ and ‘surpassing’ and ‘supersession’. Indeed, the seventh issue of the journal, 
published in April 1962, was the first issue of the journal to be published after the composition 
of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ and the break with the artists in February 1962. As such it was a 
singularly important example of what they called their ‘dominant position in culture’, 
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summarising their turn to the ‘realisation’ of philosophy as it was outlined in the ‘Theses’.157 
The SI argued that such a positon was a result precisely of not constituting either a ‘positive 
politics’ or a ‘positive art’: ‘our strength is in never having done such’.158 Here the key to the SI 
is in their project of surpassing — dépassement — the Situationist hypothesis that was not 
strictly Situationist. Situationist ‘artistic production’, indeed any of the productions of the SI 
tended toward being ‘anti-situationist’ insofar as they instantiated ‘positive’ objects of 
production (for example, the shiny metal covered issues of their journal). Thus, the SI made 
explicit their paradoxical relation to current productions. Indeed, we need to go further than 
Kotányi did at the Fifth Conference at Göteborg and argue that all productions of the SI this 
side of an anti-capitalist revolution were ‘anti-situationist’ — even and especially the journal. 
For instance, in a telling comment to his old International Letterist comrade Ivan Chtcheglov, 
Debord spoke of the paradoxes of publishing the Situationist journal. On the one hand, he spoke 
of the ‘inevitable difficulties’ and ‘inevitable faults […] of certain types of actions’ — 
difficulties which encompassed the ‘very tiresome’ nature of ‘publishing a slightly “regular” 
journal’.159 However such ‘faults’ were the ‘inevitabilities’ of acting within and against 
capitalist culture. Thus, it was necessary, on the other hand, to conceive of the SI’s journal as 
the ‘living voice’ of the group in order ‘to envision more precisely supersessions’.160 The 
question then was not one of purity or purely Situationist activity, but rather how best to both 
draw out the actual movement of potential and real supersession under conditions which tended 
to both efface and dissimulate such a movement. What then would distinguish such ‘anti-
situationist’ productions under the sign of supersession would be whether or not they would 
explicitly contribute only to a ‘simultaneous destruction and strengthening’ of the art and 
politics of their time.161  
                                                     
157 I.S., 'Du rôle de l’I.S.,' p. 19. The SI considered themselves to have the ‘dominant position in culture’, 
insofar as the dominant culture of capitalism was necessarily fragmentary and largely self-contradictory.  
158 Ibid. 
159 Debord, 'Lettre à Ivan Chtcheglov, 30 avril 1963,' p. 220. 
160 Ibid. 
161 I.S., 'Du rôle de l’I.S.,' p. 19. 
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The seventh issue of Internationale Situationniste was the first in which the SI typified their 
ideas as ‘totally popular’: ‘Situationist theory is in people like fish in water’.162 An incredible 
claim you would imagine, but consistent with Marx’s conception of the urgent solution to the 
problems of Young Hegelianism to be found in the sometime enigmatic figure of the 
‘proletariat’. Here the SI clearly identified the Situationist hypothesis and the Situationist 
project with a general revolutionary project as outlined by Marx in the 1840s. However, they 
also argued that this had, in any case, been the path of the SI from its beginning — at least for 
some Situationists. From the perspective of 1962, the SI argued that they had already rendered a 
‘provisional report on surpassing [dépassement]’ from the first issue in 1958.163 The real 
importance of this claim was that the tendency which emphasised not just the ‘anti-artistic’ 
aspect of the SI, but the idea of ‘a society of realised art’, were the same ones most dedicated to 
the experimentations with surpassing art and capitalist society. As we will see in the coming 
chapters, Situationists dedicated to the ‘art-world’ and finding a place for the SI within this 
world, tended to identify less with the project of ‘surpassing’. Indeed, the ‘Hamburg Theses’ 
was a clear repudiation of art and the art-work so far by the SI, even and especially as it played 
with the idea of absence and surpassing in artistic form. Thus, Kotányi’s point regarding ‘anti-
situationist’ art at the Fifth Conference should be further understood as the repudiation of all 
activities which abandoned the project of their own supersession.  
The identification of the SI’s earlier project of ‘realising art’ with the ‘surpassing’ that Marx 
posed in the ‘realisation and abolition of philosophy’ is without doubt the most important aspect 
of the ‘Hamburg Theses’. Just as the SI posed a new proletariat like fish swimming in 
Situationist water, Kotányi wrote in ‘The Next Stage’ that the argument against abandoning 
philosophy was ‘not solely a question of “our program”’, even though, paradoxically, 
‘[e]veryone compulsorily participates, for or against, in the Situationist program’164. In words 
redolent of Marx in 1873 avowing himself both a student of Hegel and the source of Hegel’s 
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164 Kotányi, 'L'Étage suivant,' p. 47. Note that Vaneigem in the same issue, in his article ‘Basic Banalities 
[part 1]’, quoted an uncited source to the extent that ‘our ideas are in all the heads’. I believe this is 
Vaneigem slyly quoting the ‘Hamburg Theses’. Cf. Raoul Vaneigem, 'Banalités de base (I),' 
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‘inversion’, Kotányi argued that the ‘chestnut’ of supersession [dépassement] had been dropped 
by ‘surrealism, Marxism, existentialism, etc. […] when it got too hot’.165 Indeed this ‘chestnut’ 
in which everyone ‘compulsorily participates’ whether they like it or not, is none other than the 
‘infinitely complicated conflict of alienation and the struggle against alienation’ — which is to 
say the ‘supersession’ immanent to the conflicts of everyday capitalist life.166 Here is the ‘most 
disturbing’ aspect of the SI’s ‘original program’, the terror which Marx identified in the ruling 
class when confronted with the ‘abomination’ of the revolutionary dialectic — which is to say 
the possibility of the positive negation of bourgeois private property.167 The SI declared 
themselves as the ‘positive pole’ of modern alienation; revolutionary ‘mapmakers’ whose 
charting of ‘the poverty of [modern, spectacular] wealth’ revealed a world growing over-stuffed 
with modern, spectacular misery.168   
From the perspective of 1989, Debord emphasised the singularity of the SI’s project as on the 
one hand, ‘pay[ing] [not] the least importance to any of the conceptions of the revolutionary 
groups that still survived as heirs of the old social emancipation movement’; and on the other, 
that ‘the SI alone’ would ‘relaunch as soon as possible a time of contestation’.169 However in 
1962 Kotányi emphasised the philosophical and anti-philosophical dimensions. And of course, 
so he would. The ‘Hamburg Theses’ concluded with the call to realise philosophy. As we have 
seen, the SI had come to the conclusion that those philosophers who had abandoned the project 
to ‘realise and abolish philosophy’ as Marx had argued for in 1844, had in effect abandoned 
philosophy even and especially as they practiced its Marxist afterlife. Indeed, this perspective 
would soon have ramifications for philosophers like Henri Lefebvre and militant theorists like 
Cornelius Castoriadis. The main question for the SI was simply not giving up on Marx’s 
‘ruthless criticism of everything’ — for philosophers and intellectuals more generally this 
necessarily included their specialised role under conditions of modern capitalism.  Like Marx, 
                                                     
165 Kotányi, 'L'Étage suivant,' p. 47. 
166 The phrase, ‘infinitely complicated conflict of alienation and the struggle against alienation’, is 
redolent of Henri Lefebvre’s phrasing, particularly in the first volume of the Critique of Everyday Life.  
167 Karl Marx, 'Postface to the Second Edition [1873],' in Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 
1, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, [1867] 1976. 
168 I.S., 'Du rôle de l’I.S.,' p. 18. 
169 Debord, 'Les thèses de Hambourg en septembre 1961 (Note pour servir à l'histoire de l'Internationale 
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the SI argued that their ‘materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and 
upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that the educator must himself be 
educated’.170 In the face of philosophers and leftists who had given up on this radical criticism, 
the SI posed themselves as one aspect of the thought to which alienated reality struggled. Thus, 
perhaps paradoxically, it was the SI that had not given up on philosophy or art in the midst of 
their project of supersession (as opposed to the abandonment of this perspective): 
It is not difficult for the thought whose role is to call everything into question. It 
suffices to have not abandoned philosophy (like most philosophers), to have not 
abandoned art (like most artists) and to have not abandoned the contestation of present-
day reality (like most [political] militants). These questions are thus entailed in the same 
surpassing [dépassement].171  
The abandoning, then, is what the SI would also call the spectacular and ideological 
abandonment of everyday life. That is, the abandonment of practising philosophy, art and 
politics in the mode of their supersession, of realising them in everyday life through the critique 
and supersession of capitalist everyday life, rather than retreating into their specialised, 
scholarly elaboration, and thereby contributing to the reproduction of the capitalist social 
relation (I will return to this problem in the following chapters).  
A year later in 1963 Kotányi would helpfully shorten and clarify his previously elusive 
comments in the ‘second version’ of the slightly renamed ‘Next Stage’, for a German language 
version of the Situationist journal: 
After the intensive discussions which took place between 10 and 18 October 1961 in 
Hamburg, we came to the general conclusion that: 
1. The specialists of thought, logic, language and artistic language, and of dialectics and 
philosophy, had in essence abandoned or had not taken on the main themes, results, 
                                                     
170 Karl Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach [1845],' in Karl Marx & Frederich Engels Collected Works, Vol.5, 
New York: International Publishers, 1976, thesis 3, p. 4. 
171 Internationale Situationniste, 'Les mauvais jours finiront,' Internationale Situationniste, no. 7 (Avril 
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historical ambitions, critical audacity, and methodical hopes, dreams and desires of their 
predecessors; 
2. For these reasons, we were forced to adopt the following hypothesis: one can 
discover in one form or another in every person in industrialised countries, an obvious 
aspiration for an interesting everyday life, and a criticism (formulated by us) of its 
[present] production [sa mise en scène] — even though this aspiration and this criticism 
is largely suppressed.172 
Again, Kotányi mentioned Hamburg, but this time he did not mention the public secret that was 
the ‘Hamburg Theses’. The date accompanying his words is strange, because it is more than a 
month after Debord’s later recollection of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ being composed in ‘early 
September’ 1961. However, these are all possible smokescreens. To add to the confusion the SI 
had also referred to their composition in ‘Summer 1961’, placing the ‘Hamburg Theses’ before 
September.173 What confirms that these points are a part of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ is the 
reference to the ‘intensive discussion’, the similarity between these points and Kotányi’s 
association of them with the ‘Hamburg Theses’ the year before, and finally their resonances 
with Debord’s explanation of the ‘summarised conclusion’ of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ in 1989.174 
I suggest that on this basis and the discussion above of the central importance of the idea of 
‘surpassing’ or ‘supersession’, not to mention the form of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ as the 
attempted embodiment of this central meaning, we can combine Kotányi’s ‘general conclusions’ 
with Debord’s explanation of the ‘summarised conclusion’ of the ‘Hamburg Theses’. 
What remains of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ 
‘The simplest summary of its rich and complex conclusions could be expressed in a single 
phrase: “Now, the SI must realise philosophy.” At that moment, [this] meant: 
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1. ‘The specialists of thought, logic, language and artistic language, and of dialectics and 
philosophy, had in essence abandoned or had not taken on the main themes, results, historical 
ambitions, critical audacity, and methodical hopes, dreams and desires of their predecessors’. 
2. ‘For these reasons, we were forced to adopt the following hypothesis: one can discover in 
one form or another in every person in industrialised countries, an obvious aspiration for an 
interesting everyday life, and a criticism (formulated by us) of its [present] production [sa mise 
en scène] — even though this aspiration and this criticism is largely suppressed’.  
3. [Thus] ‘We should no longer pay the least importance to any of the conceptions of the 
revolutionary groups that still survived as heirs of the old social emancipation movement 
destroyed in the first half of our century’.  
4. ‘Therefore […] we should instead count on the SI alone to relaunch as soon as possible a 
time of contestation, by revitalising all of the starting points which were established in the 
1840s’. 
Conclusion 
By eschewing a physical object-form for the ‘Hamburg Theses’, the SI drew attention not only 
to the ephemerality of their production, but also attempted to directly gesture at the becoming of 
their production; i.e. there was no physical residue to be fetishized. It is no wonder that Debord 
believed the ‘Hamburg Theses’ were the height of avant-gardism, their ‘formal innovation’ a 
striking ‘experimental originality’.175 Here was a theoretical text that argued despite its absence, 
and through its absence. Indeed, keeping in mind the argument regarding the ‘anti-situationist’ 
nature of the works of the Situationists assayed above, the ‘Hamburg Theses’ is the art work at 
its limit. It was the deliberate refusal to publish the results, even though a process of creation 
has taken place — which is to say objectified. Through the ‘Hamburg Theses’ the “authors” not 
only formulated what they saw as crucial conclusions for the Situationist project; they also 
threw down a challenge to those artists both in the SI and on its margins. The ‘Hamburg Theses’ 
was a Situationist work that wrestled with its anti-situationist nature; an attempt to conjure 
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supersession in a work of art or theory, in both its content and form, in a world hostile to such a 
project. Nonetheless, like so many innovations of the avant-garde, Debord was disabused of any 
lasting originality in form. In 1989 he noted that such “documents” made up an increasing part 
of the discrete operations of capital and the state. Indeed, we should also not forget that the 
absent object of production was hardly a new topic for Debord, considering his film without 
images in 1952. Unlike that film, Hurlements en faveur de Sade, the ‘Hamburg Theses’ did not 
conjure supersession so much as embody it in its very non-repeatability. Perhaps, by way of 
Walter Benjamin, we can think of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ as an attempt to eschew the 
degradations of artistic ‘aura’ in the wake of the spectacle of mass reproduction.176  
In the next chapter I will turn to an examination of the development of Debord’s critique of art 
and culture more generally. In particular, I will look at the idea of ‘cultural decomposition’ by 
which Debord synthesised and systematised his critique of the artistic avant-gardes that was 
underway during the time of the Letterist International (1952-1957). As we will see, the idea of 
a Situationist “work” which problematized the ‘fragmentary works’ of the traditional arts was 
developed and presented as the only way to avoid the perils of artistic repetition and the 
corralling of the avant-garde as producers for the burgeoning art market. However, it was one of 
the “discoveries” of the artistic avant-gardes in particular, that Debord saw as providing a 
method and methodology for moving beyond the artistic impasse of ‘fragmentary’ and thus 
alienable “works” — what Debord and his comrade Gil J Wolman called ‘détournement’. In 
essence, détournement (from the French ‘to divert’ and ‘to hijack’) was the practice of re-using 
the past results of human activity. First systematised by the writer Isidore Ducasse under the 
idea of progressive plagiarism, it had been further developed by Picasso, Georges Braque and 
the Dadaists as ‘collage’ and ‘photomontage’. However, Debord believed its import was far-
retching, pointing to both the irreducibly plagiaristic nature of human creation, and thus 
contrary to the capitalist attempt to delimit the “rewards” of practice via the imposition of 
intellectual and material property rights. As we will see, détournement and the critique of 
cultural decomposition were the cornerstones of the formation of the SI. Nonetheless, disputes 
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over the nature of realising the Situationist project in the capitalist present would lead ultimately 
lead Debord and others to explore methods and perspectives less prone to artistic recuperation. 
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Chapter two: Poetry necessarily without poems 
[T]here will be no more philosophy, no history, Poesy alone will survive all other                  
arts and sciences. — Friedrich Hölderlin177  
The social revolution […] cannot take its poetry from the past but only from the future.  
— Karl Marx178 
As we have seen in chapter one, the idea of the supersession of art embodied in the ‘Hamburg 
Theses’ was itself drawn from the Situationist hypothesis and the practice of unitary urbanism. 
The hypothesis proposed to solve the impasse encountered by the anti-artistic criticism and 
practice of the earlier avant-gardes by way of projecting the immediate possibility of a different 
conception of creative activity based upon the potential and limits of present capitalist society. 
Thus, the Situationist hypothesis was anticipatory in the sense that this activity — Situationist 
activity properly conceived — would only be possible beyond the ‘modern ruins of the 
[capitalist] spectacle’.179 In this way the hypothesis proposed to supersede art by way of an 
activity — the construction of situations — that would draw upon artistic practice without being 
reduced to the present conception or limited nature of such. Nonetheless the anticipatory nature 
of the Situationist project remained perplexing for some members of the SI, provoking Debord 
to argue for the ‘pre-situationist’ notion of their present practice in order to distinguish it from 
Situationist activity properly conceived. But such an argument was necessarily ambiguous 
considering both the Situationists of the SI and the pre-situationist nature of their practice. But 
as the SI pointed out, the term ‘Situationist’ would in any case be a moot point by the time 
conditions conducive to the Situationist hypothesis prevailed: ‘it will disappear when each of us 
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will be a fully-fledged Situationist, and no longer proletarians struggling for the end of the 
proletariat’.180  
The ambiguity was not practically resolved until the expulsion of the majority of the German 
and Scandinavian sections of the SI in February and March 1962, which followed relatively 
quickly upon the discussion regarding the ‘anti-situationist’ nature of artistic production under 
present capitalist social relations, in August 1961. However, ‘practical’ is the key here, because 
the ambiguity necessarily remained in the idea of the Situationists of the Situationist 
International. In the same article quoted above the group declared that ‘we are artists only 
insofar as we are no longer artists: we just realise art’.181 Considering that this statement was 
made two years after the ‘anti-situationist’ declaration and the so-called break with the artists, it 
is important to remember the ongoing artistic dimensions of the group — i.e. that for the 
Situationists of the SI, the supersession of art was inextricably caught up in what they 
considered the realisation of art.  
It is important to note that the Situationist notion of the ‘surpassing of art’ (dépassement de 
l’art) — which is to say the simultaneous abolition and realisation of art — was not initially 
phrased in this Marxian register. At the time of the foundation of the SI, the supersession of art 
was posed in terms of realising the Situationists hypothesis. Debord had then argued about the 
present state of culture being fragmented, the result of the ‘active’ and ‘repetitive’ 
decomposition of culture. In particular, he took aim at the ‘traditional arts’ and the concept of 
the ‘art work’. The production of art-objects were posed as ‘fragmented’, and in their stead an 
‘integral art’ was proposed, that would draw upon artistic technique, but not be reduced to such 
(insofar as ‘fragmentary’, alienable art-objects would not be the aim of such activity).182 
Nonetheless, it is legitimate to pose the Situationist hypothesis in terms of the later notion of the 
‘supersession of art’. What was encompassed in Debord’s critique of ‘decomposition’, and the 
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method and methodology of ‘détournement’, was precisely what came to be proposed under the 
terms ‘dépassement’.   
In this chapter I will examine Debord’s early conception of ‘cultural decomposition’ and 
‘détournement’, both of which anticipated, and were incorporated into, the notion of the 
supersession of art (dépassement de l’art) of the later, more Marxian SI. My main aim is to 
demonstrate that this later problematic — often described paradoxically as commensurate with 
the so-called ‘break’ with art in 1962 — was already central to the Situationist hypothesis, albeit 
in a less Hegelian register. Without doubt Debord was ‘engaged’ with Marx, but at this point his 
engagement seemed to be bereft of both the Hegelian dimensions and in particular Marx’s 
conception of the philosophical roots of revolutionary praxis outlined in some of his early 
work.183 Nonetheless, the supersession of art, already outlined in the Situationist hypothesis, is 
the thread of continuity in the Situationist project envisaged across the first and second phases 
of the SI. Those critics who have described the 1962 ‘break’ in the SI in terms of breaking from 
art to politics, have not sufficiently understood the Situationist hypothesis as already posing the 
‘realisation’ and ‘supersession of art’. Rather than breaking with art — a perspective, moreover 
already encompassed explicitly in The Report on the Construction of Situations (1957) and the 
Amsterdam Declaration (1958/59) — the SI’s project of the realisation of art, by way of its 
supersession, was put on a more general footing from around 1962. That is to say, in the words 
of the ‘Hamburg Theses’, the SI turned to the ‘realisation of philosophy’ — the idea of 
supersession already outlined in the hypothesis — a project fitfully elaborated and delayed from 
the foundation of the SI in 1957. I will more fully deal with this question, and the role of 
‘poetry, in the Situationist sense of the term’, in chapter five. 
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The idea of ‘cultural decomposition’ was an important precursor to Debord’s later, more 
detailed elaboration of the concept of ‘spectacle’. Certainly, the concept of ‘spectacle’ was 
already present in Debord’s 1957 elaboration of cultural decomposition; however, at that point 
the more general sense of spectacular passivity was understood as a function of cultural 
decomposition, and subordinated to such an understanding. Nonetheless, Debord’s conception 
of the severing of the artistic and political avant-gardes in the 1930s would re-emerge in his 
conceptualisation of the spectacle, particularly with regards to the pivotal role he attributed to 
the rise of Stalinism and its ideological representation of the ‘revolutionary proletariat’ (in a 
word, its false representation). I will return to this important question, and its relationship to the 
development of the concept of spectacle, in chapter seven. 
The impasse of Dada and Surrealism 
In his 1967 work, The Society of the Spectacle, Debord distinguished the Situationist project 
from Dada and Surrealism precisely on the grounds of that the Situationist project was at once 
the negation and positive realisation of art: 
Dadaism wanted to abolish art without realising it; and Surrealism wanted to realise art 
without abolishing it. The critical position later elaborated by the Situationists has 
shown that the abolition and realisation of art are inseparable aspects of a single 
surpassing of art [dépassement de l’art].184 
Debord’s point regarding the original Surrealist group is perhaps more complex and nuanced 
than the quote here indicates. By 1967 Debord presented the Situationist project as the 
revolutionary ‘surpassing of art’ which Dada and Surrealism had at best aspired to, but in their 
respective one-sided fashions had failed to achieve. In the quote above we find the final Hegel-
Marx inflected pronouncement on Dada and Surrealism. However, Debord in the mid-1960s 
was restating a judgement that had already been passed ten years before, though not couched in 
the language of the ‘realisation, abolition and surpassing of art’. What is perhaps lost in the later 
assessment was the recognition that Surrealism at its best (that is to say Surrealism at its 
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commencement in 1924) was both an attempt to continue and resolve the impasse upon which 
Dada foundered — namely its exhaustion and self-destruction. In an early ‘Declaration’ 
addressed at disabusing opinions on the Surrealist project, the Surrealists would inadvertently 
summarise the crux of their strength and weakness: ‘We have nothing to do with literature; but 
we are quite capable, when necessary, of making use of it like anyone else’.185 The tragedy of 
Surrealism, in Debord’s reckoning, was that their attempt to fashion a practice beyond art 
became consumed by the artistic methods — both means and end — they pursued. Thus, 
Surrealism’s greatest failing was not so much being the direct ‘opposite’ of the Dada group’s 
negativity; but rather being largely unaware or at least insufficiently wary of the dangers of 
recomposing a ‘positive’, artistic project in order to overcome the apparent exhaustion of 
Dadaist negativity in the early 1920s.  
Nonetheless, the experiences of the original Surrealist group held an important place in the eyes 
of Debord. In the founding document Debord noted that ‘[t]he Surrealist program, affirming the 
sovereignty of desire and surprise, [and] proposing a new way of life, is much richer in 
constructive possibilities than is generally realized.’186 Despite Debord’s and the SI’s hostility to 
the ‘really existing Surrealism’ of the 1950s and 60s, the attitude of Surrealism’s significance 
for revolutionists was precisely that practical and ephemeral aspect of Surrealism that was least 
amenable to recuperation and commodification: 
The privileged place of this movement […] comes from the fact that Surrealism 
presents itself as a total project, concerning the whole way of living. It is this intention 
that constitutes Surrealism’s most progressive aspect, which obliges us to compare 
ourselves to it, so as to differentiate ourselves […]187 
As Debord makes clear it is this ‘total project’ that is of most import as opposed to the more 
conventionally accepted notion of Surrealism’s significance lying in its peculiar aesthetic 
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sensibility.188 Thus in 1958 the SI drew attention to the contradiction of contemporaneous 
Surrealism as that between the ‘profound demand’ of its original program ‘and the stagnation 
accompanying its pseudo-success’.189 Of some interest in this regard was the extent to which 
Debord and the SI’s criticism of the Surrealists would be partially taken up by more moderate, 
“mainstream” criticism. For instance, Maurice Nadeau in his 1964 history of the Surrealist 
project: 
The fact still remains that, thanks to Dada, surrealism in its early days rejected the 
literary, poetic, or plastic solution. […] The surrealists’ ambition was not to build a new 
aesthetic on its ruins. […] The movement was envisaged by its founders not as a new 
artistic school, but as a means of knowledge […].190 
Nonetheless, Nadeau was unable to understand the root of Surrealism’s failure to remain 
faithful to its original ambition. He merely remarked that ‘[i]t has been noted that art ultimately 
found a place within Surrealism’ without understanding the enervating nature of this, or indeed 
offering to explain what he meant by such an observation.191 Worse, from the Situationist 
estimation, was his inability to locate the foundational error precisely in the Surrealists idealistic 
fetish of the unconscious.  
Debord wrote in 1957 that, 
[t]he error that is at the root of Surrealism is the idea of the infinite richness of the 
unconscious imagination. The cause of the ideological failure of Surrealism was its 
belief that the unconscious was the finally discovered grand force of life; and the fact 
that the surrealists revised the history of ideas in accordance with that simplistic 
perspective and never went any further. We now know that the unconscious imagination 
is poor, that automatic writing is monotonous, and that the whole ostentatious genre of 
would-be “strange” and “shocking” surrealistic creations has ceased to be very 
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surprising. The formal fidelity to this style of imagination ultimately leads back to the 
polar opposite of the modern conditions of imagination: back to traditional occultism. 
[…] Opposing an apparently irrational society in which the clash between reality and 
the old but still vigorously proclaimed values was pushed to the point of absurdity, 
surrealism made use of the irrational to destroy that society’s superficially logical 
values. […] But we need to go forward, not backward. We need to make the world 
more rational — the necessary first step in making it more exciting.192 
Debord argued that Surrealism’s very success in the art world, and in the Surrealist imagery 
taken up more widely in cinema and advertising, was due to ‘the most modern side of this 
society’s ideology’ renouncing ‘a strict hierarchy of factitious values and openly use[ing] the 
irrational, including vestiges of surrealism.’193 It was precisely the works of Surrealism, and the 
appropriation of Surrealist ideas and images in advertising and cultural industries more broadly, 
that could play a role in defusing the more radical claims of the original Surrealists. 
Such works were ‘de-fanged’ of their critical Surrealist context in the interests of the ‘ordinary 
aesthetic commerce’ of capitalism.194 The Situationist Mustapha Khayati commented in 1966,  
Dada realised all the possibilities of what to say, and closed forever the door on art as a 
specialised practice. It definitively posed the question of the realisation of art. 
Surrealism was valuable only as the continuation of this demand — in its literary works 
it was reactionary. Because the realisation of art (which is to say poetry, in the 
Situationist sense of the term) signifies that one cannot realise oneself in a “work”, but 
on the contrary one realises oneself — full stop.195 
The idea of the realisation of oneself, ‘full stop’, brings us back to the idea of the form of the 
‘Hamburg Theses’ as their most important aspect; i.e. the meaning of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ as 
immanent to their ephemeral production.  
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As already noted, in Debord’s 1957 criticism of Surrealism the role of the failure of the 
revolutionary movement of 1917 to 1921 was seen as central to the failure of Surrealism and 
Dada. The ‘ebbing of the movements that had tried to promote liberatory innovations in culture 
and everyday life’ was conceived as following in the wake of the ebb of the ‘world 
revolutionary movement’ after 1920.196 As the SI would mordantly put it some years later, since 
the 1920s ‘artistic movements have only been the imaginary repercussions of an explosion that 
never took place, an explosion that threatened and still threatens the structures of society’ — 
which is to say a general, worldwide communist revolution.197 Even though the SI never simple-
mindedly reduced Surrealism to the revolutionary period in which it emerged (and was an 
expression of), they nonetheless drew attention to the subordinate role of the Surrealists vis-à-
vis the revolutionary project. To the extent that the Surrealists themselves misunderstood this 
relationship was the extent to which they compromised with the existing institutions, whether 
political or artistic. Their ‘total project’ of a new way of living was much closer, in this regard, 
to the revolutionary aspirations of their time of emergence, much more so than their artistic 
evocations and misbegotten political allegiances. The idea that the non-artistic practice of 
Surrealism, or at least its conception, was more important than the extant works of the 
Surrealists would find a resonance in the SI’s examination of Marx, the history of the 
revolutionary workers’ movement and their criticism of the political expressions of anarchism 
and communism. It is here that the self-destruction of art and the critique issuing from such met 
with the experience of a workers’ movement being destroyed partly through its own alienated 
organisations — primarily the Stalinist organisations of the 1920s and 30s, but also the problem 
of representative organisation more generally. As the SI would say of the revolutionary 
contestations of the past century, it was “failures” like the Paris Commune more than the 
ambiguous “successes” like the Soviet Union that proved more instructive and better guides to 
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the future.198 In this sense the “success” of Surrealism at the hand of the art institutions of the 
capitalist West was surely a marker of its failure as revolutionary contestation.  
The decomposition of culture 
As we have seen, the failure of Dada and Surrealism was seen by Debord as a moment of a 
more general society wide failure, a part of the ‘decomposition of culture’ which he initially 
dated from around 1930. Most significant in this regard was the failure of the revolutionary 
wave at the end of the First World War and the consequent re-stabilisation of European 
capitalism and its further extension. Perhaps most significantly for the later development of the 
theory of the Spectacle, it was this period of re-stabilisation that first saw the capitalist class 
drawing upon the signs and significations of revolutionary contestation in order to dissimulate 
and justify the continued rule of capital — what the SI would later call ‘recuperation’.199 As 
Debord argued later in The Society of the Spectacle, it was the appearance of the capitalist 
counter-revolution in Germany in 1919 under the banner of socialism that marked the functional 
origin of the Spectacle, and thus of ‘cultural decomposition’ too: ‘the revolutionary 
representation of the proletariat at this stage became both the principal factor and central result 
of the general falsification of society’.200 
For Debord in 1957 ‘culture’ in the abstract could be designated as ‘a complex of Aesthetics, 
[and] of sentiments and traditions: the reaction of an era on everyday life’.201 However, such a 
designation cannot simply be reduced to an expression of Marxist orthodoxy, even though 
Debord then appeared to share the language of the ‘cultural superstructure’ reflecting the 
‘economic base’. Debord and the SI would more clearly move away from this orthodoxy in the 
coming years, particularly in the face of their more considered engagement with the works of 
the young Marx and heterodox Marxists like Henri Lefebvre, Karl Korsch and the early work of 
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Georg Lukács. But even at this point Debord eschewed a simple-minded dualism and crude 
determinism. In the same document, he wrote of how ‘what we call “culture” reflects, but also 
prefigures in a given society, the possibilities for the organisation of life’.202 Here ‘reflection’ 
and ‘prefiguration’ are based firmly on the possibility and reality of a struggle over the possible 
organisation of life. Implicit in this presentation is the possibility and reality of radical agency 
and subjectivity.203 Nonetheless the single most important influence on the idea of culture 
undergoing both ‘decomposition’ while ‘reflecting’ the struggles around such a decomposition 
as well as ‘prefiguring’ its solution was Marx’s idea of the contradiction between the forces and 
relations of production.  
Insofar as the ‘decomposition of culture’ refers to artistic culture, Debord owes a debt to his 
onetime mentor, the Letterist (and founder of ‘Letterism’) Isidore Isou — and in particular his 
theory of cultural ‘amplitude’ and ‘chiselling’. Briefly, Isou argued that from the time of Homer 
all the arts underwent an ‘amplic stage’ [le stade amplique], in which the development of the 
content of these arts — e.g. poetry, novels, paintings — reigned over the development of these 
various forms (that were, nonetheless, extensively developed). Following upon this, the 
development of art entered into a ‘chiselling period’ [une période ciselante] in which the forms 
became more important than the content. This was typified as a turning inward of art in which 
the expressive content of art became subordinated to formal experimentation. Such a 
‘chiselling’ culminated in the literary experiments of Mallarmé and Joyce as much as the 
painterly experiments of the Impressionists and Cubist. Ultimately it gave way to art’s 
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in this “realm”. That is to say it is in the realm of culture and cultural production — ‘the legal, political, 
religious, artistic or philosophic — in short, ideological forms’ in which the material struggle over the 
conflictual nature of ‘the economic conditions of production’ is fought out, and hopefully, won. Cf. Karl 
Marx, 'Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy [1859],' in Karl Marx Frederich 
Engels Collected Works Volume 29, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1987, pp. 263-64. 
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autodestruction — i.e. the death of art itself in Dadaist nihilism.204 What marks out Isou’s 
theory from Debord’s détournement of it, are respectively, its more grandiose and more limited 
nature. More grandiose in the sense that Isou pictures the seesawing of art from the amplic to 
the chiselling stages as taking in the entirety of Western art since its emergence in pre-Classical 
Greece; more limited, however, in the sense that Isou’s perspective is strictly artistic, in the 
sense of the development of poetry, painting and attendant arts. What distinguishes Debord’s 
theory is that he, on the one hand, delimited the object of criticism to the artistic practices of 
capitalist modernity, and on the other, attempted to understand these practices as both reflective 
of and a part of the constitution of culture considered more generally.205 In transforming Isou’s 
theory into his more general theory of ‘cultural decomposition’, the influence of Marx was 
crucial.  
The idea that culture was undergoing a decline was widespread among sections of the Marxist 
left in the post-war world, particularly as it pertained to so-called ‘Americanisation’. Such a 
notion was derived on the one-hand from the burgeoning mass-market dominance of US culture 
through cinema, radio and eventually television. On the other hand, it was understood with 
recourse to Marx’s idea of the conflict between the ‘forces’ and ‘relations of production’, in 
which strictly capitalist social relations (of private and state property, of commodities and the 
market) tended to ‘contradict’ or ‘oppose’ the emergent possibilities for new productive and 
technical processes in this case (made possible by the industrial relations of production). 
Needless to say, the SI’s criticism was from the latter, not the former. They did not engage in a 
defence of high European culture against low American pulp. Culture was just so much raw 
material. 
                                                     
204 Cf. Martos, Histoire de l'internationale situationniste, pp. 14-15. 
205 Recently McKenzie Wark has argued that Isou’s theory was simply one which proposed ‘[a]ll forms 
— aesthetic and social — mov[ing] from a stage of amplification to one of decomposition’ — Wark, The 
Beach Beneath the Streets: The Everyday Life and Glorious Times of the Situationist International, p. 13. 
However this is to pre-empt Debord’s détournement, and thus critical development and rejection of Isou’s 
theory. Wark also seems to believe that the ‘chiselling’ phase is a consequence of the decomposition 
rather than its harbinger. The source of his confusion appears to be Greil Marcus, Lipstick Traces: a 
secret history of the twentieth century, London: Faber and Faber, 2001 [1989]. 
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In the definition of ‘cultural decomposition’ which appeared in the first issue of the SI’s journal, 
the basis of this decline in the general development of the capitalist social relation was made 
clear. Decomposition is the ‘[p]rocess by which traditional cultural forms have destroyed 
themselves under the influence of the appearance of superior means of controlling nature, which 
permit and demand superior cultural constructions.’206 In the same definition the Situationists, 
drawing upon Isou, distinguished two phases: ‘an active phase of the decomposition and 
effective demolition of the old superstructures — which ended around 1930 — and a phase of 
repetition that has prevailed since then.’207 In the first years of the SI the active phase of the 
decomposition was associated with the period of the early 20th century avant-gardes, i.e. from 
the first Futurist Manifesto of 1909 up until the publication of the second Surrealist journal 
series in 1930.208  
1. Decomposition as the achieved state of mid-twentieth century culture 
Toward the end of the First World War the Dada movement posed the lack of meaning and 
emptiness at the heart of the moral and aesthetic order of a Western capitalism then engaged in 
mass slaughter. Dada emerged shortly after the Zimmerwald conference in Berne, at which 
internationalist socialists proclaimed the war the result of the rivalry and global drive of the 
                                                     
206 I.S., 'Définitions,' p. 14. However, unlike the orthodox Marxists the SI did not attribute this solely to 
the mysterious structural ‘agency’ of a mode of production abstracted from the actual social agents and 
often conflictual relations which constituted such a ‘mode’. 
207 Ibid. My emphasis. Though note the severely delimited sense of active ‘amplification’ in this version, 
which extends no further into the past than the most radical experiments of Romanticism in the 1790s. 
What will become clearer is that Debord oscillated between understanding artistic ‘decomposition’ in 
terms of the historical avant-gardes (1909-1930) and a longer term sense of decomposition which begins 
either in early modernity with the emergence of artists “freed” from religious subject matter and 
dependence, or the radical experiments of the early Romantics in the 1790s and later. Cf. Martos, Histoire 
de l'internationale situationniste, pp. 83-100. 
208 I.S., 'Définitions.' The last date itself was disputed by the SI. In the first issue of the SI’s journal the 
apogee of the Surrealist avant-garde was seen to have coincided with its foundation, i.e. in 1924. The 
Situationists believed that the group around André Breton had almost immediately gone wrong, to the 
extent that its more interesting proclamations about the need to live differently began to be usurped by the 
production of art-objects. However, it was the Surrealists ill-fated alliance with Stalinism, signalled by the 
re-foundation of their journal in 1930 that marked the definitive end of the Surrealist experiment for the 
SI. 1930 was also the year the Surrealists’ renamed journal, Le Surréalisme au service de la revolution, 
was first published. Debord would later comment that ‘[t]he point is not to put poetry at the service of 
revolution, but to put revolution at the service of poetry. It is only in this way that revolution does not 
betray its own project. We don’t intend to repeat the mistake of the surrealists, who put themselves at the 
service of the revolution right when it had ceased to exist.’ I.S. [Debord], 'All the King's Men.' See also 
Internationale Situationniste, 'Amère victoire du surréalisme,' Internationale Situationniste, no. 1 (Juin 
1958).  
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imperialist nations of Europe.209 However the Dadas’ international perspective, though 
undoubtedly influenced by the internationalists and revolutionists who struggled to turn the 
inter-imperialist war into a revolutionary class war, was primarily aesthetic — or more correctly 
anti-aesthetic. Dada was in essence an artistic rejection and negation of such aesthetic claims of 
the eternal beauty and truth of art. Indeed, it was Dada’s ‘anti-aesthetic’ which Debord and 
other Situationists most highly prized, insisting that to recuperate it as a new aesthetic (as was 
the fashion in the 1950s and 60s) was to precisely negate its critical worth, in particular its 
rejection of a transcendent notion of beauty. 
In the 1950s and 60s the Letterist International (hereafter LI) and then the SI noted the 
reappearance of the formal concerns of the pre-war artistic avant-gardes under different names. 
For example, movements called ‘Tachism’, ‘Abstract Expressionism’, ‘Neo-Dada’, ‘New 
Realism’, ‘Pop Art’, the ‘New Novel’ and the ‘New Wave’, were marked by the systematic 
elaboration of formal questions — i.e. matters of artistic form — that had already been 
pioneered by the pre-war avant-gardes.210 The LI and the SI pointed out that such elaboration 
was overwhelmingly repetitive and unoriginal. However, the originality or lack thereof was the 
least of their concerns. Rather the repetitive unoriginality was a function of the defeat of the pre-
war avant-garde projects, particularly the defeat of their most revolutionary aspects: Dada’s 
desire to abolish art and Surrealism’s desire to realise art in everyday life. Both of these desires 
tended to move beyond art as a practice which produced works in order to pose the 
revolutionary transformation of the conditions of everyday life itself. The Situationists argued 
that such anti-artistic and artistic projects of the avant-garde rose and fell with the fortunes of 
the revolutionary proletarian movements between 1917 and 1937. In the absence of a successful 
mass revolutionary movement the artistic avant-garde tended to be forced back onto the very 
                                                     
209 International Socialist Conference at Zimmerwald, 'Manifesto [1915]' 
https://www.marxists.org/history/international/social-democracy/zimmerwald/manifesto-1915.htm. 
210 ‘Tachism’ was primarily painterly, so was ‘Abstract Expressionism’. ‘Neo-Dada’ and ‘New Realism’ 
were primarily Dada-like in their range of what they considered and made as art-objects (e.g. Jean 
Tinguley’s ‘meta-machines’); nonetheless their focus was primarily on the fetishized art-object. Similarly, 
‘Pop Art’ drew heavily on Dada and Surrealism in the visual arts (and helped diffuse such visual styles 
throughout mass culture, e.g. rock’n’roll, cinema, magazines, etc.). The ‘New Novel’ and ‘New Wave’, 
descriptors for various ‘neo’ groupings of novelists, poets and film-makers, drew upon the literary corpus 
of Dada, Surrealism and other pre-war avant-garde trends.  
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artistic terrain they had attempted to overcome or crack open. Such was the basis of the non-
revolutionary reconstitution of a so-called ‘avant-garde’ artistic movement in the post-war 
period.  
The pre-war avant-gardes had tended to decompose the artistic forms they had revolted against, 
calling into question the often simple minded claims of art’s social role, and the part it played in 
the communication of the ruling ideas of an era. The Dadas and Surrealists contested such ideas, 
but not just in the realm of ‘content’; they also took aim at the status of the art-object, 
‘decomposing’ the received notions of what figured as art by drawing on new techniques: 
collage, détournement, noise poetry, automatic verse, cut-ups, the use of ‘found’ objects, dream 
accounts, mock trials, scientific inquiries, stream of consciousness, drug use, games, cinematic 
experimentation, non-conformist morality, and so on. Indeed many discovered that the formal 
contestation of the art-object tended to pose the possibility of doing away with specialised 
artistic activity altogether — a discovery that lead some artists to identify their artistic rebellion 
with the contemporary insurrectionary revolutionary movements.211 However their attempts to 
overcome such art faltered with the defeat of these revolutionary movements. The radical 
‘decomposition’ of the art-object — and the society which ghettoised specialised artistic activity 
— became suspended on the brink of the revolutionary overthrow of art, defeated alongside the 
final liquidation of the pre-war revolutionary movement by Stalinism, Fascism and “liberal” 
capitalism. On such a basis art, culture and bourgeois society more generally was “saved” in the 
1930s and 40s.   
This is not to say that there were no revolutionary artists who attempted to restart or continue 
the ‘surpassing of art’ of the pre-war avant-gardes. For instance, the SI itself was the result of 
various attempts to understand the impasse of the pre-war avant-gardes, notably Letterism 
(1945-the present), Cobra (1948-51, aka the International of Experimental Artists), the Letterist 
                                                     
211 Such an identification was not universal among these groups. For instance, the movement of Breton 
and other surrealists toward the French Communist Party (PCF) proved controversial among the extended 
surrealist circles of the time and lead to resignations, exclusions and heated public denunciations. For 
Breton’s perspective cf. 'Second Surrealist Manifesto [1930],' in Manifestoes of Surrealism, Michigan: 
University of Michigan Press, 1998. For an alternate view cf. Georges Bataille, 'Notes on the Publication 
of 'Un Cadavre',' in The Absence of Myth: Writings on Surrealism, London: Verso, 1994.  
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International (1952-57) and the International Movement for an Imaginist Bauhaus (1955-57). 
Taken as a whole these groups were constituted by both older participants of the pre-war avant-
gardes and younger artists who had come onto the scene during or in the wake of the war. Of 
most interest for our concerns were the ways these groups situated themselves with reference to 
the pre-war avant-gardes, in particular the perceived failure of these groups and their relation to 
the revolutionary workers’ movement. Even if the spirits of Dada and Surrealism stalked the 
artistic concerns of these groups they were never resurrected in a merely formal or uncritical 
fashion. What all of these groups shared to a greater or lesser degree was the belief that a 
revolutionary art must pose not only the possibility of overcoming the deficiencies of artistic 
practice in capitalist society, but must rather pose as its ‘work of art’ the transformation of 
human activity itself.212 This was particularly the case with regard to the 1950s trajectory of 
Asger Jorn, Constant Nieuwenhuys, and Guy Debord (respectively members of Cobra, Cobra 
and IMIB, and the LI — and later all members of the SI).  
With the advent of the LI and the work of Guy Debord in particular, we have the fashioning of 
the critique of ‘the decomposition of culture’ that will be carried over into the SI. What this 
theory allowed Debord and others to establish was that the decomposition of culture was the 
departure point for the reconstitution of a revolutionary avant-garde in culture; which is to say it 
was the cultural moment that the Situationists ranged themselves both within and against. ‘For 
us, surrealism was solely a beginning of the revolutionary experiment in culture, an experiment 
which almost immediately soured practically and theoretically.’213 Rather than merely repeating 
or chiselling away at the artistic forms of the recent past, such an avant-garde, in order to be 
worthy of the name, must reorient the most advanced workers in the cultural world toward the 
suspended project of the old avant-garde: the transformation of everyday life. Only the most 
extreme versions of artistic decomposition which incorporated the conscious critique of their 
                                                     
212 This was perhaps less so in Isidore Isou’s version of ‘Letterism’. However Isou contributed the 
valuable concepts of the Amplic (amplique) and the Chiselling (ciselante) phases of artistic development 
which contributed to Debord’s understanding of the repetitive, ‘chiselling’ nature of the bulk of post-war 
avant-garde art. Needless to say Debord rejected Isou’s idealistic notion of his own role in the rebirth of a 
modern ‘Amplic’ phase of art, preferring instead to understand the crisis of art in terms of the success 
capitalism had experienced in subsuming art and other activities under the principle of the commodity-
form.  
213 I.S., 'Le bruit et la fureur,' p. 6. 
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separate existence as art and the possibility of its overcoming could play a role in such an avant-
garde. To that end the Situationist hypothesis was developed in order to draw out the only 
possible artistic activity under such conditions. 
2.  Decomposition as the movement of art freed from Feudal dependence 
In The Society of the Spectacle, Debord presented a long view of the development of ‘culture’ 
apart from other activities in everyday life. In this regard, he is most concerned with the 
emergence of ‘art’ and the ‘artist’ in the early Modern regimes of Europe; but the picture he 
paints resonates with Marx’s and Raoul Vaneigem’s ideas about the alienation that is attendant 
upon the divisions of labour and class hierarchy that become pronounced with the emergence of 
class and property in the ancient world: 
In the historical society divided into classes, culture is the general sphere of knowledge 
and of representations of life — which is to say that it is the power of generalisation 
existing apart, as the division of intellectual labour and the intellectual labour of 
division.214  
Here we also gain the sense that Debord’s 1957 definition of culture is more clearly cast as a 
product of capitalist modernity. Cultural production is at once a result of ‘the division of 
intellectual labour’ from other types of labour, and is the ‘intellectual labour’ that represents, 
oversees and cements such a division. In such a social order, artistic production is one aspect of 
intellectual labours in general (insofar as we understand by ‘intellectual labour’ activities which 
are predominantly intellectual in nature).  Even though the ‘intellectual aspect’ of human labour 
cannot be utterly separated out (and thus a ‘non-intellectual’ labour is perforce a ludicrous 
notion), the separation of primarily ‘intellectual’ tasks have been attendant upon the hierarchical 
divisions of class society; thus the commanding and supervisory roles of the rulers and mangers 
of society have more often than not dovetailed with their domination of the thought of their 
societies.  
                                                     
214 Debord, La Société du Spectacle, thesis 180. 
99 
 
The ‘independence’ of culture is firmly established with the emergence of cultural practices 
from Feudal-Religious dependence. However, its ‘independence’ is paradoxical; at once ‘the 
locus of the search for lost unity’ and the growing comprehension of its inadequacy as it 
marches ‘toward its self-suppression’.215  
Culture emerged from the history which dissolved the way of life of the old world. But 
as a separate sphere it is still only the intelligence and manifest communication that 
remains partial in a partially historical society. It is the meaning of a world which 
hardly makes sense.216 
Debord used ‘historical’ in a Marxian sense; i.e. that society was historical to the extent that all 
or almost all of those who constituted such a society were freely and consciously engaged in its 
production, reproduction and transformation. Thus, capitalism and other class societies can be 
typified as ‘partially historical’. The paradox of ‘culture’ for the SI, particularly the cultural 
production of modernity, is to be at once of the world and seemingly outside it. The latter flows 
from the role of the arts and the artist, whose object of representation is a world held at a 
distance. However the dilemma of the arts is not ontological but rather social-ontological. It is a 
reflection of the new found ‘freedom’ of the artist, a freedom moreover that mirrors the 
‘freedom’ of the labourer stripped of their feudal dependence and now free to sell their labour-
power on the market.217  
Debord pictured the struggle within cultural production, between innovation and tradition, as 
freighted in favour of innovation (mirroring the historical movement of bourgeois production 
generally). However such a bias is precisely both a reflection of and feature of the ‘total 
historical movement’ of these societies.218 Bourgeois society generates its own gravediggers in 
Marx’s famous image; or as Vaneigem puts it, ‘[w]hatever is not superseded rots, and whatever 
                                                     
215 Ibid. 
216 Ibid., thesis 183. The last line can literally be translated as ‘It is the sense of a world which hardly 
makes sense.’ 
217 Of course, this idea of ‘freedom’, in the sense of labour power freed up for sale and exploitation, 
cannot be reasonably attributed to most people, let alone Western Europeans, until the more extensive 
development of global capitalism in the second half of the 20th century. 
218 Debord, La Société du Spectacle, thesis 181. 
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is rotten cries out to be superseded.’219 Culture ‘ends’ to the extent that the cultural projects of 
modernity — for Debord these are primarily the philosophical-scientific (‘knowledge’) and 
artistic  — manifest in two opposite sides: ‘the project of its supersession [dépassement] in total 
history, and the organisation of its preservation as a dead object in spectacular 
contemplation.’220 Thus, and perhaps more correctly, bourgeois culture ends insofar as it comes 
to directly manifest a struggle over the nature of culture, one in which the stakes are either the 
perpetuation of alienated forms (and the tendency toward a repetition of forms) or the 
possibility of a cultural production indistinguishable from the general production of everyday 
life (and thus post-capitalist).  
The “détournement of prefabricated aesthetic elements”221 
Détournement is a practice that can be simply and clearly defined as ‘the reuse of pre-existing 
artistic elements in a new unity’.222 The Situationists made no proprietary claim over such a 
practice, rather they identified it with ‘an ongoing trend of the contemporary avant-garde before 
and since the formation of the SI.’223 However, détournement can also be understood as an 
attempt to characterise a general conception of creative practice, i.e. that all production involves 
the appropriation and transformation of past practices and their results. Certainly, we can 
differentiate between détournement as a modern phenomenon and détournement as a general 
conception of creativity. Nonetheless, the Situationists were primarily interested in former sense 
of détournement, insofar as their conception drew upon the potentialities for the creative 
appropriation of everyday life under the impact of industrial production.  
We do well to remember that we should not reduce détournement to either mere plagiarism (in 
the sense of the theft and presentation of pre-existing ‘content’ as the private property of the 
thief) or contemporary senses of ‘cultural appropriation’. As Mustapha Khayati would remark 
                                                     
219 Raoul Vaneigem, The Revolution of Everyday Life, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith, Oakland: PM 
Press, [1967] 2012, p. 137. 
220 Debord, La Société du Spectacle, thesis 184. 
221 I.S., 'Définitions,' p. 13. 
222 Internationale Situationniste, 'Le détournement comme négation et comme prélude,' Internationale 
Situationniste, no. 3 (Décembre 1959), p. 10. 
223 Ibid. Nonetheless, Debord and the Letterist International were the first to consistently name such a 
practice ‘détournement’. Cf. McDonough, The beautiful language of my century: reinventing the 
language of contestation in postwar France, 1945–1968, pp. 26-7. 
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some years later, to détourn Marx, to ‘salvage’ his work for the present, it was necessary to 
‘make it more precise, to correct it and reformulate it in the light of a hundred years of 
reinforcement of alienation and of the possibilities of negating alienation’, much as Ducasse 
suggested (who nonetheless called détournement ‘plagiarism’).224 Such reformulations could 
simply be the re-contextualisation of the original, as much as the development of aspects of his 
theory or even the rejection of some of it.  
The first comprehensive presentation of détournement appeared in an article authored by Guy 
Debord and Gil J Wolman in 1956: ‘Mode d’emploi du détournement’ (lit. ‘Instructions for the 
use of détournement’). Debord and Wolman attempted to systematically present détournement, 
a task hitherto being performed haphazardly or not at all. Indeed, one can consider their work as 
the most sustained presentation since Isidore Ducasse had first presented his ‘plagiaristic’ 
method in 1870. 
In Debord’s and Wolman’s article several examples of détournement were provided. They 
quickly dismissed any real interest in détourned novels or ‘metagraphic writing’225 even while 
admitting that it would be possible to carry out. 226 More amenable to détournement, at least for 
                                                     
224 Khayati, 'Les mots captifs (Préface à un dictionnaire situationniste).' 
225 ‘Metagraphic’ writing was practiced by the Letterists and the International Letterists. In essence it was 
a version of the collages of the Dadas, mixing words, images and other found objects. Isidore Isou 
defined it in 1964 thus: ‘Metagraphics or post-writing, encompassing all the means of ideographic, lexical 
and phonetic notation, supplements the means of expression based on sound by adding a specifically 
plastic dimension, a visual facet which is irreducible and escapes oral labelling.’ Isidore Isou, 'Selections 
from the Manifestos of Isidore Isou' http://www.thing.net/~grist/l&d/lettrist/isou-m.htm (accessed 6 
October 2010).  
226 The Situationist Michele Bernstein would write and publish two détourned novels, Tous les chevaux 
du roi (1960) and La Nuit (1961). Not Bored has perhaps unfairly called the former a ‘trifle’ not worth 
reading today, even though it provided some material for André Bertrand’s more famous “Cowboy 
Philosopher” détournement, in which he used dialogue from the novel. Not Bored, 'At Dawn: the Novels 
of Michèle Bernstein in Historical Perspective,' (1 August 2013). http://www.notbored.org/michele-
bernstein.pdf. Both of Bernstein’s novels are roman-a-clefs, the almost identical tale of young 
Situationists drifting around Paris and beyond. What is perhaps the most important aspect of these novels 
is the use to which they were put. Without doubt we can extract valuable information from these novels, 
information bearing on the lives of some members of the Letterist International on the eve of the 
foundation of the SI. However, we must also pay heed to the role these novels played in the life of 
Bernstein the Situationist. Both novels made money for her and thus the group, just as they parodied the 
‘serious’ novels of Françoise Sagan and Alain Robbe-Grillet. As Debord and Wolman had written in 
1956 ‘[w]e have since come to realize that a situationist-analytic enterprise cannot scientifically advance 
by way of such works. The means nevertheless remain suitable for less ambitious goals’ (Debord & 
Wolman, 'Mode d’emploi du détournement [1956],'). Indeed, the novels of Bernstein were never intended 
to be examples of Situationist practice (such as the explicitly Situationist propaganda of the SI). 
Nonetheless, less cautious writers would attempt to recuperate détournement to the end of the novel form. 
George Perec would explicitly take up détournement in his work, particularly as a method used in his first 
102 
 
the Situationist use of détournement, was the cinema. ‘It is obviously in the realm of the cinema 
that détournement can attain its greatest effectiveness and, for those concerned with this aspect, 
its greatest beauty.’227 Debord would soon eschew any talk of aesthetics, at least in terms of the 
Situationist use of cinema; however, embedded here is the Situationist idea of the use of the arts 
for propaganda purposes. Cinema was both an appropriately fully industrial art form, one that 
was clearly and solely the product of industrial capitalist society, and the one most appropriate 
for détournement under present conditions. Cinema’s intimate relation to both industrial 
production and the sometimes large-scale creative collaborations that were required, made it the 
one artistic practice that clearly pointed toward the transformative potentialities of collaboration.  
 
‘The Cowboy Philosopher’228 
“What exactly takes up your time?” “Reification.” “I see, it is a very serious work with big books  
& many papers on a great big table.” “No, I go for walks. Mainly I just walk around.”  
                                                                                                                                                           
two novels, Les choses (1965) — for which he would win the prestigious Renadot prize — and Un 
Homme qui Dort (1967). His English translator and biographer has remarked on the important influence 
that Debord and the Situationists exerted upon him (cf. David Bellos, Georges Perec: A Life in Words, 
Boston: David R. Godine, Publisher, 1993, pp. 280-83). Considering the acclaim that Perec garnered in 
his life for his playful and challenging novels, it is worth remembering the SI’s belief that novels were 
now only useful for ‘less ambitious goals’. Thus, in the eleventh number of the Situationist journal, the 
group took Perec to task (‘Perec, the consumer of Things’) for posing that the ‘crisis of language’ could 
be understood in merely artistic terms, and without explicit reference to ‘[t]he revolutionary sense that has 
dominated all truly modern art […] in the context of the struggle against dominant conditions, that is to 
say, the project of a new communication’. Cf. Internationale Situationniste, 'Décomposition et 
récupération,' Internationale Situationniste, no. 10 (Mars 1966), p. 59. 
227 Debord & Wolman, 'Mode d’emploi du détournement [1956].' 
228 Greil Marcus has called the panel containing the détourned passage from Bernstein’s novel Tous les 
chevaux du roi, “The Cowboy Philosopher”. Bertrand’s détournement was a component of his La 
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Debord knew that the relation of sound and image in the cinema could be distorted to the point 
of the complete divorce between the two — such was the lesson of Isou’s ‘cinéma discrépant’ 
most radically applied in Debord’s own Hurlements en faveur de Sade.229 Debord and Wolman 
imagined the complete détournement of D.W. Griffith’s Birth of a Nation (1915), ‘without 
necessarily even altering the montage’.230 However, such détournement was considered both 
‘moderate’ and ‘in the final analysis nothing more than the moral equivalent of the restoration 
of old paintings in museums.’231 What is of prime interest to the authors, cinematically 
speaking, are more ambitious possibilities. ‘[M]ost films only merit being cut up to compose 
other works.’232 Debord would go on to make precisely such films, reconverting ‘pre-existing 
sequences’ to new, critical ends. Even more importantly such cinematic projects, already on a 
grander industrial scale, are immediately more cooperative and social than the ‘traditional’ arts, 
and thus point beyond the production of ‘works’ to the production of urban milieus and even 
people.  
Debord and Wolman outlined the minimum program of détournement:  
The entirety of the literary and artistic heritage of humanity must be used for partisan 
propaganda. […] It is in fact necessary to eliminate all remnants of the notion of 
personal property in this area. […] Any elements, no matter where they are taken from, 
can be used to make new combinations. […] Anything can be used.233  
                                                                                                                                                           
retourne de la colonne Durutti comic, which helped advertise the scandalise pamphlet co-written by the 
SI and students from the University of Strasbourg in 1966, De la misère en milieu étudiant…  
229 Isou’s ‘discrepant cinema’ involved the radical decoupling of the image and sound tracks in his 
Letterist films — even up to their complete divorce. Cf. Kaira M. Cabañas, Off-Screen Cinema: Isidore 
Isou and the Lettrist Avant-Garde, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2014. 
230 Needless to say, Debord and Wolman were acutely aware not only of Griffiths’ innovations but his 
racism. ‘To cut through this absurd confusion of values, we can observe that Griffith’s Birth of a 
Nation is one of the most important films in the history of the cinema because of its wealth of 
innovations. On the other hand, it is a racist film and therefore absolutely does not merit being shown in 
its present form. But its total prohibition could be seen as regrettable from the point of view of the 
secondary, but potentially worthier, domain of the cinema. It would be better to détourn it as a whole, 
without necessarily even altering the montage, by adding a soundtrack that made a powerful denunciation 
of the horrors of imperialist war and of the activities of the Ku Klux Klan, which are continuing in the 
United States even now.’ Debord & Wolman, 'Mode d’emploi du détournement [1956].' 
231 Ibid. 
232 Ibid. 
233 Ibid., p. 221. 
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The last two sentences are perhaps the most explosive; any element — such as those 
experimentally put to use in the ‘ready-mades’ of Marcel Duchamp and the Dadas — could 
serve. Duchamp’s ‘ready-mades’ had already ridiculed the ridiculous arbitrariness of the 
beautiful and the good. Debord and Wolman saw implicit in the ready-made something more 
interesting, and even “transcendental” vis-à-vis capitalist social relations — the possibility of re-
using all of the results of past human practice (cultural or otherwise) in the planned and 
conscious construction of everyday life itself.  
The Situationist presentation of détournement was disabused with regard to aesthetics. For 
instance, Lautréamont may have proposed that the ‘novel’ was the form best suited to his 
formula, but by the time Ducasse turned to write up his outline for a new poetics the novel had 
already grown stale.234 What marked out the Situationist use of détournement from their artistic 
contemporaries (e.g. the neo-Dadas, Pop artists and the organisers of ‘happenings’) was 
precisely their sense of the pre-situationist nature of this use. Détournement heralded the end of 
art and culture as domains separate from everyday life; however, art was not to be remade on 
this basis, as an anti-aesthetic, but rather used in the criticism of capitalist society and, indeed, 
the capitalist fashioning and use of culture itself.   
Thus, from the outset the overriding concern was to present the possibility of using art for 
‘partisan propaganda purposes’.235 However their conception was not akin to the crudities of 
Socialist Realism or capitalist advertising. Rather they proposed that the extreme experiments of 
the artistic avant-garde (to the extent that they consciously espoused détournement or not) held 
the key to both the apparent exhaustion of artistic avant-gardism and the possibility of posing a 
more creative life beyond the bounds of capitalist production and consumption. Certainly when 
the SI presented a list of their achievements with regard to détournement in 1959, the list 
consisted primarily of what would have (and since has) passed for artistic works — ‘Debord and 
Asger Jorn’s book Mémoires, “composed entirely of prefabricated elements,” […] Constant’s 
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projects for détourned sculptures; […] Debord’s détourned documentary film […], [Pinot] 
Gallizio’s industrial painting; [Maurice] Wyckaert’s “orchestral” project for assembly-line 
painting’.236 But the artistic appearance belied the experimental intent of the group: 
Within culture the SI can be compared, for example, to a research laboratory, or to a 
party in which we are Situationists but nothing that we do is [yet] Situationist. This is 
not a disavowal for anyone. We are partisans of a certain future of culture and of life. 
Situationist activity is a definite craft that we are still not practicing.237 
When Debord and Wolman wrote up an outline of détournement in 1956 they pointedly entitled 
the article the ‘Instructions for the use of détournement’.  Though it was a self-professed 
attempt to present détournement systematically, such reflections were made to the end of more 
clearly practicing détournement. 
By itself the theory of détournement scarcely interests us. But we find it linked to 
almost all the constructive aspects of the period of pre-situationist transition. Its 
enrichment, through practice, thus appears necessary.238  
The emphasis on use over theoretical reflection would remain an ongoing reference in Debord’s 
work. To separate the moment of reflection from the moment of action was to reinforce the 
ideological processes at work in capitalist society, in particular the bifurcation of the life 
represented and the life lived. Détournement is resolutely a practice, by turns theoretical and 
practical. To consider it contemplatively, i.e. to consider it as solely an object of enquiry or 
description would be to act in a way contrary to spirit of détournement. Indeed, Debord’s and 
Wolman’s rejection of a mere theory of détournement (i.e. détournement considered solely in a 
contemplative register) prefigured the later rejection of ‘situationism’ as a reified doctrine of the 
practice of Situationists.  
It is worth recalling the initial Situationist definition of ‘situationism’. The SI declared that there 
could not be a doctrine of ‘situationism’ because it would signify an abuse of the meaning of 
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‘situationist’; specifically, because it would be the sundering of Situationist theory and practice 
in favour of a merely contemplative theory. When Debord and Wolman spoke of theory being 
‘scarcely’ of interest, it is in the Situationist register; their theory of détournement is summary 
and systematisation, results and instructions for further experimentation. Thus, to understand 
détournement as merely an artistic technique or a new type of artistic technique is to 
misunderstand it. Détournement is not equivalent to what some structuralists and 
poststructuralists would classify under the name of ‘intertextuality’ or even a precursor of the 
present-day pop cultures of ‘remix’ and reappropriation.239 Despite such resonances 
détournement in the hands of the Situationists was a part of a much broader criticism of 
capitalist culture and the effects of industrial production. For the SI did not just propose 
détournement as a methodology but crucially as the consequence of the development of 
capitalist industry — i.e. more thoroughly enabled by the development of industrial techniques 
of mass production and reproduction. 
However, Debord’s and Wolman’s conception of détournement was never limited to the merely 
artistic, despite the primarily artistic results they called upon to flesh out their theory of 
détournement. In a definitional list of distinct Situationist terms published in the first issue of 
their journal, the SI wrote that détournement was short for the diversion of ‘prefabricated 
aesthetic elements’ into a ‘superior construction of’ place.240 ‘Prefabricated aesthetic elements’ 
is a term as wide as the productive capacities and reality of mass production; indeed its 
association with the construction of place (‘milieu’) helps us to understand that the tension 
between the pro- and anti-art aspects of the early SI were already in place in their conception 
and practice of détournement.241 In this regard a particularly suggestive aspect of the early 
theory was the notion of ‘ultra-détournement’, that is, the tendencies for détournement to 
operate in everyday social life.’242 Examples provided were forms of playful and creative social 
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interaction: the para-literary use of slang, secret languages, and ‘passwords’, as well as DIY 
clothing and disguises.243 In many respects ‘ultra-détournement’ came closer to the imagination 
of a truly Situationist activity than the (anti) artistic activity surveyed simply because it was 
unremarkable — which is to say as of the mid 1950s largely uncolonised by the capitalist 
market. In the 1956 article, it was the instance of détournement most closely associated with the 
hypothesis of the construction of situations, ‘the ultimate goal of all our activity’.244 
More than even the Futurists, Dadas and Surrealists, Debord and Wolman singled out Isidore 
Ducasse, aka the Comte de Lautréamont, as their clearest predecessor. Not only did Ducasse 
practice détournement, described in terms of ‘plagiarism’, ‘improvement’ and ‘development’, 
he even attempted to theorise it amidst his various détournements in his final work written 
shortly before his death at age 24. Ducasse’s advanced use of détournement, for instance his 
often lengthy plagiarism of selected texts in Les Chants de Maldoror (1868), was the more 
remarkable for being largely misinterpreted or misunderstood until the 1950s. Prior to the 
Situationists the work of Ducasse had been considered as the work of a mad genius (for instance 
hostilely by the writer Léon Bloy and approvingly by the Symbolist Remy de Gourmont), or as 
precursor of Surrealist automatism (for instance Lautréamont’s famous ‘he is fair […] as the 
chance meeting on a dissecting-table of a sewing-machine and an umbrella!’).245 Such 
considerations were chiefly built upon his best known work, Maldoror. However, it was in his 
lesser known final work, Poesies, that Ducasse clearly and infamously outlined his method and 
its implications.  
Ideas improve. The meaning of words plays a role in that improvement. Plagiarism is 
necessary. Progress implies it. It closely grasps an author’s sentence, uses his expressions, 
deletes a false idea, replaces it with the right one.246 
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Ducasse’s Poesies was unashamedly a work of plagiaristic ‘improvement’. The author not only 
did not hide this fact but, as we can see from the above quote he drew attention to it. The 
Poesies, with its formally aphoristic and prosaic structure, can seem like a negation of his first 
work Maldoror. Ducasse proclaimed to replace the evil of Maldoror — the often violent and 
presciently ‘surreal’ wanderings of its titular character — with the good of the Poesies; and yet 
the good that is presented is Marxian in its scope, the product of error and human labours, so 
much material artificially invested with human made myth and religious morality. For Ducasse 
the ‘good’ is the result of ‘evil’, the possibility of the new formation on the basis of the negation 
of the old. André Breton wrote that evil ‘is for Lautréamont (as it is for Hegel) the form in 
which the motor force of history becomes manifest’.247 In Maldoror transgressing against the 
good, particularly against the Christian and bourgeois conceptions of the good, is revelled in; it 
is a work of destruction and clearance, an (anti) novel hell bent on its own self-destruction. In 
the Poesies Ducasse moved onto the ‘true’ and the ‘good’, the work of establishing a new 
poetics, a new way of living poetry.248 To interpret this movement in a conventionally moral 
fashion is simply banal. Indeed, a better analogy is the movement of the SI itself, from the utter 
negativity of the Letterist International to the attempt to experiment with a new poetics of 
revolution.  
The Poesies appropriately does not ape the novel form like Maldoror. It is, rather, an evocation 
of Ducasse’s conception of a poetic principle in prosaic terms, an elaboration in advance (avant 
la lettre) of the Situationist notion of poetry. It is at once a poetics and poetry in prose. 
Particularly in the second part of Poesies Ducasse deploys from first to last a series of maxims 
derived — détourned that is — from thinkers such as Blaise Pascal, François de La 
Rochefoucauld, and Luc de Clapiers, marquis de Vauvenargues.249 Ducasse — much as Debord 
would do later in The Society of the Spectacle — plagiarised, corrected, developed and 
improved upon his borrowings; when necessary he even quoted from his sources, but usually 
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only to bolster the arguments contained in his maxims.250 In the Poesies he developed an 
argument about poetry, presented it as something that subtends and insinuates all literary 
labours (and perhaps labours tout court); for the poet’s ‘work is the code of diplomats, 
legislators, teachers of youth.’251 Ducasse proposed to ‘seek [the] laws’ of ephemeral poetry, 
and in doing posed that ‘[j]udgements on poetry are of more value than poetry. They are the 
philosophy of poetry.’252 Indeed though Ducasse argued that such a philosophy or ‘science’ 
could not be practically separated from the poems of a poet, he sought ‘a science distinct from 
poetry’, a science of its source.253 Such a science or philosophy was not the watchman or 
spectator of poetry, rather ‘[p]hilosophy thus understood embodies poetry.’254 Here Ducasse 
approached the Situationist conception of poetry, and indeed we can begin to see that his 
attraction to Debord and others exceeded his avowal of détournement as method. The Poesies is 
at once prolegomena to a philosophy of poetry, a work of poetry and the end of poetry as a mere 
poem. Indeed, Debord imagined that the ‘Hamburg Theses’, precisely because of their absence, 
and thus an instantiation of Ducasse’s sense of poetry (of a poetry ‘necessarily without poems’), 
could open the way to the ‘explication of the Poesies of Lautréamont to schoolkids’.255 
Conclusion 
The ‘decomposition of culture’ is an important precursor and component of a full-blown theory 
of the ‘spectacle’ promulgated by the Situationists.256 As we have seen, by ‘decomposition’ the 
SI understood not only the artistic decomposition of forms (i.e. the crisis and destruction of 
language and representation most obviously instantiated in Dada and Surrealism) but the 
general cultural decomposition of capitalist society. For the SI, the antagonistic core of capitalist 
modernity — i.e. the struggle between those forces dedicated to maintaining and extending 
capitalist society, and those contesting such a project — manifested as decomposition, i.e. the 
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fragmentation of a coherent bourgeois culture. However, such fragmentation was not 
necessarily linked with a wider, mass revolutionary contestation (such as what took place 
between 1917 and 1937, and more recently between 1968 and 1981). Indeed, the severing of the 
connection between the artistic contestation of bourgeois culture, and the wider, mass 
insurrectionary contestation, lay at the heart of Debord’s conception of decomposition. Thus, 
the avant-garde turning point of 1910-30 was conceived as the cultural decomposition 
commensurate with the general decomposition of capitalist society as evidenced by the First 
World War and its immediate aftermath — in particular the revolutionary wave opened in the 
wake of the Russian Revolution of 1917, and which was not completely closed until the 
suppression of the Spanish Revolution by the Stalinists and Fascists in 1937. However, the 
sense of this ‘decoupling’ of the artistic and political avant-gardes should be seen through the 
prism of the destruction of the revolutionary movement of 1917-1937. The chief problem the 
artistic avant-garde faced, was not merely being severed or decoupled from the mass 
movements with which they had identified (and in some cases merged), but rather being left 
suspended in the absence of such movements. Indeed, the confusion over the false 
representation of the continuation of such a movement (under the guise of Stalinism) proved not 
only vexing for the avant-gardists of the 1940s and post-war period, but would also provide 
much of the historical basis for Debord’s later elaboration of the concept of spectacle. As 
Debord put it in 1958, explicitly evoking the past defeat of the revolutionary movements, ‘the 
delay in the passage from decomposition to new constructions is linked to the delay in the 
revolutionary liquidation of capitalism’.257 
The SI wrote of ‘détournement’ that it was the closest that came to a ‘signature style’ for the 
group.258 If détournement marked the early years of the SI, ‘recuperation’ [récupération] 
emerged as an important concept after 1960.259 The Situationist sense of the word was applied 
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to those pro-capitalist practices that recovered critical ideas and practices in the interest of 
capitalism. The most obvious need for such a concept was the rapid development of precisely 
recuperative practices aimed at the artistic avant-garde in the 1950s and 60s. Indeed, the SI was 
on the receiving end of such; their conception of ‘the construction of situations’ and practice of 
‘unitary urbanism’ were becoming increasingly discussed in more mainstream architectural and 
artistic settings.260 However, the idea and practice of recuperation was perhaps even more 
keenly felt within the SI itself. In this sense, we can understand the fragmentation and effective 
cessation of experimental unitary urbanism after 1960, and the attempt to problematize the 
‘repetitive’ artistic practices of some Situationists as ‘anti-situationist’— i.e. as the use of the 
label ‘Situationist’ as merely a distinguishing mark for works that bore little relationship to the 
Situationist hypothesis, apart from the name.  
In chapter five we will see that, despite the turn to a more explicit engagement with 
revolutionary politics, the turn away from the retreat of those artist-Situationists into what was, 
in essence, repetitive decomposition, was made by ‘revaloriz[ing] the artist past of the SI’.261 
Such a ‘revalorisation’ was deemed necessary by Debord, Vaneigem and others precisely 
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because of what they found was shared by those in the political and artistic avant-gardes, i.e. an 
inability to pose ‘a new type of free activity’ beyond older visions of ‘militant’ political or 
artistic practice. I believe, that those critics who have described the 1962 ‘break’ in the SI in 
terms of breaking from art to politics, have not sufficiently understood the Situationist 
hypothesis as already posing the ‘realisation’ and ‘supersession of art’. Additionally, they have 
underestimated, or more often ignored the significance of the ‘supersession of art’ for the SI’s 
critique of political alienation. Therefore, in the next two chapters I will examine the tensions 
that existed in the early SI, particularly as expressed in the debates and arguments over the role 
of artistic practices in the elaboration of the Situationist hypothesis and unitary urbanism. On 
the basis of this I will turn, in chapter five, to show that nonetheless, ‘poetry, in the Situationist 
sense of the term’ came to figure prominently in the development of this criticism, 
simultaneously as an attempt to draw upon the most radical principle of the Situationist 
hypothesis, and recover — i.e. détourn — Marx’s conception of ‘revolutionary practice’ from 
the orthodox abyss of the politics of labour.  
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Chapter three: In search of a coherent revolutionary project 
Without coherence […] the SI today should be considered as without interest  
— Guy Debord, 1963262 
The internal debates of the SI, with a focus on their early practice under the term of ‘unitary 
urbanism’, are essential to understanding the transformation of the SI’s project from one 
focusing on the critique of culture into one caught up with the reconstitution of a general, 
revolutionary movement of contestation. In the first three issues of the SI’s journal — June 
1958, December 1958 and December 1959 — unitary urbanism emerged as the central concern 
of the group, i.e. as the experimental practice by which the Situationist hypothesis would be 
elaborated. However, it would be the preponderance of unitary urbanism that would result in the 
first major crisis in the group, resulting in one of its chief advocates and experimenters — 
Constant Nieuwenhuys — resigning in June 1960.  
In September 1958, Constant Nieuwenhuys (hereafter, Constant) initiated a debate regarding the 
‘means and ends’ of situationist activity. Constant believed that the collaborative elaboration of 
unitary urbanism should be the sole focus of the group’s experimental work. As such, he 
rejected fellow Situationist Asger Jorn’s formulation of the ‘free artist’ as a reactionary 
holdover of bourgeois conceptions of the role of the artist and the individual. Constant believed 
that Jorn’s ‘free artist’ gave too much importance to the individual, and in effect found a place 
for the practice of the ‘traditional arts’ in the Situationist project. Further, Constant emphasised 
the positive role for machinery and industrialisation in the elaboration of unitary urbanism over 
what he perceived as Jorn’s more artisanal and thus ‘reactionary’ approach.  
Constant’s argument set off an ongoing debate over the role of the artist in the group that would 
not be fully resolved until the ‘break’ with the artists in early 1962. The initial response of the 
editorial committee, which included Debord and Jorn, attempted to resolve what Constant saw 
in terms of an opposition, arguing that Jorn’s idea of a ‘free artist’ was an attempt to anticipate 
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the possibilities offered to subjective creation and expression beyond either art, or the restricted 
sense of bourgeois individualism. The debate quickly resulted in the draft ‘Amsterdam 
Declaration’, written by Debord and Constant, which was accepted by the group the following 
year. The Declaration attempted to find a resolution to the argument by clearly eschewing, on 
the one hand, the practice of the ‘traditional arts’ while on the other hand defending Jorn’s 
conception of the ‘free artist’, insofar as unitary urbanism would ‘entail the authentic 
accomplishment[s] of the creative individual’ (Amsterdam Declaration). 
The debate, however, was not resolved with the adoption of the Amsterdam Declaration at the 
Third Conference of the SI in March 1959. In fact, the debate between Debord and Constant 
polarised more and more. In these debates, between 1959 and 1960, Constant argued that 
unitary urbanism should be the sole focus of the group. He believed, further, the Situationist 
hypothesis was of little or no practical value. Debord continued to insist that the Situationist 
hypothesis was an absolute necessity. Not only did it contain the Situationist critique of art, but 
it also pointed beyond the merely artistic or architectural elaboration of unitary urbanism. 
However, Debord’s point can be better understand as his opposition to Constant’s reduction of 
the hypothesis to one of the means of elaborating the hypothesis — in this case, Constant’s 
primarily architectural elaboration of unitary urbanism. One of the most interesting aspects of 
Debord’s defence of Jorn’s perspective, was that he considered the use of any means — artistic 
or otherwise — as potentially important components of the elaboration of the Situationist 
hypothesis. In this way, Debord’s critique of art was not made in order to simply eschew artistic 
technique, but rather to eschew the role of art, its place in contemporary society, and the 
inability of art to problematise the ‘crisis of representation’ in anything other than artistic terms. 
In this sense, it was not a question of choosing one set of techniques over another, as Constant 
suggested, but rather to what use these techniques — and, indeed, any techniques — could be 
put in the interest of unitary urbanist experimentation, and the elaboration of the hypothesis. 
Coherence 
In late 1971, shortly before the SI was dissolved, Guy Debord wrote,  
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one cannot speak of “coherence” in the first years of the SI. If this idea can be expressed 
in such a context, it refers to the period begun in 1962 and in large part as a project that 
was more or less verified later on.263 
Debord’s retrospective wager was that the SI only became a coherent group by virtue of the so-
called ‘break’ with the artists in 1962. Debord believed that the role played by Situationist ideas 
in the occupations movement of May 1968 and the consequent success they enjoyed amongst 
considerably wider layers of people was the effective verification of his claim and perhaps even 
the ultimate justification for the split.264 However in 1962 the split was justified on the basis of 
the Spur group’s flaunting of the organisational discipline of the SI, their ‘systematic 
misunderstanding of situationist theses’, and their attempt to hide from the rest of the group 
their ‘participation in the Biennale de Paris, [and] collusion with diverse traffickers of modern 
art’.265 It is my belief that in order to fully understand the split we need to contextualise it with 
regard to the disputes over the role of art vis-à-vis the attempt to outline and practice a 
distinctive Situationist practice between 1957 and 1962. In particular, we also need to consider 
Debord’s attempt, from the outset, to cohere a distinctive Situationist project and practice, most 
clearly indicated by his role as the editor in chief of the Situationist journal. If we consider the 
split as the culminating point and resolution of a period of organisational malaise and inertia in 
1960 and 1961, then the proximal justification for the split proffered by Debord’s circle 
becomes easier to understand.  
Debord is the significant individual in the SI group through which we can chart its developing 
coherence. The major theoretical statements were either written by him or were initiated or 
coordinated by him. As the editor of the entire 12 issue run of the journal he was responsible for 
much of the editorial commentary and criticism, not to mention the work of literally cohering 
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février 1962),' in Guy Debord Œuvres, Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2006, p. 591. The SPUR group of 
artists, based in Munich, was in effect the German section of the SI between 1959 and 1962. 
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the group around its journal.266 However, and despite the many and varied criticisms of Debord 
(up to and including megalomania) he cared little for either the notion of individual genius or 
proprietary rights over work in which he collaborated.267 Indeed, his commitment to the 
collaborative work of the SI group is marked from the outset, and his penchant for such 
collaboration can already been detected in the drift of drunken days, friendships and theory in 
the Letterist International (hereafter LI).  
However, we can also see that Debord’s initial commitment to the SI group involved in a sense 
a type of compromise in order to get the group going. In the work ‘One Step Back’ published 
shortly before the founding of the SI, we find that his acknowledgment of the need to reach out 
to other currents and individuals in order to develop a specifically Situationist project is 
conceived as literally ‘one step back’ from the extreme position of the LI.268 Certainly he did not 
compromise his criticism of either the art world or capitalism more generally in this work (or 
others of the period); but the human task of building a collaborative project was foremost. We 
can see this in the first few years in the way Debord attempted to mediate the argument that 
began between Asger Jorn and Constant Nieuwenhuys over the role that the traditional arts 
would play (if any) in the Situationist project. However, just as Debord initially identified the 
need for a broader, more collaborative base for the founding and early period of the SI’s 
existence, so too he came to move on from the perspective of ‘one step back’ when such 
collaborations became derailed.  
                                                     
266 Debord’s position as editor of the SI journal from the outset put him in a unique positon with regard to 
the published representations of the Situationist project and activity. Indeed, this positon appeared to be 
directly related to the search for coherence, something apparently acknowledged early on by the group, as 
the following letter to the Situationist Piet de Groof in 1958 indicates: ‘Of course, you are perfectly free 
to publish whatever you want under your own name if my critique seems unfounded to you. I could not 
publish it in our “official organ,” the ideological coherence of which was made my responsibility.’ 
Debord, 'Letter to Piet de Groof (aka Walter Korun), 16 June 1958,' p. 125. 
267 For instance, when the ex-Situationist, André Frankin, published an article in Arguments, in which he 
used the ideas of the SI, including an almost direct plagiarism of Debord’s address to Lefebvre’s research 
group on everyday life, what aggrieved Debord was not the plagiarism so much as Frankin appending his 
name, and thus proprietary rights, to Situationist ideas: ‘the pretension to a “property of ideas,” […] 
always seems ridiculous to claim, even when one is entitled’, Debord, 'Lettre à André Frankin, 8 
septembre 1961.' Also, cf. G.-E. Debord, 'Perspectives de modification conscientes dans la vie 
quotidienne,' Internationale Situationniste, no. 6 (Août 1961); André Frankin, 'Le parti, le quotidien,' 
Arguments, no. 25-26 (1er et 2e trimestres 1962); Internationale Situationniste, 'L’I.S. vous l’avait bien 
dit !,' Internationale Situationniste, no. 8 (Janvier 1963). 
268 Cf. Debord, 'Un pas en arrière [1957].' 
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Debord’s chief concern in the first five years of the group was the establishment of a coherent 
Situationist project. Before 1962 there were attempts at coherence, and even evanescent 
moments of such coherence. But ultimately such attempts failed before the artistic inertia of 
many of the group’s members. Debord’s initial program for achieving coherence was fleshed 
out along the following lines: (1) he argued for the immediate use of present day culture — 
artistic, industrial or otherwise — integrated into an experimental ‘unitary urbanism’; and (2) 
that such experimental practices would be both a means of developing and a ‘means of 
approaching’ the aim of the SI, the Situationist hypothesis.269  
Indeed, for Debord the Situationist hypothesis was the crux of any present use of culture. 
Without it the Situationist project became meaningless and indeed ran the risk of simply being 
absorbed by capitalist society. Thus, it served to orient the present use of elements of cultural 
production and the rejection of capitalist culture considered as a totality. However, the means 
for the present practice of the SI was to use whatever was available — that is to say to engage in 
the détournement of cultural and technical means — to the end of developing the Situationist 
hypothesis and demonstrate the immediate possibilities for new forms of human behaviour 
enabled by experimental urban ‘ambiances’ (thus unitary urbanism).270 
So, it is probably not too strange that the main disputes in the early SI were over the use of art 
and its relationship to Situationist practice. Indeed, here is where attempts to cohere the group 
played out. They have often been represented as the dispute between a more ‘artistic’ (Constant, 
Jorn, the Spur artists) and a more ‘political’ (Debord, Bernstein, Vaneigem, Kotányi, etc.) 
conception of the Situationist project, but such typification is unsatisfactory.271 For instance, as 
we will see in the initial dispute in which Debord and Constant Nieuwenhuys were the 
significant parties, Debord insistently maintained that Situationists must use any means ‘even 
                                                     
269 Constant [Nieuwenhuys] & [Guy] Debord, 'La déclaration d'Amsterdam,' Internationale 
Situationniste, no. 2 (Décembre 1958), p. 32. 
270 Or as Constant remarked, ‘even if we must reject [present culture] in its entirety, it is necessary to 
strictly distinguish between the true and the false, between what is usable for the moment, and what is 
compromising.’ 
Internationale Situationniste, 'Sur nos moyens et nos perspectives,' Internationale Situationniste, no. 2 
(Décembre 1958), p. 26. 
271 Varied commentators have taken this position, for instance Peter Wollen (1989), Stewart Home (1991) 
and McKenzie Wark (2011) — to name a few. 
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artistic ones’, while Constant maintained a determined opposition to the ‘traditional arts’ and 
painters and painting in particular. The question was not one so much of art versus politics as 
that between the uses to which ‘alienated’ and ‘separated’ art (and later politics) could be put.  
As we saw in chapter two, a better way to understand Debord’s perspective is by way of his 
conception of the Situationist project as being built upon both the successes and failure of the 
earlier ‘anti-art’ artistic avant-gardes. The Situationist hypothesis was not just a suggestion for a 
future world of playful creation beyond work and alienation, it was offered as a solution to the 
impasse of Dadaist ‘anti-art’ and the ambivalent Surrealist ‘solution’ to the latter. Dada had 
more than sufficiently shown the problems inherent in contemporary art, detonating its 
pretensions and undermining its claims to ultimate aesthetic significance. Yet Dada’s negative 
project ultimately consumed it, which is to say having declared the death of art it was unable to 
successfully outline a project beyond it.272 The early Surrealists posed their project as the 
positive solution to Dadaist negativity. However, despite their declarations to be the 
personification of the positive move beyond the Dadaist demolition job, the Surrealists ended by 
formulating in effect a new aesthetic style and movement, one which would later be accepted 
into the pantheon of art.  
Debord’s Situationist hypothesis (aka ‘the hypothesis of the construction of situations’) was an 
attempt to outline a positive project founded on the foregoing. It was ‘anti-art’ to the extent that 
it based itself on the Dadaist rejection of aesthetics and the Surrealist division between art and 
everyday life. However, Debord drew its positive aspects from the failure of either the Dadaists 
or Surrealists to actually move beyond an artistic elaboration of ‘anti-art’. Indeed, Debord 
believed that Dadaist negativity in itself was the most positive aspect of Dada. Its failure then 
was the extent to which its productions were understood as the foundation of an anti-artistic 
aesthetic.  
                                                     
272 It is interesting that the ex-Parisian Dadaist, Georges Ribemont-Dessaignes, outlined, though 
negatively, the alternative that the SI decided to explore, in his 1930 reminiscences of Dada. Ribemont-
Dessaignes believed that ‘[t]o repeat similar experiments [in what Ribemont-Dessaignes called the 
‘revolution of the mind’] Dada would have had to risk turning to propaganda and consequently becoming 
codified’. Georges Ribemont-Dessaignes, 'History of Dada (1930),' in The Dada Painters and Poets: An 
Anthology, ed. Robert Motherwell, 1981, p. 110. 
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Thus, Debord was particularly keen to differentiate the Situationist hypothesis from 
contemporaries engaged in ‘neo-Dada’ artistic production (or for that matter any artist 
production). What was most egregious about ‘neo-Dada’, and other self-professed artistic avant-
gardes, was that their positive interpretation of the exhaustion of Dadaist negativity remained at 
the artistic level. Indeed, a chief lesson of Dada was that there could no longer be artistic 
‘progress’. Through such moves as ‘found objects’ and ‘ready-mades’, the Dadaists had 
demonstrated through a delirious inflation that anything could be considered art. The necessary 
flip side of such a gesture was the destruction of the authoritative aesthetic designation. If 
anything could be considered art, then what point art? For Debord any move to aestheticize 
Dadaist anti-art was a retrograde one. The point now was not to develop art — in any case such 
a ‘development’ was impossible. The point was now to cash out the promise of an artistic 
beyond ‘by any means, even artistic ones’.273 
It is strange then to consider that the dispute over the use of artistic means in the SI is usually 
described as a dispute between those that adhered to a more ‘cultural’ or ‘artistic’ interpretation 
and those that adhered to a ‘political’ interpretation of the Situationist project. 274 As already 
noted, in the dispute between Constant and Debord during 1959 Debord continued to defend the 
use of ‘artistic means’ in unitary urbanist experimentation against Constant’s belief that the 
‘traditional arts’ had no place in such experiments. Indeed, Debord would continue to defend the 
use of artistic and any means in Situationist experiments and practice — even after the 1962 
split. The crucial difference between him and the so-called artist members was not over whether 
or not to use artistic means, but rather over the question of accommodating or reducing such 
Situationist experiments to the practice of art as it then existed under conditions of capitalist 
alienation. For Debord, art, politics, philosophy or any other practice or discipline under 
                                                     
273 Debord, 'Rapport sur la construction des situations et sur les conditions de l'organisation et de l'action 
de la tendance situationniste internationale [1957],' p. 322. 
274 The typification of the SI from 1962 as ‘political’ in opposition to its earlier ‘artistic’ focus finds its 
origin in Jacqueline de Jong’s description of Debord’s circle as acting in a ‘completely political and 
absolutist’ fashion when expelling the Spur artists. Such a description has been taken over, largely 
uncritically, by supporters of de Jong, Jørgen Nash and other artists expelled from the SI. Cf. Jacqueline 
de Jong, 'Critique of the Political Practice of Détournement [1962],' in Cosmonauts of the Future, ed. 
Mikkel Bolt Ramussen & Jakob Jakobsen, Copehangen: Nebula, 2015; Jacqueline de Jong, Jørgen Nash, 
and et al., 'The Struggle of the Situcratic Society: A Situationist Manifesto [1962],' in Cosmonauts of the 
Future, ed. Mikkel Bolt Ramussen & Jakob Jakobsen, Copenhagen: Nebula, 2015. 
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conditions of capitalist alienation and the divisions of labour, was necessarily compromised. 
Nonetheless they were the cultural ‘raw materials’ which Situationist must seize hold of. Thus, 
the Situationist use of such means, in order to be Situationist, must simultaneously draw 
attention to the ‘compromised’ nature of their existence in capitalism. Here, then, is the core of 
Debord’s dispute with those Situationists who also pursued careers in art — a dispute that 
would also be extended to the criticism of a specialised, ‘separated’ politics. As he would 
mordantly point out after the split,  
on the artistic side, all the hypocrites feign to treat us as politicians, and on the political 
side reassure themselves by reproaching us for being artists and dreamers. Their 
common point is that they speak in the name of artistic or political specialisation, the 
one as dead as the other.275 
I believe a better representation of the division within the group before 1962 is between those 
that had a primarily ‘artistic’ interpretation and those that had a primarily ‘anti-artistic’ 
interpretation. The advantage of such a schema is that it does not absolutely exclude a certain 
‘porosity’ between the perspectives. For instance, those like Debord who opposed an artistic 
interpretation of the Situationist project were not above the use of artistic technique — albeit 
within an overarching ‘anti-art’ perspective (i.e. within the perspective of the Situationist 
hypothesis). Thus, he conceived of his films as artistic propaganda to the end of a Situationist 
project, rather than ‘Situationist’ per se (cf. chapters one, five and seven). Similarly, 
Situationists like Asger Jorn, Constant and Giuseppe Pinot-Gallizio continued to practice and 
exhibit as artists, and even use Situationist ideas in their public art practice. However, they too 
attempted to place this artistic ‘bias’ within a Situationist perspective. The advantage of 
emphasising the ‘anti-artistic’ perspective of some Situationists also helps to connect Debord’s 
Situationist hypothesis to its stated purpose of resolving the impasse of the earlier (anti) art 
avant-gardes, and distinguish the SI from the ‘neo-Dada’ artists of the 1950s and 60s whose 
interest was certainly more aesthetic (or aestheticizing) than it was anti-art. 
                                                     
275 I.S., 'Sur l’exclusion d’Attila Kotànyi [1963],' pp. 666-67. 
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Before 1962 there was an internal struggle in the SI regarding the nature of a coherent 
Situationist practice. In the argument between Constant and Debord (1958-60) the focus was on 
the role of the ‘traditional arts’ and whether or not they could be used in an experimental 
Situationist practice. In the dispute between Debord and the loose faction of Jacqueline de Jong, 
Jørgen Nash and the Spur artists, the focus was on the freedom to interpret what was classed as 
‘Situationist’ practice (for instance, for the latter Situationists the programs that had been agreed 
upon at the founding conference, and again at the Munich conference in 1959, were considered 
more as guidelines than programs to act upon or put into practice).276 For those around Debord 
(primarily the Belgian and French sections), the programs were the distillations of the 
arguments and experience of the SI, but perhaps more importantly they were the ‘common’ 
programs and principles agreed upon. To treat them as mere guidelines or worse dismissively or 
even ignored (as Debord and others accused Spur of doing), is to effectively renounce them, by 
putting the individual or sections before the collective practice of the SI.  
Let us now turn to a more detailed examination of the SI between 1957 and 1960 in order to 
flesh out the argument regarding coherence and the disputes over the role of art. 
The Situationist hypothesis  
We saw in chapter two that Debord’s criticism of Surrealism was extended to their successors, 
in particular the post-war avant-gardes, which drew precisely on the artistic successes of 
Surrealism at the expense of its practical non-conformism and original commitment to ‘change 
life’ and ‘transform the world.’277 Debord positioned the Situationist International as the 
inheritor of the Surrealist project at its most radical — the Surrealism of 1924 rather than 1958, 
as it was put in the first issue of the SI’s journal.278 And because Surrealism still existed as an 
organised tendency in the late 1950s, mired in all that Debord criticised (e.g. the artistic 
practices, the evocation of mysticism and the power of the unconscious), the Situationist project 
                                                     
276 In some cases, de Jong et al. even imagined a ‘Situationist programme’ that appear to be non-existent 
— for instance her and Nash’s assertion that the SI held to a ‘programme of anti-organisation’, Jong et al., 
'The Struggle of the Situcratic Society: A Situationist Manifesto [1962],' p. 91.  
277 ‘“Transform the world,” Marx said; “Change life,” Rimbaud said. These two watchwords are one for 
us.’ Cf. Breton, 'Speech to the Congress of Writers (1935),' p. 241. 
278 Cf. I.S., 'Le bruit et la fureur,' p. 5. 
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was necessarily a break not a continuation. Indeed, the Situationist International derived its 
name from what was to be the central idea of the early SI: the hypothesis of the construction of 
situations. 
In the founding document of the SI, the Report on the Construction of Situations, Debord 
hypothesised the possibility and desirability of constructing situations in opposition to the 
‘fortuitous situations’ of the everyday life of capitalist societies.279 To the apparent sameness 
and repetitive nature of these situations, rendered largely ‘drab’ and ‘undistinguished’ to the 
extent that alienated, capitalist imperatives had come to dominate everyday life, Debord posed 
the possibility and indeed the necessity of Constructing Situations.280 
The Situationist hypothesis of the construction of situations was offered simultaneously as a 
totalising synthesis of the results of the experimental practice of the Letterist International (e.g. 
urban ‘dérives’, psychogeography) and as the solution to the impasse reached by the avant-
garde artistic experiments of the previous half century.  
‘Our central idea’ Debord wrote ‘is the construction of situations, that is to say, the concrete 
construction of momentary ambiences of life and their transformation into a superior passionate 
quality.’281 As originally envisaged the Situationist hypothesis proposed ‘an organised 
intervention [in everyday life] based on the complex factors of two components in perpetual 
                                                     
279 Debord, 'Rapport sur la construction des situations et sur les conditions de l'organisation et de l'action 
de la tendance situationniste internationale [1957],' p. 325. 
280 Ibid. Debord’s conception of ‘situation’ bears a passing resemblance to Jean-Paul Sartre’s — insofar 
as he contrasts the limited, poor ‘situations’ of present capitalist society with the possibility of free, 
created situations. However, it is a mistake to make too much of such a passing ‘family’ resemblance. In 
fact, we can consider the Situationist theory of the ‘constructed situation’ as a critique of and an inversion 
of Sartre’s idea of the situation. Considering Sartre’s antipathy toward the Surrealists, the SI’s 
‘constructed situation’ is a recovery and détournement of the revolutionary and ‘constructivist’ impulse of 
the Surrealists who proclaimed change and the transformation of life a desirable principle of everyday 
mores. In contrast, the Sartrean ‘situations’ of everyday capitalist life were endured rather than created; 
the ‘constructed situation’ was implicitly a critique of the ontological fatalism of the existentialists and 
explicitly a theory of the free construction of everyday life. Sartre’s sense of the ‘freedom’, ‘in situation’, 
resembled more Hegel’s philosophical reconciliation — i.e. a purely philosophical and thus ideal 
reconciliation with the reality of capitalist everyday life (even through Sartre’s was presented through a 
superfluous Heideggerean filter of the necessity of the alienation ‘in situation’). For more on Sartre, also 
cf. fn. 114, chapter one (above), and fn. 530, chapter 5, below. 
281 Ibid., p. 322. 
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interaction: [1] the material décor of life; [2] the behaviours which this material décor brings 
about and which [in turn] transforms it’.282 
The ‘Constructed Situation’ was contrasted with the ‘objectified’ results of previous artistic 
avant-gardes: painting, poetry, prose, sculpture, cinema, etc. — indeed the production of any 
object that could potentially be isolated and fetishized as a commodity for sale. This was not to 
say that the Situationists were opposed to the production of artistic objects at such. Rather they 
saw the very artistic techniques as necessarily being appropriated by the Constructors of 
Situations, reappropriating such diverse practices and others in order that they would be 
combined in new totalities, new ‘ambiances’ for living rather than as objects solely for 
spectatorship or sale. Nonetheless Debord clearly distinguished their project from the 
‘traditional goal of aesthetics’.283 
This brings us to a central if often misrepresented aspect of the idea of the ‘Constructed 
Situation.’ Most often the ‘Constructed Situation’ is presented as a type of artistic ‘happening’ 
or, to use a term favoured by art criticism, a type of ‘Gesamtkunstwerk’ or ‘total work of art’.284 
But in fact ‘the construction of situations’ was presented in the founding document of the SI as a 
hypothesis; i.e. a theoretical proposal for the construction of environmental and behavioural 
ambiences in a post-capitalist society.285 Certainly the SI drew inspiration from such critical 
artistic practices as Kurt Schwitter’s Merzbau and elements of the experimental and artistically 
inclined Bauhaus. But to reduce their pointed criticism of the artistic limits of the previous 
avant-garde experiments is to misunderstand the nature of the hypothesis they proposed: 
The situation is conceived as the contrary of the work of art, which is an attempt at 
absolute valorisation and preservation of the present moment. […] Every situation, as 
consciously constructed as it can be, contains its [own] negation and moves inevitably 
                                                     
282 Ibid. Note the way Marx’s conception of ‘revolutionary practice’ being ‘[t]he coincidence of the 
changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change’, is already an influence at this point. 
Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach [1845],' p. 4 (thesis 3). 
283 Debord, 'Thèses sur la révolution culturelle,' p. 20. 
284 Cf. chapter one above, in particular under the heading ‘From ‘pre-situationist’ activity to art as ‘anti-
situationist’.  
285 ‘Everything leads us to believe that it is around the hypothesis of the construction of situations that the 
essentials of our research will be decided.’ Debord, 'Rapport sur la construction des situations et sur les 
conditions de l'organisation et de l'action de la tendance situationniste internationale [1957],' p. 325. 
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toward its own reversal. In the conduct of individual life, a situationist action is not 
founded on the abstract idea of rationalist progress (which, according to Descartes, 
“renders us masters and possessors of nature”), but on the practice of arranging the 
milieu that conditions us. The Constructor of Situations, to take over a few words from 
Marx, “by acting through his own movements on external nature and transforming it… 
transforms at the same time his own nature”.286 
The Situationist hypothesis & unitary urbanism 
The Situationist hypothesis was not merely an aspirational goal but intimately entwined with the 
means proposed for its realisation. Thus, Debord argued that the SI would nevertheless, ‘try to 
construct situations’.287 Given the poor reality of contemporary ‘situations’, such an attempt 
would characterise much of the early SI.  
We see that it is necessary to multiply poetic subjects and objects […] and organise the 
play of these poetic subjects among these poetic objects. This is our entire program, 
which is essentially transitory. Our situations will have no future; will be places of 
passage. The immutable character of art or of anything, does not enter into our 
considerations — which are serious.288 
The plans for experimenting with the hypothesis were distinguished from the possibility of 
realising the hypothesis in the future; in particular distinguished on the basis of the poverty of 
means at the disposal of contemporary Situationists, and the relative marginal and isolated basis 
of contemporary Situationist experiments. In order to both signify the present constraints of 
such Situationist attempts at constructing situations, as well as identify the key critical object 
which they faced, Debord proposed the possibility of immediate experimentation under the 
rubric of ‘unitary urbanism’: 
                                                     
286 I.S., 'Le sens du dépérissement de l’art,' Internationale Situationniste, no. 3 (Décembre 1959), p. 7. 
Note that the Marx quote is from Capital, specifically chapter 7, ‘The Labour Process and the 
Valorisation Process’, p. 284. 
287 Debord, 'Rapport sur la construction des situations et sur les conditions de l'organisation et de l'action 
de la tendance situationniste internationale [1957],' p. 325. 
288 Ibid., p. 326. My emphasis. 
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Unitary urbanism is defined first of all as the use of all arts and techniques as means 
contributing to the integral composition of a milieu. […] Secondly, unitary urbanism is 
dynamic, which is to say in close relation to styles of behaviour. The smallest unit of 
unitary urbanism is not the house, but the architectural complex […] Architecture must 
advance by taking as its material emotionally moving situations, rather than emotionally 
moving forms. And the experiments conducted with such material will lead to [as yet] 
unknown forms [des formes inconnues]. 289 
Unitary urbanism was, perforce, contrasted with the fragmented ‘urbanism’ of contemporary 
capitalism. It was initially conceptualised and presented as an experimental platform for the 
investigation of possible urban configurations to the end of encouraging the free expression and 
realisation of human needs and desires. It would be ‘unitary’ to the extent that the capitalist city 
was ‘fragmented’ and overwhelmingly determined by the false universalism of market ‘needs’. 
It is necessary to envisage this ensemble as infinitely more expansive than the old 
empire of architecture over the traditional arts, or the present occasional application to 
anarchic urbanism of specialized technology, or of scientific investigations such as 
ecology. Unitary urbanism must, for example, dominate the sonic milieu as well as the 
distribution of different varieties of food and drink. It must embrace the creation of new 
forms and the détournement of the already known forms of architecture and urbanism 
— as well as the détournement of poetry and old films.290 
It can seem that the theory of unitary urbanism and the Situationist hypothesis are identical. 
However, as I have argued above the Situationist hypothesis was proposed as the apotheosis of 
the fragmented, individual arts, as opposed to a type of artistic practice or art work. It was 
hypothetical to the extent that it proposed a mode of living (a use of life) on a radically 
difference social-productive basis than contemporary capitalism. Unitary urbanism, on the other 
hand, proposed simultaneously, the criticism of contemporary ‘urbanism’ and the uses of the 
present (capitalist) city; and on the other, practical experimentation to the end of exploring the 
                                                     
289 Ibid., pp. 322, 323. 
290 Ibid., pp. 322-23. 
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immediate possibilities for unifying the urban terrain. Moreover, its experimental techniques 
would draw upon contemporary artistic and scientific techniques in order to suggest an 
‘integral’ use for these techniques — itself a form of practical criticism of the present 
fragmented use of technique by capital (and in the interests of capital).291 
As we will discover, despite distinguishing between the Situationist hypothesis and unitary 
urbanism, confusion remained within the group regarding their relationship and importance. 
Indeed, the most serious dispute in the group prior to those that ended with the expulsion of the 
Spur artists in 1962, revolved precisely around the role of unitary urbanism in the group and its 
potential for supplanting the Situationist hypothesis as the guiding practice and theory of the SI. 
One step back 
In 1963, almost a year after the final break with the artists, the SI typified those artists who used 
the ‘Situationist’ label to distinguish themselves in the art market as ‘Nashists’, after Jørgen 
Nash, the ex-Situationist and exemplar of such a practice. Reflecting on the first years of the SI 
the group wrote: 
It seems to us that Nashism expresses an objective tendency, a result of the ambiguous 
and adventurous politics which the SI had risked by accepting to act within culture, 
[while] being against all of the current organisation of this culture and even against all 
culture as a separate sphere[.]292 
What is perhaps most interesting about this attempt to understand the risk the Situationist 
project took in its first years, was the extent to which it confirmed concerns Debord outlined 
two months before the founding of the SI:  
It is certain that the decision to exploit, from the economic as from the constructive 
viewpoint, backward fragments of modern aesthetics entails the grave danger of 
decomposition. To cite a specific case, friends worry about a sudden numerical 
                                                     
291 Note that the early use of the term ‘integral’ by the SI, in the sense of drawing a link between unitary 
urbanism and an ‘integral art’, would later be given up to the extent that they encountered problems 
distinguishing the Situationist project more generally from artistic practices. This was directly related to 
the term ‘integral art’ enjoying a wider use among sections of the then contemporary artistic scene.  
292 I.S., 'L'Operation Contre-Situationniste Dans Divers Pays,' p. 24. 
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predominance of painters, whose work they judge necessarily insignificant and 
indissolubly tied to the artistic trade. […] Any use of the current framework of 
intellectual commerce yields ground to ideological confusionism — and this includes 
us. But on the other hand we can do nothing without taking into account from the outset 
this fleeting framework.293  
Debord’s attitude between his assessment of the dangers of ‘ideological confusionism’ in 1957 
and ‘Nashism’ in 1963 remained consistent. What we find is that Debord did not abstractly 
argue against art and artistic practices, as say his fellow Situationist Constant Nieuwenhuys did, 
but rather against the practice of the ‘traditional arts’ insofar as such practices were 
accommodated by capitalist society. From the outset of the Situationist project, Debord was 
interested in the alternative uses to which artistic techniques, and indeed any techniques could 
be put to in the service of the Situationist project. Certainly, this was in the broader context of 
the criticism of art and the impasse reached by the artistic avant-gardes; however, Debord’s 
prime concern was the turn toward the alternative use of already existing techniques in order to 
experiment with the transformation of everyday life. Thus conceived, it was not so much artistic 
technique that was the problem but rather the merely artistic uses to which such techniques were 
more often than not deployed.  
In the text cited above from 1957, Debord conceived of the coming formation of the SI as ‘one 
step back’; that is a step back from the utter rejection of the contemporary artistic milieus as 
pursued by the Letterist International (LI), in order to enter into a ‘new international 
organisation’ the better to ‘seize hold of modern culture in order to use it for our own ends’.294 
However this was also a ‘step back’ from what was conceived as the abstractly correct 
assessment of the LI, i.e. their negative attitude toward the production of art in capitalist 
societies. It was the increasingly isolated position of the LI that necessitated such a step, in 
order to break out of their relative isolation and fully explore the possibilities of a Situationist 
project. But perhaps more importantly, it was the acceptance that the abstract opposition of the 
                                                     
293 Debord, 'Un pas en arrière [1957],' pp. 294, 295. 
294 Ibid., p. 295. 
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LI was itself an impasse without a practice aimed at the realisation of the Situationist hypothesis 
— a hypothesis moreover which had emerged from the LI’s practice of urban dérives and 
psychogeographical criticism of the capitalist city.  And so Debord championed the perspective 
in the SI that combined the negative assessment of the arts in capitalist society with a program 
for their immediate use in unitary urbanist experimentation — summarised by Debord as 
‘within and against’ culture.295 
The best way to consider Debord’s conception of ‘within and against’ is with an eye to what 
was the exemplary Situationist activity in the first years of the group: the elaboration of unitary 
urbanism. As we have seen unitary urbanism was presented as the key method of developing the 
Situationist hypothesis. Not only was it an attempt to turn to a ‘work’ beyond the confines of the 
art-object, but it proposed to use any means — even artistic ones. Debord described this attitude 
in 1957 as being ‘within and against’ cultural decomposition in order to distinguish it from 
contemporary attempts to ‘renovate’ or chisel away at the formal innovations of previous avant-
gardes.296 Certainly there are paradoxes in his perspective, but they were acknowledged as 
inevitable (and even embraced after a fashion). ‘We wish to transform these times (in which all 
that we love, beginning with our manner of research, also belongs)’.297 
Debord described the Situationist project as the creation of ‘a new cultural theatre of 
operations’. The project was conceived not as a new art form or contribution to present cultural 
production, but rather the outline for a new culture entailing a clear break with the present. 
Debord’s choice of terms was apt. For the Situationist hypothesis to be realised, a war was to be 
waged via a ‘theatre of operations’ destined to disappear with the victory or defeat of the 
                                                     
295 The turn from the LI to the SI was conducted under the broad conception of ‘with and against’, insofar 
as Debord proposed to use artists and artistic techniques in the experimental elaboration of unitary 
urbanism and the Situationist hypothesis. Unfortunately, this is still misunderstood by some 
commentators. For instance, McKenzie Wark has erroneously invoked Debord to justify his own 
conception of ‘with’ (as opposed to  Debord’s conception of ‘with and against’): ‘Just as Debord, with the 
founding of the Situationist International, accepted the tactic of positioning the movement within rather 
than against the art world, perhaps today one might take up a defensive position within higher education 
rather than against it.’ Wark, The Beach Beneath the Streets: The Everyday Life and Glorious Times of 
the Situationist International, p. 158.  
296 Debord, 'Encore un effort si vous voulez être situationnistes : L’I.S. dans et contre la décomposition 
[1957].' 
297 Ibid., p. 350. 
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project.298 One would lay hold of presently available techniques in order to flesh out this culture 
‘placed hypothetically at the level of the eventual general construction of ambiances’.299 But 
such experimentation, necessarily restricted by their marginal nature and poor command of 
material resources, was merely a sketch within present culture of a possible future:  
we must anticipate and experiment beyond the present atomisation of the worn-out 
traditional arts, not in order to take up again some coherent [architectural] ensemble 
(e.g. a cathedral), but rather to open the way to a future coherent ensemble 
corresponding to a new state of the world whose most important statement will be the 
urbanism and everyday life of a society in [the process of] formation. We clearly see 
that the development of this task assumes a revolution which has not yet happened, and 
that all research is [thus] limited by the contradictions of the present.300 
What is remarkable about the first years of the SI is the extent to which Debord, and those who 
agreed with his perspective, accommodated the ‘ideological confusionism’ of operating within 
and against art. Debord’s early misgivings about ‘the grave danger of decomposition’ were 
mitigated by his belief that the SI must use ‘any means, even artistic [ones]’ in order to develop 
the Situationist project.301 Indeed this was the entire point of the foundation of the SI, to step 
back from the nihilism and abstentionism of the LI in order to engage in a broader project — 
albeit with the emphasis on the revolutionary use of the arts and other techniques. Nonetheless, 
the ‘grave danger’ persisted throughout the first phase of the SI, and eventually, under the 
threatened dissolution of the Situationist project over 1960 and 1961, turned Debord and other 
Situationists against such an accommodation. 
Debord’s perspective is more fully revealed when examining the debate over the role of art and 
artists in the early SI. It is to this argument we must now turn. 
                                                     
298 Ibid., p. 345. The militaristic sense of ‘theatre’ here is deliberate and a recurring image in Debord’s 
representations. The SI is engaged in a war, deep behind enemy lines and liable to be picked off one by 
one. 
299 Ibid. 
300 Ibid., pp. 345-46. 
301 Debord, 'Rapport sur la construction des situations et sur les conditions de l'organisation et de l'action 
de la tendance situationniste internationale [1957],' p. 322. 
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Episodes from the dispute over art — Constant and the elaboration of unitary urbanism 
In September 1958, Constant, member of the Dutch section of the SI, initiated a debate in the 
group. The proximate cause was his opposition to the ‘traditional arts’ and in particular painting 
as a component of unitary urbanist experimentation. It is almost certain that the publication of 
Asger Jorn’s book Pour la forme under the name of the SI in the same month as Constant 
initiated the debate contributed to the emergence of the latter.302 Jorn and Constant had been 
members of a group that the SI considered one of its immediate precursors: the Cobra group 
which existed between 1948 and 1951.303 In the wake of Cobra, both Jorn and Constant became 
engaged with more architectural concerns; concerns which would bring them into contact with 
Debord’s Letterist International group and ultimately the foundation of the SI in 1957. 
However, unlike Jorn, Constant had foresworn painting around 1952 as a result of his 
experiences in Cobra.304 
The crux of the debate was this: Constant believed that Situationists like Jorn continued to 
emphasise traditional artistic practices like painting — for instance Jorn’s painterly 
‘modifications’ by which he painted over cheap paintings he found in local flea markets. 
According to Constant, such techniques, based upon an individualist and backward looking 
‘artisanal’ notion of the ‘free artist’, were an impediment rather than a boon to the necessarily 
collaborative and industrially based experimentation required for unitary urbanist 
experimentation.305 Constant proposed instead that the ‘task of the artists’ in the SI was to 
                                                     
302 Constant initiated the debate before the publication of Pour la forme, however his disagreement with 
Jorn was made on the basis of re-reading some of Jorn’s articles, including one’s that were republished in 
the book. 
303 Cobra: an acronym derived from the originating cities of its initial participants: Copenhagen, Brussels, 
Amsterdam. From 1949 it was more formally known as the International of Experimental Artists 
(Internationale des Artistes Expérimentaux). 
304 ‘I drew the conclusion there six years ago by abandoning painting and launching myself into a more 
effective experimentation […] in relation to the idea of a unitary habitat.’ I.S.,'Sur nos moyens et nos 
perspectives,' p. 24. 
305 It is arguable if Jorn’s artistic practice was simply ‘artisanal’. It is true that his work often involved 
small scale collaboration – for instance at his artistic ‘laboratory’ in Albisola, Italy. However, it is hard to 
lumber Jorn with either the practice of, or longing for the old style artisanal structure based upon a 
‘master craftsman’ guiding and working alongside his ‘companions’. See footnote 306 below. 
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‘invent new techniques’ that would allow the ‘integration of the arts in the construction of the 
human habitat’.306 
The ‘real contradiction’ for Debord was not between painting and traditional arts on the one 
hand and ‘cold’ industrial and architectural techniques on the other, but rather that between the 
‘outmoded [notion of] artisanal freedom’ and the possibility of proposing ‘a free art […] that 
masters and uses all the techniques of [social and behavioural] conditioning’.307 Indeed, from 
the foregoing we can see that Debord distinguished between the anachronistic notion of an 
artisanal art and Jorn’s conception of ‘free art’.308 He thus rejected Constant’s representation of 
Jorn’s perspective, pointing out that Jorn had already rejected this ‘reactionary aspect of the 
Bauhaus’.309   
The question for Debord was not one of favouring artistic techniques against architectural or 
industrial ones, but rather emphasising the present unitary urbanist uses to which they could be 
put; and, with an eye on the Situationist hypothesis, the necessary transformation that all 
technique would undergo under the solvent process of social revolution. Certainly, Debord 
agreed that industry and industrialism, unlike painting, was already redolent with unitary 
urbanist potential.310 However the difference between technical potential and actual social 
transformation was crucial. Industrial techniques may be immediately more suited to unitary 
urbanist experimentation, but such Situationist experimentation was made with the Situationist 
                                                     
306 I.S., 'Sur nos moyens et nos perspectives,' p. 24. 
307 Ibid.; Debord, 'Letter to Constant, 25 September 1958,' p. 159. Note that the response of the editorial 
board of the Internationale Situationniste to Constant in the second part of ‘Sur nos moyens et nos 
perspectives’ was originally sent by Debord in his letter to Constant of 25 September 1958.    
308 I.S., 'Sur nos moyens et nos perspectives,' p. 24. Jorn’s conception of ‘free art’ or the ‘free arts’ can be 
hard to pin down, but in essence it appears to be one with the statement made against Constant’s attack on 
it: ‘A free art of the future is an art that would master and use all the new conditioning techniques’ (ibid.). 
For Jorn, under the impact of industrial, machine production, the movement of avant-garde art tended to 
pose the freedom to create and construct architectural ‘ambiances’ as opposed to art-works as such. 
309 Ibid., p. 24. Jorn had argued at the first meeting organised toward the formation of the SI in 1956, that 
‘[t]he error of the old Bauhaus was included in the slogan of its first Staatlichen Bauhauses Weimar 
manifesto: ARCHITECTS, SCULPTORS, PAINTERS, WE MUST ALL RETURN TO CRAFT 
PRODUCTION. This slogan perhaps had a certain pertinence at the time, but today craft production has 
become a small and insignificant domain in comparison with the domains of industry and of free art’ 
(Asger Jorn, 'Against Functionalism [1957],' in Fraternité Avant Tout: Asger Jorn’s writings on art and 
architecture, 1938-1958, ed. Ruth Baumeister, Rotterdam: 010 Publishers, 2011, p. 277). 
310 ‘[T]he material development of the era that has created the general crisis of culture and the possibility 
of its overthrow in a unitary construction of practical life.’ I.S., 'Sur nos moyens et nos perspectives,' p. 
24. 
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hypothesis in mind: ‘The construction of ambiances is not solely the application to everyday 
existence of an artistic standard permitted by technical progress. It is also a qualitative 
modification of life, likely to result in a permanent conversion of technical means’.311 
Debord would conclude this initial debate with Constant by arguing that ‘the culminating point 
in our discussion seems to me to be situated in the uses that we propose for present culture.’312 
However such an argument — one that Debord would return to repeatedly in his discussions 
with Constant over the following year — was crucially oriented by the critical nature of the 
Situationist hypothesis. Debord was uninterested in reducing the Situationist project to mere art 
criticism; instead he wanted to put the fruits of present cultural production to use in Situationist 
experimentation. Thus he wrote ‘[l]et us leave to the official gravediggers the sad task of 
burying the corpses of pictorial and literary expression’.313 For the Situationists, on the other 
hand, the task was to distinguish between the ‘true and the false [in present culture], between 
what is usable for the moment, and what is compromising.’314 
As a direct result of the argument, Debord and Constant wrote the ‘Amsterdam Declaration’ in 
November 1958. This draft, written for the upcoming Third Conference of the SI planned for 
Munich in April 1959, was an attempt to synthesise the results of the argument. For instance, 
the two key topics under dispute appeared to be settled: firstly, in the declaration that in the 
present ‘[a]ll means are utilisable, provided that they serve in unitary action’;315 and secondly, in 
the repudiation of the ‘renovation’ of the ‘individual arts’ being in any way commensurate with 
such unitary action. 316 The Declaration ended with two statements regarding both the mutual 
                                                     
311 Ibid., pp. 24-5. 
312 Ibid., p. 25. 
313 Ibid., p. 26. 
314 Ibid. 
315 Constant & Debord, 'La déclaration d'Amsterdam,' p. 32. 
316 Constant & Debord, ibid., p. 31. Indeed of all the points in the Declaration this point was strengthened 
at the April 1959 conference, being changed to a clear repudiation of the practice of the traditional, 
‘individual arts’. The original third point read: ‘The possibility of unitary and collective creation is 
already announced by the decomposition of the individual arts. The SI cannot include any attempt at 
renovating these arts’ (ibid., p. 31). At the 3rd Conference of the SI in April 1959 the Amsterdam 
Declaration was adopted by the SI with some amendments. Apropos the above: ‘In the third point replace 
“The SI cannot include any attempt at renovating these arts” (i.e. the individual arts) with “The SI cannot 
include any attempt to repeat these arts.” And add the following: “Unitary creation will lead to the real 
accomplishment of the individual creator.” Internationale Situationniste, 'Corrections pour l'adoption des 
onze points d'Amsterdam,' Internationale Situationniste, no. 3 (Décembre 1959), p. 28. 
133 
 
entailment of the Situationist hypothesis and unitary urbanism, and their distinction. On the one 
hand, the ‘construction of a situation’ was conceived as both less durable than the ‘general 
ambiance’ of a unitary urbanist construction; on the other hand, unitary urbanism was conceived 
as ‘the indispensable basis for the development of the construction of situations’.317 However it 
appears that there is a subtle distinction here between the construction of particular situations 
and the Situationist hypothesis regarding the general construction of situations. Thus, the 
Declaration also spoke of ‘a constructed situation’ as ‘a means of approach’ [un moyen 
d’approche] for unitary urbanism’.318 
However, it was an argument shortly before the Third Conference regarding a draft ‘appeal to 
revolutionary artists and intellectuals’ that would prove most prescient for the following year 
and more of the SI. The argument was mainly between Debord and Constant, though on 
Constant’s side it was initially made under the rubric of the recently established Bureau for 
Research into Unitary Urbanism (in effect the Dutch section of the SI consisting of Constant, 
the painter Armando and the architects Anton Alberts and Har Oudejans).  
The argument revolved around the question of the centrality of unitary urbanism and the agents 
who would realise it. The draft had presented unitary urbanism as one aspect of the Situationist 
critique of culture. Further the draft outlined the ‘revolutionary transcendence of existing 
conditions’ as the necessary condition for the success of the Situationist project (and thus of the 
Situationist hypothesis).319 The Dutch Situationists insisted that unitary urbanism was the 
central ‘point of departure’ for the Situationist group.320 Further they rejected the idea of the 
‘revolutionary overthrow of contemporary society’ as the condition of this practice.321 They 
argued that such a transformation had been undermined by the ‘evolution’ of the working class 
                                                     
317 Constant & Debord, 'La déclaration d'Amsterdam,' p. 32. 
318 Ibid. What we will find is that the distinction between a particular ‘constructed situation’ and the 
Situationist hypothesis will become lost, particularly in Constant’s interpretation. Thus, Constant 
disregarded the hypothesis in favour of ‘constructed situations’ as a component of unitary urbanism. This 
would became the chief issue under dispute between Debord and Constant. 
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away from the material poverty of the pre-war period.322 As such the SI must rely upon 
‘intellectuals who rebel against cultural poverty’ as the agents of a Situationist project.323 
Debord responded that despite the profound alteration of the ‘classical schemas’ of working 
class immiseration, capitalist exploitation as such had not been eliminated.324 Thus it was 
premature to rule out a social revolution as ‘utopian’.325 Additionally Debord believed the 
perspective of the Dutch Situationists was parochial, reflecting too much both the peculiar 
position of Holland in the Western European and North American post-war ‘affluence’, and 
disregarding the global conditions of such ‘affluence’.326 However Debord was most opposed to 
the idea that unitary urbanism must be the central practice and concern of the SI to the exclusion 
of all else. Drawing upon the distinction between the Situationist hypothesis and the attempt to 
develop a unitary urbanist practice, Debord reiterated his perspective and that of the shared 
Amsterdam Declaration, that ‘unitary urbanism is not a conception of the totality, nor must it 
become one. It is an instrument’.327 Both of these questions would not be definitively resolved 
until the break with the artists in 1962. Indeed, the draft appeal was shelved and the discussion 
was put aside as the Third Conference rapidly approached.328 
Constant was Debord’s chief correspondent throughout 1959. Despite their differences their 
perspectives on the prosecution of a distinctly Situationist project with unitary urbanism as a 
key component were close. However, the differences would prove crucial. Throughout 1959 
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323 Ibid. 
324 Ibid. I will briefly deal with the question of ‘immiseration’ and ‘poverty’ in relation to the SI’s 
conception of the ‘new poverty’, in chapter six.  
325 Ibid. 
326 ‘What you say about the “abolition, for the working class, of grim material poverty,” has actually 
occurred over the last fifty years in some Western European countries and in America. It has been paid 
for by the colonial slavery of the rest of humanity, and the atrocities of two world wars. “The slow 
development in the economic sphere” that you foresee overlooks the Chinese revolution, the 
revolutionary movements in all the underdeveloped countries, the harsh economic and political results of 
Stalinist collectivism and the central phenomenon of the “cold war,” and the success of the monopolistic 
and catholic-military reaction in Europe. The perspective of social revolution has changed profoundly to 
its classical [Marxist] schemas. But it is real.’ Debord, 'Response to Alberts, Armando, Constant, 
Oudejans [4 April 1959],' p. 233. 
327 I.S., 'Discussion sur un appel aux intellectuels et artistes révolutionnaires,' p. 24. 
328 After the expulsion of the architects Alberts and Oudejans in March 1960 and Constant’s resignation 
in June 1960, the question of the centrality of unitary urbanism was momentarily settled. But what 
Debord described as the ‘purely reformist’ perspective of the Dutch vis-à-vis the possibility of proletarian 
social revolution would be taken up on almost identical lines by the Spur artists within the SI in 1960 and 
1961.  
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Debord’s chief concern appeared to be directed at finding a means to integrate and transform 
those Situationists who were still wedded to the traditional arts (not to mention serve as a pole 
of attraction for other artists and technicians moving in a Situationist direction, or open to such). 
Constant, though appeased by the arguments around and resulting from the drafting of the 
Amsterdam Declaration, appeared to be unable to completely throw off his distrust of painters 
in general and Jorn in particular.  
Shortly after the Third Conference, Debord replied to a letter from Constant regarding the 
‘Situationist minority’ in the group.329 Constant’s letter to Debord was almost certainly 
motivated by the recent mass membership of the Spur group of painters. 330 The thrust of 
Debord’s response was to reassure Constant that a self-conscious Situationist minority was in a 
good position to influence and guide the debates in the group among the more ‘modernist-
nihilist’ majority.331 The most interesting comment though is Debord’s warning that ‘we […] 
cannot rely on the abstract accuracy of our ideas’.332 Instead he suggested that it was the 
experimental use of the artistic means that were then most readily available to the SI that were 
the surest way of ‘spread[ing] our problems, and our outlines for solutions’.333 
Nonetheless, Constant’s concern about the painters continued to simmer, propelled somewhat 
by the ambiguous results of Pinot-Gallizio’s exhibition in May 1959.334 His concerns in this 
regard were piqued particularly by the turn to organising an exhibition on unitary urbanism at 
                                                     
329 Debord, 'Letter to Constant, 26 April 1959,' p. 242. 
330 The Third Conference witnessed the adhesion of the Spur group of artists from Germany to the SI 
(‘Spur’ — meaning the ‘Way’ or ‘Trail’). Spur would prove to be a nettlesome presence in the SI and 
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331 Debord, 'Letter to Constant, 26 April 1959.' 
332 Ibid., p. 243. 
333 Ibid. Debord went on to outline the ‘importance of dialectical materialism’ in this regard in the same 
letter. The question was not for him one of rejecting ‘pragmatism’ or ‘idealism’ or any other contested 
doctrine, body of ideas or practice, but rather to what uses such doctrines or practices could be put — 
indeed such a Situationist use would encompass a criticism of the merely doctrinal or pragmatic 
perspective. Thus ‘the supremacy of practice, the notion of praxis that contains and supersedes 
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the mere ‘scholarly’ rejection of different ideological perspectives (ibid., p. 243-44). Perhaps what is most 
striking about the foregoing, is that Debord was already taking up, more obviously, Marx’s ‘ideology 
criticism’, which would become centrally important to the SI from around 1960 and 1961. See chapter 
seven for more on this.  
334 As Debord commented to Constant, ‘Pinot’s show was manifestly a reactionary farce […] The most 
serious shortcoming was that Pinot, in his practical attitude towards the Parisian painting public, more or 
less consciously accepted the role of a very ordinary artist recognized by his peers’ Guy Debord, 'Letter to 
Constant, 20 May 1959,' in Correspondence: The foundation of the Situationist International (June 1957-
August 1960), Los Angeles: Semiotext(e, 2009, p. 250. 
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the Stedelijk Museum in Amsterdam, to be run by the Situationists. On the back of a successful 
showing of some of Constant’s models of New Babylon (his imaginary unitary urbanist city) at 
the Stedelijk in May 1959, the curator Willem Sandberg agreed to host ‘a large exhibition from 
the Situationist movement’ in May and June of the following year.335  
 
Photograph of the original model of the East sector of New Babylon 
Constant was concerned about the participation of the painters in the exhibition, though mostly 
with regard to them exhibiting as ‘painters’ rather than participants in a collective elaboration of 
unitary urbanism. Debord shared his concern but attempted to mollify Constant. ‘Naturally […] 
no one will participate other than as a disciplined collaborator (and you are in charge — and 
therefore at ease).’336 However Debord was mostly concerned with Constant’s return to his 
abstract denunciation of the painters. Debord posed that the question was not one of continuing 
to engage in an art criticism that would take them away from the tasks at hand (‘I don’t want to 
be an art critic, that would be a waste of time for them and me’) but rather ‘can we do 
something new?’337 Could the SI put forward a new activity, moreover a critical activity like 
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unitary urbanism, which could include artists, draw upon their various skills, but refuse to use 
such techniques in an artistic fashion? 338  
Debord, against Constant’s hostility, refused to act in an arbitrary or authoritarian fashion:  
I don’t have the right — and do not have the least desire — to try to impose directives 
and values on painters (for instance) except in the name of a real movement that is more 
advanced than their work, a movement in which they can choose to participate.339 
Indeed, it would be the later effective refusal of some members, mostly the practicing artists, to 
participate as collaborators in the elaboration of a Situationist project that would motivate their 
expulsion. But at this point his prime concern, despite his shared misgivings regarding the 
painters, was to put forward a reasonable Situationist practice in the present — perforce a 
critical one which rejected the ‘renovation’ of the arts, but one that would nonetheless draw 
upon the artists involved in the group.   
Debord had earlier cautioned Constant about fetishizing other disciplines, in this case 
architecture and urbanism, over the ‘traditional arts’ he so loathed. Debord argued that even 
unitary urbanism, deprived of its critical orientation, could end up as problematic as any 
doctrine or practice incorporated into capitalist society. He wrote that even if unitary urbanism 
could be presented as ‘infinitely larger and more interesting than painting’, as a doctrine it 
would be ‘just as isolated as painting by those who have determined its theories and practical 
construction’.340 Such an argument was redolent of the Situationist opposition to the conception 
of ‘situationism’. Indeed, implicit in Debord’s argument is the fear that Constant’s focus on 
unitary urbanism as the goal and ‘art of a new type’ was precisely the preliminary to such a 
transformation. But it also foresaw what Debord would soon see as Constant’s transformation 
into a ‘technician’ of unitary urbanism.  
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In August 1959 Constant published an article in the architectural journal Forum, outlining and 
defending unitary urbanism. In the article, he embraced the perspective of the Amsterdam 
Declaration which called for both the critical rejection of the ‘traditional arts’ and their 
détournement in present unitary urbanist experimentation.341 However for some reason Constant 
decided to use ‘two snapshots of a mock-up of a church by Har [Oudejans] and [Anton] 
Alberts’ to illustrate the article.342 Needless to say, Debord was not amused. ‘I imagine that one 
might think it is a parody’, Debord wrote.343 Nonetheless, he considered the appearance of the 
pictures as ‘very ambiguous and suspect’ even if ‘the comic character [of the pictures] probably 
saves Har and Alberts. But they need to declare it themselves clearly’.344 Though he was clear 
that he did not hold Constant responsible for the church design, Debord argued that Oudejans’ 
and Alberts’ apparent ‘indifference’ to its use for illustrating the critical theory of unitary 
urbanism ran the risk of ‘a reversion to a kind of art for art school of free formalism’.345  
In the December 1959 issue of the Internationale Situationniste journal such question were 
addressed directly — particularly with regard to the possibility of a retrogressive doctrinal 
development of unitary urbanism. In the article ‘Unitary urbanism at the end of the 1950s’ 
published in that issue the Situationists346 wrote, 
unitary urbanism is not a doctrine of urbanism but a critique of urbanism. In the same 
way [as] our presence in experimental art is a critique of art, sociological research must 
                                                     
341 ‘[T]he Situationists believe that individual arts, because of their historical function, are unable to be 
integrated into everyday life as it appears today. The revolutionary destruction of these arts that has been 
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be a critique of sociology. No separated discipline can be accepted in itself; we are 
moving toward a global creation of existence.347 
Here Debord’s argument against the possible transformation of unitary urbanism into a doctrine 
or ‘separated’ practice akin to painting and other ‘traditional arts’ was foregrounded. However 
the obvious relation this bore to Debord’s discussions with Constant was underlined by a less 
obvious side swipe at the architects Oudejans and Alberts. In a fashion reminiscent of Debord’s 
insistent rejection of abstract art criticism and the need to use ‘any means, even artistic ones’, 
the author(s) proposed that unitary urbanism was ‘not a reaction to [the architecture of] 
functionalism, but rather a move past it’.348 The problem of functionalism in architecture was 
conceived as its ‘narrow application’ and its practitioners thoughtless accommodation with ‘the 
most conservative and fixed doctrines’.349 Presumably like the traditional arts, functionalist 
architecture could be used, or détourned in unitary urbanist ensembles. However, such a use 
would involve both a criticism of the present role of architectural functionalism and its 
accommodation with capitalist urbanism.  
By way of illustrating the problems of accommodation with the dominant social order, the 
Situationist article singled out a peculiar example of functionalist abstraction:   
The question of the construction of churches provides a particularly conspicuous 
criteria. Functionalist architects have a tendency of accepting to build churches, 
thinking — if they are not deist idiots — that the church, [an] edifice without function 
in a functional urbanism, can be treated as a free exercise in plastic form. Their error is 
to neglect the psycho-functional reality of the church.350   
Now this reference is odd unless you are aware of the dispute that had arisen over the use of the 
pictures of a church in Constant’s article in Forum. Debord was no stranger to the criticism of 
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churches and their architects; the Letterist International had attacked Le Corbusier in 1954 for 
his ecumenical eclecticism and his effective submission to the design of a futuristic city of 
compartments and total surveillance (i.e. our present).351 The architects Oudejans and Alberts 
are diplomatically not mentioned in the article, but the intent is clear: an admonishment of their 
‘ambiguous and suspect’ behaviour. Debord had argued with Constant that ‘[i]t is impossible to 
build a church from the barely coherent perspective of modern urbanism’, which is to say that 
the church as emblematic of the communion of the sacred and the profane is effectively 
rendered null and void by secular modernism — all that remains is pastiche and reactionary 
ideology.352  
Unfortunately, Oudejans and Alberts did not clear things up, eventually entering into an 
agreement to build a church in Volendam, Holland.353 They were expelled in March 1960, 
Constant approving — though one would imagine that this was a blow to his plans for New 
Babylon and the role of the architects in the Bureau for Research into Unitary Urbanism set up 
the previous year in Holland. In the same month as the architects were expelled, the SI withdrew 
from the planned exhibition at the Stedelijk Museum due to interference in their plans for the 
exhibition.354 The confluence of these events, the effective gutting of the Bureau and the end of 
the collaborative project that was then the prime focus for integrating the artists in unitary 
urbanist experiments, left Constant and the group at a loss. Debord moved quickly to suggest 
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methods for recovering from this ‘setback’, including a plan for the possible relocation of the 
exhibition.355  
Debord had thought highly of the Dutch architects. He saw their participation as important to 
the development of the SI, particularly with regard to developing the resources the group could 
draw upon for the elaboration of its experimental practice (not to mention as a move in 
challenging the predominance of the painters).356 In his letter of 2 June 1960, when asking 
Constant to reconsider his resignation, he recalled Kotányi relaying Oudejans’ ‘excellent’ 
formula of ‘architects of a new type’.357 But as Debord wrote to the obviously troubled 
Constant, the ‘Dutch architects have not been “placed outside the SI” by us. They put themselves 
there, manifestly’ when they agreed to build the church.358  
Constant was never able to overcome his abstract opposition to the painters of the group, nor his 
belief that unitary urbanism should be the prime focus of any possible Situationist action in the 
present. As he would comment some years later, ‘I quit [in June 1960] because there were 
actually too many painters in this Situationist movement. […] I always opposed it. How can you 
work on urbanism when you are surrounded only by painters?’359 Certainly this sounds right, 
but in fact Constant did not explicitly cite ‘too many painters’ as a reason for his resignation at 
the time. Indeed, at the time he cited the earlier expulsion of two painters as contributing to his 
desire to leave the group. The account that the SI gave of his resignation in late 1960 is most 
consistent with this: 
[Giuseppe] Pinot-Gallizio and G[iors] Melanotte were excluded from the SI in June 
[1960]. […] Constant […] who had rightly denounced their conduct, was not happy 
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with this break. He deplored, moreover, that we had to resort to the same measure some 
months before against the architects of the Dutch section [Anton Alberts and Har 
Oudejans], who had had no fear of undertaking the construction of a church. […] [T]he 
simple equality of treatment, regarding the minimum required conduct toward each 
other, appeared to him already disproportionate and severe. Thus, Constant declared, in 
the same month of June, that because he disagreed with the discipline of the SI, he 
wanted to regain his freedom in this regard, for a period that the course of the events 
would determine.360  
Debord responded to Constant’s letter of resignation with an impassioned defence of the 
expulsions and a plea for Constant to reconsider his resignation.361 But the break was final and 
Constant never reconciled himself with the group. However, as the SI wrote, his reasons were 
‘more profound’ than mere opposition to the expulsions: ‘other Situationists had to recall that at 
the present stage of the project it was necessary to put the accent on its content (play, free 
creation of everyday life)’.362 The SI’s charge that Constant had become ‘primarily concerned, 
almost exclusively, with structural questions […] of unitary urbanism’ is hard to dispute.363 His 
focus in his last year in the group was, on the one hand the elaboration of the designs of ‘New 
Babylon’ and on the other the forceful advocacy for the elaboration of such unitary urbanist 
designs and experiments as the central concern for the SI. ‘Thus, Constant’s theses valorised the 
technicians of architectural forms compared to any research [toward] a global culture.’364 Indeed 
Constant would spend the following decade refining his New Babylon project before largely 
abandoning it altogether by 1970.365  
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Photograph of the original model of the Yellow Sector 
Conclusion 
Debord once described the painter Giuseppe Pinot-Gallizio as being on the ‘right wing’ of the 
SI.366 McKenzie Wark has attempted to extend this description by describing Constant as the 
‘left wing’.367 However Debord’s shorthand explanation is perhaps not the best basis for such a 
schema. Worse it casts Debord in the strange position of being the ‘centre’ not to mention 
eliding the similarities between Constant and the right wing — particularly Constant’s belief 
that in the absence of a potentially revolutionary proletariat the elaboration of unitary urbanism 
must be the work of ‘intellectuals who rebel against cultural poverty’.368  
A better schema for understanding Constant and the other artists of the group is via a formula 
Debord would soon draw upon: Marx’s criticism of the Young Hegelians. To détourn Marx to 
this end, we can say that Constant wanted to abolish art without realising it; Jorn and the Spur 
painters wanted to realise art without abolishing it. The critical position elaborated by the SI 
showed that the abolition and the realisation of art are inseparable aspects of a single surpassing 
or “transcendence” of art. 
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Without doubt Constant was closer to Debord’s conception of the Situationist hypothesis than 
Pinot-Gallizio and many of the painters of the group, and his belief in the redemptive value of 
Dadaist negativity can be contrasted with Asger Jorn’s more Surrealist inspired ‘positivity’ 
when it comes to the role of the traditional arts in a revolutionary project. However it was this 
closeness that also ultimately made his ‘technocratic concept of a situationist profession’ a 
bigger threat to the Situationist project.369 As the SI would later write Constant’s perspective 
was ‘immeasurably more dangerous that the old artistic conception’ because it ‘was more 
modern’.370 In the same article the group argued that ‘all really modern research’, particularly its 
‘non-revolutionary’ variants like Constant’s unitary urbanism, must be ‘treated as our number 
one enemy’ precisely because of the apparent similarity to the Situationist perspective.371 Here 
was a lever with which elements of the Situationist critique could be ‘integrated’ into capitalist 
culture, a threat moreover that was never really posed by the so-called ‘right wing’ of the SI. 
The debate between Debord and Constant clarified the differing perspectives within the group 
over the efficacy of the Situationist hypothesis. In Constant’s reckoning, its use was largely 
made redundant by his focus on unitary urbanism as a technical problem, whereas Debord 
argued for it as the theoretical orientation necessary for a truly Situationist appropriation of 
technique. Debord would continue to make this argument after the departure of Constant, 
particular in the face of the SPUR artists almost complete indifference to the elaboration of the 
Situationist hypothesis. As Constant resigned, Debord and his circle began turning to the 
question of the possibility of the Situationist project being redirected toward the reconstitution 
of the absent revolutionary movement. Faced with the real problems of the Situationist 
appropriation of techniques, Debord began to ponder elements of the political avant-garde, and, 
in particular, the possibility of relaunching the revolutionary movement beyond the impasse of 
orthodox Marxism. I will turn to this question over the next four chapters.  
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Chapter four: Surpassing the first phase of the SI, 1959 to 1962 
Whatever is not superseded rots, and whatever is rotten cries out to be superseded. 
— Raoul Vaneigem372 
The debate between Debord and Constant was without doubt key to the final ‘resolution’ of the 
problem of art in the SI. Certainly, it was not resolved at this point, in 1961. Nonetheless, those 
that attempted to continue this debate, in particular the Spur artists in the German section of the 
SI — and, at a later point in concert with Spur, Jacqueline de Jong and Jorgen Nash — did not 
in any real sense substantively add to the arguments already raised between 1958 and 1960. In 
this chapter and the following, I demonstrate that the argument with Spur et al., was 
conceptually less important that that between Debord and Constant. However, the argument 
with Spur has often been singled out, and given more importance because of the way it ended 
— i.e. the expulsion of the bulk of Spur in February 1962 and the so-called ‘break’ with art. 
Indeed, it is precisely the singularity that has been attributed to the Spur artists, associated with 
their expulsion from the SI, that I seek to refute in chapters three and four. My close reading of 
these events demonstrates that: (1) that their expulsion was the end result of a long process, 
rather than an example of a purported political demagoguery on the part of Debord, Vaneigem, 
et al; and (2) that the practice of art was not forbidden to Situationists, rather it was 
problematised with regard to the elaboration of a strictly Situationist project (and thus rendered 
secondary in this sense, rather than outlawed).  
Between Constant’s resignation in June 1960 and the expulsion of the Spur artists in February 
1962 there was both a heightening of tensions between the artists and Situationists around 
Debord and a diminution in the coherence of artistic experimentation which contributed to the 
tensions. Most obviously, this diminution was the result of the effective impasse reached with 
unitary urbanist experimentation with the resignation of Constant. Nonetheless this impasse was 
also the departure point for the developing coherence of Debord’s circle. Certainly, this makes 
sense retrospectively. Such coherence was never gained nor claimed by the artists who left the 
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group; in fact, those that did put forward criticisms of Debord’s circle, like Jacqueline de Jong, 
maintained a more amorphous conception of the situationist project. Howard Slater, drawing 
upon Asger Jorn, has described this outlook as ‘unity in diversity’.373 However what Slater fails 
to take into consideration is the distinctive nature of the Situationist project from the outset, and 
those forces which threatened it — particular from the close proximity of membership of the SI. 
As Debord would write in 1963, ‘[w]ithout coherence […] the SI of today must be considered to 
be without interest’.374 Indeed, if Slater’s conception of ‘unity in diversity’ had been triumphant 
in the SI then at worse it would have been the dissolution of a distinctive Situationist project and 
at best its reduction to one project among many.375 The latter thus would surely have also been 
the dissolution of a Situationist project and cause for a split. As we will see it is this latter 
conception, of incompatible interpretations of what constituted being a Situationist, which led to 
the break in 1962. 
Issue number 6 of Internationale Situationniste was significant in this regard. It appeared in 
August 1961 on the cusp of the important Fifth Conference and shortly after the Spur group had 
republished many of the most important earlier articles on unitary urbanism in their 5th journal 
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in June. The issue was a harbinger of the post-1962 SI, particularly its lead editorial article 
‘Instructions for taking up arms’. However, unitary urbanism as the practical criticism of 
capitalist urbanism was the explicit content of three articles as well as important aspects of two 
more.  
Two relatively new Situationists — Attila Kotányi and Raoul Vaneigem — marked this 
renewed attempt to cohere the SI in the wake of Constant. Kotányi, refugee from the Hungary 
Revolution of 1956 and trained architect, had joined in Belgium before Constant’s resignation. 
In contrast to the Dutch architects he celebrated his ‘ability to go ten years without building 
anything’ in front of Debord and Constant, on the eve of the latter’s resignation.376 In his first 
article for the journal, ‘Gangland and philosophy’, Kotányi depicted the socialisation of the 
subject in modern capitalist societies as akin to the gangsterism of the US mafia in the 1920s 
and 30s. The divisions of urban space and the ‘ganglands’ of the neighbourhoods and suburbs 
functioned to intimidate their denizens into not accepting the apparently obvious: the 
Situationist use of space.377 The organisation of the modern city acted like Wilhelm Reich’s 
description of character armouring, with capitalist urban space embodying the pathological 
reinforcement of the habitual at the cost of the spontaneously creative use of time and everyday 
life. Kotányi was soon invited to ‘occupy the place left vacant by the resignation of Constant’ 
on the new Central Council of the SI at the 4th Conference in September 1960.378 
Raoul Vaneigem joined the SI in early 1961. He would prove to be as important as Debord to 
the shape of the group throughout the 1960s. At the time, he joined his was working as a high 
school teacher in Nivelles in Belgium. When he wrote to Debord in January 1961 the General 
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148 
 
Strike that had beset Belgium over the summer had just come to an end. Debord himself had 
only recently travelled to Belgium with a group of comrades from Socialisme ou Barbarie. The 
strike took place as parts of Europe began the long pivot of ‘de-industrialisation’, in this case 
mixed up with the results of Belgian’s “loss” of its Congolese colony. The centre of the strike 
was in the ‘Borinage’, a heavily industrialised area in the Hainaut province in southern Belgium 
(i.e. ‘Wallonia’) in which coal mines had figured prominently in the lives of the working class 
since the 18th century. The Hainaut was where Vaneigem had grown up, the son of a socialist, 
working class family.379 
In his first article for the Situationist journal, ‘Comments against Urbanism’, Vaneigem 
fruitfully détourned the criticisms of capitalist modernity by Marx and Nietzsche. Urbanism is 
presented as an ‘abstract and non-existent’ force that has the best claim to the position ‘left 
vacant by the death of God’.380 Drawing on Lefebvre’s 1947 observation that ‘the concentration 
camp is the most extreme and paroxysmal form of the modern housing estate’ Vaneigem argued 
that the new capitalist cities were machines that manifest capitalist ideology.381 ‘[U]rbanism 
renders alienation tactile’.382  The modern proletariat’s reward for the past struggles against 
hunger and poverty was the ‘blind misery of things’ whose guarantee was an even more radical 
proletarianisation of the world.383 Here was an answer to the sceptical Germans of the SI, a 
world more thoroughly submitted to capital and the proletariat, whose alienation was even more 
forcefully inscribed in the world of things that many mistook for the alleviation of the 
proletarian condition. Such a world was more not less ripe for the insurrection precisely because 
the conditions of alienation were more insidiously prevalent.  
Vaneigem has recently said of this time in the SI that ‘[t]he artistic mindset could no longer be 
integrated into a revolutionary perspective.’384 If we look at the trajectory of the Spur artists, 
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their association with Asger Jorn’s rising star in the art markets, not to mention Jorn’s brother 
Jørgen Nash and the ‘Situationist Bauhaus’ at Drakabygget in Sweden, then we see a process 
that Debord and Vaneigem ably described.  
[Vaneigem:] something in the artistic project seemed dreary [sinistre] to us. Without 
going as far as questioning their honesty, we thought that these artists were following a 
direction that was no longer ours because it consisted, above all, in making their 
paintings, their art, become successful… For them, what was justification was, for us, 
incompatible with our revolutionary aspirations.385 
The main problem the group face in the period of Spur’s membership of the SI — April 1959 to 
February 1962 — was the singular inability to integrate Spur into the Situationist activity of the 
group. Certainly, the collapse of unitary urbanist experimentation on the back of Constant’s 
resignation contributed to this. However, the Spur artists also demonstrated no real interest in 
developing the critical theory of the group. Even those initially closest to the more obviously 
Situationist concerns of the French and Belgian sections — Heinz Höfl and Hans-Peter Zimmer 
— admitted the incapacity of their group in this regard.386 More obvious was the apparent lack 
of interest in Situationist collaboration (beyond artistic collaboration) amongst key members of 
Spur, notably Heimrad Prem, Helmut Sturm and Lothar Fischer whose attitude sometimes 
bordered on hostility (though in Fischer’s case it was largely indifference to the Situationist 
project). For instance, at the Fifth conference of the SI in august 1961 Prem infamously 
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admitted to finding Situationist theory ‘hardly comprehensible’ after being a member of the 
group for almost two and a half years.387  
Vaneigem and Kotányi would prove crucial in the break with the artists. Indeed, both of them 
spearheaded the criticism of the artists at the 5th conference in August 1961, as well as 
participating in the drunken composition of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ shortly after. However as 
mentioned above they were both deeply involved in the attempt to recover the Situationist 
project after the withdrawal of Constant and the effective end of unitary urbanist 
experimentation along such lines.  
The sixth issue of Internationale Situationniste, released earlier in the month of the 5th 
conference — i.e. August 1961 — marks the beginning of ‘official’ break with the artists. 
However, we do well to remember what Debord would say about the ‘Hamburg Theses’ 
composed a month later — i.e. that this ‘did not imply the forthcoming break with the artistic 
“right” of the SI […] but rendered it extremely probable.’388 In the lead editorial article, 
‘Instructions for taking up arms’, a new direction was outlined for the group, grounded in their 
previous work but more obviously pointing toward the transformation of the Situationist project. 
First the group declared that the only current of the old revolutionary movement worth 
defending was ‘that gathered around the watchword of workers councils.’389  Compressed in this 
declaration was both the rejection of the hierarchical models of revolutionary transformation 
(e.g. the various Leninist, Trotskyist and Stalinist variants) and even the rejection of the model 
offered by such heretics as the Socialisme ou Barbarie group.390 However it is the expression of 
disdain for politics and art in the article that is of most interest to our argument. 
The different moments of Situationist activity up until now can only be understood in 
the perspective of a new spectre [apparition] of revolution, not solely cultural but 
social, and whose field of application must be immediately more far-reaching than all 
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previous attempts. The SI thus does not have to recruit disciples or partisans, but 
[rather] bring together people capable of applying themselves to this task in the years 
that follow, by [using] all means and without worrying about labels. Which is to say, in 
passing, that we must refuse the relics of specialised politics as much as the relics of 
specialised artistic behaviour[.]391 
The tensions of the Situationist project are here writ clear. All means are to be used, labels are 
superfluous. But, and to conjure a slogan yet to appear among the group, the struggle against 
alienation cannot be made via alienated means. It is one thing to use artistic means; it is quite 
another to imagine that the elaboration of art as it exists in capitalism is coincident with the 
needs or aspirations of the SI.   
As we have seen, Debord never hid his suspicions or disdain for the traditional arts. However, 
he neither believed nor practiced exclusion as an expression of personal authority.392 In a letter 
to Asger Jorn in 1962 he addressed the problem in the wake of the recent break with the artists: 
‘[t]he practice of exclusion appears to me absolutely contrary to the use of people’.393 This is not 
to say that Debord advocated the instrumental use of people. Rather his primary concern was the 
elaboration of a collaborative Situationist practice which would, in broad outline, anticipate the 
social relations advocated in the Situationist hypothesis. In the same letter to Jorn, Debord 
argued that what was most troubling about the artists was not that they were artists, but rather 
that by maintaining their ‘freedom’ — especially their freedom from the elaboration of the 
Situationist hypothesis — they effectively refused to engage in a collaborative project.394  
Around the time the SI broke with Henri Lefebvre Debord wrote in an internal document that 
‘coherence finds its sole measure in communal praxis’.395 As we have seen in Debord’s debates 
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with Constant, establishing a communal or collaborative practice was of preeminent importance. 
The document, written around the time the group publically broke with the philosopher Henri 
Lefebvre (February 1963) placed a premium on such ‘communal’, collaborative practice — 
particularly for the development of a Situationist project.  In the case of Lefebvre what was seen 
as most egregious and ‘serious’ was not his plagiarism of some Situationist theses, but rather his 
‘retreat […] from a communal action (true dialogue) with us.’396 Indeed such a retreat or refusal 
was the only measure of inclusion or exclusion from the project of the SI. So, for instance when 
some critics — beginning with the ex-Situationist Jacqueline de Jong — emphasise the 
purported freedom of the artists to be artists in the group as being the reason for their expulsion, 
they are at best confused.  
The break in 1962 was precisely over the retreat of the Spur group from such a ‘communal 
praxis’, not their continued practice of the ‘traditional arts’. Without doubt Spur’s prioritisation 
of such practices at the expense of participating in the collaborative elaboration of a Situationist 
project was key. But it was the practical results of this prioritisation that led to their expulsion. 
Those critics, like McKenzie Wark, who identify the ‘official’ declaration of the ‘anti-
situationist’ nature of the traditional arts at the Fifth conference of the SI, not only 
misunderstand the reasons for the expulsion of the Spur artists.397  They also cannot, and in fact 
do not attempt to make sense of the continued membership of practicing artists in the group — 
notably J.V. Martin who remained until the end in 1972.398 Indeed being a practicing artist was 
never an obstacle to joining the SI. However, prioritising one’s career in the arts over 
participation in the Situationist project certainly was.399  
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From the foundation of Spur origins to the 4th conference of the SI 
‘Spur’ (‘path’ or ‘way’ in German) was a group of artistic collaborators formed by the German 
painters Heimrad Prem, Helmut Sturm and Hans-Peter Zimmer and the sculptor Lothar Fischer 
in 1957. During their brief time of existence, 1957 to 1965, they incurred the wrath of the 
German state for artistic non-conformism. In late 1958 Asger Jorn met the group and co-wrote a 
manifesto with them broadly sympathetic to the new Situationist International. At the Third 
conference in April 1959 they joined the SI, effectively becoming the German section.400 The 
Spur members in attendance were Erwin Eisch, Heinz Höfl, Heimrad Prem, Gretel Stadler, 
Helmut Sturm and Hans-Peter Zimmer. Spur’s eponymous journal became the organ of the SI in 
West Germany in 1960 and 1961, though only the fifth number of the journal can be considered 
fully Situationist in content. Threats of censorship and seizure finally manifested in the 
Bavarian state government’s seizure of all six issues of the journal in November 1961 and their 
initiation of legal proceedings against members of the group in 1962.  
It is significant that Debord never completely gave up on the possibility of integrating the Spur 
group into Situationist activity until the expulsions of February 1962. Some critics, notably 
Stewart Home, have cast him in the role of scheming manipulator who ‘chose to bide his time’ 
in the face of the dastardly Spur artists and Dutch architects.401 However Home is completely 
wrong about the relationship between Constant and Spur, falsely believing that they had ‘much 
in common’ particularly regarding the ‘production of art’.402 He further believes that it was 
Debord and not Constant that was opposed to Spur from the outset. However, there is no 
evidence — despite Debord’s growing belief that Spur’s membership was harmful to the SI — 
that he plotted their expulsion from the outset.403 Additionally there is no acknowledgement on 
the part of Home that Debord, despite this distrust, struggled to accommodate Spur in the SI. 
Home’s criticism would be laughable if it was not inexplicably influential. More recently 
McKenzie Wark has given an account of the same period with some “Homean” touches, writing 
that Debord was forced to ‘gather […] forces that would help him dispense with [the artist’s] 
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nettlesome presence.’404 Wark bases this claim on his belief that the artists had ‘tilted the 
Situationist International to their particular concerns.’405 But when examining the period of 
Spur’s attachment one is struck more by their disengagement rather than their purported 
influence on the group. Debord and others, particularly Kotányi and Vaneigem from 1960 and 
1961, continued on with their explorations, notably the engagement with the Socialisme ou 
Barbarie group and the General Strike in Belgium over the winter of 1960-61. 
As we have seen, Debord and Constant were suspicious of the efficacy of the recruitment of the 
Spur group to the SI from the outset. Indeed, their imminent membership reignited the argument 
between Constant and Debord on the role of artists in the group. In a letter to Constant in the 
month before the Third conference and the adhesion of Spur, Debord defended the group to 
Constant. However, his defence was both more measured and more critical than Constant’s 
straightforward opposition to the painters. Debord agreed with Constant that the SI should try 
and ‘obstruct and prevent the conversion of new painters into Situationists’, and instead attempt 
to ‘attract sociologists, architects, etc.’406 However he argued that such a change in the balance 
of the SI’s composition would not in itself be the answer: ‘we will also have difficulties with 
sociologists, architects, etc., because they will generally start off as prisoners of their divided 
practical activity.’407 In the case of the Spur artists Debord believed that their incorporation into 
a Situationist project was a question of the extent to which ‘they are not already comfortably 
installed’ in the art world.408 Such an opinion would prove prophetic. 
In November of 1959 Debord wrote Constant about the state of the Spur group. He represented 
the group as ‘very divided’, split by members closer to the Situationist project (e.g. Höfl and 
Zimmer) and those still prioritising ‘strictly pictorial and plastic activity’.409 Significantly his 
comments on the ‘Sturm-Zimmer-Prem show’ in Munich were exceedingly brief — ‘pitiful’ —
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consistent with his repeated statements regarding his disinterest in art criticism. Of more 
significance to Debord was the appearance of ‘a very long text’ alongside the Spur exhibition.410 
Despite being unable to read the German (he asked Constant to translate the text) he saw ‘the 
arrival of the brave “Spurists” on theoretical terrain’ as a chance to gauge their development and 
thus their relationship to the Situationist project.411 
Despite his many reservations regarding the recruitment of artists Debord believed that the most 
likely source of new Situationists in the near future would be from this milieu, insofar as such 
artists were still open to the Situationist critique of the traditional arts.412 What would prove 
ultimately the most troubling in this regard was not the artistic background of Situationists, nor 
their continued practice of the ‘traditional arts’, but rather the extent to which they refused to 
collaborate with a distinctive Situationist project. Such a refusal was foreshadowed at the Third 
conference of the SI when Heimrad Prem of Spur raised concerns about the ‘the subordination 
of individual investigations to the discipline of the movement’.413 Certainly Debord grew to be 
frustrated by the ‘open door tactic’ practiced by Jorn and Pinot-Gallizio which had resulted in 
painters predominating in the group.414 However it was not painters per se that were the 
problem. Rather it was a question of finding people capable of collaborating on the nascent 
Situationist project. The Spur group were certainly enthused to become members of the SI, but 
it appears that they were little prepared for the peculiarities of the Situationist hypothesis. 
Despite his reservations about some of the group (notably Heimrad Prem and Helmut Sturm) 
Debord would write after the Third conference that ‘[a]ll of them [are] capable of a very 
favourable evolution.’415 
The collapse of the unitary urbanist exhibition and derive around Amsterdam in 1960 was 
definitely a blow to Debord’s idea of incorporating the Spur artists into an activity that could at 
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once take advantage of the Spur’s artistic preoccupations, while demonstrating the insufficiency 
of the merely artistic.416 In the year between Constant’s resignation and the heated debates at the 
Fifth conference in August 1961, Debord and the French and Belgium sections of the SI became 
more engaged with the French ultra-left group Socialisme ou Barbarie and the Belgian General 
Strike over the Winter of 1960-61. Indeed, the latter was taken as a confirmation of both the 
ongoing revolutionary capacity of the proletariat, and the reality of the ongoing problem of the 
recuperation of working class organisations such as trade unions and social democratic parties 
into the State managed policing of the working classes. However, such recuperation was 
measured against the continued capacities of workers to revolt outside and against such 
institutions — as the recent events in Belgium so ably demonstrated. 
Debord believed that the existence of a separate Bureau of Research for Unitary Urbanism 
within the SI had contributed to the internal opposition of the architects to the revolutionary 
goal of the SI. In the wake of their expulsion Debord wanted to move to the elimination of all 
the internal ‘Bureaus’ and groups. In a letter to Maurice Wyckaert he wrote, ‘[w]e lack the 
means […] to promote more than one movement […] We need to recognise, in each country, 
only one Situationist group.’ 417 In a pointed stab at the Spurists he continued, ‘invasion by 
elements that are both irresponsible and autonomous does us major harm.’418 However at this 
point such ‘invasions’ were seen by Debord as problematic insofar as groups like Spur or the 
Bureau in Holland remained organisationally independent. What was required was a 
‘liquidation’ of these groups, as opposed to the expulsion of their members, in favour of the 
cohesion of a single Situationist group.419 
During 1960 and 1961 Debord spoke more frequently of the need to either dissolve the group as 
an independent entity within the SI, or, failing this, expulsion.  In a letter to Jorn in July 1960 
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Debord responded, ‘[a]greed on the one-year reprieve for the “Spur” faction. Let’s try to raise 
the level during this time.’420 It’s not clear what this ‘reprieve’ is, whether or not it is a reprieve 
on the dissolution of Spur within the SI or the expulsion of some or all of its members. Debord 
was most probably reassured with Spur’s recent agreement to publish the Situationist Manifesto 
from May in the first issue of their SPUR journal. Additionally, he was almost certainly glad to 
avoid another fight for the time being, particularly in the wake of Constant’s resignation and the 
collapse of the Dutch section.  
Debord first raised the possibility of expulsion of the Spur group with Constant in October 
1959, because they had not ‘made any progress’ since the Third conference in April.421 
However Debord did not pursue a campaign of expulsion directed at Spur. Indeed just one 
month later, on the back of his visit to the ‘pitiful’ Spur exhibition in Munich, Debord was keen 
to examine evidence of possible progress in the Spur document which accompanied their 
exhibition.422 Certainly Debord spoke of the possible use of expulsion as a way of dealing with 
Spur’s distance from the Situationist project, but such instances seemed to be connected to his 
frustration with the group rather than being moments in an ongoing campaign to garner support 
for their exclusion. More importantly Debord distinguished between Spur members who were 
more or less sympathetic with the Situationist project. Thus, it was never a question of Debord 
versus the artists, or the non-artist members Situationists versus the artist members — a dubious 
distinction considering the artistic activity that all Situationists engaged in professionally or 
otherwise. What Debord wanted more than anything was the development of a Situationist 
presence in Germany. To the extent that Spur could provide that he was keen to continue in the 
belief that they could be developed — at least some of them.  
As we have seen, Debord was cognisant of divisions within Spur vis-à-vis their relationship to 
the SI. Indeed, he identified ‘wings’ of the group similar to his occasional references to the 
wings of the SI (though in a similar fashion to his references to a ‘right wing’ of the SI, he only 
noted a ‘right’ wing of Spur — never a ‘left’). Of the core of the Spur group — Lothar Fischer, 
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Heimrad Prem, Helmet Sturm and Hans-Peter Zimmer — Zimmer appeared to be closest to the 
SI in Debord’s reckoning.423 Of the more obviously pro-Situationist Spurists, most of them 
came from ‘non-core’ members, notably Heinz Höfl (who resigned in May 1960), Dieter 
Kunzelmann (who was excluded with the other Spur artists in February 1962) and Uwe Lausen 
(who remained with the SI after the exclusion of his Spur comrades until his own exclusion in 
March 1965). In all cases the proximity or distance of these individuals was in relation to their 
willingness to collaborate with the SI. As we will see, Lausen sided with the Central Council of 
the SI against Spur in February 1962. However, Lausen was expelled in March 1965 when he 
informed the SI of ‘his intention to organise a “happening” in Munich’.424  
Debord reserved particular animus for Heimrad Prem, who he considered a ‘perfect zero’ who 
engaged in ‘perilous ravings’.425 As we have seen, Prem was the Spurist most keen to maintain 
the organisational independence of the group. He was almost certainly the most conservative 
member of the group vis-à-vis the Situationist critique of artistic activity. For instance Lauren 
Graber has recently noted how Prem put a premium on gallery shows and art sales as the prime 
concern of the Spur group, an attitude distinctly at odds with the elaboration of the Situationist 
hypothesis.426 At the SI’s Fourth conference in London in September 1960 Prem presented the 
German section’s response to a questionnaire put by Debord to the SI regarding what forces the 
SI could rely upon in society.427 Prem delivered a ‘very long’ response in which he ‘attack[ed] 
the tendency in support of a revolutionary proletariat.’428 Prem pictured a working class 
incapable of going against the trade union and political bureaucracies which dominated them. 
As a result, ‘the SI must prepare itself to realise alone its entire program, by mobilising the 
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avant-garde artists’ in order to ‘themselves seize the weapons of conditioning’.429 The majority 
of the conference rejected Prem and the Spur position. Kotányi pointed out the reality of 
increasing numbers of ‘wildcat’ strikes in France, Britain and even the US, further arguing that 
Prem’s parochial focus also underestimated the capacities of German workers.430 The group 
referred to Prem’s conception as the reappearance of the ‘the hypothesis of the satisfied 
worker’, last seen presented by Constant and the Dutch section at the Third conference in April 
1959.431  
[At the Fourth conference of the SI…] “While the conference is happening.”  
“Hello 3-12, report… Hello 3-12” “Hey! Do you understand!”432 
Here one of the highpoints in the dispute between the German section and the rest of the SI 
reached a first climax. It would be repeated in slightly altered guise and less amicably at the 
Fifth conference the following year. At the Fourth conference, Spur agreed to retract Prem’s 
declaration and declare their complete agreement with the SI and its activity in the past, present 
and ‘foreseeable future’.433 In any case Spur declared that it was a secondary matter. Debord and 
Kotányi, presciently perhaps, had their opposition to this latter statement noted. If there is 
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anywhere we can mark the ‘beginning of the end’ for Spur it is here, at the Fourth conference 
and their decidedly anti-situationist stance, hastily retracted when encountering a majority of 
descent and argument. If we also recall Prem’s future incomprehension regarding Situationist 
theory at the Fifth conference, one is struck that perhaps the retraction at the Fourth was made in 
order to preserve Spur rather than develop the German section of the SI.  
However, this ‘beginning of the end’ was also nothing of the sort at the time — except, perhaps, 
retrospectively. If we examine the relations between the German artists and the rest of the SI in 
the year that followed there is no real indication of a worsening of relations until the Fifth 
conference in August 1961. Additionally, if we consider that Debord has already considered 
Spur’s lack of progress vis-à-vis the development of the Situationist hypothesis problematic in 
October 1959, then one is struck by two things. On the one hand, there appears to be little 
development on the part of Spur in the intervening year, insofar as there is no real evidence of 
their contribution to the Situationist project apart from their signature on Manifestoes written by 
others and their dutiful attendance of Situationist conferences. On the other hand, Debord had 
remained at the point he had reached with his discussion with Constant. He is none too happy 
with the conduct of the Spur artists in the SI. However, it was not their artistry as such that was 
the problem, rather it was their lack of contribution to the Situationist project.  
Between the September 1960 conference and the eruption of the ‘Van de Loo affair’ in February 
and March 1961 there is little development in the Spur/SI relationship. The Spur group is tardy 
in publishing the circular against Alexander Trocchi’s imprisonment for heroin possession, but 
this is perhaps a minor infraction in a group dedicated to indolence (when possible) and drifting. 
However, the SI is very active during this period, particularly the French and Belgian sections 
and for good reason. Not only did the aforementioned General Strike break out in Belgium over 
the winter, the opposition to the Algerian war grew in France. Debord and Michele Bernstein 
signed the ‘Declaration on the Right to Insubordination in the War in Algeria’ (aka The 
Manifesto of the 121).434 Debord became active in Pouvoir Ouvrier and Socialisme ou Barbarie, 
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and as a member demonstrated with the group against the Algerian war.435 Added to this Debord 
worked on shooting his short film Critique de la Separation in September and October 1960, 
not to mention preparing the 5th issue of the Internationale Situationniste for publication in 
December.  
The van de Loo affair 
In February 1961, the SI learnt that Otto van de Loo, an art dealer and gallery owner, planned to 
set up a ‘Laboratory of study of unitary urbanism’ in his Essen gallery.436 It appears that the ex-
Situationist Constant had some role to play in this.437 The SI quickly moved to repudiate van de 
Loo’s move, directing him to issue a retraction. The development of unitary urbanism was 
strictly an affair of the SI, and not a question of art — particularly not for one whose business 
was art. Jorn and Debord insisted van de Loo issue a retraction, which he reluctantly did on 21 
February. However on 23 March van de Loo attempted to bring pressure to bear on the Spur 
group, insisting that they choose between their pecuniary relationship with him or their 
membership in the SI.438 Debord wrote to Spur, reminding them that even if he and the SI’s 
Central Council also demanded the retraction, ‘it was, above all, Jorn’ who did.439 More 
importantly Debord pointed out that no one, particularly no local bourgeois and art dealer had 
the right to bring pressure to bear on Situationists regarding the work of the SI. Thus, they must 
clearly choose between van de Loo and the SI. This Spur did, cutting their ties with van de Loo 
and treating his attempts at influence as a form of extortion. At least initially they did.  
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For a whole week, Spur resisted the siren song of van de Loo before privately agreeing to 
resume their relationship with him.440 One must eat after all. However, what is most striking is 
that Spur hid this arrangement from the rest of the SI. Indeed what would make it worse in their 
eyes and cruelly ironic for Spur is that van de Loo himself cockily confirmed the truth of this 
secret agreement five months after it was made — on the last day of the heated debates of the 
SI’s Fifth conference in Göteborg.441 On 30 August 1961 van de Loo would publish Offene 
Erklarung zu einem Artikel der Internationale Situationniste (Open Declaration on an article of 
the Situationist International), his response to the SI’s account of the affair published in 
Internationale Situationniste no. 6 (August 1961).442 In the declaration van de Loo apparently 
boasted of his influence upon the SI, and ‘made much of the cordial personal relations he kept 
with a few Situationists to this day.’443 Even though it appears that Debord only definitively 
knew about it later in September, already at the Fifth conference such ‘rumours’ flew among the 
violent arguments.444  
Lauren Graber has written that the quickly re-established relationship between Spur and van de 
Loo was known within the SI.445 But Graber’s source for this confirms that there was a lengthy 
lapse before the relationship was reaffirmed and it was publically acknowledged — i.e. when 
van de Loo published his account, Offene Erklarung zu einem Artikel der Internationale 
Situationniste, on 30 August 1961, the last day of the Fifth conference.446 
Spur had been associated with van de Loo and his gallery since the year they formed. Indeed it 
was due to Asger Jorn’s association with van de Loo that Spur had first made contact with the 
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a month after Van de Loo’s revelation that it was ‘very amusing’. Debord, 'Lettre à Dieter Kunzelmann, 
27 septembre 1961,' p. 109. 
445 Graber, 'Gruppe SPUR and Gruppe GEFLECHT: Art and dissent in West Germany, 1957 – 1968', p. 
154. 
446 Ibid., p. 154, fn. 161. 
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SI.447 Van de Loo was vitally important to the Spur group, organising exhibitions and perhaps 
most importantly financially supporting Spur ‘through commissions of art works, payments for 
the SPUR magazine and catalogue printing, as well as monthly stipends and atelier rentals.’448 
Thus, we can understand and perhaps even sympathise with Spur’s desire or even need to re-
establish their relationship with van de Loo. But the clandestine fashion in which they went 
about it, combined with their turn to the use of the Situationist label to sell their art later in the 
year were clearly contributing to the rapidly developing tensions within the SI.    
The ‘Van de Loo affair’ which initially begun as a dispute over the SI’s control of the 
development of unitary urbanism, and in particular the necessarily non-artistic nature of this 
development (in the sense described above), quickly developed into a dispute over the meddling 
of forces outside the SI with the internal operations of the group. Van de Loo moved from his 
attempt to set up a ‘Laboratory’ to his attempt to drive a wedge between Spur and the rest of the 
SI in the space of a month. Indeed van de Loo almost certainly conceived of his relationship 
with Spur as more important than theirs with the SI. As the SI would comment in 1962, ‘we are 
not declaring our opposition to a specific art dealer — which would mean that we could 
investigate alliances with others — but that we are protecting the SI from outside pressures with 
the most definite measures’.449 Such is the real beginning of the end for the artists in the SI, 
made of the stuff of secrecy and rumours, opportunistic art dealers and half-baked plans to carve 
a Situationist niche in the art market.   
The SPUR journal, nos. 5 and 6 
Apart from the ‘Van de Loo affair’ and its shady denouement, it was the events known as ‘Spur 
in exile’ later in 1961 that was also a contributor to the later accusation of their artistic 
‘arrivisme’ and use of their SI membership as a fillip to their artistic careers.  
In June 1961, the Spur group prepared to publish the 5th issue of the SPUR journal, this time a 
‘special number on unitary urbanism’. The entire issue was markedly different from earlier 
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448 Ibid., p. 150. 
449 I.S., 'Renseignements situationniste [7],' p. 53. 
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issues of the journal. Rather than the usual omnipresent reproduction of Spur paintings this issue 
saw the almost exclusive reproduction of Situationist and Letterist International texts on unitary 
urbanism and its origins.450 Debord was particularly keen to see the appearance of this journal, 
considering it a major step forward in the ongoing integration of Spur into the SI, and perhaps 
most importantly for the presence of the SI in Germany. However the publication was held up 
by the publishers on the grounds of the content of the journal — ‘because of its “social 
revolutionary texts” and two instances of “pornographic content”’.451 Debord and Jorn wrote to 
the group suggesting that they immediately retain a lawyer, in order to expedite the situation.452 
The refusal of the publishing company did not result in either seizure of the issue or criminal 
proceedings and the Spur group were able to finally distribute the issue (including a second 
print run published under the ‘Spur-verlag’ name). However, in the aftermath of this process the 
bulk of Spur chose to take up an offer from Jørgen Nash and Asger Jorn to come visit and 
collaborate at Nash’s farm called ‘Drakabygget’ (Dragon’s Lair) in Sweden. Indeed, one of the 
prime results of this trip was the next issue of the SPUR journal with the subtitle ‘Spur in exile’. 
SPUR no. 6, ‘Spur in exile’, was fashioned to conjure the belief that Spur was on the run from 
the Bavarian authorities for SPUR no. 5, and indeed would face prosecution on their return to 
West Germany. However, what is remarkable about these claims is the extent to which they 
were, at that point, speculative. Indeed Debord and Vaneigem counselled caution on the part of 
Spur, not because they thought the prospect of a trial would result in defeat but rather because 
‘it surpasses our present capacities’.453  As Graber has pointed out, Spur ‘used their “exile” and 
                                                     
450 The marked exception was the reproduction of Gunter Feuerstein’s long article ‘Theses on Accidental 
Architecture’, which was critically engaged in the forthcoming issue of the International Situationniste 
(no. 6). Additionally, there was a brief introduction to the issue and H. P. Zimmer’s brief (and, 
considering Spur’s major concerns, inevitable…) article, ‘Painting and unitary urbanism’. Cf. Gruppe 
Spur, SPUR 5: Spezialnummer über den unitären Urbanismus, (Juni 1961).  
451 Graber, 'Gruppe SPUR and Gruppe GEFLECHT: Art and dissent in West Germany, 1957 – 1968', p. 
156. 
452 Guy Debord and George Keller, 'Lettre au groupe Spur, 18 juin 1961,' in Correspondance volume II 
septembre 1960 - décembre 1964, ed. Patrick Mosconi, Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2001, p. 96. 
Note that ‘George Keller’ was the pseudonym Asger Jorn adopted after he ‘officially’ resigned from the 
SI in April 1961. 
453 Guy Debord and Raoul Vaneigem, 'Lettre au groupe Spur, 20 juillet 1961,' in Correspondance volume 
II septembre 1960 - décembre 1964, ed. Patrick Mosconi, Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2001, p. 103. 
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prospects of future “persecution” to market their artworks and advance their artistic careers.’454 
On the back of their fruitful trip to Drakabygget the group organised exhibitions at the 
Kunstsalon in Halmstadt, Sweden (August) and the Galerie Birch in Copenhagen, Denmark 
(September, October).455 At the latter, the imaginary persecution of Spur by the Bavarian state 
government was an important selling point — a point, moreover which exploited the relatively 
recent reality of Nazi occupation.456 Of course Spur would be persecuted by the Bavarian state 
government, but this still lay in the near future, and would be the result of a complaint made 
over the distribution of SPUR no. 6. 
The Fifth conference of the SI at Göteborg 
August 1961 would prove to be the pivotal month in Spur’s relationship with the SI. In August 
SPUR no. 6 (“Spur in exile”) was published, so too was the sixth issue of Internationale 
Situationniste. And to top it off the Fifth conference of the SI was held late in the month. This 
was the conference that has, more often than not been presented as the preamble to the break 
with the artists, a conference full of recriminations and insults thrown between the so-called 
‘theorists’ and ‘artists’. However less spoken of is the confluence of events at the Fifth 
conference which brought not only the simmering debate over the role of art to the surface yet 
again, but also revealed the way Spur and Jørgen Nash seemed more interested in using the 
Situationist label as a brand with which to distinguish their artistic activity. Indeed, it is the later 
that significantly contributed to the expulsion of the Spur group the following February, insofar 
as Spur continued to cultivate a distinctly non-Situationist practice in the wake of the 
conference.  
In the first session of the conference Heimrad Prem proposed that national sections of the SI 
should not only have the right to decide by themselves who became a Situationist in their 
section, but even the ability to judge ‘the circumstances and duration of the participation of 
                                                     
454 Graber, 'Gruppe SPUR and Gruppe GEFLECHT: Art and dissent in West Germany, 1957 – 1968', p. 
170. 
455 Ibid., pp. 170-71. 
456 Ibid., p. 171. ‘[Jørgen] Nash remarked retrospectively that although not many people went to the 
Copenhagen exhibit, all the artworks were purchased after three days. This confirmation of Gruppe 
SPUR’s artistic success was discussed for many years to come in the Copenhagen art scene’ (ibid., pp. 
171-2).  
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those already in the SI’.457 Of course the rest of the conference — which is to say the majority 
of the SI — rejected such a ridiculous demand. As the conference noted the proposal amounted 
to a call to ‘exclude from the German section those opponents who supported within it the 
politics of the SI’.458 Why Prem made this demand is less clear. Certainly, if such a proposal had 
been in place over the previous year the German section could have rejected both the move on 
the Central Council’s part against Van de Loo and the push to make SPUR no. 5 reflect 
Situationist theses rather than just the artistic activity of Spur. In the conference notes the SI 
made the case for Prem’s proposal being related to the ongoing divergence of the German 
section from the Situationist majority and their desire to maintain such de facto independence. 
i.e. that the German section minority position vis-à-vis the group remain in a majority position 
within the German section (for instance ‘the hypothesis of the satisfied worker’ associated with 
their belief in the domination of workers’ by the bureaucratised trade unions and social-
democratic parties).459  
 
[The Fifth conference] … on a base installed on asteroid G.X. lost in space…460 
Prem’s move at the Fifth conference resonated with his question at the Third conference in 
April 1959 regarding ‘the subordination of individual investigations to the discipline of the 
                                                     
457 I.S., 'La Cinquième Conférence de l’I.S. à Göteborg,' p. 25. 
458 Ibid., pp. 25-6. 
459 The conference notes that this was based on the German section’s minority position vis-à-vis the SI 
majority remained, nonetheless, the majority position within the German section — and thus their general 
hostility to the SI majority For instance the German section had defended ‘the hypothesis of the satisfied 
worker’ at the Fourth conference, and had withdrawn it to avoid further argument rather than as a sign of 
their agreement with the majority opinion against this hypothesis. Cf. I.S., 'La quatrième conférence de 
l’I.S. à Londres,' pp. 20-21; I.S., 'La Cinquième Conférence de l’I.S. à Göteborg,' p. 25. See above for 
more details, in particular for its resonance with Constant’s and the Dutch sections perspective in 1959. 
460 Détourned cartoon accompanying the report on the Fifth conference in Internationale Situationniste 
no. 7. I.S., 'La Cinquième Conférence de l’I.S. à Göteborg,' p. 28. 
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movement’.461 However it would be a mistake to think this was just the repetition of the earlier 
position. In 1959 the Spur group had barely been exposed to the work of the SI. Over two years 
later the Spurists, considered as both Situationists and as practicing artists, had developed — 
though mostly in the sense of the incompatibility of their artistic careers with the elaboration of 
the Situationist project. Prem’s move at the Fifth conference was directly related to this 
question, for instance the problems that Spur had recently faced with regard to Otto van de Loo.  
Spur’s failed move to render themselves autonomous within the SI, and thus have the best of 
both worlds (i.e. the ‘Situationist’ label without any of the responsibilities which flowed from a 
unified conception of ‘Situationist’) surely confirmed rather than assuaged the doubts of the rest 
of the SI — particularly Debord, Vaneigem, Kotányi and the majority of the French and Belgian 
sections. For instance, at this point the Scandinavian section was solidly on the side of the SI 
majority, and moreover had rejected Spur ‘hypothesis of the satisfied worker’ at the Fourth 
conference. However later in the conference the argument over what constituted ‘anti-
situationist’ activity would test some of the artists of the Scandinavian section — notably Jørgen 
Nash. Indeed, we cannot discount the recent collaboration of Spur at Nash’s Drakabygget farm-
commune as a deepening of the ties between many of the two sections, particularly when it 
comes to considering their perspectives on the relationship between artistic activity and 
Situationist activity.  
However, if we take into consideration that Spur’s relationship with van de Loo had continued 
after the public break in March 1961, then Prem’s move to secure autonomy for the German 
section takes on sinister overtones. Indeed, and as mentioned above, Van de Loo himself 
revealed the truth of this arrangement in a public document published on the last day of the Fifth 
conference. In the conference notes published in Internationale Situationniste the following 
April, attention is drawn to the acrimonious and ‘violent’ arguments amidst ‘rumours’ in which 
the Third session of the Fifth conference ended.462 Indeed the conference notes at this point 
appear to confirm that the rumour of Spur’s continued relationship with van de Loo was the 
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462 I.S., 'La Cinquième Conférence de l’I.S. à Göteborg,' p. 29. 
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subject of the insults: ‘one hears shouts from one side: “Your theory is going to slap you in the 
mouth!”, and from the other side: “Cultural pimps!”.’463 
Between Prem’s ill-played move to gain autonomy for the German section and the violent 
arguments at the end of the Third session, the argument over the ‘anti-situationist’ nature of art 
had been thrashed out.464 In the first session after Prem proposal, Vaneigem had reminded the 
assembled Situationists that ‘[o]nce and for all’, ‘[t]here is no situationism, no situationist work 
of art — even more so, no spectacular situationist.’465 In the second session, on the back of 
Nash’s perhaps naïve question regarding what constituted Situationist art, Attila Kotányi 
delivered his infamous definition of all current artistic practice as being ‘anti-situationist’.466 
However, as outlined in chapter one, this appellation was not suggested in order to ban or 
exclude artistic practice from the life of Situationists, but rather to clarify the already 
acknowledged anti-artistic nature of the Situationist project. Indeed from 1957 ‘pre-situationist’ 
had been the term suggested to indicate the transitional nature of Situationist practice in the 
capitalist present (i.e. anti-artistic, but since partially founded in present artistic techniques, not 
fully ‘Situationist’ in the sense of the Situationist hypothesis). That Vaneigem had placed such 
importance on the reaffirmation of the anti-artistic nature of the Situationist project and Kotányi 
suggested ‘anti-situationist’ in order to clarify this, is testament to the need for clarity brought 
on by Spur and now Nash’s confusion of art with the elaboration of a Situationist project.    
The idea that art was ‘anti-situationist’ had a longer history in the SI, as we have seen with 
regard to the argument between Constant and Debord, not to mention the development of Spur’s 
relationship with the group. Indeed, the SI had definitively reached the perspective of art being 
‘anti-situationist’ in the Amsterdam Declaration written by Constant and Debord in late 1958, 
and ratified by the Third conference of the SI in April 1959. What is significant about the 
perspective raised at the Fifth conference, particularly in the contributions of Vaneigem and 
Kotányi, is not the novelty but rather the context. Spur’s recent activity, and the ongoing trouble 
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464 The following account of the argument over the term ‘anti-situationist’ is covered in more depth in 
chapter one, above. 
465 I.S., 'La Cinquième Conférence de l’I.S. à Göteborg,' pp. 27, 26-7. 
466 Ibid., p. 27. 
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that the SI encountered in its relations with the art world — the ‘Van de Loo affair’ being an 
exemplar of such — demonstrated that the issue had not been signed off as a result of 
“legislative” fiat.467 Rather the perspective, technically subscribed to by the majority of the SI, 
was practically fought out in the arguments and attempts at collaborative activity between 1959 
and 1961. In this context Prem’s attempt to wrest more autonomy for the German section could 
only be seen as a backward step by the SI in toto, and an attempt to retreat from the 
development of the ideas and practice already agreed upon by the Situationist majority. Perhaps 
more stunning in Prem’s case was the lack of any reasoning for such autonomy, based for 
instance in a perceived failure of previous developments, or evidence that the SI position against 
the artistic spectacle was wrong. It is my belief that Prem and Spur’s ploy was precisely 
motivated by the secretive arrangement with van de Loo, and the artistically “successful” results 
of their brief collaboration at Drakabygget.  
In this context, the declaration of art as ‘anti-situationist’ was not a declaration against the 
practice of art, merely a clarification of what did and did not count as strict ‘Situationist’ 
activity. That this declaration has been so singularly misunderstood by commentators ever since 
it was made is perplexing. The widespread belief that Kotányi’s and Vaneigem’s arguments at 
the conference was in effect an attempt to ban art or rule it out as activity appropriate for 
members of the SI is, in truth, on a par with Prem’s admitted ‘incomprehension’ in the face of 
Situationist theory — and thus a marker of the wilful ignorance of such a belief.468 If the 
declaration at the Fifth conference was truly directed against Situationists practicing art then we 
                                                     
467 For instance as to be found in the Amsterdam Declaration, ratified at the April 1959 conference by the 
SI, including the then newly minted German section consisting of Spur. 
468 In Prem’s response to Kotányi’s suggestion of using the term ‘anti-situationist’ to describe the 
artworks of Situationists, Prem responded along two lines. First he assuaged the SI majority by formally 
agreeing with this typification. But secondly he made the case for the SI concentrating its ‘power’ through 
artistic interventions. How one would reconcile the ‘real power’ of the Situationists with what Prem 
admitted was ‘anti-situationist’ activity was never resolved by him. Indeed in an obvious slight against 
Debord, Kotányi, Vaneigem and other so-called ‘theorists’ he argued that ‘theoretical power these days is 
sterile, without the capacity to change things practically’. Despite this “criticism” of ‘theoretical power’ 
Prem proceeded to admit to finding Situationist theory ‘incomprehensible’ — but presumably not so 
incomprehensible that he felt capable of rejecting it! ‘Several comrades asked him why he was here [at 
the conference]. Debord recalled a story [Vladimir] Mayakovsky recounted: “No-one calls himself 
intelligent for the sole reason that they don’t understand mathematics or French; but anyone can confirm 
their intelligence by the proof that they understand nothing of futurism.” Where we are in advance is that 
Mayakovsky’s story referred to the bourgeois spectator, whereas here the SI is the first avant-garde which 
has among its participants one who admits to not understand its theory, which he had agreed with for 
more than two years.’ I.S., 'La Cinquième Conférence de l’I.S. à Göteborg,' p. 29. 
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would do well to ponder why practicing artists remained members of the SI after the so-called 
break with the artists (most obviously the painters J.V. Martin and Uwe Lausen, and for a time 
the poet Peter Laugesen). Indeed, the painters Jacqueline de Jong and Jørgen Nash, and the 
ceramicist Ansgar Elde were not expelled in February 1962 but only later excluded when they 
declared themselves in solidarity with those members of Spur who were expelled.  
That the practice of art became a measure of the 1962 break is testament only to 
misunderstanding the nature of the break. Proximally it was due to the Spur group’s 
contravention of an agreement made at the Fifth conference. More generally it was with regards 
to the priorities Situationists attributed: to Situationist activity on the one hand and artistic 
activity on the other. In Spur’s case the latter ruled the former. What had been demanded of the 
group at the Fifth conference was the reverse — not the cessation nor the renunciation of artistic 
activity. 
Expulsion 
Over the weekend of the 10th and 11th of February, 1962 Central Council of the SI met. Present 
at the meeting were the Central Council members accepted at the Fifth conference — namely 
Guy Debord, Attila Kotányi, Dieter Kunzelmann, Uwe Lausen, Jørgen Nash and Raoul 
Vaneigem (Ansgar Elde was noted as sending apologies for his absence). Hardy Strid, 
Jacqueline de Jong, Lothar Fischer, Heimrad Prem, Helmut Sturm and Hans Peter Zimmer were 
also present, but as a non-voting members.469 The other members of Spur (Prem, Sturm, 
Zimmer and Fischer) had been called on to attend the meeting considering that it would deal 
with the question of the contested publication of SPUR no. 7 and attendant breaches in group 
discipline. At the council meeting Debord, Kotányi, Lausen and Vaneigem put the motion for 
                                                     
469 De Jong would later claim that she was the official Council representative for the Dutch section, which 
at that time consisted of herself alone (Jong, 'Critique of the Political Practice of Détournement [1962],' 
pp. 81-2). However neither the report from the Fifth conference nor the official account of the Central 
Council meeting confirm that she was a member of the Council ('La Cinquième Conférence de l’I.S. à 
Göteborg.'; 'Renseignements situationniste [7],' Internationale Situationniste no. 7). After her expulsion 
de Jong claimed that the Spurists who were expelled and Ansgar Elde affirmed her positon as a member 
of the Central Council (Jong, 'Critique of the Political Practice of Détournement [1962],' p. 81). However, 
apart from the fact that by this time all of these people including de Jong had been expelled from the SI, 
we are still faced with the fact that the majority of the Central Council rejected her belief in being a 
member. No doubt she was at the Central Council meeting but her vote was neither accepted nor recorded 
at the meeting (even if it had been given).   
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the expulsion of a majority of the Spur group from the German section — namely Kunzelmann, 
Prem, Sturm and Zimmer.  
[Jørgen] Nash, blaming the schemes of those responsible for Spur, supported the 
publication of a retraction, but stopped short of [demanding] an exclusion. However, 
after a debate on this subject, Nash rallied to the decision to exclude, which was thus 
achieved with 5 votes to 1.470 Kunzelmann himself approved of all the criticisms of the 
C[entral] C[ouncil], and affirmed that he was not personally responsible for any of the 
incriminating facts. But, left free to effectively break with the others he could not 
resolve himself to do this, and was therefore left among the excluded. This exclusion 
was immediately made public in the tract Nicht hinauslehnen! [Do not lean out!] The 
only person present, and not implicated, who then expressed that they shared the 
positon of the excluded, was Lothar Fischer. He was thus necessarily counted with 
them.471  
The ‘schemes’ which the Spurists were accused of and cited as grounds for expulsion were ‘the 
content of issue 7 of the journal SPUR; the distrust or hostility of this group toward the 
comrades applying the directive of the SI in Germany and outside Germany; as well as its now 
undeniable collusion with some of the ruling class of European culture’.472 The ‘undeniable 
collusion’ was without doubt a reference to Spur’s ongoing association with the Van de Loo, 
Munich bourgeois and incontestably a member of the ‘ruling class of European culture’.473  
                                                     
470 Lauren Graber has written, citing de Jong, that Debord, Kotányi, Lausen and Vaneigem ‘precluded any 
discussion or dissent on the expulsion’. But this appears to be contradicted by the official Situationist 
account which details Nash’s initial opposition, and the single vote, Kunzelmann’s, against the expulsion 
order (I.S., 'Renseignements situationniste [7],' p. 49). Additionally Graber has written that ‘Debord 
demanded that only those Situationists who agreed with SPUR’s expulsion could return to the evening 
meeting of the Council’, however without citing a source for this claim (Graber, 'Gruppe SPUR and 
Gruppe GEFLECHT: Art and dissent in West Germany, 1957 – 1968', p. 206). Certainly de Jong has 
detailed that Debord et al. presented the expulsion as a fait acompli. However she also confusing adds that 
nonetheless ‘THE BIG FIGHT HAD STARTED’ (Jong, 'Critique of the Political Practice of 
Détournement [1962],' p. 79). 
471 I.S., 'Renseignements situationniste [7],' p. 49. 
472 Ibid. 
473 ‘This group [Kunzelmann, Prem, Sturm and Zimmer] committed numerous acts of artistic arrivism 
which they hid from the SI at the time of the Göteborg Conference and since then (participation in the 
Biennale de Paris, collusion with diverse traffickers of modern art enemies of several Situationists, or of 
all)’. Debord et al., 'Résolution adoptée par le 4e session du Conseil Central de l’I.S. (Paris 10-11 février 
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However it was also a reference to a more recent association, with the ‘industrialist and art 
patron, Paolo Marinotti’, mediated via the composition and publication of SPUR no. 7 in 
January 1962.474  
At the Fifth conference the previous August, Asger Jorn (under the pseudonym George Keller) 
had suggested in absentia that the different publications of the SI, primarily Internationale 
Situationniste and SPUR, be unified in order to order to address and overcome the obvious 
‘divergences’ in the organisation. In the discussion that followed the Belgian section (in effect 
Kotányi and Vaneigem) supported Jorn’s suggestion. Spur, while ‘accepting the project in 
principle’, believed that the project of unification should be postponed until the future.475 As a 
result further discussion of such a unification was put off. However, Spur did request that that 
Attila Kotányi and Jacqueline de Jong be added to the editorial board of the SPUR journal in 
order to aid in the development of such unification (additional to their commitment to reapply 
themselves ‘as soon as possible to the diffusion and elaboration of Situationist theory, as they 
had [already] begun to in issues 5 and 6 of SPUR’).476 
Despite this request made by Spur, the group went ahead and worked on the 7th issue of SPUR 
without either informing or attempting to involve Kotányi and de Jong. However, as 
Kunzelmann stated at the Central Council meeting in February this did not involve him. Rather, 
Prem, Sturm, and Zimmer travelled from Sweden to Venice in late September or early October 
1961 ‘to visit with Paolo Marinotti and Lothar Fischer, who was there completing a study grant 
for sculpture.’477 Paolo Marinotti was an Italian industrialist and collector who also bankrolled 
the 7th issue and payed each of the Spur members a stipend as well.478 Considering the recent 
‘Van de Loo affair’ and its final revelation in later August, Spur’s engagement with another 
                                                                                                                                                           
1962),' p. 591. Cf. also Graber, 'Gruppe SPUR and Gruppe GEFLECHT: Art and dissent in West 
Germany, 1957 – 1968', pp. 205-06, fn. 363 p. 205. 
474 Graber, 'Gruppe SPUR and Gruppe GEFLECHT: Art and dissent in West Germany, 1957 – 1968', p. 
177. 
475 I.S., 'La Cinquième Conférence de l’I.S. à Göteborg,' p. 31. 
476 Ibid. 
477 Graber, 'Gruppe SPUR and Gruppe GEFLECHT: Art and dissent in West Germany, 1957 – 1968', p. 
203. 
478 Marinotti had also attempted to set up the ‘Utopolis’ project with the SI through the mediation of 
Asger Jorn. However when he could not guarantee the SI complete creative control, the group withdrew 
from the project. See above.  
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bourgeois art dealer and collector was sure to only further inflame their relationship with the 
rest of the SI. Such was Spur’s flouting of the SI’s discipline — a discipline, moreover, they had 
themselves requested. Jacqueline de Jong would inform the Central Council of these facts in 
January 1962 when the 7th issue was finally published.479  
From the perspective of the Central Council, and in particular the core group of Debord, 
Kotányi and Vaneigem, the composition and publication of SPUR no. 7 only confirmed what 
they considered as the continued backward movement of the Spur group. Not only had the 
group continued to engage in its questionable relation with van de Loo, but it extended the 
cultivation of such relations with the addition of Marinotti to their list of patrons. Additionally, 
the content of SPUR no. 7 was a marked backward step from no. 5 (and even no. 6). Not only 
was there no theoretical work that could reasonably pass as ‘Situationist’, but the text that did 
exist was simply inane and almost certainly designed to irritate Debord et al.: ‘Debord likes us 
but not van de Loo… Pinot (Gallizio) likes us but not Debord… Kotányi likes Debord but not 
Constant…’.480 However, a final breaking point seemed to be reached when the Spur group 
responded to a request made by the Central Council of the SI regarding the German translation 
of works written by other Situationists (notably members of the Central Council), by 
‘withhold[ing] [the] German translations’, and contesting the right of the Central Council ‘to 
fair use or even examination of the translations by arguing that the translator had been paid for 
                                                     
479 According to the SI, SPUR no.7 was published in January 1962 — cf. Jean-Jacques Raspaud and Jean-
Pierre Voyer, L'internationale situationniste : chronologie, bibliographie, protagonistes (avec un index 
des noms insultés), Paris: Éditions Champ libre, 1972, p. 113. However Lauren Graber has written that 
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beginning of the criminal investigation into Spur in late October and early November 1961 began as a 
result of a sold copy of the 6th issue. Indeed the criminal investigation into Spur began with seizure of all 
of the issues of the SPUR journal in early November 1961 (ibid., p. 178).  Additionally in Graber’s 
account of the state harassment and investigation of the group, SPUR no. 6 holds a prominent positon, 
and the putative 7th issue is never mentioned in relation to the criminal investigation.   
480 Cited in Graber, 'Gruppe SPUR and Gruppe GEFLECHT: Art and dissent in West Germany, 1957 – 
1968', p. 204. 
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by them [i.e. Spur]’.481 Needless to say, this recourse to disputing the proprietary rights of works 
in translation — works, moreover, that were not originally written by the Spur members — was 
justifiably interpreted as negatively by the Central Council and the rest of the group.    
Aftermath 
Jørgen Nash’s role in the promotion of Spur as Situationist artists was crucial in their backward 
movement from the publication of SPUR no. 5 in June 1961. Indeed, Nash was described as 
entering into an ‘uncontrollable rage’ on the back of art being deemed ‘anti-situationist’ activity 
by a majority vote at the Fifth conference.  Nash’s dependence on the reputation of both his 
older brother Asger Jorn, and his own designation of Situationist appeared to be a crucial part of 
his niche marketing — something he had decided to extend to his Spur comrades. As the SI 
wrote a year after the expulsions ‘the German Situationists [i.e. Spur] who were excluded at the 
beginning of 1962 expressed with more frankness and more artistic capability an opposition 
comparable to that of the Nashists.’482 Nash, and his followers on the other hand, ‘have only 
pushed bad faith and the profound indifference to any theory (and even conventional artistic 
action) much further, and in favour of the crudest commercial publicity.’483 
The animus which developed between the SI and Nash was not only restricted to his showman-
like efforts in the second half of 1961. It is perhaps best demonstrated by Nash’s behaviour, in 
concert with Jacqueline de Jong and Ansgar Elde, a month after the expulsions. On 15 March 
1962, they issued a declaration against the expulsions, but then perversely backdated it to 13 
February. Presumably they acted thus in order to show that they quickly disagreed with the 
majority decision of the council. But as we know (though not from their declaration) Nash not 
only voted with the majority of the council, Ansgar Elde was absent from the meeting and 
Jacqueline de Jong was present as a non-voting member — which is to say she was not a 
member of the council (despite the false claim of the declaration and her later protestations).484 
                                                     
481 Debord et al., 'Résolution adoptée par le 4e session du Conseil Central de l’I.S. (Paris 10-11 février 
1962).' 
482 I.S., 'L'Operation Contre-Situationniste Dans Divers Pays.' 
483 Ibid. 
484 I.S., 'Renseignements situationniste [7],' p. 49; Jong, 'Critique of the Political Practice of 
Détournement [1962].' 
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The backdating then was either a gesture of contempt directed at the Central Council or at the 
very least a misplaced wager on their ability to pull off a bald faced lie.  
This last-ditch attempt to protest the Spur exclusions ended with the signers of the declaration 
also being expelled from the SI. The SI’s Central Council declared their move as a ‘conspiracy’ 
which, 
did not shy from resorting to the most outrageous lies, going so far as to give the 
impression that on 10 February, at the SI's last Central Council — in session under 
some sort of alleged pressure from the streets! — the minority were intimidated by 
cunning use of the atmosphere of civil war that has apparently been prevalent in Paris 
for the last two years (alas!).485  
Further they quickly moved to make the painter J.V. Martin ‘the supreme authority to represent 
the Situationist International in the area covered by the former Scandinavian section (Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, and Sweden)’.486 So ended the so-called break with the artists. 
 
“Sabotage! Make contact with headquarters by space radio!” 
Originally subtitled in IS 7: After the Nash putsch J.V. Martin  
organised the resistance of loyal elements.487 
                                                     
485 I.S., 'Renseignements situationniste [7].' 
486 Ibid., p. 54. 
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Conclusion 
Amidst the recriminations, rumours and confused accounts and misunderstandings, the so-called 
‘break’ with the artists did, nonetheless, usher in a new period for the SI. As Debord would 
remark years later, it was this period of the SI’s story which ‘fixed the departure point for the 
operation that led to the movement of May 1968, and what followed.’488 Whereas the initial SI 
project had drawn most clearly from the anti-artistic practices of Dada and Surrealism, the SI 
from around 1961 began to apply itself to the rediscovery of the anti-philosophical and anti-
political practices of Marx and dissident ‘Marxists’ and left communists from the 1910s, 20s 
and 30s. Now ‘the realisation and abolition’ of art, politics, philosophy, everyday life, became 
the watchword of the SI.  
If I was to summarise the difference between Debord et al. and the artists, whether the 
‘technician’ Constant or the Spur painters and sculptors, it would be this: Debord saw the 
Situationist project itself as the ‘work’ of the SI, whereas the artists were never able to progress 
beyond their attachment to discrete ‘works’ of art and architecture. I realise this runs the risk of 
distorting the thrust and counter thrust of the discussions and disputes which animated the SI 
between 1957 and 1962. However, it was the peculiar notion of the avant-garde being its own 
project (and further its own disappearance) that distinguished Debord conception from both the 
Situationists expelled and those contemporaries who claimed the ‘avant-garde’ mantle more 
from habit than conviction. Indeed, such a conception flew in the face of the sclerotic political 
‘avant-gardes’ of Stalinism and its pretenders, testament to the brutal extermination of the 
revolutionary aspirations of past generations. The avant-garde experiments of the 1910s and 20s 
had failed. Where they failed was precisely at the boundary between the present reality of 
capitalism and the dream of a free future.  
                                                                                                                                                           
487 Détourned cartoon accompanying the account of Nash, de Jong and Elde’s ‘sabotage’ of the 
Scandanvian ‘sabotage’ of the Central Council’s decision in  Internationale Situationniste no. 5. I.S., ibid. 
488 Debord, 'Les thèses de Hambourg en septembre 1961 (Note pour servir à l'histoire de l'Internationale 
Situationniste) [1989],' p. 703. 
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In a letter to Robert Estivals in 1963, Debord wrote that the ‘term “avant-garde” implies the 
affirmation of a novelty.’489 What counted as an ‘avant-garde movement’ existed on the frontier 
between its ‘arbitrary’ claims about the future, and a more widespread ‘general’ acceptance in 
the present.490 Nonetheless the avant-garde’s field of operation is in the present, even as ‘it 
describes and begins a possible present’.491  
 
‘Poème Objet’ — André Breton, 1935 
Debord’s description of ‘avant-garde’ resonated with the historical avant-gardes — for instance 
Futurism, Dada and Surrealism. In each of these cases the work of the avant-garde was the 
avant-garde itself, whereas the ‘works’ of the avant-garde were subordinate to the movement — 
at best expressions of the movement’s existence on the frontier of the present and desire for a 
different future.492 However this had changed with the rise of critical and practical ‘aesthetics’ 
which signified the defeat of these movements by ‘the weight of the past and the inauthentic 
                                                     
489 Debord, 'L'avant-garde en 1963 et après,' p. 638 (thesis 1). 
490 Ibid. 
491 Ibid. 
492 Ibid., pp. 638, 639 (theses 1, 3). At best, André Breton’s ‘poem-objects’ could almost seem to be 
artefacts communicated from a future yet to be. At worse they became merely art-objects for 
spectatorship and sale in the present. 
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present’.493 To use a Situationist term, the movements had been recuperated to the extent that 
they were reduced to their works, as opposed to the ‘work’ of the avant-garde itself.  
Recalling the arguments at the Fifth conference in 1961, Debord continued to Estivals, 
today, the first realisation of an avant-garde is the avant-garde itself. It is also the most 
difficult of its realisations; and the fact that it is, from now on, a prerequistie explains 
the absence of authentic avant-gardes for long periods [of time]. What are usually called 
“realisations” are first of all concessions to the banalities of the old cultural world. In 
this regard, what is notable today is the tendency of all fake avant-gardism to put the 
accent on “works” that are not very new (ideological mystification tends to valorise the 
very small number of distinct nuances in these works as richness and originality); on the 
contrary, a movement like the SI tends to conceal (to deliberately disparage), not only 
partial projects, but above all completed realisations [les réalisations effectuées] — 
designated “anti-situationist” — despite the fact that the numerous sub-products of the 
SI’s central activity of the self-formation of the avant-garde contain more effective 
novelties than all other artistic-philosophical productions of the last few years. It is by 
not believing in currently permitted works that an avant-garde also makes “the best” of 
currently permitted works.494 
It is important to note here that even though Debord puts primary emphasis on the realisation of 
the avant-garde itself rather than any works of the avant-garde, he does not therefore argue 
against the production of such ‘works’. They are ‘disparaged’ when others proclaim their 
repetitive works “new”, and ‘concealed’ insofar as such works made by members of the SI are 
not exhibited as remarkable achievements (for instance, the collages Debord continued to make 
in the 1960s). The ultimate “truth” of opposing the production of art-objects, as claimed against 
Debord, would in fact be an argument against objectification tout court. The problem, then, was 
one of ‘not believing in the currently permitted works’, as opposed to what the official had ruled 
impermissible: the destruction and overthrow of capitalist social relations.  
                                                     
493 Ibid., p. 638 (thesis 1). 
494 Ibid., p. 639 (thesis 3). 
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The objectified intellectual labours of the SI, most obviously contained in the journal 
Internationale Situationniste, are no less prone to the fate of the art-objects produced by the 
Spurists, Constant, Jorn, de Jong, Nash, etc. Alas, in the present year, original copies of the 
Internationale Situationniste have befallen the fate of all objects torn out of context and 
fetishized as historical curios — they sell as “collectable” objets d’art, for prices markedly 
inflated in comparison to their original cost (not to mention at odds with their original intent). In 
the face of such fetishes, the question we face is still one of disinterring the ideas from these 
objects and using them again (or not) under our changed circumstances. Indeed, it is even the 
case of running the risk of creating new objects at the frontier of the present and the future.  
However, unlike most of the painterly and “artistic” work of Situationists — ‘designated anti-
situationist’ — the Situationist critique was an attempt to make the case for ‘realization of an 
avant-garde today’. Which is to say they were consciously fashioned to not only gesture at the 
self-dissolution of the avant-garde (the ‘work’ of the avant-garde in the Situationist sense), but 
were also attempts at the communication of such. Debord, Kotányi, Vaneigem, et al. did not 
push for, nor could they, an absolute end to Situationists producing paintings, films, poetry, 
novels — or, indeed, for the end of the results of any practice. However, they did push for the 
clear distinction of what reasonably could be classified as a moment of the elaboration of the 
Situationist project; and what could not. For instance, Debord did not believe his film work was 
‘Situationist’ in the sense of realising the Situationist hypothesis, even though he fashioned his 
films as passing arguments for such.  
Indeed, as Debord constantly stressed, due to the poverty of material means at the disposable of 
the SI, necessarily all means must be seized upon for the fashioning of the Situationist project. 
By 1961 the primary avenue for this project was identified by Debord et al. as lying in the need 
to fashion a criticism of actually existing capitalism — the commodity-spectacle as it would be 
called. To the extent that the ‘works’ of Situationists could become impediments to the ‘work of 
the SI’, necessitated the designation of ‘anti-situationist’. But even in the realisation of the 
Situationist hypothesis, the realisation and abolition of a Situationist avant-garde, ‘anti-
situationist’ production would have its part to play.  
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Chapter five: Emissaries of the new poetry 
There are not two kinds of poetry; there is only one. […] It is a majestic and fertile river.  
— Isidore Ducasse495 
Poetry must be understood as immediate communication in reality and the real modification    
of this reality.  
— Guy Debord496 
The ‘Hamburg Theses’ were an attempt to ‘manifest’ the apparently un-manifestable 
Situationist work. Thus, a conception of such a work immanent to its practice was central to the 
Situationist hypothesis, yet has proved perhaps the most difficult aspect of the project outlined 
by the SI to understand. Nonetheless, this sense of a work immanent to its practice was based on 
what Debord identified as the impasse reached by the radical artistic avant-gardes during their 
period of flourish (c. 1910-30). In the last two chapters I showed the real tensions that arose 
regarding the attempt to cohere Situationist activity around the Situationist hypothesis, and, in 
particular, unitary urbanism as the experimental practice to this end. What was perhaps most 
notable was the confusion regarding what constituted practice for the SI. Against Constant’s 
focus on the elaboration of unitary urbanism as primarily a design problem, Debord attempted 
to foreground the anticipatory nature of the Situationist hypothesis, and thus the import of 
focusing upon the present necessity of a critical practice, in particular the criticism of 
‘urbanism’ as an increasingly important ideology of capitalist control and integration. 
Nonetheless, the question of the practice anticipated by the Situationist hypothesis remained an 
open question. Was it more or less artistic? And, increasingly, to what extent could it be 
conceived in political terms? 
In this chapter, I will examine more fully the idea of ‘poetry’ in the Situationists sense of the 
term. By the use of the term ‘poetry’, the Situationists, particularly those around Debord, 
Vaneigem and Kotányi in 1961 and 1962, intended chiefly two things: on the one hand, a 
                                                     
495 Ducasse, 'Poésies [1870],' p. 223. 
496 I.S. [Debord], 'All the King's Men,' p. 31. 
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recovery of Marx’s conception of ‘revolutionary practice’ and ‘free, productive activity’ as the 
critical ‘beyond’ of the negation of capitalist, alienated labour; on the other hand, by virtue of 
the term ‘poetry’, they wanted to recover that positive aspect of the artistic avant-gardes, who, 
in contrast to orthodox Marxism, had intuited a perspective closer to Marx than Marxism by 
virtue of posing ‘poetry’ — in a general sense — as a free activity not reducible to labour. 
Indeed, this sense of ‘poetry’ as free activity beyond instrumental labour was already 
encompassed by the Situationist hypothesis; thus, by posing ‘poetry’ at this point Debord et al., 
brought the Situationist critique of art into a fruitful engagement with the recovery of Marx 
beyond Marxism. As we will see, Marx, in posing ‘revolutionary practice’ and ‘free, productive 
activity’ beyond labour, criticised and overcome the conceptual Aristotelian division of 
‘poiesis’ and ‘praxis’. However, Marxist orthodoxy, by positively valorising productive labour 
as it exists under conditions of capitalism (i.e. as the possibility of the democratisation of 
alienated labour) tended to decompose Marx’s criticism, and jettison his negative critique of 
labour and production (of activity reduced to ‘poiesis’, i.e. instrumental production). In 
particular, orthodox Marxism lost Marx’s sense of human activity as itself an object of 
productive and playful transformation. However, the critical target for the SI in this case was the 
less than orthodox Marxism of Socialisme ou Barbarie, and Cornelius Castoriadis in particular, 
who, despite elaborating a far-reaching critique of modern, ‘bureaucratic state capitalism’ in its 
Western and Eastern variants, still tended to hold to an orthodox conception of ‘labour’ as a 
neutral term for purposeful human activity, and thus liable to ‘liberation’ and ‘self-management’ 
(rather than supersession). The importance of the SI asserting ‘poetry, in the Situationist sense’, 
was key to distinguishing their conception of a revolutionary project from the impasse it had 
reached in both the orthodox and heterodox quarters of Marxism, whose shared valorisation of 
the labours of the ‘political militant’, tended to reproduce the hierarchies of direction and 
execution within the heart of even the most explicitly ‘revolutionary’ organisation. By virtue of 
posing ‘poetry’, the SI argued that the free practice to which they worked must be anticipate in 
the present practice of (anti) political agitation, otherwise any purported critique of capital 
would only tend to reproduce the hierarchies and divisions of labour that permeated all of social 
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life. Additionally, they were able to address the artistic impasse of the SI, insofar as ‘poetry’ 
was a reassertion of the Situationist hypothesis, and the argument regarding the critical 
appropriation and supersession of art.  
In order to avoid any terminological confusion, ‘poetry, in the Situationist sense of the term’ is 
not reducible to ‘poiesis’, in the sense of being equivalent to ‘production’ or more exactly 
instrumental production. Rather, the Situationist sense bears comparison to Marx’s idea of 
‘revolutionary practice’ or ‘free, productive activity’, which he contrasted with both 
instrumental and alienated labours. In this sense, Situationist ‘poetry’ is similar to Marx’s 
critical reconciliation of ‘poiesis’ and ‘praxis’, i.e. the praxis which itself is produced and 
transformed over time. As Marx phrased it in the Theses on Feuerbach, ‘[t]he coincidence of 
the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can be conceived and 
rationally understood only as revolutionary practice’.497 For Marx, praxis is an object of poiesis 
(production), and thus cannot be functionally opposed to poiesis; rather they are reconciled as 
revolutionary practice (i.e. as the conscious appropriation of the self-transformation and 
production of practice).  
This conception of practice already figured, to an extent, in the early SI. Debord conceived of 
the activity of the constructors of situations as self-transformative, in Marx’s sense, whose 
object was not merely the external environment, but especially the ‘behaviour’ of the 
Situationists themselves.498 Additionally, the Situationists had early on conceived of this 
hypothetical activity, as ‘replacing and completing […] poetry’.499 Thus, we can say that the 
idea of human practice as both practice and product(ion), was a part of the Situationist 
hypothesis (see chapters one and three, in this regard). However, the context in which this 
‘revalorisation’ and assertion of the Situationist sense of poetry also helps us to understand the 
more deeply Marxian dimensions of this revalorisation around 1961. In his encounter with 
Socialisme ou Barbarie over 1960 and 1961, Debord found not only the ‘political alienation’ 
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498 Cf. Debord, 'Rapport sur la construction des situations et sur les conditions de l'organisation et de 
l'action de la tendance situationniste internationale [1957].'; Debord, 'Encore un effort si vous voulez être 
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that he criticised (a subject I will turn to more fully in chapter seven), but the related problem of 
the positivistic conception of human practice as ‘labour’ redolent of Marxist orthodoxy. 
‘Poetry’, then, was offered as a corrective of sorts, and attempt to détourn Marx beyond his 
positivistic Marxist avatars, and correct the sense of ‘free, productive activity’ beyond the 
socialist imaginary of a freer labour.  
We can best understand the import of this ‘revalorisation’ if we contrast Cornelius Castoriadis’ 
critique of Marx alongside a reading of what Marx actually argued, which I will turn to shortly. 
Indeed, this allows us to also understand the explicit association of ‘poetry’ with the SI’s 
attempt to recover Marx beyond his mutilation at the hands of Marxism (a question I will also 
deal with in chapter seven below). At the heart of Castoriadis’ argument regarding the ‘self-
management’ of labour and production was the idea that workers already implicitly self-
managed production; all that was necessary was to make it explicit. Thus, apart from the more 
egregious examples of superfluous, harmful or pointless production, by Castoriadis’ lights 
labour as it existed was already in anticipation, the productive activity which would continue 
after capitalism. To say that this was in contrast with the idea of free, playful activity embodied 
in the Situationists hypothesis is perhaps an understatement. Therefore, by way of proposing 
‘poetry’, albeit in the ‘Situationist sense of the term’, the SI wanted to not only ‘revalorise’ their 
artistic past, but also recover Marx’s more general sense of ‘free, productive activity’ that Marx 
also theorised under the term ‘revolutionary practice’: i.e., ‘[t]he coincidence of the changing of 
circumstances and of human activity or self-change’.500 In contrast with Castoriadis, who 
conceived of such activity only in the register of the ‘democratic’, ‘self-management’ of labour 
as it presently existed, the SI argued that a ‘new type of free activity’ must be posed in its stead, 
one that is based on the real resistance and rebellion of workers rather than their ‘labour’ for 
capital as such.501 In this way, they associated the ‘insubordinate’ poetry of the past — 
particularly the poetry of Dada and Surrealism — with the insubordination of workers against 
work (and their reduction to labour). Importantly in this regard, the SI’s conception of a ‘new 
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type of activity’ was not simply restricted to activity apart from labour, but rather the end of 
labour wholly determined in the alienated mode, i.e. as a ‘blind power’ (Marx). Thus, the pithy 
graffito of Debord’s from 1952, ‘ne travaillez jamais’ (‘never work’ or ‘never labour’), can be 
seen as a part of the (anti) artistic ‘revalorisation’ around this time, retrospectively recast as the 
‘preliminary program of the Situationist movement’.502 
Poetry, in the Situationist sense of the term 
As we have seen, in the early work of the SI (particular before 1962 and 1963), the terms used 
to describe Situationist activity stressed the way they surpassed present ‘traditional arts’. 
Nonetheless from the outset Debord evoked the ‘poetic’ qualities of the Situationist project, 
stressing a sense that would later be evoked by the ‘Hamburg Theses’. When describing what 
would be necessary in order to constitute a constructed situation Debord wrote that ‘we must 
multiply poetic objects and subjects […] and organise games for these poetic subjects amongst 
these poetic objects. This is our entire program, which is essentially transitory’.503 At the same 
time Debord noted that the ‘poetic’ appropriation of ideas and practices to the end of 
impassioning the world, had already been outlined by the Surrealists in the 1920s.504 Such an 
expansive conception of the ‘poetic’ was redolent of the more extreme conceptions of 
Romanticism — for instance those of Hölderlin, Rimbaud and Lautréamont — in which new 
sensibilities and new ways of living would not only be conjured, but everyday life itself would 
become the poetic medium for its collective elaboration and self-transformation.   
The Surrealists positioned themselves as the inheritors and systematisers of past ‘extreme’ 
poetic projects (among others). The lineage that Surrealism identified in the Romanticism of 
Hölderlin and the ‘Bousignots’ bohemians in the 1830s and 1840s, and Lautréamont in the 
1860s, was taken over by the Situationists in its entirety.505 Debord was most interested in these 
examples of artistic rebellion as transitory models and attempts at a free subjectivity. In this 
                                                     
502 Internationale Situationniste, 'Programme préalable au mouvement situationniste,' Internationale 
Situationniste, no. 8 (Janvier 1963). 
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regard their biggest impediments were their material poverty and marginality; indeed, it was 
these latter traits that allowed them to be both defeated and recuperated (in the Situationist 
sense). 
We can measure the drift of the Situationist sense of ‘poetry’ from that of the Surrealist sense 
through their debates with the remaining Surrealist faithful in the late 1950s. Initially, Debord 
concentrated his criticism of the Surrealists upon their obsession with the unconscious and 
irrationality, and their tendency toward mysticism.506 But soon his criticism would be more 
obviously focused on the largely artistic and literary orientation of the Surrealists, no doubt 
influenced by the widespread influence of Surrealism on not only the SI’s literary and artistic 
contemporaries, but members of the group as well. As Debord said of the original Surrealists, 
their ‘limited scope […] was in large part due to the lack of material means for fulfilling its 
aims’, notably that of impassioning everyday life more generally.507  The chief expression of 
this lack of material means was precisely the poetry and art produced by the surrealists, insofar 
as the transformation of the word or the canvas was closer at hand than the social-revolutionary 
implications of the Surrealist ‘revolution’. As Debord would later say,  
whereas surrealism in the heyday of its assault against the oppressive order of culture 
and daily life could appropriately define its arsenal as “poetry without poems if 
necessary,” for the SI it is now a matter of a poetry necessarily without poems.508 
In 1958 the Situationist tone was more surrealist, but the argument was the same: ‘We do not 
want to renew [artistic] expression in itself, […] we want to impassion [passionner] everyday 
life. Poetry can no longer be less than this’. 509 Poetry, in the Situationist sense of the term, was 
precisely the transformation of everyday life embodied in the Situationist hypothesis and 
experimentally elaborated through unitary urbanism. As we have seen in chapters one and three, 
such a conception did not preclude the production of art by members of the SI, but rather 
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clarified the non-artistic nature of the Situationist project. Whether or not Situationists were also 
artists was not the chief concern; rather the question was one of how the group could take hold 
of elements of past cultural production in order to elaborate and develop the idea of the poetic 
elaboration and appropriation of everyday life.510 As we have seen, the way the Situationist 
sense of poetry was evoked and objectified became the point of contention within the group. 
But it is this sense of the poetic, as at once anticipative of a Situationist future and the measure 
of current ‘pre-situationist’ activity, that proved most durable across the phases and breaks of 
the SI. By emphasising the process of production across time over fetishizing the results of such 
production, Debord and his circle gestured at a sense of poetry that was both poiesis and praxis 
(in the senses outlined by Aristotle). In doing so they evoked Marx’s sense of revolutionary 
praxis by way of recovering the anti-artistic thrust of the most extreme experiments in artistic 
decomposition of the past century and more.  
The Situationist argument regarding the ‘poetic’ versus the reified results of poetic activity (e.g. 
the poem, or any other art work for that matter) resembles, in the negative, Aristotle’s argument 
regarding the difference between ‘making’ (poiesis) and ‘acting’ (praxis). For instance, 
Aristotle cautioned against conflating poiesis and praxis, arguing that the former is an activity 
that is distinguished from its results (i.e. the production of things), whereas the latter is activity 
(i.e. acting, doing) as an end in itself.511 The SI’s perspective constitutes a critique of Aristotle, 
insofar as they implicitly argued for such a conflation against the received wisdom of 
distinguishing the act from the result (or one type of practice — poiesis — from practice — 
                                                     
510 By way of illustration it is useful to compare some of the artistic productions of the SI. If we look at 
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describing so-called ‘extreme’ or avant-garde art.    
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Princeton University Press, 1984, pp. 1799-1800 (VI. 4, 1140a 1-23, VI. 5, 1140b 5-7). Also cf. Aristotle, 
'Magna Moralia,' in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984, pp. 1893-1894 (I. 34, 1197a 3-13). 
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praxis — as such).512 In doing so the SI followed Marx’s conception of ‘praxis’ and in 
particular his idea of ‘revolutionary practice’.  
Marx’s argument was not aimed at the conceptual distinction poiesis/praxis, but rather what was 
practically implicit in this division.513 For Aristotle the ‘praxis’ of a thing is bound up with its 
nature. Thus praxis, ‘doing’, is to be found in things themselves; it is not a question of accident 
or design but one of natural necessity. In contrast, ‘poiesis’, ‘making’, is based upon chance and 
accident; it is a question of ‘what can be otherwise’ rather than a question of what must be by 
necessity.514 However, Marx rejected the idea of ‘praxis’ being commensurate with the nature of 
a thing, insofar as such a ‘nature’ was invariant. For instance, in the Theses on Feuerbach Marx 
argued that human nature itself was an object of (self) transformation, and thus posed it as an 
object of poiesis in Aristotle’s reckoning. That is, he posed the idea of ‘revolutionary praxis’ 
which encompassed the idea that ‘praxis’, as Aristotle understood it, was not only liable to 
transformation and production, i.e. ‘poiesis’, but was also a potential object of self-conscious 
transformation. Against the idea of an invariant nature, Marx posed the ‘essence of man’ as not 
merely an abstraction, but rather ‘[i]n its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations’ whose 
full meaning cannot be revealed without reference to his idea of revolutionary practice: ‘The 
coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can be 
conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice’.515 
Marx and the Situationists’ conception of human practice — as ‘poetry’ or as ‘revolutionary 
practice’ — was not a plea for an indeterminate or purely relative human ‘nature’. In this sense, 
they did not make praxis derivative of poiesis, as Cornelius Castoriadis did in his departure 
                                                     
512 For the purposes of this discussion I will limit my discussion to praxis and poiesis, and will set aside 
their relation, for instance, to such important Aristotelian categories as phronesis (practical wisdom) and 
theoria (contemplation).  
513 Cf. Jorge Larrain, The Concept of Ideology, London: Hutchinson & Co., 1979, pp. 41-2. ‘Marx 
emphasizes […] that practice is not only the transformation of nature but also the transformation of men 
themselves. Practice should be understood not merely as the production of the physical existence of men, 
but also as an activity express sing their life. In this sense, Marx surpasses Aristotle's distinction between 
praxis and poiesis. What men are coincides with their practice. Therefore, practical activity cannot be 
opposed to other aspects of man. Practice is man's specific way of being. It is not an external 
determination, a sort of appendage to theory or even the application of theory. Practice determines man in 
its totality. It is the activity which produces not only material means but also men and their social life’. 
514 Aristotle, 'Nicomachean Ethics,' p. 1800 (VI. 4, 1140a 23). 
515 Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach [1845],' p. 4 (thesis 6 & 3). 
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from Marxism.516 Indeed, and as we will see below, the idea of grounding poiesis in praxis (and 
praxis in poiesis), or practically conflating these distinctions in the human animal, allows us to 
steer a path between determinacy and indeterminacy. The question, then, for both Marx and the 
Situationists was not one of whether the human was essentially determined by poiesis (as 
Castoriadis wagered against Marx) or whether the human was in essence just poiesis (as was 
also paradoxically asserted by Castoriadis), but rather to what extent was the human animal 
successively a product of its own, self-transformative practice.517 Lost in Castoriadis’ evocation 
of poiesis is the idea that praxis as such is the mediate form of the relationship between the 
(human) animal and the rest of nature. Whether or not this relationship itself becomes an object 
of poiesis is immaterial to the priority of praxis in this sense; thus, in the human case, praxis 
itself becomes an object of poiesis. But, without doubt, praxis as the marker of the mediation of 
the human with both human and non-human nature is primary. Nonetheless, when Vaneigem 
wrote that ‘praxis alone [is] the foundation of the relation between men and nature’, like Marx 
he drew attention to both the peculiar nature of the human in contrast to the non-human animal, 
and the way human activity itself had become the departure for the elaboration and 
                                                     
516 ‘The Aristotelian division into theoria, praxis and poiesis is derivative and secondary. History is 
essentially poiesis, not imitative poetry, but creation and ontological genesis in and through individuals’ 
doing and representing/saying. This doing and this representing/saying are also instituted historically, at a 
given moment, as thoughtful doing or as thought in the making’. Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary 
Institution of Society, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1987 [1975], pp. 3-4. 
517 Castoriadis argued that Marx considered the ‘predominant motivation’ of human nature as an 
‘essentially unalterable’ economic determinism which entailed that for ‘all time, human societies are held 
to have aimed […] first and foremost to increase their production and their consumption’ (ibid., pp. 29, 
25). In apparent opposition to this perspective, Castoriadis argued that ‘[h]istory is essentially poiesis […] 
[i.e.] creation and ontological genesis in and through individuals’ doing and representing/saying’ (ibid., 
pp. 3-4). However, as the SI argued against Castoriadis, Marx did not propose an ‘essentially unalterable’ 
human nature, but rather that ‘the whole of history is only the progressive transformation of human 
nature’ (Internationale Situationniste, 'Socialisme ou Planète,' Internationale Situationniste, no. 10 (Mars 
1966), p. 79). Indeed, by their lights Marx’s perspective was superior to Castoriadis’ simply because 
Marx held onto the idea of nature — albeit one undergoing unconscious and conscious transformation in 
the case of the human animal. The danger of Castoriadis’ perspective is that it opened onto the possibility 
of a complete relativism insofar as it recognises no ‘nature’ apart from poiesis (a danger, moreover, 
clearly realised by those poststructuralists influenced by Castoriadis’ criticism of Marx — notably 
Foucault, Lyotard and Baudrillard). By doing so Castoriadis further exposed himself to paradox, i.e. that 
amidst his rejection of determinism under any guise, he nonetheless he had recourse to a determinism of 
the apparently indeterminate. What we will see, below and in chapter seven, is that by ‘determinism’ 
Marx and Castoriadis understand different objects. For Marx, such ‘determinism’ was neither ironclad nor 
impervious to accident or free action; whereas for Castoriadis ‘determinism’ simply meant the operations 
of impersonal forces or laws. 
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transformations of such praxis, i.e. productive activity which entailed the reproduction and 
transformation of the natural relationship itself.518   
As we will find below, the different interpretations of what constituted praxis, poiesis, 
revolutionary practice and the idea and reality of human productive activity cuts to the heart of 
not merely the differing interpretations of the SI, Castoriadis and Socialisme ou Barbarie, but 
also to the real differences between Marx and Marxist orthodoxy. Before turning to this in more 
detail we should consider more clearly the nature of poetry in the Situationist sense. Above I 
dealt with the Situationists’ criticism of conventional and avant-garde poetry, insofar as such 
convention led to a focus upon the art-work over the process of creation. However, as we have 
seen via the brief consideration of praxis and poiesis above, the SI’s conception of poetry bore 
more than a striking resemblance to Marx’s conception of revolutionary practice.  
For the SI, as opposed to much of Marxist orthodoxy, the question was not one of “freeing” or 
“liberating” labour, but rather posing free, playful activity in opposition to its reduction to 
alienated labour — an insight moreover that brought them into line with Marx’s early argument 
regarding the reduction of ‘free, conscious life activity’ to ‘estranged labour’. The Situationist 
hypothesis thus presented the possibility of constructing situations not as labour but rather as 
poetry, i.e. as the conscious and collaborative organisation of ‘play’ or ‘spontaneous creativity’. 
The concepts of ‘play’ and ‘poetry’ embodied both the Situationist critique of the Marxist 
notion of ‘labour’, and their attempt to détourn Marx beyond his mutilation at the hands of 
Marxism. ‘Play’ for the SI was the equivalent of free activity, i.e. activity that was not 
compelled by immanent needs, whether constituted ‘naturally’ or ‘socially’ (even if they 
accepted such needs as the ground of play). In this sense the opposition ‘play-labour’, insofar as 
‘play’ is considered as secondary to and attendant upon ‘labour’ (i.e. as rest and recuperation 
from labour) was rejected. Here the SI was following the argument of Johan Huizinga, who had 
rejected functionalist conceptions of play that reduced it to either a ‘biological purpose’ or 
                                                     
518 Raoul Vaneigem, 'Banalités de base (II),' Internationale Situationniste, no. 8 (Janvier 1963), p. 45 
(thesis 28). 
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secondary to labour.519 Of course this is not to say that that ‘play’ is not experienced as rest from 
labour, but rather that in a society in which labour is the condition of survival, the free play of 
human powers is largely reduced to labour for subsistence, just as play is reduced to rest and 
recuperation from labour. Thus, the SI distinguished between their sense of ‘play’ and the 
‘pseudo-games’ on offer as so many compensations for a life of wage slavery.520 
Vaneigem spoke of ‘creativity’ in similar terms to Marx’s early conception of ‘production’ as 
the activity in which humans distinguish themselves from non-human animal production.521 
Thus, Vaneigem spoke of creativity as a quality in which all humans share — and so, after a 
fashion, something akin to human nature — whereas the capacity for ‘spontaneous creativity’ 
was a mode of individual creativity he considered a conquest and not a given.522 Vaneigem 
distinguished between the general capacity for creativity and its activation; additionally he was 
able to distinguish between the hierarchical and exploitative harnessing of creativity — as wage 
labour, as slavery, etc. — and the necessarily critical, ‘free’, spontaneous mode of creativity 
required in order to refuse the canalisation of creativity. Here we begin to approach the 
significance of the Situationist notion of ‘poetry’. According to Vaneigem, the incidence of 
truly free, spontaneous creativity has so far led a shadowy existence, in the face of the 
hierarchical canalisation of creativity. Nonetheless the canalisation of this capacity, as in Marx’s 
sense of labour power at the disposal of capital, is crucial to the creation of commodities. So far, 
free creativity in the sense of being autonomous and mostly unrestricted in its individual 
instances has been restricted to either sections of the ruling classes, or those groups, relatively 
marginal in non-revolutionary times, who cultivate a critical resistance to the ruling powers (for 
instance, in bohemian ‘micro-societies’ like the SI). Vaneigem, following Debord’s Situationist 
hypothesis, gives the name ‘poetry’ to the cultivation and organisation of such spontaneous 
creativity. Debord identified ‘the poetry of the era’ (as opposed to the false poetry of poems) 
                                                     
519 Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A study of the play element in culture, trans. R. F. C. Hull, Boston: 
Beacon Press, [1944] 1955, p. 2. 
520 Cf. I.S., 'L’urbanisme unitaire à la fin des années 50.' 
521 For instance, in the way Vaneigem speaks of the peculiarly human ‘natural alienation’. Cf. Vaneigem, 
'Banalités de base (I)' & 'Banalités de base (II)'.  
522 Vaneigem, The Revolution of Everyday Life, pp. 167, 170. 
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with the construction of situations, with the ‘dynamic system of an environment and playful 
behaviour’:523 
poetry must be understood as direct communication within reality and as real 
modification of this reality. It is none other than liberated language, language regaining 
its richness, language breaking its [rigid] significations while simultaneously embracing 
words, music, cries, gestures, painting, mathematics and events [les faits]. Poetry thus 
depends on the greatest [material] wealth, in a given stage of socio-economic formation 
in which life can be lived and changed. Needless to say, the relation of poetry to its 
material base in society is not one of unilateral subordination, but [rather] one of 
interaction.524   
Like Vaneigem, ‘poetry’ for Debord was clearly associated with the Situationist activity that is 
entailed in the realisation of the Situationist hypothesis. However Debord’s phrasing at this 
point — 1963 — was more semiotic, perhaps, emphasising the play of language that not only 
breaks its rigidity but also embraces ‘events’ — among other items.525 ‘[D]irect communication 
within reality and as real modification of this reality’ is here analogous to Marx’s conception of 
‘free, conscious activity’ and ‘revolutionary practice’, opposed by the ‘pseudo-communication’ 
of the commodity-spectacle (exemplified in the largely mono-logical “communication” of 
information and news).526 Under the rule of the commodity, words, like proletarians, are forced 
into work. The free play of language is constrained to the extent they are put to work and 
transformed into the ‘counter-poetry of power’ — namely ‘information’ and ‘news’.527 Thus, 
                                                     
523 Debord, 'Encore un effort si vous voulez être situationnistes : L’I.S. dans et contre la décomposition 
[1957].' 
524 I.S. [Debord], 'All the King's Men,' p. 31. 
525 In doing so he betrays the influence of Henri Lefebvre, and his research group on the everyday day at 
the CNRS, as much as the heady atmosphere of the contemporaneous blossoming of structural semiotics 
in France in the 1950s and 60s. Cf. Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, Volume II: Foundations for a 
Sociology of the Everyday. 
526 The Situationists had earlier spoken of ‘artistic expression’ as ‘pseudo-communication’, insofar as 
artists had continued to engage in such ‘expression’, despite the ‘testimony’ rendered by the anti-art 
avant-gardes through their practice of ‘destruction in poetry, novels and all the plastic arts’. Cf. I.S., 'Le 
sens du dépérissement de l’art,' p. 5.  
527 I.S. [Debord], 'All the King's Men,' pp. 30, 31. 
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the ‘problem of language’ is ‘inseparable from the very terrain of those struggles. We live 
within language as within polluted air’.528  
Vaneigem also addressed the problem of language in the same issue as Debord’s article. As if 
by way of establishing the parameters of his and Debord’s argument, Vaneigem had earlier 
remarked in the first part of his long essay ‘Basic Banalities’, that ‘in the language of an era one 
can follow the unfulfilled but always immanent trace of total revolution’.529 Later, in the second 
part, and in language similar to Debord’s, he drew attention to the ‘distortion and awkwardness 
in the way we express ourselves […] on the confusing frontier where we engage in the infinitely 
complex battle [between] language confined by power (conditioning) and free language 
(poetry)’.530 Here Vaneigem called the language of power ‘conditioning’, underlining the 
purpose of what Debord described as the ‘unilateral’ “communications” of power.531 For 
Vaneigem, poetic activity is always ‘irreducible and non-recuperable [non récupérable] by 
power’, precisely because once it is laid hold by power it is transformed into a ‘stereotype’, into 
‘conditioning’ and the ‘language of power’ — which is to say ‘counter-poetry’. Common to 
both Debord and Vaneigem is the sense that power attempts to isolate and strictly determine the 
meaning of words, a process akin to the attempt to corral the poetic tendency to play and 
transform meanings.  
The crucial connective between the Situationist sense of the word ‘poetry’ and Marx’s idea of 
‘revolutionary practice’ is contained in the final two sentences quoted above. Here Debord 
grappled with an idea that Castoriadis came to believe revealed the limits of Marx’s conception 
of production. On the one hand, Debord argued that poetry in the Situationist sense depended 
upon ‘the greatest [material] wealth’; on the other hand the relationship between poetry and its 
material basis is not one of ‘unilateral subordination, but [rather] one of interaction’.532 Marx 
and the Situationists argued that the priority of the economic base qua economic base is a 
function of the capitalist reduction of life to the production and sale of commodities (or the 
                                                     
528 Ibid., p. 29. 
529 Vaneigem, 'Banalités de base (I),' p. 38 (thesis 10). 
530 Vaneigem, 'Banalités de base (II),' p. 38 (thesis 17). 
531 Debord, 'All the King's Men,' p. 30. 
532 Ibid., p. 31. 
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prioritisation of the production and sale of commodities), and the reproduction of this schema. 
In his schematisation of ‘base and superstructure’ Marx’s apparent “approval” is actually critical 
and analytical, following upon his early ideas about the separation of mental and manual labour, 
and their role in the rise of hierarchical class divisions and the various class based ‘modes of 
production’. 
We can perceive Debord’s idea of ‘the relation of poetry to its material base in society’ being 
‘one of interaction’ rather than ‘unilateral subordination’ in the playful nature claimed for the 
poetic organisation of spontaneous, ‘playful’ creativity — free praxis and poiesis (production) 
in Marx’s sense. As mentioned elsewhere, the Situationists hypothesis is the détournement of 
Sartre’s sense of the situation, however drawing its sense from a similar idea of the temporal 
nature of the situation, the freedom to be other than ‘in situation’.533 There is no “point” here 
apart from the play of the Situationists themselves, which is to say ‘games for these poetic 
subjects amongst these poetic objects’. And bound up in this ‘play’ is both the situation as a 
temporal passage and the playful self-creation of the Situationists themselves. This brings us 
back to what Debord considered the most important ‘results’ of the Dada and Surrealist avant-
gardes, i.e. not the exoteric artistic results so much as the esoteric behavioural results — 
possibilities outlined and explored for a ‘new type of free activity’ (as Vaneigem would later put 
                                                     
533 It has often been remarked that Debord’s Situationist hypothesis was influenced by Sartre’s idea of the 
situation; it is less remarked that Debord’s hypothesis was a critical inversion of Sartre’s conception — a 
détournement in the Situationist vernacular. In this sense Debord’s détournement is not dissimilar to what 
Marx did to Hegel’s notion of ‘supersession’ (dépassement — aufheben) by way of Feuerbach. Rather 
than dispensing with Hegel altogether (as Feuerbach had argued was necessary, in a Hegelian fashion…) 
Marx ‘inverted’ him, that is to say used the dialectic inversion of subject and predicate against Hegel in 
order to demonstrate not only that the spiritual world was a simulacra of the “real” one (as Feuerbach 
argued), but that the so-called “real one” was itself the product of human activity which had largely taken 
place, so far, under the demonstrably distorted hand of religious hierarchies and “spirituality”. Marx’s 
innovation was to argue with and against Feuerbach that even though he agreed religious ideas tended to 
form a cruel and pale simulacrum of the “material” world, this made them no less “real” insofar as they 
were embodied in human practices. As Marx would mordantly argue, ‘once the earthly family is 
discovered to be the secret of the holy family, the former must then itself be destroyed in theory and in 
practice’ (Theses on Feuerbach, thesis 4). Debord did to Sartre something similar to what Marx did to 
Hegel’s spiritual hierarchy: he turned it on its head. We could get lost in the Heideggarean roots of all of 
this — but let’s not. Heidegger’s sense of being is deficient in comparison to Marx’s, as we can 
understand by way of Debord’s détournement of Sartre. The facticity of being gives too much to the 
objectivity of situation over its openness to malleability and free construction. Of course, this is not to 
claim a complete malleability, but rather to pose like Marx that the facticity of natural being is not 
completely closed to human transformation. This is Marx’s contention in posing ‘revolutionary practice’ 
in the Theses on Feuerbach. We will return to Marx’s ideology criticism in chapter seven. For more on 
Sartre, cf. fns. 114, 278, in chapter one, and three, above. 
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it534). However, considering the caution regarding misapprehending the Situationist hypothesis 
as merely ‘the unitary use of artistic means contributing to an ambience’ — which is to say 
poiesis (production) — we should note the way the elaboration of the constructed situation is 
presented as a practice immanent to Situationists — i.e. as praxis.535 This Situationist praxis is 
itself a poiesis, i.e. not only do the ‘actions’ contained within the constructed situation 
contribute to the décor of the situation, but they are produced by the décor and produce ‘other 
forms of décors and actions’ in turn.536 In this sense the practice of Situationists, in the 
anticipative sense, is at once praxis and poiesis, i.e. it is commensurate with the activity of these 
Situationists (praxis) and the ongoing production of the conditions for this activity (poiesis). 
Here we begin to see the distinct lineaments of ‘poetry’ in the Situationist sense, and the basis 
for its later fruitful interchange and criticism of Marx’s idea of ‘revolutionary practice’.  
Marx, production and revolutionary practice 
In his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 Marx presented a conception of human 
‘productive activity’ consonant with what he would soon call ‘revolutionary practice’. Here he 
wrote of the ‘species character’ of the activity of the human animal as ‘free, conscious activity’ 
and ‘spontaneous, free activity’.537 He contrasted such activity with, on the one hand, non-
human animal activity and on the other hand with the ‘estranged labour’ predominating in 
capitalist societies. Indeed, he drew a comparison between the latter two conceptions, insofar as 
he conceived of ‘estranged labour’ as a type of reduction of the species character of the human 
to a purely animal level. Marx argued that through the imposition of ‘estranged labour’ as the 
general type of productive activity in capitalist societies, ‘[l]ife itself appears only as a means to 
life’, insofar as ‘life activity, productive life itself, appears to man in the first place merely as a 
means of satisfying a need — the need to maintain physical existence’.538 Thus ‘free, conscious 
activity’ is contrasted to unfree ‘labour’, in which the latter is the former reduced to the merely 
instrumental. In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels contrasted ‘self-activity’ to ‘labour’ in 
                                                     
534 I.S. [Vaneigem], 'Domination de la nature, idéologies et classes,' p. 4. 
535 I.S., 'Problèmes préliminaires à la construction d’une situation,' p. 11. 
536 Ibid. 
537 Marx, 'Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,' pp. 276, 277. 
538 Ibid. 
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a similar fashion; thus under conditions of constraint, and specifically those of capitalism, the 
historical conditions for ‘self-activity’ are reduced to ‘labour’, which, as the ‘negative form of 
self-activity’ has ‘lost all semblance of self-activity and only sustains […] life by stunting it’.539 
‘Labour’ is here presented as a degraded, alienated form of self-activity, i.e. as the negation of 
‘life activity, productive life itself’, of ‘free, conscious activity’. What is clear from the 
foregoing is that Marx did not simply equate productive activity with labour; indeed, at this 
point (1844-45) ‘labour’ was more often associated almost exclusively with the ‘estranged 
labour’ of capitalism. But most importantly ‘labour’, insofar as it was the productive activity 
geared solely toward the subsistence of the labourer, was considered reductive — both 
conceptually and practically — of a more expansive sense of free, conscious, productive life. 
Marx moved from using ‘labour’ in mostly a negative sense in his early writing (i.e. as 
‘estranged labour’) to using ‘labour’ as ‘one of his fundamental ahistorical categories’ by the 
time of the Grundrisse and Capital.540 However, it would be a mistake to consider this as Marx 
simply conflating ‘labour’ and ‘life activity’. For instance, in Capital he examined the ‘labour 
process’ in abstraction, strictly in terms of ‘productive activity’ to the end of the production of 
‘use-values’ — thus he was able to conceive of this process abstracted from both the production 
of commodities for sale and the separation of ‘labour power’ from the labour process itself.541 In 
his draft of this section from Capital, Marx further considered the labour process, in terms of its 
particularity — as ‘purposeful activity aimed at the creation of a use value, at the appropriation 
of natural material in a manner which corresponds to particular needs’ — and in terms of its 
abstract quality as a technical process; an abstraction, moreover, which Marx argued follows 
upon its capitalist character.542 By doing so he was able to consider the labour process firstly in 
                                                     
539 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, 'The German Ideology [1845],' in Karl Marx & Frederich Engels 
Collected Works, Vol.5 New York: International Publishers, 1976, p. 87. 
540 C.J. Arthur, Dialectics of Labour: Marx and his Relation to Hegel, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, p. 
13. 
541 Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1, pp. 283-84, 290. The distinction between the 
labour process and ‘labour power’ was a crucial part of Marx’s idea of ‘surplus value’. 
542 Karl Marx, 'Economic Manuscript of 1861-63 [1],' in Marx Engels Collected Works, Vol. 30, London: 
Lawrence & Wishart, 1988, p. 55. Also, cf. György Márkus: ‘[W]ork as labour constitutes only one side 
or aspect of that unitary and indivisble process which from the other side appears as the process of 
transformation of the “socio-economic form”, i.e. as that of the realisation and change of definite 
productive relations between the different social actors of economic life. […] The earlier, philosophic-
anthropological meaning of work is connected not with the concept of “work” (labour) in [an] economic 
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terms of the production of use-values and secondly as a restricted instance of the ‘metabolic 
interaction between man and nature’ (i.e. restricted in the sense of ‘subsistence’ production of 
‘use-values’) vis-à-vis its capitalist character.543 However, by more strictly stipulating the 
abstract notion ‘labour process’, Marx was able to continue an argument he carried over from 
his earlier work, namely that the ‘metabolic interaction of man and nature’ to the end of the 
production of subsistence goods (i.e. use-values) would be a component of any social form 
created by humans. The problem, as always, was the extent to which life-activity, productive 
life, free activity, etc., was simply restricted or reduced to the labour process itself.   
Marx’s idea of human practice is naturalistic, i.e. it is rooted in our ‘nature’. However, because 
the human, unlike the animal, is not completely ‘merged’ in its nature, the human makes of 
nature (both its ‘own’ and non-human nature) an object of life activity (conceptually and 
materially). Such ‘objectification’ opens up the possibility of the transformation of nature, 
insofar as, (i) it is an object of practice, and (ii) it is objectified in practice (such as human 
activity itself). Marx called ‘free, conscious activity’ the species-character of the human animal, 
insofar as the conditions of possibility of such ‘free’ practice, beyond animal (re)production, 
was what marked out the human animal from other animals.  
Conceptual abstractions play a singularly important role in Marx’s estimation. He contrasts 
human production with that of the spider and the bee.544 Whereas it is true that the bee and the 
spider do not perceive or conceive of their ‘production’ as a human does, in the labour process 
the human builds ‘the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax’. Whether or not she makes 
the building out of wax or stone, good, bad or indifferent, the human objectifies her practice, 
conceptually abstracts her project in such a fashion that she can transform the object — both 
conceptually and materially.  
                                                                                                                                                           
sense, but with that of “production”. […] More precisely, what is expressed in the early philosophic 
manuscripts of Marx by the category work (or production) is designated in his later economic writings 
with the help of locutions like “the material life-creating process of men”, “the real social life-process”, 
[and] “the productive life-process of society”.’ György Márkus, Marxism and Anthropology: The concept 
of "human essence" in the philosophy of Marx, trans. E. de Laczay and G. Márkus, Sydney: modem-
Verlag., [1966/1978] 2014, p. 15, fn. 12.  
543 Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1, pp. 283, 290. 
544 Ibid., p. 284. 
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Castoriadis vs. Marx vs. Castoriadis 
Recently Raoul Vaneigem has spoken of the need ‘to revalorize the artist past of the SI […] in 
the name of poetry’ around 1962-63.545 Such a ‘revalorisation’, of what Breton called the 
‘poetic adventure’ in the first Surrealist Manifesto, was made in the face of their encounter with 
Socialisme ou Barbarie.546 At the time of the SI’s encounter with Socialisme ou Barbarie (most 
‘amicably’ between 1960 and 1963) Marx’s notion of ‘production’ and ‘revolutionary activity’ 
were being contested by Cornelius Castoriadis. Thus, perhaps the best way, at least an often 
misunderstood or ignored way, is to approach the relationship between the Situationist sense of 
‘poetry’ and Marx’s sense of ‘revolutionary activity’ by way of their implicit and explicit 
criticism by the chief theorist of Socialisme ou Barbarie — i.e., Castoriadis. This way, 
moreover, is hinted at in a recent interview with Vaneigem: 
Socialisme ou Barbarie retained an anti-bureaucratic radicality without managing to 
accomplish anything else […] The SI had no reason to be opposed to Socialisme ou 
Barbarie. We agreed with their analysis of the bureaucratization of the workers’ 
movement. They lacked what we had: poetry, that is to say, self-management, which 
was the poetry of the proletariat rediscovering its everyday life, rediscovering the 
veritable substance of class struggle: the self-management of everyday life[.]547  
The group Socialisme ou Barbarie (hereafter ‘SB’) famously argued for working class ‘self-
management’ (autogestion) of industrial production and society throughout the 1950s.548 
                                                     
545 Vaneigem, 'Raoul Vaneigem: Self-Portraits and Caricatures of the Situationist International [2014]'. 
546 Ibid. 
547 Ibid. 
548 It is not exactly clear when the term ‘self-management’ (‘autogestion’) began to be used in Socialisme 
ou Barbarie. Castoriadis wrote in 1976 that ‘the wide diffusion of the idea of self-management over the 
last two decades is to be linked to the exemplary demands of the Hungarian workers' councils’ Cornelius 
Castoriadis, 'The Hungarian Source [1976],' in Cornelius Castoriadis Political and Social Writings 
Volume 3, 1961-1979, ed. David Ames Curtis, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993, p. 251. 
Indeed, the word does not appear to be used by Castoriadis before 1957 — for instance before his article, 
‘On the Content of Socialism, II’.  Of course, this is not to argue that Castoriadis and other Social 
Barbarians did not speak of the workers management of production — which they did, at length, from the 
outset of the group — but rather to note that the term ‘autogestion’ does not enter into their lexicon until 
after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Castoriadis’ main translator in English, David Ames Curtis, has 
confused things slightly by choosing to translate a term Castoriadis did use prior to the Hungarian 
Revolution, namely ‘gestionnaire’ (i.e. ‘manager’ or ‘administrator’) as ‘self-managerial’. Cf. Cornelius 
Castoriadis, Cornelius Castoriadis Political and Social Writings Volume 1, 1946-1955, trans. David 
Ames Curtis, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1988, p. 335 (Appendix I). 
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Vaneigem’s point was not to claim ‘self-management’ for the SI, particularly in the same breath 
in which he acknowledges the debt of the SI to SB. Rather, he argued that their notion of self-
management was more limited than the SI’s: ‘[t]hey lacked what we had: poetry’. By 
Vaneigem’s reckoning, and by extension the SI’s, the question of self-management should not, 
nor could it be limited to the question of the organisation of production as it stood in capitalist 
societies. Rather, it was a question of the ‘self-management’ of everyday life itself, beyond the 
momentary production and reproduction of the means of existence in order to encompass the 
transformation of these means and — crucially — the ongoing self-transformation of human 
nature. In this sense Vaneigem’s argument was directed against the reduction of the 
revolutionary idea of ‘self-management’ to a question of the management of production alone, 
rather than against SB as such. Nonetheless, and as we will see below, the idea of the ‘self-
management of everyday life’ implied a critical rejection of SB’s notion of ‘self-
management’.549  
                                                     
549 For the SI, the idea of the ‘everyday’ was derived from Henri Lefebvre’s work. In contrast to those 
arguments that placed the ‘economic’ or the ‘political’ as the determining instant of the everyday, 
Lefebvre argued that elevation of any ‘instant’ or ‘moment’ above or in opposition to the everyday was 
‘alienating’ or ‘ideological’ in Marx’s sense of the terms.  However, in the face of the practical 
separations and specialised activity proliferating across the social space-time of capitalism, the ‘everyday’ 
is relegated to cracks in the façade — classed as mundane and unimportant. Thus the ‘everyday’ is often 
associated with ‘private life’, ‘family life’, ‘leisure-time’ or life otherwise not directly engaged with what 
passes for productive activity in capitalist societies. Lefebvre, like Marx, held to both a negative and 
positive conception of the everyday. The negative conception, already outlined above, corresponded with 
the idea that the everyday was the ‘very scanty residue’ left over when one ‘removes’ the ‘highly 
specialized occupations’ from it.  The positive conception, on the other hand, was both anticipative and a 
‘recovery’: anticipative in the sense of posing the possibility of an everyday life in which no ‘part’ was 
elevated at the expense of another; but also, a ‘recovery’ in the sense that aspects of the ‘everyday’ 
present were testament to the incomplete nature of capitalist domination. Nonetheless, Lefebvre described 
this ‘everyday’ as ‘lagging behind what is possible’ insofar as it was marginalised, as the ‘residue’ or 
space-time yet to be fully invested by capitalism. Marx in effect operated with a concept of the everyday; 
however, he was less interested in an elaboration of a theory of the everyday than he was in posing the 
possibility of overcoming the practical separations ‘within’ it (to use an overworked spatial image). For 
instance, in his early work ‘On the Jewish Question’, Marx argued that only when the fragmented 
individual (fragmented across ‘economic’ and ‘political’ space-time) has become a self-conscious social 
being, in his everyday life, in his particular work, and in his particular situation, only when man has 
recognised and organised his “own powers” as social forces, and consequently no longer separates social 
power from himself in the shape of political power, only then will human emancipation have been 
accomplished. In a criticism and détournement of the idea of a ‘lag’ in everyday life, Debord would speak 
of ‘colonisation’ of everyday life, deliberately evoking the extension of the commodity-spectacle and its 
divisions of the world in the post-war world (the first, second and neo-colonial third worlds). Cf. 
Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, Volume I, pp. 8-10, 86, 148-50, 230 (See in particular the first 
chapter in which he outlines a criticism of the artistic and literary denigration of everyday life coming 
from such erstwhile critics of the everyday as the Surrealist group around André Breton); Debord, 
'Perspectives de modification conscientes dans la vie quotidienne.' 
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Castoriadis believed that Marx was inconsistent across his earlier and later work; however, the 
real inconsistency lay in Castoriadis’ interpretation of Marx.550 For instance, Castoriadis came 
to believe that Marx had, in his later years (the so-called ‘second element’ of Marx in 
Castoriadis’ vernacular), come to envisage ‘productive activity’ as determined utterly by 
‘natural necessity’ and that free activity only began at the limits of such activity. On such a 
basis Castoriadis claimed that Marx saw ‘only alienation’ in the production process, no matter if 
it was subordinated to the ends of capital or the ends of the self-management of the producers.551 
Whereas it is true that Marx contrasted the realms of freedom and necessity, he did not oppose 
them. Contrary to Castoriadis’ belief that such a conception constituted a retreat from his earlier 
work, Marx had already outlined an identical perspective in his earlier writing when he argued 
that, in contrast to the non-human animal, which ‘produces only under the dominion of 
immediate physical need, […] man produces even when he is free from physical need and only 
truly produces in freedom therefrom’.552 
The main problems with Castoriadis’ criticism of Marx are as follows. First, he appeared to 
misapprehend Marx’s early critique of the reduction of ‘life activity’ to ‘labour’ or ‘estranged 
labour’, arguing instead that Marx initially conceived of ‘labour becom[ing] free activity’.553 
Secondly, he confused Marx’s later conception of the ‘realm of freedom’ and the ‘realm of 
necessity’ as an opposition, further believing (mistakenly) that such a conception was absent 
from his earlier work. Finally, and on the basis of the foregoing, he argued that by rejecting his 
earlier conception of labour becoming free, and moving on to conceive of labour in a strictly 
determinist fashion, Marx posed that ‘technique’ insofar as it is equivalent to the production 
                                                     
550 Castoriadis would later consider Marx inconsistent within not only a single work, but a single chapter 
(in this case of Capital): ‘He implies that, in one and the same chapter of Capital, Marx holds the very 
quasi-natural, nonhistorical position he analyzes critically in his discussion of the fetish.’ Moishe Postone, 
Time, labor, and social domination: a reinterpretation of Marx's critical theory, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993, p. 171, fn. 110. Also, Cornelius Castoriadis, 'From Marx to Aristotle, from 
Aristotle to Us,' Social Research Vol. 45, no. 4 (Winter 1978).  
551 Cornelius Castoriadis, 'On the Content of Socialism, II [1957],' in Cornelius Castoriadis Political and 
Social Writings: Volume 2, 1955-1960, ed. David Ames Curtis, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1988, p. 106. 
552 Marx, 'Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,' p. 276. 
553 Castoriadis, 'On the Content of Socialism, II [1957],' p. 107. 
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process, ‘follows an autonomous development, before which one can only bow down’.554 Indeed 
this last point proved crucial to Castoriadis’ later critical rejection of Marx.555 
I have already shown above that Marx did not conceive of ‘labour becom[ing] free activity’, but 
rather contrasted the reduction of human activity to labour with the possibility (and reality) of 
‘free, conscious activity’. Indeed, Marx’s later theorisation of the ‘labour process’ in abstraction 
was made in order to draw out an idea he carried over from his earlier work, namely that insofar 
as ‘the metabolic interaction between man and nature’ required the production of use-values for 
subsistence, human productive activity would be ultimately determined by such an 
‘interaction’.556 Further, and contrary to Castoriadis’ assertion, Marx also contrasted the 
“realms” of freedom and necessity in his earlier work, albeit not under these terms. Thus, he 
argued that whereas the animal ‘produces only under the dominion of immediate physical need, 
[…] man produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom 
therefrom’.557  
Castoriadis’ argument against Marx first clearly crystallised in an article written in 1957, under 
the influence of the Hungarian Revolution (among other things). In this article, ‘On the Content 
of Socialism, II’, Castoriadis put forward the argument that in the struggle of workers, and in 
particular in the ‘modern’ struggle between ‘directors’ and ‘executants’, the worker-executants 
posed a positive notion of labour and production, insofar as self-management was implicit, and 
sometimes explicitly posed, in their struggles against the capitalist management of work. 
Castoriadis noted that not only had Marxism missed this positive content, but Marx himself had 
seen ‘only alienation’ in the capitalist labour process.558 Castoriadis noted that this had not 
always been the case, and that Marx had moved from an earlier perspective in which he 
                                                     
554 Ibid. 
555 I will return to the question of Castoriadis and his relation to the SI in chapter six. I hope to return, in 
more detail, to the question of Castoriadis’ critique of Marxism in a latter article. 
556 Marx did not use the term ‘use-value(s)’ in his early work, rather speaking of production conditioned 
by ‘needs’, of which the production of ‘new needs’ was a primary consequence. Cf. Marx & Engels, 'The 
German Ideology [1845].' 
557 Marx, 'Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,' p. 276. 
558 Castoriadis, 'On the Content of Socialism, II [1957],' p. 106. 
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conceived of labour as (potentially) ‘free activity’ to one in which — by the time of Capital — 
he saw, 
in modern production only the fact that the producer is mutilated and reduced to a 
“fragment of a man” […] and, what is more serious, to link this aspect to modern 
production and finally to production as such, instead of linking it to capitalist 
technology.559  
Castoriadis’ contention was that instead of identifying the problem as the capitalist domination 
of the production process (and more exactly, such domination being exercised by the peculiarly 
capitalist nature of industrial technology), Marx presented the production process itself as 
always — and thus necessarily — dominating of human practice. However, there are real flaws 
in Castoriadis’ assessment. For instance, Marx saw the technological determination of the 
production process only to the extent that such technology was itself an expression of the 
capitalist ‘labour process’, it’s artificial and ‘natural’ division, and the strange paradox of the 
commodity labour power.560 In the same article, Castoriadis pointed to a late work of Marx’s in 
order to substantiate his claim that Marx only saw alienation in the labour process. In what 
would become the third volume of Capital, Marx posed two ‘realms’ as invariant moments of 
any human community: the realm of freedom and the realm of necessity. Castoriadis’ 
assessment of this passage is damning. First, he accused Marx of now posing that ‘freedom […] 
could only be found outside of labour’, unlike in his earlier work.561 Secondly, and given 
Marx’s apparent rejection of the possibility of free labour, he argued that his conception of time 
‘freed’ from labour was simply ‘empty time’ which avoided the ‘problem’ at hand: ‘to make all 
time a time of liberty and to allow concrete freedom to embody itself in creative activity’.562 
Finally, and perhaps most damning, considering Castoriadis’ later trajectory, he concluded:  
                                                     
559 Ibid. 
560 ‘The sole point to be kept in view here is the specificity of labour where it appears as a real process. It 
will be seen below that this indifference towards the specific content of labour is not only an abstraction 
made by us; it is also made by capital, and it belongs to its essential character. Just as the investigation of 
the use values of commodities as such belongs in commercial knowledge, so the investigation of the 
labour process in its reality belongs in technology.’ Marx, 'Economic Manuscript of 1861-63 [1],' p. 55.  
561 Castoriadis, 'On the Content of Socialism, II [1957],' p. 107. 
562 Ibid. 
203 
 
Underlying the idea that freedom is to be found “outside the sphere of actual material 
production” there lies a double error: first, that the very nature of technique and of 
modern production renders inevitable the domination of the productive process over the 
producer, in the course of his work; second, that technique and in particular modern 
technique follows an autonomous development, before which one can only bow down. 
Modern technique would moreover possess the double attribute of, on the one hand, 
constantly reducing the human role in production and, on the other hand, of constantly 
increasing the productivity of labour. From these two inexplicably combined attributes 
would result a miraculous dialectic of technical progress: More and more a slave in the 
course of work, man would be in a position to reduce enormously the length of work, if 
only he could succeed in organizing society rationally.563  
However, if we more closely consider the section from Capital volume 3 that Castoriadis 
indicts, we find a conception of necessity and freedom that is actually consistent with the earlier 
Marx (i.e. the Marx favoured by Castoriadis). For instance, Marx did not argue that ‘freedom 
[…] could only be found outside of labour’, as Castoriadis maintained, but rather that ‘freedom 
really begins only where labour determined by necessity and external expediency ends’.564 Such 
a perspective was consistent with his earlier belief that ‘man produces even when he is free from 
physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom’.565 Marx did not oppose labour to 
free activity (or productive activity to free activity), but rather argued that productive activity 
that was truly free from subsistence production was also firmly and inescapably based upon 
such production. Thus, we do well to remember his belief that such free productive activity 
could and did emerge on such a basis. Indeed, it is strange that Castoriadis passed over so 
quickly and with little comment Marx’s point that the ‘realm of necessity’ was not inoculated to 
freedom, but rather that, 
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564 Ibid., p. 107; Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 3, trans. David Fernbach, 
London: Penguin Books, [1894] 1991, pp. 958-59. 
565 Marx, 'Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,' p. 276. 
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[f]reedom, in this sphere, can consist only in this, that socialized man, the associated 
producers, govern the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it 
under their collective control instead of being dominated by it as a blind power[.]566 
Castoriadis’ confusion may lie in the fact that Marx later stipulated in Capital that productive 
activity, insofar as it concerned the production of use-values for subsistence, could be 
considered abstractly as the ‘labour process’. However, apart from this, Marx did not cease to 
speak of productive activity (and at times of ‘labour’ activity) which encompassed both the 
‘labour process’ so delimited and productive activity that moved beyond this, but was 
nonetheless necessarily based upon the ‘labour process’. 
The real source of Castoriadis’ error lies in what appears to be his adoption of the younger 
Georg Lukács’ schema regarding ‘labour’ and ‘production’. For instance, in his criticism of 
Lukács, Castoriadis rightly condemns the Hegelian ‘sleight-of-hand trick’ whereby the 
proletarian’s consciousness of its revolutionary immanence is brought to it from without.567 
However, in making this criticism, Castoriadis does not challenge Lukács belief in the essential 
identity of the proletarian with its alienated objectification (mediated only in its alienation) but 
only that ‘self-knowledge’ of this relation can come from without. Additionally, Castoriadis 
mistook Lukács conception of capitalism as simply the alienated object of proletarian 
subjectivity as Marx’s. On this basis, Castoriadis retained Lukács’ subjectivism (‘proletarian 
consciousness is nothing outside of proletarian action; simply put, it is action’) while rejecting 
what he considered was Marx’s objectivism.568 
In History and Class Consciousness, the younger Lukács posed that the proletariat was in effect 
alienated as the world of commodities which paraded before it as, in truth, the alienated 
objectification of its activity. Such a conception is not missing from Marx or Debord’s work; 
however, in emphasising the alienated objectification of the proletariat, Lukács underestimated 
— and this instance, ignored — objectification as the positive expression of human subjectivity 
                                                     
566 Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 3, p. 959. 
567 Castoriadis, 'Modern Capitalism and Revolution [1960-61],' p. 262. Debord takes up this criticism in 
The Society of the Spectacle, thesis 112. 
568 Castoriadis, 'Modern Capitalism and Revolution [1960-61],' p. 262. 
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beyond its alienated objectification. Entirely absent from Lukács conception of ‘labour’ or 
‘productive activity’ is Marx’s augment regarding the productive mediation of the ‘metabolism 
between man and nature’; thus ‘labour’ as the activity which, on the one hand transforms the 
‘object’, and on the other hand is the ‘objectifying’ activity of the subject was lost. By posing an 
immediate, albeit alienated relationship under conditions of capitalism, Lukács lost sight of the 
necessarily antagonistic and conflictual nature of objectification under conditions of capitalist 
labour and production. As he would later write, critical of his earlier self, ‘[i]t […] means the 
disappearance of the ontological objectivity of nature upon which the process of change is 
based’.569 This is to say, under Lukács earlier vision capitalism is understood as simply 
alienation or estrangement rather than the contested development of labour as the ‘ontologically 
fundamental’ mediating activity.570 
The question has been raised to what extent Debord was influenced by Lukács’ earlier 
conception of the proletariat as the ‘identical subject-object of history’.571 The French 
translation of Lukács’ 1967 Preface did not appear until 1974. However, Debord would 
certainly have known of Lukács criticisms of his earlier text, even if from the brief ‘declaration’ 
published in French in 1960.572 However more importantly Debord, unlike the younger Lukács, 
had access to Marx’s early Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, a work moreover that 
criticised Hegel for holding to precisely the conflation of alienation and objectification that 
Lukács later admitted to. In the Manuscripts Marx pointed out that the transcendence of 
‘alienated objectification’ for Hegel meant ‘also or primarily the transcendence of 
objectivity since the objective character of the object for self-consciousness […] is the scandal 
of alienation.’573 Such a conception flowed from Hegel’s belief in a ‘spirit’ and its successive 
                                                     
569 Georg Lukács, 'Preface to the New Edition (1967),' in History and Class Consciousness: Studies in 
Marxist Dialectics, London: Merlin Press, 1983, p. xvii. 
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alienated objectifications (as nature, but primarily as self-conscious “man”). In his schema 
‘objectification’ was synonymous with the self-alienation of spirit, short of its philosophic 
reconciliation. In Lukács’ early schema the objectification of the proletariat — i.e. its self-
alienation as labour-power and its objective alienation as capital, as the means of production and 
surplus value extracted — simply was alienation. As Debord pointed out, 
The reversal carried out by Marx […] does not trivially consist of putting the materialist 
development of productive forces in the place of the journey of the Hegelian Spirit 
towards its encounter with itself in time, its objectification being identical to its 
alienation, and its historical wounds leaving no scars. […] Marx demolished Hegel’s 
position of separation from what happens — the contemplation of a supreme external 
agent, whatever it may be.574  
In contrast to Marx, Castoriadis, much like the younger Lukács, emphasised human production 
(alienated or not) at the expense of conceiving of productive activity as the mediation of our 
relationship with our nature (conceived as both first, ‘ontologically fundamental’, and second, 
‘social’ nature). History simply is poiesis, and Castoriadis disregarded the possibility of any 
natural relation (or ‘necessity’ as he condemns it via his reading of the later Marx) apart from 
the one established as “nature” through poiesis: 
There exists no place, no point of view outside of history and society, or ‘logically 
prior’ to them, where one could be placed in order to construct the theory of them […] 
Every thought of society and of history itself belongs to society and to history. Every 
thought, whatever it may be and whatever may be its ‘object’, is but a mode and a form 
of social-historical doing. It may be unaware of itself as such — and this is most often 
the case, by a necessity which is, so to speak, internal to it.575  
Castoriadis rightly criticised the idea that theory can somehow stand outside of history or 
society. But to note that theory is a social product is not to deny the ability of humans to make 
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of society, history or even the ‘totality’ of being an object of theory. By reducing everything to 
the inescapable artifice of the social bond, Castoriadis, like the younger Lukács, tended to 
eliminate the non-social dimensions of sociality, i.e. of the social as an emergent property of 
human nature. Castoriadis was half right; but by being so he is largely wrong about the nature of 
alienation and production — not to mention his erroneous belief that the younger Marx shared 
his view in a series of ‘stunning intuitions’. For instance, Castoriadis’ conception of alienation 
is similar to Lukács early idea of it being largely misrecognition, i.e. that the proletariat 
misrecognises that its alienated object, capitalism, is simply its objectified “self” under 
alienation. Again, this is sort of half-right, but as the latter Lukács (and Debord) recognised, 
such a notion effectively erased the unity of the early and later Marx’s belief in the ‘natural 
necessity’ that was contained in the social bond.576  
In contrast to Marx, it is easy to see that Castoriadis held to a positive conception of labour. 577 
However, this did not mean that Marx only conceived of ‘productive activity’ in a negative 
sense; rather he criticised the capitalist reduction of productive activity to mere labour for 
subsistence as the negation of the ‘free, conscious life activity’ of the human. Because 
Castoriadis misunderstood the unity of Marx’s perspective across his earlier and later works, he 
formed the mistaken belief that Marx moved from a more subjectivist to a more objectivist and 
‘determinist’ conception of productive activity in general in his later work. That is to say, 
Castoriadis argued that Marx, having posed labour as ‘free, conscious activity’ in his early 
work, turned to ‘see in modern production only the fact that the producer is mutilated and 
                                                     
576 Castoriadis’ interpretation and use of the young Lukács was taken up by other writers after him. For 
instance, Jean Baudrillard’s conception of what counts as Marx on labour comes almost entire from 
Castoriadis (though not clearly attributed). Like Castoriadis, for Baudrillard the social relation is 
everything. However unlike Castoriadis, who reduces alienation to the alienation of the workers from 
control of the means of production (dispensing with Marx’s other senses), Baudrillard’s sees in alienation 
only a chimaera, a product of the alienation of human activity as labour power itself (cf. The Mirror of 
Production). However, Baudrillard like Castoriadis did not seem to understand that labour power was for 
Marx both a category derived from a critique of political economy and the reality of the alienating 
reduction of ‘free, conscious’ human activity to labour power for sale. The ‘young-Lukácsian Marx’ is 
one of the bugbears of poststructuralism, but in fact it is a production of Marxism and some of Marx’s 
interpreters (even if we acknowledge the use of Marx today is always a production).   
577 ‘Castoriadis implicitly reads Marx's negative critique [of labour] as a positive science and then 
criticizes it on this basis; he does not consider the relation between Marx's categorial analysis and his 
notion of the commodity fetish, and imputes an implausible degree of inconsistency to Marx. He implies 
that, in one and the same chapter of Capital, Marx holds the very quasi-natural, nonhistorical position he 
analyzes critically in his discussion of the fetish’. Postone, Time, labor, and social domination: a 
reinterpretation of Marx's critical theory, p. 171, fn. 110. 
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reduced to a “fragment of a man”.’578 Contrary to Castoriadis’ belief that the worker 
experienced their role in the labour process as ‘only alienation’, Marx emphasised the alienation 
experienced as the condition of the workers rebellion against their reduction to labour power for 
capital (and thus the basis for posing what the Situationist called a ‘new type of activity’, i.e. 
poetry in the Situationist sense). Against the alienation of labour power, Marx thus conceived of 
the positive movement of the workers in terms of their rebellion against the capitalist labour 
process, ‘stand[ing] from the outset in a relation of rebellion towards it and perceive[ing] it as a 
process of enslavement.579 Thus, whereas it is perhaps true Marx only saw alienation in the 
capitalist labour process, the ‘relation of rebellion’ is itself ‘free, conscious activity’ emerging 
in the midst of its alienation as labour. This was recognised by the Situationists through the 
emphasis they laid upon the refusal of labour, as opposed to its self-management.  
In a more Hegelian-Marxian register embraced by the SI around the early 1960s, we can argue 
that Castoriadis and SB wanted to realise production without abolishing it in its present form; 
i.e. in their conception, self-managed labour as embodied in industrial production, would not be 
surpassed but rather democratically self-managed by the workers.580 Work, as such, would 
remain organised as an independent ‘realm’ within and apart for everyday life, and according to 
                                                     
578 Castoriadis, 'On the Content of Socialism, II [1957],' p. 106. 
579 Karl Marx, 'Chapter Six. Results of the Direct Production Process [1863-4],' in Marx Engles Collected 
Works, Vol. 34, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1994, p. 399. 
580 The question of ‘self-management’ (autogestion) has taken on more controversial shades which are 
related to the SI’s use of this term détourned from Socialisme ou Barbarie. For instance, the criticism of 
the ‘workerist’ and ‘productivist’ limits of the idea of the self-management of production have been 
extended to the Situationist notion of ‘generalised self-management’ which Vaneigem, among others, 
advocated. Recently  
Gilles Dauvé has restated an argument he first made in the 1970s, i.e. that the Situationist notion of 
generalised self-management does not escape the capitalist imaginary of production and ‘self-managed’ 
industrial production. That is to say that ‘self-management’ is too redolent of the alienated labour it 
purports to supplant and surpass, despite the addition of ‘generalised’ — i.e. generalised self-
management. Indeed, a case could be made that Vaneigem’s notion of ‘generalised self-management’ 
tends to naturalise not only diverse capitalist forms of labour, but also reduces human activity to labour. 
However, this is not necessarily problematic as long as we pay attention to Marx’s early distinction of 
‘life activity’ and ‘labour’, and his later delimitation of the labour process’ in relation to what he would 
call the ‘realm of necessity’ (we will turn to these questions below in this chapter and to a limited extent 
in chapter seven). Dauvé does not simply oppose the idea or practice of ‘self-management’ (or of ‘self-
organisation’ with which it is often confused and conflated); rather he argues for the need to understand 
the capitalist dimensions of ‘self-management’ in order to avoid the reduction of the revolutionary 
supersession of alienated labour to the mere self-management of alienated labour. Cf. Gilles Dauvé, 'The 
Bitter Victory of Councilism,' in Eclipse & Re-Emergence of the Communist Movement, PM Press, 2015.  
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Castoriadis’ 1957 formulation would even form the basis for non-work ‘socialisation’.581 
Needless to say such a conception of ‘work’ or ‘labour’ was rejected by the SI. Indeed, in the 
same issue of Internationale Situationniste in which both Debord and Vaneigem argued for the 
idea of poetry in the Situationist sense of the term, Vaneigem specifically targeted the 
conception of work embraced in SB’s idea of ‘self-management’. There he argued that 
Castoriadis and SB, though ‘rightly opposing the increasingly perfected reification of human 
labour […] end up maintaining, more or less unconsciously, a sort of nostalgia for older forms 
of work’.582 Thus they failed to adequately conceptualise the ‘erasure [effacement] of work in 
favour of a new type of free activity’.583 
Conclusion 
In the intervening years since the onset of Marxism, ‘revolutionary practice’ had become 
narrowly associated with the practice of adherents of various Marxist parties, and ‘labour’ and 
‘production’ narrowly associated with industrial production. In a way, Marxism détourned 
Marx, but rather than making it more precise, or correcting it, it had stripped it of all of its 
radical vision and ossified it as doctrine and dogma. In a word, Marxism narrowed Marx’s 
sense of ‘revolutionary practice’ and ‘labour’. Indeed, it is better to conceive of Marxism — as a 
State philosophy, and as the ossification of revolutionary praxis — as the recuperation of not 
only Marx’s work, but the revolutionary events in which he produced (and was produced by).584 
For instance, in his early elaboration of ‘revolutionary practice’ Marx was keen to include the 
subject within the ‘objective powers’ which constituted material causation. Therefore, the 
individual subject was not just an effect of social-material forces, but was a potentially active 
participant in such ‘objective’ causation. Marx thus distinguished his sense of materialism from 
those mechanical materialists who tended to eliminate the subjective side of material 
                                                     
581 ‘Workers’ management is only possible, within the framework of new organizational forms 
embodying the direct democracy of the producers (as represented by the councils). Workers’ management 
can be consolidated and enlarged only insofar as it attacks the deepest roots of alienation in all fields and 
primarily in the realm of work’. Castoriadis, 'On the Content of Socialism, II [1957],' p. 149.  
582 I.S. [Vaneigem], 'Domination de la nature, idéologies et classes,' p. 4. 
583 Ibid. 
584 In this regard see, in particular, chapter four of La Société du Spectacle. 
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transformations (notably Feuerbach in this case).585 Indeed Marx was most concerned to 
conceive of the human social order as primarily a result of subjective human powers 
individually and collectively ‘objectified’, and most importantly liable to further 
transformations. Unfortunately, since the foundation of Marxism, Feuerbach’s non-dialectical 
conception of materialist determination has become the dominant materialism of Marxist 
orthodoxy, albeit lumbered with the adjectival ‘dialectic’.  
For the SI, art was alienated objectification, in Marx’s sense of the term, even if such alienation 
itself could point beyond its alienated nature. Thus, what most excited the SI regarding the 
Dadas and Surrealists was precisely the practices of these groups and individuals that attempted 
to sketch an objectifying ‘productive’ practice beyond the restrictions of alienated practice. 
‘Poetry’ came to be equated with ‘revolutionary practice’ — as the critical practice which brings 
about the surpassing of capitalism, and as the general ‘free activity’ which will be manifest in 
the construction of situations (among other activities). The emphasis here is on ‘revolutionary 
practice’, but only insofar as such an activity can be considered as on a continuum with its 
destination, i.e. the unity of means and ends which presents the practical criticism of capitalist 
alienation as already the practice of the future social order in anticipation.  
If we recall that Marx considered ‘alienation’ as primarily the experience of human powers and 
objectifying practices as an ‘alien force’ (in the sense of appearing separate to or beyond the 
control of the human agents who objectify so), then implicit in the Situationist criticism, like 
Marx, is the possibility of non-alienated practice and production in the present (apart from 
‘natural alienation’, the term the SI use to speak of the ‘ontologically fundamental’ activity by 
which the human mediates her relation with nature, and other humans). The SI’s wager at the 
end of the 1950s was that the state of present social and technical development immediately 
revealed uses, in the negative, that were in effect denied or obscured by the capitalist imaginary 
of work, the nuclear family, conventional morality, etc. At best, such practices were considered 
merely ‘play’ (for instance the dérive). Against Castoriadis, the SI believed that Marx’s 
conception of activity (under the rubric of ‘labour’ and ‘modes of production’) and the material 
                                                     
585 Cf. Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach [1845].' 
211 
 
transformations of this activity (as subjective ‘self-change’ and ‘objectifying’ activity) bears 
only a passing resemblance to the one-sidedly ‘objectivist’ conceptions of Marxism which, at 
the very moment the SI turned to the use of ‘poetry’, were being further ossified under the 
notion of ‘structuralist Marxism’. ‘Poetry’, then, played a dual role for the Situationists: the 
assertion of a radically subjectivist interpretation of Marx’s notion of ‘revolutionary practice’ 
against its ‘objectivist’ mutilation (and thus not merely subjectivist); and the ‘revaloriz[ation] of 
the artist past’ of the SI.586 I will return to the criticism of Castoriadis in chapter seven below.  
Debord and Vaneigem’s notion of poetry is not naturalistic, in the sense that ‘poetry’ is a 
description of a natural state or activity which is merely oppressed and obscured by its 
exploitation. ‘Poetry […] depends on the greatest [material] wealth, in a given stage of socio-
economic formation in which life can be lived and changed.’587 Like Marx, Debord connects 
poetry to both the possibility and sometime past reality of a freer human activity, but within the 
context of the human transformation of human activity, and thus the transformation of what 
constitutes human activity. Nonetheless this human activity is commensurate with a freely 
determined and determining activity, i.e. consciously self-transformative. Thus, Debord is clear 
that such ‘poetry’ is not reducible to just ‘poems’. Rather it is more resonant with the ancient 
sense of ‘poiesis’ — a point later drawn out more clearly by Vaneigem. Debord explicitly 
equates it with the Situationist hypothesis, while implicitly equating it with what Marx called 
‘revolutionary practice’. ‘The programme of realised poetry is nothing less than the 
simultaneous creation of events and their language — inseparably.’588 The idea of ‘realised 
poetry’ is commensurate with its surpassing, i.e. the realisation and abolition of poetry. Such a 
program of ‘realisation’ is here playing the role of the ‘revalorisation’ of the artistic past of the 
SI which Vaneigem recently spoke of, i.e. the need to emphasis the moment of realisation in its 
abolition and ‘supersession’ (i.e. dépassement, aufheben). And so, we must turn to these ideas in 
the next chapter, surpassing them in turn… 
  
                                                     
586 Vaneigem, 'Raoul Vaneigem: Self-Portraits and Caricatures of the Situationist International [2014]'. 
587 [Debord] I.S., 'All the King's Men,' p. 31. 
588 Ibid. 
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Chapter six: The realisation and abolition of art & philosophy 
The root of the reigning lack of imagination cannot be understood if 
one does not accede to the imagination of [what is] lacking; which is to 
say, to conceive of what is absent, forbidden and hidden, and yet 
possible in modern life. — Situationist International, 1962589 
The identification of Marx’s project of surpassing capitalism and the self-destruction of the 
proletariat with the Situationist project of surpassing art became for the SI not a mere 
correlation but rather the basis for the modern revolutionary project. Indeed, the terms in which 
the Situationists cast their project of surpassing resembled nothing so much as Marx’s attempt 
to move beyond the radical milieu from which he emerged: the Young Hegelians of the 1840s. 
However, where they differed marks the real changes between the insurgent capitalism of the 
19th century and the established, spectacular capitalism of the 1960s.  
When Debord wrote that the only thing that remained of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ was their 
conclusion — ‘Now, the SI must realise philosophy’ — it is almost as if he had recalled them in 
the form of a pre-Socratic fragment, so full of implied meaning and yet frustratingly slight in its 
keyhole apprehension of a conversation long gone. 590 The source of the détournement was 
Marx’s ‘celebrated formula’, from his ‘Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of 
Right — Introduction’.591 In this work Marx took aim at his Young Hegelian confreres, arguing 
that the two wings of their group variously attempted to realise philosophy without abolishing it 
as a separate practice, or abolish philosophy without realising its radical project of 
comprehending and transforming the world. Common to both, according to Marx, was the 
inability to locate an agent of transformation, one which could by turns realise and abolish 
philosophy. Marx located such an agent in the burgeoning proletariat of wage workers, who he 
                                                     
589 Internationale Situationniste, 'Géopolitique de l’hibernation,' Internationale Situationniste, no. 7 (Avril 
1962), p. 10. 
590 Interestingly Debord had described Ivan Chtcheglov’s ‘proto-Situationist’ Formulary for a New 
Urbanism (1953) as ‘a very condensed, quasi-Heraclitean document’. Cf. Debord, 'Lettre à Ivan 
Chtcheglov, début avril, 1963,' p. 207. 
591 Debord, 'Les thèses de Hambourg en septembre 1961 (Note pour servir à l'histoire de l'Internationale 
Situationniste) [1989].'; Marx, 'Contribution to Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction 
[1843-44].' 
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conceived of as the ‘negative’ being of bourgeois society, thoroughly dehumanised and 
excluded from its wealth and yet at the same time the sole source of this wealth which they had 
not effective control over. And so he famously argued that this class could only free itself from 
its exploitation by realising and abolishing at once its human potential and the negation of this 
potentiality.592 For the composers of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ such a conception resonated with 
the SI’s project to surpass art, which is to say the desire to realise the creative promise of 
radical, avant-garde art while abolishing it as a separate, specialised and progressively exploited 
realm of human activity.593 Perhaps even more so it resonated with their then new belief that the 
Situationist project itself was the truth hidden amidst the new, spectacular alienation and the 
fitful struggles against it.  
In order to better understand what Debord would later describe as the ‘formal innovation’ of the 
‘Theses’, in this chapter I will turn to their resonance with Marx’s criticism of philosophy. 
Indeed, this relationship was more than simply an accidental resonance. The Situationists would 
come to believe that Marx’s lacunae with regard to art and its supersession was twofold. On the 
one hand, he tended to take over largely intact Hegel’s schema with regard to the criticism of 
aesthetics (albeit ‘inverted’ after a fashion). On the other hand, the tendency for art to pose its 
own supersession in artistic terms was still under development in the 19th century, and would 
not clearly flower until the dazzling confrontations posed by the Dadas and Surrealists in the 
1910s and 20s. Nonetheless it was in Marx’s criticism of philosophy that the SI found a general 
theory for the criticism of the alienated practices of capitalist society, one that held for art as 
much as philosophy to the extent that art and philosophy were the separated domains of critique 
and reflection vis-à-vis everyday life.  
                                                     
592 Marx, 'Contribution to Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction [1843-44],' p. 185. 
593 Without doubt, there is more buried away in this phrase, particularly the debt owed to Hegel’s 
conception of ‘aufheben’ (i.e. the abolition and preservation of past ideas in their dialectical 
‘transcendence’). Debord’s historical account of the origins of ‘independent’ artistic practices in the late 
feudal/early Modern period of capitalism’s rise to global dominance is crucial in this regard, pointing to 
the movements in artistic practice as themselves a form of dialectical movement. Cf. Debord, La Société 
du Spectacle, - in particular, chapter 8, ‘La négation et la consommation dans la culture’ [Negation and 
consumption in culture]. 
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In chapter one we saw how the ‘Hamburg Theses’ was an exemplary instance of Situationist 
practice — possibly the exemplary instance short of a revolutionary situation. Faced with the 
paradox of promoting a practice without works, Debord, Vaneigem and Kotányi set out to bring 
to bear precisely such a work. By conjuring their thesis regarding the abolition and realisation of 
art in the (absent) form of the ‘Hamburg Theses’, these Situationists hoped to practically 
demonstrate the significance of their perspective. Thus, the ‘Hamburg Theses’ became a pivot 
for the group, obviously in terms of the turn away from the interminable debates over the role of 
art, but even more so toward an explicitly general, revolutionary conception of the surpassing of 
art. At once the ‘Hamburg Theses’ attempted to synthesis the SI’s criticism of art, and the 
discovery of the correlation with Marx’s project of the proletarian supersession of philosophy. 
Indeed, as the SI would also argue, the surpassing of art was the missing dimension of Marx’s 
critique, the lacunae in his almost exclusive turn to the criticism of political economy.594  
As we have seen, by eschewing the typical form of avant-garde manifestoes and theses, the SI 
attempted to draw attention to what exactly constituted the surpassing of art and politics under 
conditions of capitalist reification. Similar to Marx’s differentiation of ‘free activity’ and 
capitalist labour, the SI argued that unless the general form of activity were to change (i.e. the 
predominance of alienated, wage-labour in the present case), posing their ‘realisation’ would 
merely result in the valorisation of the existing forms of production and consumption — i.e. 
wage labour, its results, and the consumption of both. Thus, the only way to surpass art as it 
presently existed would be to both realise and abolish it as a ‘separated’, ‘alienated’ practice. In 
order to better understand this, it will be necessary to turn to an examination of the congruence 
between the SI’s notion of the surpassing of art and Marx’s notion of the supersession of 
philosophy (a ‘supersession, moreover, that lay at the heart of his conception of the self-
overcoming of labour and capital).  
Not only did the Situationists use Marx to better understand the critical impasse of art and 
politics — in the limited, alienated sense — but, we can use Marx to better understand the SI, 
particularly with regard to the idea of pushing the critique already embodied in the Situationist 
                                                     
594 Cf. Martos, Histoire de l'internationale situationniste. 
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hypothesis toward the later idea of the ‘supersession of art’. What the SI proposed, in short, was 
the recovery of Marx beyond its ‘ideologization’ as Marxism. Indeed, this ‘recovery’ was made 
against the more orthodox conception of MArx(ism) that he SI subscribed to up until 1961. As 
Debord would later argue, Marx was partly responsible for the ‘ideologization’ that led to 
Marxism, insofar as he finished off his critique of political economy in the absence of a 
revolutionary movement, ‘in the separation of scholarly work [du travail savant]’.595 In this 
sense, the separation of the elaboration of his theoretical critique from a living revolutionary 
movement had greater import than merely being the result of circumstances; instead, it 
established the orthodox precedent of opposing theory and theoretical elaboration to the practice 
of the revolutionary movement. Nonetheless, there is no indication that Marx gave up on his 
early notion of ‘realisation and abolition’, nor the idea of ‘revolutionary practice’, as enunciated 
in the 1840s amidst the radical circles working toward what became the revolutionary 
movement of 1848-1849. Rather, Debord’s wager — détourned to an extent from ‘Hegelian-
Marxists’ like Henri Lefebvre and Georg Lukács — was that the early Marx enabled one to 
critically surpass Marxist orthodoxy, considering that the conceptions of labour and ideology 
held by the latter in many respects reproduced the schema of Feuerbach which the young Marx 
had criticised and rejected (I will return to this question in the following chapter). The 
misfortune of Marx, to some extent, is that his scholarly sequestration throughout the 1850s and 
some of the 1860s — an isolation he bitterly resented rather than sought out — became a model 
for the real separation of the thought and practice of the future socialist workers’ movement. 
In this chapter I will begin by examining the appearance of Marx’s early problematic of 
‘realisation and abolition’ and ‘supersession’ in the work of the SI, around 1959. At this point, 
the SI framed their appropriation via the critique of two Hegelian-Marxists, who raised the idea 
of ‘supersession’ in terms of the supersession of art — namely Lucien Goldmann and Henri 
Lefebvre. However, the SI argued that both Lefebvre and Goldmann demonstrated the 
insufficiency of their turn to Marx; in the case of the former, by virtue of suggesting a return to 
the Surrealist practice of poetry already comprehensively criticised by the SI; in the case of the 
                                                     
595 Debord, La Société du Spectacle, thesis 85. 
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latter, by virtue of his inability to grasp the weakness of Marx’s conception of art, insofar as 
Marx himself neither observed nor accepted that artistic practice could be the site of the 
emergence of a similar problematic to the one he identified and criticised in philosophy. 
Nonetheless, in his critique of the radical philosophical movement that he was involved in the 
1840s, the Young Hegelians, Marx presented a critical framework that enabled the clarification 
of the Situationist critique art and the impasse of cultural decomposition (outlined in chapter 
two, and the debates over art in chapter three and four). Before moving on to a detailed 
examination of Marx’s conception of the ‘realisation and abolition of philosophy’, I will briefly 
look at the idea of the ‘new proletariat’, the figure posed by the SI as the agent which would 
realise art in a similar fashion to the proletarian ‘body’ Marx proposed as realisation and 
abolition of philosophy. Finally, I will turn to a brief examination of how the SI’s recovery of 
Marx strengthened their criticism of Marxist orthodoxy, rather than reaffirming such orthodoxy, 
as has been argued by Jean Baudrillard, among others. By distinguishing the SI and Marx from 
Marxism, I will the then turn, in chapter seven, to a detailed account of Debord’s reckoning with 
just such an orthodoxy, in the figure of ‘political militancy’ in Socialisme ou Barbarie. Perhaps 
more importantly, I will also show how this reckoning entailed the rapid development of 
Debord’s concept of spectacle, though not as the mere extension an orthodox conception of 
‘ideological superstructure’, as he has been falsely represented, but rather as the critique of the 
becoming ideological of ideas and culture. This will complete my argument against the 
reduction of the SI being either the return to or last gasp of Marxist orthodoxy.  
The twilight of philosophy, art and other idols 
Debord drew an analogy between the artistic and political avant-gardes in his Report on the 
Construction of Situations in June 1957. However, in making this analogy he merely reiterated a 
common idea, an idea moreover that was explicitly proclaimed by the avant-gardists in their 
manifestoes throughout the 1910s, 20s and 30s.596 Nonetheless in the same work Debord had 
already discovered a homology between Marx’s criticism of alienated labour and the 
                                                     
596 Debord, 'Rapport sur la construction des situations et sur les conditions de l'organisation et de l'action 
de la tendance situationniste internationale [1957],' p. 311. As Debord noted in the Hamburg Theses, the 
artistic avant-gardes had been ‘avid to explain themselves’. Cf. Debord, 'Les thèses de Hambourg en 
septembre 1961 (Note pour servir à l'histoire de l'Internationale Situationniste) [1989],' p. 704.   
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Situationist critique of art. In the key section of the piece in which he outlined both the 
Situationist hypothesis and associated methods and criticism, Debord noted that the hypothesis 
itself was based on a ‘non-continuous conception of life’:  
The notion of unity must be displaced from the perspective of the whole of life (in 
which it is a reactionary mystification founded on the belief in an immortal soul, and, in 
the last analysis, on the division of labour) toward the perspective of isolated moments 
[instants isolés] of life, and of the construction of any moment [instant] by a unitary 
employment of Situationist means. One can say that in a classless society there will no 
longer be painters but [rather] Situationists who, among other things, will [also] paint.597 
In The German Ideology, Marx had written (as a Situationist avant la lettre perhaps) that ‘[i]n a 
communist society there are no painters but only people who engage in painting among other 
activities.’598 Marx’s target in this case was one of his Young Hegelian confreres, specifically 
Max Stirner. His broader point against Stirner was with regard to the social conditions of 
creativity, i.e. that the apparently ‘unique’ creative individual is also a product of the social 
relations which bind and constitute her. ‘The exclusive concentration of artistic talent in 
particular individuals, and its suppression in the broad mass which is bound up with this, is a 
consequence of [the] division of labour.’599 In a society in which such divisions no longer 
prevailed, the basis for a creative flowering, both cooperatively and “individually”, would move 
beyond the reduction of the individual to any of the activities to which they turned 
themselves.600 
Toward the end of 1959, Debord and the SI drew a direct parallel between Marx’s belief that 
philosophy, in order to be realised, must be abolished as a “realm” of practice separate to and 
“superior” to the rest of everyday life. Marx’s perspective had been very influential on Henri 
Lefebvre’s Critique of Everyday Life (1947), which had in turn greatly influenced the early 
                                                     
597 Debord, 'Rapport sur la construction des situations et sur les conditions de l'organisation et de l'action 
de la tendance situationniste internationale [1957],' pp. 326-27. 
598 Marx & Engels, 'The German Ideology [1845],' p. 394. 
599 Ibid. 
600 Theodor Adorno spoke of society as ‘the objective determinant of the mind’ in which the (social) 
individual is epitomised and ‘negated’. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 10. 
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Situationists.601 In Marx’s early work, the solution to the suspension of the philosophical and 
political “realms” from everyday life was formulated in the conjoined ideas of philosophy’s 
‘realisation and abolition’, and a proletarian subject become revolutionary in order to destroy 
capital, and thus abolish itself. Marx had presented humanity reduced to the proletariat in a 
similar fashion to philosophy’s degraded state in the early 19th century; i.e. the paradox of being 
both the source of wealth (or critical ideas in the case of philosophy) but excluded from any real 
control over the potential realisations of this wealth (or, for instance, the practical realisation of 
the philosophical ‘good life’).  
Around 1959, at the height of the elaboration of ‘unitary urbanism’ and Constant’s experiments 
in architectural form cohering around his ideal city of ‘New Babylon’, we find that Debord was 
engaged in the further elaboration of the Situationist hypothesis. Of particular interest in this 
regard, was an article published in Internationale Situationniste no. 3, under the title ‘Le sens du 
dépérissement de l'art’ (‘The meaning of the decline of art’). In the article, the anonymous 
Situationist author(s) discuss how even though the sense of the ‘decline’ or ‘decomposition’ of 
art was widespread at the time, most of the discussion revolved around either attempts to 
dismiss it in a reactionary fashion, or attempts to defend it as a ‘new’ type of artistic expression 
(albeit dominated by existential dread and negativity). Two critics were singled out for 
addressing the problem of decomposition as one of ‘alienation’ and the possibility of the 
supersession of art and culture in its present decline — namely Henri Lefebvre and Lucien 
Goldmann. However, despite approving of Lefebvre and Goldmann directly confronting both 
the question and even the necessity of ‘surpassing’ art, the SI nonetheless found both of their 
criticisms lacking. For instance, the SI rejected Lefebvre’s belief that the expressive qualities of 
surrealist art were adequate to the problem at hand, arguing that he misapprehended the real 
impasse of surrealism. Similarly, they criticised Goldmann’s typification of the destruction of 
expression as evidence of alienation in the most extreme forms of avant-garde art, instead 
                                                     
601 Lefebvre criticised Surrealism, and its literary progenitors (Baudelaire, the Romantics, etc.), with the 
effective elevation of the ‘marvellous’ at the expense of everyday life (despite the Surrealists professing 
the materialism of their marvellous). This bears comparison to Marx’s criticism of his Young Hegelian 
confreres. Cf. Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, Volume I, pp. 105-17. 
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arguing that ‘the progressive aspect of this destruction’ must be understood as ‘being at the 
same time the testimony of a whole epoch on the insufficiency of artistic expression’.602 
In the article, the SI drew an explicit relation between the decline of Marxism into an ideology 
and the original “Marxists” (i.e. Marx and Engels) inability to fashion an equally revolutionary 
criticism of capitalist culture (equal that is to their criticism of philosophy and political 
economy).603 In the ‘classics of Marxism’ no ‘real critique’ of art had been developed.604 
‘Moreover, in the era in which Marxist thought was constituted, the formal movement of 
dissolution in art was not yet apparent.’605 As such most Marxist critics continued to work under 
the schema Marx inherited from Hegel: that of the ‘Classical/Romantic’ dichotomy in which the 
latter was the art-form most historically and “materially” appropriate to the capitalist era.  
The SI noted that despite Lucien Goldmann ‘correctly’ arguing that art, like other separated and 
apparently ‘autonomous […] domains’ of everyday life would disappear in a classless society, 
he was unable to shake off the Marxist schema.606 Thus he saw in Romanticism and post-
romanticism (i.e. the entirety of modern art) only ‘reification’, remaining unable to see, like the 
Situationists, that in addition to the reifying tendencies immanent to all production under 
capitalist conditions, modern art had also born a critical, self-destructive movement akin to that 
identified by Marx in German Idealism and its epigones. Thus, the dissolution of art which 
Goldmann considered a necessity in communist society had already been ‘verified’ by the 
movement of modern art itself.607 
In the same article the SI turned to consider a more recent book and article by Henri Lefebvre 
dealing with the same question.  In the wake of his split from Stalinism in 1958 Henri Lefebvre 
had returned to an early love: Marx on alienation and estrangement.608 For instance the SI 
                                                     
602 I.S., 'Le sens du dépérissement de l’art,' p. 5. 
603 Note that at this point — 1959 — the SI had yet to develop their critical rejection of ‘Marxism’ as 
ideology. 
604 I.S., 'Le sens du dépérissement de l’art,' p. 4. 
605 Ibid. 
606 Ibid., pp. 4-5. ‘[L]ike the law, the economy or religion, art as an autonomous phenomenon separated 
from other domains of social life, will be lead to disappear in a classless society’. 
607 Ibid., p. 5. 
608 Lefebvre, alongside Norbert Guterman, was a pioneering translator and commentor on Marx’s early 
work in French in the 1930s. Cf. Henri Lefebvre, Key Writings, New York: Continuum, 2003. 
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happily discovered the resonance between their Situationist hypothesis and Lefebvre’s ‘theory 
of moments’ formulated in his reckoning with his Stalinist past in La Somme et le reste (1959) 
— a resonance which would lead to a fruitful exchange between Lefebvre and the group 
between 1960 and 1962. Also in 1959 Lefebvre published an article in the journal Arguments, 
ruminating on the meaning of Nietzsche’s ‘death of God’.609 An early, if often forgotten 
exponent of a type of ‘Nietzcshean-Marxism’, Lefebvre wrote about the “schizoid” nature of the 
modern, alienated subject of capitalism.610 In the same article Lefebvre spoke of religion in a 
similar fashion to Marx’s criticism of philosophy and religion in 1843 and 1844. For Marx — in 
a register that Nietzsche would take up against the religious nature of secular modernity — the 
criticism of religion was the foundation of all criticism, ‘in embryo the criticism of the vale of 
tears of which the halo is religion.’611 For Marx, religion was the exemplar of a ‘separated’ 
practice, posing an impossibly ideal world in opposition to the ‘vale of tears’ which was, in fact, 
its real condition of existence. However, rather than accepting, like many of his liberal 
contemporaries, that religious ideology had been dissolved in the glare of the revolutionary 
enlightenment, Marx put forward the thesis that the ‘inverted world’ of religion had merely been 
                                                     
609 Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann, New York: Vintage Books, [1887] 
1974, thesis 125, 'The madman'. Nietzsche tells the story of a Diogenes the Cynic like character, wielding 
a lantern, who leaps about in the market place calling out ‘I seek god! I seek God!’ To the crowd which 
gathers he cries ‘Whither is god? […] I will tell you. We have killed him — you and I.’ Then the madman 
asks the crowd ‘how did we do this?’ The vertiginous abyss opens before us and we are barely aware of 
the noise of the shovels as the gravediggers bury the corpse. ‘Is not the greatness of the deed too great for 
us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it?’ (ibid., p. 181). But then the 
madman realises he has come too early. In a register redolent of Marx and in advance of the Situationists, 
he says ‘[t]his deed is more distant from them than the most distant stars — and yet they have done it 
themselves’ (ibid., p. 182). Modern ‘man’ is alienated from his very creation. Summoning Marx’s style, 
the Situationists proclaim themselves the bridge between the alienated forms of “secularised” Christianity 
and the future new ‘men’, constructors of situations.  
610 Lefebvre was influenced by his fellow Argumentiste, Joseph Gabel, who wrote about the alienated and 
reified subject of capital in such terms. Gabel 1962 work, False Consciousness, would influence Debord’s 
The Society of the Spectacle and Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus.  
611 Marx, 'Contribution to Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction [1843-44],' p. 176. 
Translation modified. The Situationists drew on Marx and Nietzsche — the latter, in particular, after 
Raoul Vaneigem joined the group in early 1961. Their theory of the ‘spectacle’ bore both Marx and 
Nietzsche’s influence (though undoubtedly more of the former than the latter). They compared the 
spectacle to Marx’s depiction of religious dualism, itself repeated after a fashion in Nietzsche’s history of 
an error. Like the critique of religion, the critique of the spectacle was the contemporary foundation of all 
criticism. The spectacle was religion “secularised”, the inverted world transformed into its material 
integument of the commodity-spectacle, in which appearance ruled over the hitherto displaced rules of 
having and being.   
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taken over in a bourgeois world which pitted the ideal state against the profane world of ‘civil 
society’ (I will return to the question of the ideological ‘inversion’ in chapter seven).612 
In a tone redolent of Marx, Lefebvre spoke of Nietzsche’s ‘death of God’ as itself a result of the 
‘completion’ of the “realm” of religion, and thus a marker of its self-destruction. ‘Only a 
finished totality can reveal that it is not a totality.’613 For Nietzsche not only was God dead, but 
the blood was on everyone’s hands — in more Nietzcshean terms, everyone was the unwitting 
modern Oedipus slaughtering one authoritarian father after another.614 In Lefebvre’s reckoning 
all of the incomplete domains of social life must be added to Nietzsche’s discovery that, ‘man 
must traverse the death of God (the sacred and accursed, good and evil, beauty and ugliness, 
etc.).’615 By Lefebvre’s lights, and in terms redolent of the Situationist criticism, Art ‘defined 
man in dazzling flashes and the human through exceptional moments [instants exceptionnel], 
alienating in their striving toward deliverance’ — which is to say that they were ‘incomplete 
totalities’.616 The Situationists agreed with Lefebvre, arguing that it correlated with their 
criticism of the ‘decomposition of culture’: 
This scheme [of Lefebvre’s], which applies rather to philosophy after Hegel, perfectly 
defines the crisis of modern art, as can be easily verified by examining an extreme 
trend: for example, poetry from Mallarmé to Surrealism.617  
Here, on the back of their criticism of the ‘classics of Marxism’ and Goldmann, the Situationists 
once again drew out the argument which would distinguish them from other ‘heretical 
Marxists’. Indeed, Lefebvre himself would explicitly take up the Situationist argument in his 
work Introduction to Modernity three years later.618 The movement of ‘self-dissolution’, posed 
                                                     
612 Cf. Marx, 'On the Jewish Question [1844].' 
613 Henri Lefebvre, 'Justice et vérité,' Arguments, no. 15 (3e trimestre 1959), p. 16. 
614 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, thesis 125, pp. 181-82. Of course one is Nietzcshean in the same way one 
is Christian, according to Nietzsche — which is to say not Nietzsche. Thus the post-Freudian 
“Nietzsches” promulgated by such as Lefebvre, Deleuze, Foucault, etc. 
615 Lefebvre, 'Justice et vérité,' p. 15. Lefebvre’s additionally lists, ‘the cosmic, the divine, the maternal, 
[…] philosophy, […] economics and its history, […] politics and the State, […] Art’ (ibid., pp. 15-16). 
616 Ibid., p. 16. 
617 I.S., 'Le sens du dépérissement de l’art,' p. 5. 
618 ‘Here are a few more lines from the same [Situationist] text: “The fundamental characteristic of 
modern spectacle is that it stages its own ruin.” Art does not die an ontological or a metaphysical death, as 
Hegel thought, and Nietzsche after him. It dies like a human being, killed by being externalized. Its death 
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by Marx as emergent in the radical philosophy of the early 19th century had reappeared in the 
movements of art throughout the 19th and into the 20th century. The most extreme experiments 
in artistic form, ‘from Mallarmé to Surrealism’, had encountered the apparent impasse of the 
dissolution of artistic expression itself.  
In their critique of Lefebvre and Goldmann, we can see the SI moving toward problematising 
the Situationist hypothesis in terms that more clearly engaged with the idea of ‘realisation and 
abolition’. Indeed, and to a limited extent, we can conceive of Lefebvre and Goldmann’s 
perspectives as recapitulating the perspectives that Marx criticised among his Young Hegelian 
confreres in the 1840s. Thus, Goldmann wanted to abolish artistic alienation, while 
misunderstanding the need to realise its destruction (i.e. he misrecognised the positive moment 
of the destruction of expression); whereas Lefebvre wanted to realise artistic expression (in its 
Surrealist guise) without understanding that such ‘expression’ was the real impediment to the 
realisation of the more radical aspects of the Surrealist project.  
The SI at this point still phrased their criticism in terms of the current absence of a revolutionary 
proletarian movement (such as existed before the late 1930s), and considered the reappearance 
of such as the real solution to the impasse of cultural decomposition. Indeed, unlike the 
approach outlined in the ‘Hamburg Theses’, the SI in 1959 still conceived of themselves in 
cultural terms, albeit negative ones, ‘encamped at the gates of culture’, but ‘not want[ing] to 
establish themselves inside’.619 In this sense, their cultural critique was still conceived as the 
accompaniment — in the ‘realm’ of cultural criticism — to a revolutionary movement not yet in 
existence. The critique of Lefebvre and Goldmann, in this instance, was an opening to a project 
that would soon eschew the early sense of the Situationist project being the specialised critique 
of culture in the context of the broader reconstitution of a revolutionary movement, and their 
turn toward an attempt to reconstitute such a movement itself.  
                                                                                                                                                           
is a social one. […] [N]ow that art has become pure spectacle, pure separation, there is just one thing left 
for it to do: disappear. It has already done so, in aestheticism.’ Henri Lefebvre, Introduction to 
Modernity: Twelve Preludes September 1959-May 1961, trans. John Moore, London: Verso, [1962] 1995, 
pp. 353-53. The lines quoted from the SI are from: Internationale Situationniste, 'Le cinema après Alain 
Resnais,' Internationale Situationniste, no. 3 (Décembre 1959). 
619 I.S., 'Le sens du dépérissement de l’art,' p. 7. 
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The New Proletariat 
It was precisely the ‘proletariat’ that is missing from the SI’s assessment of Lefebvre and 
Goldmann in 1959. Indeed, the proletariat is conceived here as an absent subject, insofar as 
there is a modern proletariat but no revolutionary proletarian movement. As noted, the SI still 
demarcated themselves into the realm of cultural criticism, albeit as a negative force whose 
positivity was the elaboration of the Situationist hypothesis. However, in their criticism of 
Goldmann, and his inability to recognise the positive moment of present artistic negativity as 
the pivot of the overcoming of artistic alienation, we can recognise an opening to the SI’s turn 
away from the further elaboration of the Situationist hypothesis as it then existed (or at least that 
element of the hypothesis focused on the criticism of cultural decomposition). 
In 1962 and 1963 the SI began to speak of a ‘new proletariat [which] tends to encompass almost 
everybody’.620 In contrast to those then contemporaneous theories which pointed to an eclipse of 
the proletarian condition in the midst of commodity abundance, the SI argued that in fact the 
proletarian condition was being extended and intensified. Thus the growing commodity 
abundance was in itself deceptive, being rather a marker of a ‘new poverty’ which included the 
apparent amelioration of the old, material poverty.621 The SI saw the lineaments of the ‘new 
poverty’ at the point where the manufactured ‘needs’ of the new commodity abundance met the 
extension of the proletarian condition; which is to say that condition which finds all ‘the people 
who have no possibility of modifying the social space-time that society allots to them to 
consume’.622 The desires of proletarians did not match the needs manufactured for them, not 
because they were false needs as such but rather because they were falsified to the extent the 
proletarians had no real control over their determination. Indeed, the falsification of needs in 
this sense was founded on what capitalism proclaimed as the primary “unquestioned” need — 
                                                     
620 I.S., 'Les mauvais jours finiront,' p. 13. 
621 Ibid., p. 16. It is worth noting that the SI did not believe that material poverty had been done away 
with by modern bureaucratic capitalism. Instead they argued against the orthodox Marxism which still 
placed the struggle against material poverty at the centre of their programme, even in situations like 
France in the 1950s and 60s which witnessed a substantial amelioration of the material poverty hitherto 
experienced by large sections of the working class. Moreover, the SI wanted to focus on the patent 
possibilities for a different life which was hidden or sublimated in the burgeoning commodity-spectacle 
of the advanced industrial nations in the post-war world. 
622 I.S. [Vaneigem], 'Domination de la nature, idéologies et classes,' p. 13. 
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the apparent need to labour for a wage in order to continue to secure the material bounty on 
offer.  
The ‘new poverty’ the SI proposed as the complement to, and expression of the alienation of the 
‘new proletariat’ constituted a type of ‘immiseration’ theory; however, unlike the orthodox 
Marxist conception of poverty or immiseration, the ‘new poverty’ of the contemporary 
proletariat referred clearly to the domination of the commodity-object rather than material 
poverty in the vulgar sense. Indeed, such ‘new poverty’ for the SI, constituted both a critique of 
Marxist orthodoxy and, amongst their general recovery of Marx’s radical critique, a recovery of 
the more general sense of poverty in his alienation theory. No doubt Marx emphasised material 
impoverishment in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts. Labour produces ‘wonderful 
things for the rich’, such as ‘palaces’ and ‘beauty’; whereas for the worker it produces the 
‘privation’ of ‘hovels’ and ‘deformity’.623 But in his argument Marx emphasised the objective 
nature of this impoverishment, i.e. that the ‘the worker is related to the product of his labour as 
to an alien object.’624 More than the material impoverishment of the worker, it is precisely the 
alienated objectivity of the product of labour, and crucially of the labour process itself, that is 
the cause of such impoverishment. In this sense, the material privation of the worker is a 
dependent variable; its inverse relation to the material wealth of capitalism is a ‘fact [which] 
expresses merely […] labour’s product […] as something alien, as a power independent of the 
producer.’625 Thus it is the form which productive activity is reduced to, the reduction of the 
worker herself to the status of a commodity-object, and the results of this formal reduction — 
the object-world of commodities — which determine the nature of the privation. However, 
despite the attention that Marx pays to the reality of material privation in the lives of workers in 
Western Europe in the 1840s he did not conceive of such impoverishment either necessarily or 
exclusively material. The impoverishment is of the whole person, as much material as it is 
spiritual: ‘the more powerful becomes the alien world of objects which he creates over and 
                                                     
623 Marx, 'Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,' p. 273. 
624 Ibid., p. 272. 
625 Ibid. 
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against himself, the poorer he himself — his inner world — becomes’.626 Certainly the poverty 
of ‘his inner world’ is related to the poverty of her outer world; but Marx’s broader point was 
that under conditions which reduce productive activity to labour for capital, and the products of 
labour to commodities alienated from their producers, the ‘inner world’ is necessarily 
impoverished in a world in which labour produces an ‘alien world of objects’. It is ‘[t]he 
devaluation of the world of men’ and thus of the possibilities of generic humanity that is 
enacted ‘in direct proportion to the increasing value of the world of things.’627 
I cite Marx in detail, to demonstrate that the Situationists sense of the ‘new poverty’ is of a 
piece with Debord’s critique of Marxism by recovery of Marx. Nonetheless, the poverty of the 
‘new proletariat’ was ‘new’ precisely because the poverty of their everyday life was posited on 
the basis of implied accessibility to the new commodity abundance of contemporary capitalism 
— implied, that is, in the spectacle of commodity abundance. At the same time that the SI were 
outlining this criticism, Cornelius Castoriadis was continuing his argument against Marxism by 
asserting that the material immiseration that what an essential moment of Marx’s theory was 
another reason to reject not only Marxism, but Marx as well. Needless to say, the SI rejected 
this perspective; and even Castoriadis would come to admit, in part, that he had fudged his 
Marx scholarship in this regard (I will return to Castoriadis in the next chapter).  
Perhaps the most interesting if often overlooked aspects of their theorisation of this ‘new 
proletariat’, was with regard to the development of what the SI called a ‘revolutionary 
intelligentsia’.628 The concomitant of the development of a ‘new proletariat’, the ‘revolutionary 
intelligentsia’ was also the result of the proletarianisation of the intellectual in contemporary 
capitalist society. Here we begin to approach the real difference between Marx’s milieu of the 
1840s and the milieu of the SI in the early 1960s. For the SI one of the clear markers of the 
‘new proletariat’ was what they saw as the progressive ‘proletarianisation’ of previously non-
proletarian sectors of production and consumption. They argued that intellectuals as a social 
layer were being subjected to such a proletarianisation. Indeed, this process was leading to an 
                                                     
626 Ibid. My emphasis. 
627 Iibid. 
628 I.S. [Vaneigem], 'Domination de la nature, idéologies et classes,' p. 9. 
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internal differentiation brought on by the process of proletarianisation, one which divided 
intellectuals progressively into those submissive to their new role and those broadly in 
opposition to it. They spoke of ‘specialised intellectuals’ and ‘the growing mass of “intellectual 
workers” whose conditions of work and life’ were becoming largely indistinguishable from 
other wage labourers.629 For the SI what marked out the latter from the former was the extent to 
which they rejected their allotted role as a specialised intellectual for the commodity-spectacle. 
They compared them to the ‘delinquents’ and ‘lumpens’ among the working classes actively 
refusing their role as wage labourers for capital.630 Perhaps most importantly the SI argued that 
among those intellectuals who recognised the ‘new’, proletarian conditions of their intellectual 
labour emerged ‘critics and saboteurs […] of consumer capitalism’ who clearly ‘refuse the 
conditions of individual competition, and thus of servility’.631  
The SI saw the potential for a ‘revolutionary intelligentsia’ to emerge from this 
proletarianisation and internal differentiation. They were at pains to argue that such a ‘layer’ did 
not constitute an ‘intellectual party’ apart, but rather a moment of the development of a 
revolutionary proletarian class itself.632 In words redolent of the early Marx they wrote of this 
radicalising layer as a moment of a general mass ‘which look for their theory’.633 The search for 
a theory adequate to the criticism of modern capitalism was, at the same time, the refusal to 
labour for capital — or at least the movement toward an active resistance to wage labour and the 
                                                     
629 Ibid. 
630 Ibid. Note that the SI used the term ‘lumpen’ to characterise those consciously refusing wage labour, 
most likely derived from its pejorative English use. However the term ‘lumpenproletariat’ was used by 
Marx and Engels to typify ‘[t]he “dangerous class”, the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown 
off by the lowest layers of old society may’ who  they believed might join the revolutionary movement 
but were more likely to be  ‘a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue’ — Marx and Engels, 'The German 
Ideology [1845],' p. 494. The SI’s use of ‘lumpen’ was a détournement of this pejorative sense, indeed a 
pointed rejection of its pejorative sense and a valorisation of the abolition of wage labour as the 
foundation of a revolutionary perspective.  
631 I.S. [Vaneigem], 'Domination de la nature, idéologies et classes,' p. 9. Indeed the SI recognised the 
milieu from which they originated as an exemplar of this emergent critical practice, in which ‘the 
movement of modern art can be considered as a permanent deskilling [déqualification] of the intellectual 
labour power of the creators’— ibid. 
632 The SI made the practical criticism of the role of the specialised intellectual the sine qua non of a 
potential revolutionary intelligentsia. Thus, they sometimes spoke of such an ‘authorised intelligentsia’ as 
effectively constituting a party apart on terms set by capitalism, ‘in the final analyse satisfied [with their 
positon], or even satisfied with mediocre literary expression of their dissatisfaction’. To the extent that 
some of these ‘authorised’ ones kept the expression of their dissatisfaction strictly within the realm of 
‘literature’ was the extent to which they constituted the ‘social sector most spontaneously anti-
situationist’ — ibid., p. 10.  
633 Ibid. 
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proselytization of such a revolutionary perspective. The SI of course eschewed the orthodox 
view of liberation from wage labour being fought through the eye of the needle of wage labour 
itself—i.e. as the largely mysterious and even mystical relationship posed by many orthodox 
Marxists between the struggle over the wage and the rate of exploitation, and the possibility of 
the ‘abolition of the wages system’ altogether.634 The real contradiction in ‘the new world we 
must comprehend’ was that between ‘those material powers which are multiplied without 
[being] used, and those spontaneous acts of contestation lived by people without a 
[revolutionary] perspective’.635  
However, what marked this perspective out as distinctive, particularly when we set it against the 
SI’s détournement of Marx and his notion of ‘realisation and abolition’ of philosophy and the 
proletariat, was precisely the idea of the proletarianisation of the intelligentsia. In Marx’s early 
conception the intelligentsia were firmly outside of the emergent proletariat. Marx conceived of 
himself and other radical intellectuals as the potential ‘head’ of a process of which a 
revolutionary proletariat constituted the ‘heart’.636 For Marx the practical surpassing of 
philosophy would be made possible by a revolutionary self-abolition of the proletariat, the 
impasse of the purely theoretical surpassing of the former project announcing the necessity of 
its transformation into the latter. From the perspective of the Situationists and France in the 
early 1960s, the intelligentsia had been largely subsumed by the proletarian condition, a 
“victim” of the voracious appetite of the commodity-form and the needs of capital. Whereas 
Marx and Engels had spoken of ‘a portion of the bourgeois ideologists’ going over to the 
proletariat (in effect declaring their own “treason”), in a world more thoroughly submitted to 
commodity production the privileged position of the intellectual was increasingly subject to its 
corrosive effects.637  
                                                     
634 Karl Marx, 'Value, Price and Profit [1865],' in Marx Engels Collected Works Vol. 20, London: 
Lawrence & Wishart, 1985, p. 149. 
635 I.S. [Vaneigem],'Domination de la nature, idéologies et classes,' p. 9. 
636 ‘The head of this emancipation is philosophy, its heart is the proletariat.’ Marx, 'Contribution to 
Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction [1843-44],' p. 187. 
637 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, 'Manifesto of the Communist Party [1848],' in Karl Marx & 
Frederich Engels Collected Works, Vol.6, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1976, p. 494. 
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Thus, for the SI, the movement of the ‘surpassing of art’, of the ‘realisation and abolition’ of art, 
is not the mere parallel of Marx’s criticism of philosophy or accidentally associated with the 
project of proletarian self-abolition. Rather it was the result of a functionally identical process. 
In the case of philosophy Lefebvre had argued that its ‘surpassing’ was posed by Marx insofar 
as philosophy itself was posed as a ‘completed totality’ in the wake of German idealism, and 
thus necessarily a false totality.638 More pointedly Marx also saw this as the result of the 
alienated development of philosophy, which had reached a paroxysm of development in the 
Hegelian philosophy which recognised the self-transformations of history in a merely 
speculative fashion.639  For the SI the emergence of the perspective of self-destruction in the arts 
was to be found in the history the arts shared with philosophy and the emergence of the 
proletarian movements from the French Revolution and its aftermath.640 To the extent that 
philosophy and the incipient proletarian movement posed their surpassing in the first half of the 
19th century was proof only of their relative advancement over the arts.641 Nonetheless on the 
basis of the large scale recuperation of the intelligentsia, both in terms of its submission to the 
rule of the commodity-form and the recuperation of the explicitly posed surpassing and self-
destruction of its most advanced expressions (of philosophy and of the arts) the SI proposed the 
reappearance of a revolutionary movement from the ruins of modern art.  
It is thus that starting out from modern art — from poetry — from its supersession 
[dépassement], from what modern art looked for and promised, starting out from the 
clean sweep of the values and rules of everyday behaviour that it has already made, we 
will now see reappear the revolutionary theory which emerged in the first half of the 
                                                     
638 Lefebvre, 'Justice et vérité,' p. 16. 
639 One can see here that the proposition of classical political economy, namely Adam Smith’s and David 
Ricardo’s recognition of ‘labour’ as the ultimate source of wealth, as akin to the false ‘completed totality’ 
of which Lefebvre spoke. 
640 The best description of this is to be found in Martos, Histoire de l'internationale situationniste, pp. 83-
100. 
641 Though the J.-F. Martos has noted that Hölderlin already posed something akin to the SI’s 
dépassement de l’art in his work Hyperion (1797/99), not to mention Hegel’s own dabbling with such 
notions when a student alongside of Hölderlin. Nonetheless such imagined projects were isolated in 
regards to the more generalised appearance of self-destruction as an explicit theme of the artistic avant-
gardes in the early 20th century. Cf. Ibid., pp. 85-88. 
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19th century from philosophy (from the critical reflection upon philosophy and from the 
crisis and death of philosophy).642 
The negative dimension of such a project was, perforce, inimical to the idea of a positively 
constituted ‘intellectual party’, or even a class of ‘professional revolutionary’ intellectuals, 
beloved of Marxist orthodoxy. Indeed, for the SI it was precisely the tendency to abandon or 
obscure the self-destructive nature of the revolutionary project that had led to the defeat or 
recuperation of the revolutionary contestation of 1917-37 (particularly in the form of the 
‘Bolshevisation’ of the international revolutionary labour movement at this time). Indeed, the 
reappearance of conscious self-destruction in the artistic avant-gardes contemporaneous with the 
revolutionary era of 1917-37 was for the SI both the necessary corrective for the failings of the 
positive constitution of the labour movement, and the basis upon which the negative criticism of 
the early Marx could be rediscovered in the present. It is to the latter that I will now turn. 
In order to better understand the transformation of the Situationist hypothesis from a critique 
‘encamped at the gates of culture’, to one in which it was posed as the end immanent to a 
revolutionary movement that was already in formation, we need to examine Marx’s critical 
appropriation of philosophy, and his turn to identifying the ‘proletariat’ as the subject capable of 
‘realising and abolishing philosophy’. Indeed, such an examination is not made in order to 
merely contrast Marx and the SI, but rather draw attention to what Debord, Vaneigem and 
others saw as the functional equivalence of the problems faced by the SI and Marx. In the case 
of the SI, we can say that the struggle over the ‘realisation and abolition of art’ was perhaps the 
key thread of the argument over art, and the debate between Debord and Constant. In this sense, 
Constant pitted his conception of the abolition of art against Asger Jorn’s notion of art’s 
realisation, in the figure of the ‘free artist’. Debord, via this debate, and his later engagement 
with Marx, came to embody a perspective similar to the latter’s: i.e. for the supersession of art 
through its realisation and abolition. Let us now turn to an examination of Marx’s argument 
apropos this subject.  
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Marx and Hegel’s political philosophy 
If the publication of the 1844 Introduction and On the Jewish Question in the Deutsch-
Französische Jahrbücher can be considered the departure point for Marx’s development of a 
distinctive body of ideas sometimes known as ‘Marxism’, it was his experiences in the year 
before that provided the context and content for these works. 
At the beginning of 1843 Marx was the editor of the Rheinische Zeitung, a journal of avowedly 
democratic mien, and one of the mouthpieces of the philosophical radicalism of ‘Young 
Hegelianism’. Over the previous two years this milieu of mostly young philosophers had turned 
their attention to political questions.643 In opposition to their avowed master the Young 
Hegelians rejected the idea that the Prussian state was the perfect embodiment of the spirit of 
history and thus the perfect resolution of the contending interests in society. In a Europe in 
which the French Revolution of 1789 cast a long shadow alongside of the stunning 
transformations signalled by the English and the Scots through industrialisation, the Young 
Hegelians saw their ‘nation’ as hopelessly backward, mired in the muck of an absolutist 
autocracy.644 Nonetheless their image of the ideal state was decidedly Hegelian, which is to say 
that the state was the perceived solution to the conflicts of social particularities. 
Hounded out of the state university system because of their atheistic philosophical radicalism 
the Young Hegelians turned to journalism in order to espouse their ideas. Established in early 
1842, the Rheinische Zeitung had an uneasy relationship to the Prussian state and even the local 
Rheinish bourgeois who effectively funded it. By October 1842 Marx had become editor and 
under his editorship the journal’s popularity grew. However, Marx’s writing in particular fell 
afoul of the Prussian censor and in March 1843 the Rheinische Zeitung was forcibly closed. In a 
                                                     
643 David McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, London: Macmillan & co. Ltd., 1969, p. 25. 
Much of the particular historical detail of the following is taken from this work, as well as McLellan’s 
Marx Before Marxism, London: Macmillan & co. Ltd., 1970. 
644 Note that the German nation-state did not come into existence until 1871. The largest single state of 
the German states in the 1840s was the Kingdom of Prussian. A German state was a demand of all 
political liberals, after the model of the French Revolution. 
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letter to his friend Arnold Ruge Marx wryly quipped ‘[t]he Government have given back my 
liberty.’645 
Under the impact of such censorship, and the patently worsening attitude of the Prussian state to 
criticism, Marx re-thought his relationship to the philosophy of the state the Young Hegelians 
had inherited. Over the summer of 1843 Marx used his liberty to finally marry Jenny von 
Westphalen and develop a critique of Hegel’s philosophy of the state. Years later he wrote 
‘[m]y inquiry led me to the conclusion that neither legal relations nor political forms could be 
comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a so-called general development of the 
human mind’.646  
In Hegel’s schema, the liberal state represented the universal mediation of particular and 
individual interests. Above the ‘civil society’ of public and private interests there arose a state, 
the ‘realm’ of universal ‘political’ life. For Hegel, such a ‘liberal state’ was the goal of world 
history in which the particular interests of individuals can finally be resolved and sublimated; 
which is to say at the level of the universal state the particularities are ‘abolished’. However, for 
Hegel such ‘abolition’ is ideal; the particularities of civil society remain, conserved, ‘realised’ 
and mediated by their resolution at the level of the universal state.  
In contrast Marx rejected the idea of the state as the outcome of the movement of the soul or 
‘Spirit’ of world history. He believed that the universal perspective was simply the work of 
history as opposed to the work of the Spirit’s journey through successive phases of self-
alienation, ‘moving towards a meeting with itself in time’.647 To détourn Hegel’s language, the 
possibility of universal ‘Spirit’ is produced through social conflict and the particular 
‘resolutions’ which result. It is not their presupposition, nor the unwitting result of the ruse of 
history. Rather the modern political states which emerged from the anti-Feudal struggles led by 
the rising capitalist class instantiated bourgeois particularism as their image of political 
universality. Thus, the claims of their defenders — Hegel included — that such states stand 
                                                     
645 Karl Marx, 'Letter to Arnold Ruge, 25 January 1843,' in Marx Engels Collected Works Volume 1, 
London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975, p. 397. 
646 Marx, 'Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy [1859],' p. 262. 
647 Debord, La Société du Spectacle, thesis 80. 
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above the conflicts and private interests of ‘civil society’ are simply false. For Marx, such states 
are clearly bourgeois states, in which the bourgeois worldview was projected into the political 
firmament. 
For Marx, the political state was the resolution of neither the particularities of civil society, nor 
the solution to the ‘politicisation’ of the religious Feudal states but rather the practical 
separation of political and civil life (and indeed is founded on such a separation). ‘Political 
emancipation was at the same time the emancipation of civil society from politics, from even 
the appearance of a universal content.’648 In the bourgeois state, political life is sundered from 
civil life; it is set outside and against it, extruded as it were, leaving ‘unpolitical’ civil life as the 
apparent ‘natural’ core of human life and practice. And so, the peculiar myth of the bourgeois 
epoch takes on the trappings of a universal truth. The social individual is reduced to ‘egotistical 
man’ — the calculating, selfish individual of civil society whose only alleviation comes through 
the mediation of the political state, completely ‘exterior’ to the purported nature of ‘man’.649  
And yet as Marx points out in his examination of the ‘rights of man and citizen’ in the French 
Revolution, it is precisely the idealised ‘egotistical man’ which is the truth of the universal 
citizen. The universal ‘rights’ of liberty, equality and security are the rights of an idealised 
bourgeois, whose freedom ‘is the right of man to private property’, whose equality is to be 
considered ‘a self-sufficient monad’, and whose security is ‘the concept of police’.650 Marx thus 
derided the illusory universality of the bourgeois political state, in which society only appears as 
an exterior constraint upon the ‘naturally’ self-interested monad, and in which ‘political life 
                                                     
648 Marx, 'On the Jewish Question [1844],' p. 233. Riffing on Marx’s arguments Raoul Vaneigem argued 
out that the ‘pulverisation’ of the feudal pyramid left ‘the shadow of the divine hierarchy’ in the 
bourgeois conception of the ideal ‘man’ in which a ‘myriad of diminutive beings each, each seemingly 
absolute: little “citizens” set in motion by the process of social atomisation’. Cf. Vaneigem, The 
Revolution of Everyday Life, p. 74. 
649 Strictly speaking this accords more fully with political-economic assertions regarding the nature of 
‘man’ than that of Hegel, who conceived of the particular interests finding reconciliation in the rational 
universalism of the state, itself the product of the self-development of ‘mind’. Nonetheless Hegel’s 
conception of civil society was at one with the emergence of political-economic accounts in the 18th 
century. 
650 Marx, 'On the Jewish Question [1844],' pp. 229, 230. 
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declares itself to be a mere means whose goal is the life’ of this apparently selfish ‘civil 
society.’651 
Looking back on his early work almost thirty years later Marx wrote that his dialectical method 
was ‘not only different from the Hegelian, but exactly opposite to it.’652 However he argued that 
despite Hegel’s idealistic failings he openly avowed himself ‘the pupil of that mighty 
thinker’.653 Indeed the main problem with Hegel’s dialectic was that it was mystified by such 
ideas as the ‘world spirit’ and thus needed only to be ‘inverted, in order to discover the rational 
kernel within the mystical shell.’654  In contradistinction, in its ‘rational form’, in which its 
idealism was not merely stripped but negated through a critical inversion, the dialectic ‘was a 
scandal and an abomination to the bourgeoisie and its doctrinaire spokesmen, because it 
includes in its positive understanding of what exists a simultaneous recognition of its negation, 
its inevitable destruction.’655 It was a scandal simply because it called into question the 
bourgeois conception of ‘egotistical man’ as the revealed truth of human nature. Thus, Marx 
presented something much more radical than Hegel’s ideal sublimation of the particular in the 
supposed universal political state; he argued that the realisation of the universal claims of the 
bourgeoisie could only be carried out through the negation of bourgeois particularity — in both 
its ‘political’ and ‘civil’ forms. For the young Marx of 1843 the main failing of his Young 
Hegelian comrades was precisely in following Hegel’s mystical dialectic. 
Even when they criticised Hegel’s belief that the Prussian state was the manifestation of his 
ideal state, what they found lacking was not Hegel’s idea but rather the reality of the Prussian 
state. Behind the veil of state universality lay the particular interests of the Prussian monarchy 
and aristocracy. Marx agreed. However, Hegel’s idea of a universal state was a phantasm; it did 
not exist and it could never be brought into existence. In Marx’s view, the Prussian state, or any 
state for that matter, was the vehicle through which a particular class imposed its perspective as 
the universal perspective — its weltanschauung passed off as human nature.  
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The Young Hegelian desire to finally bring into being the true universal state theorised by Hegel 
was empty. For Marx, the future of the Prussian state could already be made out in the present 
of France and Britain; here he saw the particularity of the bourgeois worldview transformed into 
the alleged ‘universality’ of the bourgeois state. Here was the real limit of Young Hegelian 
radicalism; in effect their call for a truly liberal state was merely the call for the elevation of the 
bourgeois worldview to the level of state ‘universality’. The question now for Marx was how to 
do away with the separation of political and civil life grounded in the particularities of class. 
The realisation and suppression of philosophy 
In the 1844 Introduction Marx presented his Young Hegelian milieu as the avant-garde of 
German society. However, there was a great deal of irony in his presentation. In a German 
society that was backward in its civil and political life, the ‘dream history’ of philosophy was its 
only advanced element.656 And such an advanced element was in reality only theoretically at a 
level already practically achieved by the bourgeoisies of France and Britain — i.e. the elevation 
of their particularity to the ‘universality’ of the state. Thus, Marx goes on to examine the partial 
critique of the two ‘sides’ of the Young Hegelians, what he calls respectively the ‘practical’ and 
‘theoretical’ parties. Of the former he argued that they tried to abolish philosophy without 
realising it; of the latter, he argued that they tried to realise philosophy without suppressing it. 
By 1844 the point for Marx was to realise philosophy and abolish it; abolish it, that is, as an 
activity apart from other activities of everyday life; as an activity that merely reflects upon the 
state of the world rather than engages in its practical creation and transformation. As he would 
later put it, perhaps more pithily and famously: ‘[t]he philosophers have only interpreted the 
world in various ways; the point is to change it.’657 
                                                     
656 ‘German philosophy of law and state is the only German history which is al pari [on par] with the 
official modern reality. The German nation must therefore take into account not only its present 
conditions but also its dream-history, and subject to criticism not only these existing conditions but at the 
same time their abstract continuation.’ Marx, 'Contribution to Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. 
Introduction [1843-44],' p. 180. For more on Marx and ‘dream history’ cf. David Leopold, The Young 
Karl Marx: German Philosophy, Modern Politics, and Human Flourishing, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007, pp. 26-34. 
657 Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach [1845],' p. 5. 
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Of the ‘practical party’, most often associated with Ludwig Feuerbach, Marx argued that its 
demand for ‘the negation of philosophy’ did not go far enough. Correctly understanding that the 
Hegelian political philosophy was merely the ideal projection of a ‘solution’ on the basis of the 
real conflicts and divisions of earthly reality, Feuerbach et al. misconceived speculative 
philosophy as mere illusion rather than as a practice itself mired in the sensuous conflicts of 
everyday life. Indeed the “practical” component of their demand — ‘turning its back on 
philosophy and with averted face muttering a few trite and angry phrases about it’ — tended to 
be as abstract as its charge against speculative philosophy.658   
You demand that real living germs be made the starting point but you forget that the 
real living germ of the German nation has grown so far only inside its cranium. In a 
word – You cannot supersede philosophy without making it a reality.659 
For Marx, speculative claims about the German nation nonetheless ‘existed’ as moments and 
expressions of actual social conflicts — even and especially such a thing as the ‘German nation’ 
did not exist at that point in history. To ignore them, or pretend that they were illusory was not 
to embrace a practical position but rather to resile from the real conflicts fitfully expressed in 
such ideal formulas.   
Of the ‘theoretical party’, most often associated with Bruno Bauer’s circle, Marx wrote that it 
had achieved a similar perspective to the practical party, ‘but with the factors reversed’.660 The 
theoretical party pictured the present struggle against Prussian absolutism as an exclusively 
philosophical one:  
These Berliners [Bauer’s ‘Die Freien’ circle] do not regard themselves as men who 
criticise, but as critics who, incidentally, have the misfortune of being men. They 
therefore acknowledge only one real need, the need of theoretical criticism. People like 
Proudhon are therefore accused of having made some “practical” “need” their point of 
departure. […] This criticism thus regards itself as the only active element in history. It 
                                                     
658 Marx, 'Contribution to Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction [1843-44],' p. 180. 
659 Ibid., pp. 180-81. 
660 Ibid., p. 181. 
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is confronted by the whole of humanity as a mass, an inert mass, which has value only 
as the antithesis of intellect.661 
In contrast to the idealisation of sensuous reality contra abstraction on the part of the practical 
party, the theoretical party emphasised abstraction at the cost of sensuality. Nonetheless it 
shared the mistake of the practical party, effectively bracketing philosophy itself as a part of the 
world, and thus equally in need of criticism. Indeed, Marx’s point is precisely the one that I 
surveyed above, that the disparity between the actual Prussian state and the ideal state of the 
theoretical wing of Young Hegelianism were both grounded in the real particularities and 
conflicts of German society; the ideal state was inevitably the state of particular class, whether 
‘ancient’ (i.e. the monarchy) or ‘future’ (the bourgeoisie). Perhaps worse for both sides of 
Young Hegelianism was the fact that the ‘dream history’ of Germany had been surpassed, 
fitfully realised ‘beyond the Rhine’ in France and Britain. Indeed, in this fitful reality the truth 
of Hegel’s universalism was revealed in all of its stark reality: the rise to political supremacy of 
the bourgeoisie.   
Practice and the proletariat 
Crucial to Marx’s argument against the so-called ‘practical’ and ‘theoretical’ wings of Young 
Hegelianism, was the symmetry of their apparent opposition. He demonstrates this by showing 
their shared belief regarding the exceptional nature of philosophy; the former to deny its 
significance, the latter to hail its singular importance. Both in effect made of philosophy 
something otherworldly and beyond criticism, either to be embraced as an absolute value or 
utterly rejected as pointless. In contrast to these perspectives, and as the attempted dialectical 
synthesis of their partial perspectives, Marx’s argument was that philosophical critique can be 
made practical to the extent that it is at once the criticism of the world and a part of the world so 
criticised. Thus, Marx posed the practical criticism of the world as also the sublimation of 
                                                     
661 Karl Marx, 'Letter to Ludwig Feuerbach, 11 August 1844,' in Marx Engels Collected Works Volume 3, 
London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975, p. 356. Marx would make a related criticism against Feuerbach, 
charging him with elaborating a contemplative, ‘objective’ materialism. Cf. Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach 
[1845].'  
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philosophical critique as practical criticism; philosophy is at once realised as a crucial moment 
of practical criticism and abolished as ideal criticism.   
It is important to recall this in opposition to those Marxists that believe Marx suggested 
philosophy was outdated or to be replaced by a positivistic science.662 They do well to 
remember that even when Marx contrasted his ‘practical critical activity’ with philosophers who 
only ‘interpret the world’ instead of changing it, philosophy nonetheless remains as a 
transformed moment of ‘practical critical activity.’663 Indeed Marx posed his critique of the two 
parties of Young Hegelianism as providing the grounds for the solution to the quandary of 
philosophy’s role: ‘the criticism of speculative philosophy of right [i.e. Hegel’s political 
philosophy] strays, not into itself, but into problems which there is only one means of solving 
— practice.’664  Marx proceeds along two lines from this point. First, he considers what it 
means to pose the realisation and suppression of philosophy as a practical question. Secondly, 
he looks around contemporary German society for an agent of such practice, eventually finding 
the ‘proletariat’. 
Marx’s critique of the two wings of Young Hegelianism locates their solution in practice; this 
solution is drawn from the insufficiency of the two wings themselves. The ‘practical’ wing 
locates practice as something outside or beyond philosophy’s grasp; the ‘theoretical’ wing 
locates philosophy itself as the preeminent practice which reality must be adjusted to. Both 
views mistake the potential role of philosophical thought as a moment of critical practice, at 
once reflective of and shaping reality: 
The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism of the weapon, material 
force must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force as 
soon as it has gripped the masses. Theory is capable of gripping the masses as soon as it 
                                                     
662 Indeed, we can compare the ‘orthodox’ Marxist hostility to philosophy to the ‘practical party’ of 
Young Hegelianism whose mistake is to ignore philosophy or pretend that it is merely an ‘ideal’ activity 
with no real-world import.  
663 ‘Practical critical activity’ is the term Marx uses to describe precisely his notion of the ‘realisation and 
suppression of philosophy’ contra Feuerbach’s ‘passive’ materialist philosophy in Marx, 'Theses on 
Feuerbach [1845],' pp. 3-5. 
664 Marx, 'Contribution to Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction [1843-44],' p. 181. 
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demonstrates ad hominem [to the person], and it demonstrates ad hominem [to the 
person] as soon as it becomes radical. To be radical is to grasp the root of the matter. 
But, for man, the root is man himself.665 
Marx poses the idea of a ‘radical revolution’ to ‘the partial, the merely political revolution’.666 
To be radical, ‘to grasp the root of the matter’ is opposed to what I considered earlier as the 
particularity of the bourgeois world view and its aspirations to universality. However, if the 
philosophy is neither to be abolished by disenchanted philosophers, nor realised by philosophers 
par excellence, how exactly will it be ‘realised and abolished’? 
[…] [R]evolutions require a passive element, a material basis. Theory can be realised in 
a people only insofar as it is the realisation of the needs of that people. […] Will the 
theoretical needs be immediate practical needs? It is not enough for thought to strive for 
realisation, reality must itself strive towards thought.667 
We do well to remember that Marx is talking about Germany in the mid-1840s. We should 
remind ourselves of this when we consider the specificity of the dispute within the largely 
German Young Hegelian movement; as too we should remember the specifically German 
problems Marx wrestles with in regard to the possibility and desirability of revolution in the 
German states.  
Nonetheless, Marx is always at pains to contextualise German problems, particular with regard 
to the then present reality of Britain and France. In particular, he compares the German 
bourgeoisie unfavourably to the revolutionary bourgeoisies of France and Britain. And it is 
precisely the shortcomings of the German bourgeoisie that propels Marx to consider the 
possibility of a ‘radical revolution’ as opposed to a narrow, particularistic, bourgeois political 
revolution as the solution to the problems that assail German society both theoretical and 
                                                     
665 Ibid., p. 182. 
666 Ibid., pp. 183, 184. 
667 Ibid., p. 183. Note that Marx’s use of ‘passive’ here is not an attribution of ‘passivity’ to the material 
base, but rather an analogical description of materiality in the sense of the ‘material basis’ allowing 
philosophy to be realised. Thus, he continued ‘[t]heory can be realised in a people only insofar as it is the 
realisation of the needs of that people.’ 
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practical.668 Indeed, the nub of his argument  — the role of philosophy in such a ‘radical 
revolution’ — is not only important for its time and place, but perhaps even more so for the 
reconfiguration of the Situationist project and ‘modern’ revolution. 
The negative being of the proletariat  
By Marx’s lights the German bourgeoisie, unlike their French confreres in 1789, were simply 
not up to the challenge of posing themselves as the representatives of the universally wronged. 
The general project of emancipation, whose banner the French bourgeoisie draped themselves in 
and through which they successfully united the mass of French society behind them, was simply 
not an option for the German bourgeoisie.  
The German bourgeoisie, for Marx, was not the class through which ‘reality […] itself strive[s] 
towards thought’. Unlike the bourgeoisie of France in the late 18th century they were only 
universal in their narrowness. Marx cast them as ‘the general representative of the philistine 
mediocrity of all the other classes’ of German society, buried in their real and imagined disputes 
with the German state, its bureaucrats and monarchy, and incapable of ‘that revolutionary 
audacity which flings at the adversary the defiant words: I am nothing and should be 
everything.’669 Meanwhile the modern world has already begun to develop the very industrial 
relations that will supersede the real and imagined particularistic struggles of the German 
bourgeoisie. And in such a development the lineaments of a new class emerged, 
[…] a class with radical chains, a class of civil society which is not a class of civil 
society, an estate which is the dissolution of all estates, a sphere which has a universal 
character by its universal suffering and claims no particular right because no particular 
wrong but wrong generally is perpetuated against it; which can no longer invoke 
                                                     
668 Which is not to say there would be no political dimension to such a universal, social revolution, but 
rather that such a ‘dimension’ would be liable to change and negation. ‘Every revolution dissolves the old 
society and to that extent it is social. Every revolution overthrows the old power and to that extent it is 
political. […] [W]hereas a social revolution with a political soul is a paraphrase or nonsense, a political 
revolution with a social soul has a rational meaning. Revolution in general — the overthrow of the 
existing power and dissolution of the old relationships — is a political act. But socialism cannot be 
realised without revolution. It needs this political act insofar as it needs destruction and dissolution. But 
where its organising activity begins, where its proper object, its soul, comes to the fore — there socialism 
throws off the political cloak.’ Marx, 'Critical Marginal Notes on the Article "The King of Prussia and 
Social Reform. By a Prussian" [1844],' pp. 205, 206. 
669 Marx, 'Contribution to Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction [1843-44],' p. 185. 
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a historical but only a human title; […] a sphere, finally, which cannot emancipate itself 
without emancipating itself from all other spheres of society and thereby emancipating 
all other spheres of society, which, in a word, is the complete loss of man and hence can 
win itself only through the complete re-winning of man. This dissolution of society as a 
particular estate is the proletariat.670 
Marx speaks of the proletariat as ‘the artificially impoverished’ result of the development of 
modern capitalist industry, and thus a marker of the ‘dissolution of society’ rather than its 
positive (re)constitution — as, say, the burghers and bourgeoisie were in late Feudal society.671  
It is this ‘negative being’ of the proletariat that marks it as the materialisation of the realisation 
and suppression of philosophy. The ‘secret of its own existence’ is precisely the proletariat as 
the dissolution of society: 
By demanding the negation of private property, the proletariat merely raises to the rank 
of a principle of society what society has made the principle of the proletariat, what, 
without its own co-operation, is already incorporated in it as the negative result of 
society.672 
The proletariat is not merely posed as the revolutionary subject of a ‘radical revolution’ in the 
absence of a revolutionary bourgeoisie; rather the proletariat is the solution to the mystery of 
social development, particularly its own development as the ‘negative being’ of bourgeois 
property and industry.  
Here we approach an analogous situation to philosophy as posed by Marx; i.e. that the contrary 
developments of Young Hegelianism as the most advanced thought (and practice) of Germany 
immanently posed its own solution precisely through its contradictory developments. Thus, 
philosophy finds its solution in the proletariat as much as the proletariat finds its solution in 
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philosophy: ‘As philosophy finds its material weapons in the proletariat, so the proletariat finds 
its spiritual weapons in philosophy.’673  
Marx also poses this by way of a bodily metaphor: ‘The head of this emancipation is 
philosophy, its heart is the proletariat.’ However, such an ‘alliance’ is hardly the stuff of 
positive constitution; the confluence of Young Hegelianism and the German proletariat is the 
negation and transcendence of both; it is the realisation and abolition of the proletariat and 
philosophy. Thus ‘[p]hilosophy cannot be made a reality without the abolition of the proletariat, 
the proletariat cannot be abolished without philosophy being made a reality.674 
The supersession of orthodox Marxism 
The SI has often been accused of holding to an orthodox conception of the ‘base superstructure 
image’.675 Jean Baudrillard put forward this criticism in 1973, saying that for the SI behind the 
apparent falsehood of the commodity-spectacle lay the “real” of the proletariat.676 Jean-Luc 
Nancy made a similar albeit more philosophically grounded charge against the Situationists, 
arguing in the late 1990s that their society of the spectacle was a criticism of a material world 
absorbed entire by representation — i.e. the appearance of the commodity-form.677 The tragedy 
of their criticism, by Nancy’s reckoning, is that,  
[t]he denunciation of mere appearance effortlessly moves within mere appearance, 
because it has no other way of designating what is proper — that is, nonappearance — 
except as the obscure opposite of the spectacle. Since the spectacle occupies all of 
space, its opposite can only make itself known as the inappropriable secret of an 
originary property hidden beneath appearances.678  
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674 Ibid. 
675 I use Jorge Larrain’s term ‘base superstructure image’ here to distinguish the critical image of the base 
superstructure, particularly with regard to fully capitalist societies, from those who consider this image as 
a real description of invariant human social structures, for instance Althusser’s structural variant of 
Marxist orthodoxy. Cf. Jorge Larrain, Marxism and Ideology, London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1983, p. 
175. 
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677 Nancy, Being Singular Plural, p. 49. 
678 Ibid., pp. 51-52. 
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Baudrillard and Nancy’s claims concerning the SI are widespread, even among people broadly 
sympathetic to the Situationist project (as both Baudrillard and Nancy have identified 
themselves).679 However what is either misunderstood or forgotten in relation to this criticism is 
that the SI originally held to an orthodox conception of the ‘base-superstructure image’ of 
material-economic determinism, but moved away from such a conception progressively and 
rapidly between 1960 and 1963. By the time of Debord’s The Society of the Spectacle, written 
between 1965 and 1966, the conception of base-superstructure dualism is entirely absent. In its 
place, Marx’s early conception of ideology as the becoming ideological of ideas (in opposition 
to practice broadly conceived) has replaced the earlier notion of the ideological ‘realm’ (a 
question I will return to in chapter seven). I believe that the SI attempted to differentiate 
between ideas as instances of social-material reality, and the becoming ideological of ideas, in a 
similar fashion to Jorge Larrain. Larrain has attempted to recover the original negative sense of 
ideology from its conflation with a positive sense of ‘ideological superstructures’, by 
differentiating between the ‘ideational’ and the ‘ideological’.680 Such a distinction is in contrast 
to Marxist orthodoxy, which imagines ideas as necessarily superstructural, emergent from the 
material “base”, and merely reflective and secondary of this material base. Larrain’s argument, 
as too implicitly the SI’s, was that Marx did not hold to the orthodox conception of an 
‘ideological superstructure’, insofar as he considered ideas as variously ideological and non-
ideological. The criterion for being ‘ideological’ was precisely the extent to which ideas were 
presented as either opposed to or elevated above the material conditions of their existence, i.e. 
as an indivisible part of ‘human sensuous practice’ as Marx put it. Against the orthodoxy not all 
ideas are ideological; and perhaps more importantly ideas are considered as moments of a 
material practice (as opposed to a merely emergent and dependent mode of matter). To the 
extent that ideas are superstructural (or in Nancy’s reckoning merely representational) is the 
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extent to which they are ideological, i.e. practically opposed or ideally elevated above the 
material practices in which they are embedded and are expressions of. However, Debord, or 
Marx for that matter, did not oppose representation to the “real” of ‘non-representation’, but 
rather pointed to the way representational forms emerged from everyday practice and came into 
an ideal (and thus ideological) opposition to the reality (of which they were a part).  
Marx argued that Hegel’s account of particular social and historical forms of ‘object’ alienation 
and estrangement, ‘for instance, wealth, state power, etc.’, considered this estrangement only ‘in 
their form as thoughts… They are thought-entities, and therefore merely an estrangement of 
pure, i. e., abstract, philosophical thinking. The whole process therefore ends with absolute 
knowledge.’681 In contrast, the main line of Marx’s attack was not that Hegel was an idealist and 
he a materialist, but rather that Hegel, operating on the basis of the priority of thought, only saw 
in alienation something negative which could only ever be ‘resolved’ ideally. ‘Absolute 
Knowledge’ for Hegel was the ideal resolution of the contradictions of everyday life, not their 
“real” resolution as such. For Marx, this was a utopia only a philosopher could construct, who 
take themselves ‘as the criterion of the estranged world’. 682 For the real estrangements of the 
world, in which Marx included first and foremost religion and philosophy, Hegel resolved them 
into the alienation of mind and the object world of its alienations: ‘that is to say, it is the 
opposition between abstract thinking and sensuous reality or real sensuousness within thought 
itself.’683 For Hegel, 
[i]t is not the fact that the human being objectifies himself inhumanly, in opposition to 
himself, but the fact that he objectifies himself in distinction from and in opposition to 
abstract thinking, that constitutes the posited essence of the estrangement and the thing 
to be superseded.684 
For Marx, the object world was neither fated to alienation, nor its essence. Rather objectification 
as praxis and the results of praxis was the sine qua non — at least of the human.  This ‘essence’ 
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was an emergent and volatile property; it was brought into being, it did not pre-exist its forms of 
appearance as in Hegel. In this sense, Marx posed that ideas are the real products of real 
practices; but only insofar as these ideas, even considered in terms of a truth value which 
exceeds human practice — for example, physical laws — cannot be completely disentangled 
from the conditions of their sensuous production and consumption by humans. Thus, the 
essence of the human was the passing truth of a ‘complex activity’ in which practice mediates a 
relation between the human natural being and the rest of nature. For Marx, this relation is 
human insofar as it is uniquely human. Of the animals, only the human has a relation with all of 
nature.685 In doing so the human comes to understand a pre-existing nature and also fashions 
this understanding amidst the human transformation of nature and, crucially, the transformation 
of human nature — i.e. the human comes-to-be human. Here again we approach Marx’s idea of 
‘objective activity’, or ‘practical- critical’, ‘revolutionary practice’ being ‘conceived and 
rationally understood’ as the ‘coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human 
activity or self-change’.686 That is to say, the truth of human practices, beyond the claims of 
tradition, divinity and the various ideologies that score human history, are their own self-
transformation and coming-to-be and passing-away.  
As already touched on, above, Marx considered the Hegelian dialectic ‘in its essence critical and 
revolutionary’, albeit ‘mystified’, insofar as Hegel believed that it described the movement of 
‘spirit’, in which the real historical movement and ‘objectifications’ of human practice across 
time signified successive alienations of this Spirit’s movement. Spirit, thus, was presented by 
Hegel as both the premise and result of historical movement. Marx believed that Hegel’s 
conception was ‘inverted’, not merely by virtue of him prioritising Spirit over ‘matter’ (as 
Marxist orthodoxy would have it), but rather by misunderstanding the priority of Spirit. For 
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activity. Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has 
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Marx, Spirit — insofar as this term signifies conscious practice and the results of such — is 
dependent in the sense that to consider it in abstraction from its ‘embodied’ appearance, i.e. as 
‘sensuous’, ‘conscious practice’, is to engage in an ideological fallacy. That is, it is to maintain 
that ideas and consciousness can be considered as really autonomous of the sensuous practices 
in which they are embedded, and are expressions of. Nonetheless, Marx recognised that 
historical movement could be described dialectically, i.e. that human practice, considered 
individually and social-historically, can be conceived by way of its negative movement, i.e. by 
the positing of ideas and practices in social life, by which one ‘must prove the truth, i.e., the 
reality and power, the this-worldliness of […] thinking in practice’.687 In his 1873 Postface to 
Capital, Marx described the demystification of Hegel’s dialectic, infamously, as consisting of 
inverting Hegel’s dialectic, ‘in order to discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell’.688 
Insofar as Marx rejected Hegel’s conception of the priority of Spirit over its material 
objectifications, the inversion can be considered, for my purposes, as primarily the rejection of 
the Hegelian notion of objectification as necessarily alienation (i.e. alienation of the spirit as 
objectivity), based upon Hegel’s prioritisation of Spirit, and further his belief in its immanent 
telos (as Absolute Spirit at the end of history). As Debord pointed out,  
[Marx’s] inversion […] does not trivially consist of putting the materialist development 
of productive forces in the place of the journey of the Hegelian Spirit moving towards 
its encounter with itself in time, its objectification being identical to its alienation, and 
its historical wounds leaving no scars. History become real no longer has an end. Marx 
ruined Hegel’s position as separate from what happens, as well as contemplation by any 
supreme external agent whatever. From now on, theory has to know only what it 
does.689  
Nonetheless, Marx was criticised precisely for what Debord argued he did not do.  For instance 
at the same time Debord was using Marx to formulate the criticism of the commodity-spectacle, 
Cornelius Castoriadis came to believe that Marx merely recast Hegel’s scheme of the successive 
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‘spiritual’ alienations as ‘historical’ alienations, substituting for Hegel’s spiritual determinism a 
material ‘economic determinism’.690 In more philosophical terms Jean-Luc Nancy has argued 
that the Situationists, drawing upon Marx, fell prey precisely to the ‘metaphysical in the 
Nietzschean sense’ by posing an authentic reality (‘deep, living, originary’) beyond the apparent 
one, as the basis upon which to contest alienation.691 Castoriadis and Nancy’s criticism coincide 
insofar as they both pose that Marx and the Situationists attribute a deeper, more authentic level 
as the determinant level. For Castoriadis this is merely a reductive move, whereas in Nancy’s 
Nietzcshean terms, it denies the apparent in favour of the ‘fable of the real world’.692 
Whereas it is true the Situationists identified a tendency for living to recede into the distance of 
representation, in particular the representations of the commodity-spectacle, pace Nancy they 
did not reduce representation to the spectacle (or the spectacle to mere representation).693 In The 
Society of the Spectacle Debord wrote that the spectacle ‘is not a collection of images, but a 
social relation between people mediated (médiatisé — also, ‘broadcast’ or ‘publicise’) by 
images.’694 ‘The spectacle simultaneously presents itself as society itself, as a part of society and 
as an instrument of unification.’695  By Debord’s reckoning all of these instances of the spectacle 
are both really lived and ideological; importantly the latter does not exhaust either the ideas or 
reality of the former. Thus, the spectacle was never just representation, even if it is that part of 
everyday life in which the ‘gaze and consciousness is concentrated’.696 Rather it was the 
produced and consumed representations of everyday life on the basis of the capitalist 
organisation. Like Marx against Hegel, the problem for Debord and the Situationists was not 
one of representation per se, but rather representation posed ideologically, i.e. as separated from 
its material conditions of existence. Ideology is false to the extent that it is the real 
representation of a falsehood, for instance of the claims of political economy with regards to 
‘labour’ and its alienation as wage-labour and capital. Nonetheless capitalist society is real, 
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albeit with an inverted consciousness of its real existence. However, the disjunct between 
‘ideology’ and ‘reality’ is not absolute. We must recall that under capitalism not all ideas are 
ideological, however all practices tend to be dominated by ideological, ‘inverted’ thought (e.g. 
the “necessity” for human activity to appear as wage-labour, capital, commodity-markets, etc.). 
If we recall Debord’s argument that the spectacle is not a collection of images, but rather those 
images and representations which mediate (médiatisé) the capitalist social relation, then we can 
understand that the spectacle is not the beyond or just the apparent falsehood of the social 
relation, but rather a real part of everyday life.  Its “secret” then is not beyond the everyday life 
that the spectacle tends to invade and occupy with its version of the truth, but rather the 
everyday itself which is so occupied. The spectacle falsifies social reality on the basis of social-
natural reality itself. The beyond then, is not to be found literally beyond the spectacle but on 
the ground that the spectacle falsifies as itself a product of this (social-natural) reality. For 
instance, the proletariat in Marx and the SI’s conception is both ground of alienation and the 
constitution of a revolutionary agency against this ground. ‘In a world that is actually inverted, 
the true is a moment of the false’.697 Or, to rephrase this with an eye to the Baudrillard’s charge 
that the SI could not shake their ‘fidelity to the proletariat’, the truth of the proletarian condition 
is the movement of surpassing this condition as ultimately false — i.e. as bound by the 
ideological claims regarding the reality of the proletarian condition.698 
The Situationists captured the positive aspect of Marx’s notion of supersession in opposition to 
Hegel’s largely negative conception. Marx’s conception of alienation, contra Hegel, 
differentiated between objectification and alienated objectification; thus, “man” objectified her 
human powers, but alienated “man” posed her powers as alienated objects, i.e. as powers 
become autonomous of human agency (or even origin, in the case of religious objectifications). 
For Hegel, by posing ‘man as equivalent to self-consciousness’, and ‘the estranged object (the 
estranged essential reality of man) [as] nothing but consciousness’, he further proposed that 
‘man’ could ideally surpass his estranged objectification, insofar as his ‘objectified’ being was 
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only alienated to the extent that it was misrecognised.699 That is to say, the objective forms 
posed in opposition to ‘man’, particular as the objectified production of ‘man’, are in reality 
merely the objectified consciousness of ‘man’ in an ‘estranged’ state (i.e. appearing as things 
apart from consciousness — even and especially in the case of consciousness as a posited 
thought-entity). Note that Hegel equated objectification with alienation; thus, the surpassing of 
alienation was also a surpassing of objectification (in the recognition of the essential identity of 
the subject — self-consciousness — and its object — objectified consciousness). Marx, on the 
other hand, rejected such an identity, distinguishing between alienated objectification and 
objectification as such. Of course, this flowed from his materialist re-interpretation of the idea 
of subjective human activity as objectifying activity. Marx typified Hegel’s solution— i.e. the 
supersession as the ‘negation of the negation’ of objectification — as an ‘empty supersession of 
that empty abstraction’.700 Marx, instead, proposed the possibility of the positive supersession of 
alienation as the negation of alienated objectification (as opposed to Hegel’s negation of 
objectification, as such). In what appears to be a non- or even anti-Marxist register, Marx 
conceived of communism as the pivot of this supersession and not the goal as such.701 
Communism is the historical movement of the negation of private property that posits the 
possibility for a truly human social arrangement beyond the alienations of private property. That 
is to say, communism poses the possibility of truly human objectifications beyond the 
alienations of private property; and by this movement, ‘the first real emergence, the actual 
realisation for man of man’s essence and of his essence as something real.’702 
Conclusion 
In the Situationist hypothesis we can find an argument for the ‘realisation and abolition’ of art, 
however without this Hegelian-Marxist terminology. Though critical of the fragmented and 
repetitive nature of their artistic contemporaries, Debord initially phrased the overcoming of art 
as it existed in terms of the immediate possibilities on offer: of realising art, realising the 
potentialities of current artistic and non-artistic techniques in an ‘integral art’ deployed across 
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cities and everyday life.703 The anti-artistic nature of this was nonetheless clear; for instance 
‘artistic means’ were seen as one set of methods among others to be used to realise the 
Situationist hypothesis.704 However, the idea that this surpassing was at once, the one and the 
same abolition of the present state of affairs was only implicit. Indeed, it is the development of 
capitalism’s ability to not only absorb criticism (artistic and other wise), but flourish on this 
basis, that set some Situationists on the path of making what was implicit explicit. In the face of 
such a disarming of criticism — what the SI would come to designate ‘recuperation’ — art 
needed to be abolished as it existed in order to be realised. Thus, one way we can typify the 
changing perspective of the SI throughout the first five years is the movement from the 
perspective of realising art to a perspective of surpassing art (which was at once its realisation 
and its abolition). 
Debord would write in The Society of the Spectacle (published in 1967), that since the Dada and 
Surrealist experiments in the abolition and realisation of art, ‘the critical position elaborated […] 
by the Situationists has shown that the abolition and realisation of art are inseparable aspects of 
a single surpassing of art [dépassement de l’art]’.705 The significance of Debord’s perspective 
here is twofold. On the one hand, it demonstrated the ongoing importance of Marx’s conception 
of ‘surpassing’ and ‘realisation and abolition’, which Debord and other Situationists derived 
from their more considered engagement with the work of the young Marx from around 1959 
and 1960. On the other hand, implicit in Debord’s assessment is the convergence of the 
Situationist hypothesis with Marx’s criticism of the philosophical radicalism from which he 
emerged in 1843-44. Indeed, this convergence is better understood as an homology, insofar as 
Debord, Vaneigem, et al., proposed that the negative movement in art not only paralleled that of 
philosophy, but was ultimately entailed in the general decomposition of bourgeois culture. Thus, 
we can understand the ‘Hamburg Theses’, further, as a gesture at encompassing the negative 
movement of supersession as the critique of art and politics.  
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However, what was perhaps most striking about the homology that the SI posed was the 
practical consequence they drew from this. Unlike Lefebvre and Goldmann, the SI’s recognition 
of such a homology moved beyond the identification of a theoretical-critical homology to 
posing an unresolved alienation of culture and cultural production embodied in the figure of a 
‘new proletariat’, much as Marx had posed such a similar figure in the mid-1840s. However, 
this recovery was not the mere return to Marx’s problematic in an abstract, ahistorical fashion. 
Rather, the figure of the ‘new proletariat’ embodied the ‘new poverty’ the SI spoke of, i.e. a 
poverty of means and methods for the real control and self-transformation of everyday life. At 
least in its contemporaneous Western European variant, this ‘new poverty’ was masked by the 
burgeoning commodity-abundance of consumer society. Hence, the conceptualisation of a ‘new 
poverty’ was contrasted with, and functioned as a criticism of the material poverty that Marxist 
orthodoxy considered the sine qua non of proletarian immiseration and alienation. However, 
and as we will see to an extent in the following chapter, this ‘new poverty’ was not merely the 
critical rejection of Marxist orthodoxy in this case. It also functioned as the recovery of Marx’s 
conception of the alienation of the worker as her alienation from the object-world constituted by 
her labour (including herself as labour-power for capital). 
Indeed, and bearing in mind the foregoing, what is perhaps most striking regarding the 
Situationist recovery of Marx was that it constituted as critical rejection of Marxist orthodoxy. 
This runs counter to those critics, like Baudrillard and Nancy, who see in the SI either a 
reassertion of orthodoxy (such as the supposed equivalence of the ‘separate’ and ‘ideological 
superstructures’) or as the last gasp of a disintegrating orthodoxy. Debord would turn to a more 
considered critique of Marxism, dedicating the longest chapter of his The Society of the 
Spectacle to such a task. A consideration of this criticism is beyond the scope of the present 
work. Nonetheless, I will turn to an elaboration of the Situationist critique of Marxism, a 
critique, moreover, that I have already sketched in this chapter and the previous one. As we will 
see in chapter seven, the recovery of Marx’s sense of ‘ideology critique’ became central to both 
this criticism and the development of the concept of spectacle. Indeed, such a recovery is more 
often ignored and less often misunderstood, by those critics who seem either incapable or ill-
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equipped to understand that the sheer presence of Marxism does not require one to 
anachronistically read Marx as a Marxist (for instance, as Castoriadis did). Let us now turn to 
the last piece in this puzzle, the Situationist critique of Socialisme ou Barbarie, and the 
enrichment of the concept of spectacle by way of the original sense of ‘ideology critique’.  
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Chapter seven: The spectacle of ideology 
 
In time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer satisfied, and the 
Cartographers Guild struck a map of the Empire whose size was that of the 
Empire, and which coincided point for point with it.  
— Jorge Luis Borges, 1946706 
The worker does not produce himself, he produces an independent power. 
[…] The spectacle is the map of this new world, a map which exactly covers 
its territory.  
— Guy Debord, 1967707 
1961 would prove to be the pivotal year for the SI. We have already seen this in the 
manifestation of the ‘Hamburg Theses’. However, so far, I have only touched on what were to 
become the most significant developments of the year, developments moreover that were 
summarised in the ‘Hamburg Theses’. In 1961 the concept of the ‘spectacle’ and the critique of 
the ‘political militant’ would move to the centre of the group’s concerns, and, indeed, set the 
stage for its metamorphosis beyond its existence on the edge of artistic and cultural criticism.  
The concept of the ‘spectacle’ had been a part of the Situationist arsenal since Debord had used 
it in the founding document, associating the ‘alienation of the old world’ with ‘the very 
principle of the spectacle: non-intervention’.708 The idea of an engaged practice, in which there 
were no passive bystanders, or ‘spectators’, was key to the hypothesis of the constructed 
situation, as opposed to the more or less passively experienced situations of capitalist everyday 
life. However, what we see in 1961 is the concept of the ‘spectacle’ becoming more forcefully 
asserted, and its use by the Situationists to describe the travails of alienation across the social 
field, and in particular against the idea of the political alienation they found in groups like 
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Socialisme ou Barbarie. It would be too much to argue that the encounter with Socialisme ou 
Barbarie was merely negative in this sense, insofar as this encounter positively influenced the 
development of the SI in its trajectory beyond the artistic ghetto. As we have seen in previous 
chapters, and as was definitely the case with the lingering arguments over art in the group 
between 1960 and 1962, ‘the very principle of the spectacle: non-intervention’ had become a 
serious problem for the SI itself. We can thus consider Debord’s turn to an engagement with 
Socialisme ou Barbarie in the winter of 1960 as an attempt to address the impasse reached in 
the SI, due to both the stalling of unitary urbanist experimentation, and the relatively passive 
level of engagement with the Situationist hypothesis on part of most of the artist members of the 
group.  
The marked efflorescence of the concept of the spectacle in the work of the SI in 1961 was 
closely associated was Debord’s critique of the ‘political militant’, and his discovery of such a 
figure in his brief passage through Socialisme ou Barbarie. Debord’s membership of Socialisme 
ou Barbarie, via its ‘political’ organisation Pouvoir Ouvrier, was brief but significant. Partially 
motivated by his collaborative work with the ‘Social-Barbarian’ Daniel Blanchard in 1960, 
Debord participated as a rank and file militant in Socialisme ou Barbarie/Pouvoir Ouvrier 
between the summer of 1960 and May 1961. However, it was Debord’s experience of the life of 
the young militants in the group, and the largely unavowed hierarchy he found there, that helped 
solidify his growing belief in the breadth of the ‘spectacularisation’ of everyday life.709 Indeed, 
it was this experience that informed one of the key conclusions of the ‘Hamburg Theses’: ‘that 
we should no longer pay the least importance to any of the conceptions of revolutionary groups 
that still survived as heirs of the old social emancipation movement destroyed in the first half of 
our century’.710 Debord’s chief point here was against the conceptions of what constitutes a 
revolutionary group, rather than the theories elaborated by revolutionary groups as such. In the 
case of Socialisme ou Barbarie/Pouvoir Ouvrier (hereafter SB/PO) their critical theory was not 
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in question (at least not at this point); rather it was one of calling into question how their 
conception of politics and political practice came into conflict with their critical theory. As 
Debord would remark in his letter of resignation, SB/PO, though ‘founded on the contestation 
of all aspects of current society’, was ‘not particularly favourable to the contestation of the least 
of its own habits’.711 By Debord’s reckoning the largely uncriticised internal hierarchy of 
SB/PO was evidence of alienated, spectacular relations, whose existence could not remain 
bracketed or ignored if the group wanted to accede to the unquestionably radical nature of its 
theoretical criticism of capitalist society as a whole. It was this critique, rooted in the SI’s 
criticism of the spectacular passivity of the burgeoning mass market in culture, that would prove 
crucial to the Situationist conception of the need for a revolutionary organisation of a ‘new 
type’.712  
One of the most significant aspects of the entailed development of the concept of the ‘spectacle’ 
and the critique of the ‘political militant’, was the (re)discovery of Marx’s early conception of 
‘ideology critique’. The significance of this is sometimes hard to grasp from a post-1970s 
perspective. For instance, when the SI proposed over the course of 1961 and 1962 that ‘it is 
necessary to recover the Marxian critique of the role of ideologies’, their demand was made in 
opposition to the orthodox Marxist conception of ideology. They underlined the need to 
differentiate ideology in ‘Marx’s sense of the term’, a sense which they took over and extended 
in the concept of ‘spectacle’, from not only the orthodox conception, but from what they came 
to see as the ‘ideologization’ of Marx’s work as Marxism.713 The apparent paradox of calling 
themselves Marxists in the same way that Marx was when he said ‘I am not a Marxist’, was 
precisely made in order to draw attention to the ideologization of his work, and the ideology of 
Marxism.  
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Recently Jan Rehmann has noted that the eclipse of Marx’s ideology critique by Marxist 
orthodoxy’s positivistic notion of ideology — what Rehmann calls the ‘neutral concept of 
ideology’ — ‘helps explain […] the appeal of the postmodernist challenge from the 1970s 
onwards’.714 Certainly the association of ‘ideology’ with the sense of the ‘ideological 
superstructure’ being in effect the ‘ideational’ reflection of the material base has done great 
damage to Marx’s notion of ideology criticism.715 Marxist orthodoxy largely reduced ideology 
to a correspondence theory of truth, i.e. that the ideological superstructure simply reflected the 
material base in a more or less truthful fashion. By its lights, one can pit the more truthful 
proletarian or socialist ideology against the less truthful bourgeois ideology. However, if we pay 
close attention to Marx’s early and later work, we find that he did not present a general theory 
of the ‘ideological superstructure’ (indeed, he never used this term). What we do find is that 
Marx differentiated between ideas and consciousness, and their ideological deformation under 
particular conditions. Marx argued that the ideological deformation of ideas was a result of 
those practices (in particular, specialised, intellectual practices) that understood consciousness 
and its results autonomously of their material conditions of being — for instance as the ‘history 
ideas’ (considered separately to history as such).716 Certainly, such a conception is at odds with 
the orthodox conception of ideology, and has only been fitfully recovered over the course of the 
20th century.  
Even if we concede that the SI held to a relatively orthodox conception of ‘ideology’ and 
‘ideological superstructures’ before 1961, we nonetheless find ideas in their theoretical toolbox 
that mitigated such a conception. One of these was the concept of ‘spectacle’. Certainly, in its 
initial elaboration it bore a resemblance to aspects of the orthodox conception of the ‘ideological 
superstructure’. However, even at this point the concept of the spectacle was not presented as 
the ‘ideational’ doubling of material reality, as it was in Lenin’s conception of ideology, but 
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rather as the material production of ‘spectacles’ (films and other mass produced images), which, 
via their circulation as commodity-objects, were presented as so many compensations for the 
real loss of control over everyday life by a primarily working class audience. It was, however, 
another Situationist criticism that prepared them for the (re)discovery of Marx’s early 
conception of ideology critique, namely ‘situationism’. ‘Situationism’ was formulated by the 
group in its first year in order to disabuse onlookers of what the Situationist project was not: 
‘There can be no situationism, which signifies a doctrine of the interpretation of existing 
facts’.717 The influence of Marx is palpable. In his Theses on Feuerbach, one of the key 
documents regarding his early critique of ideology, Marx infamously concluded, ‘[t]he 
philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it’.718 To 
reduce the Situationist hypothesis to merely an interpretation of existing situations, would be to 
risk its reduction to the passivity the Situationists sought to interpret and change. Thus, to 
reduce the critical practice associated with the Situationist hypothesis to a doctrine of 
‘situationism’ would be merely to return to the philosophical perspective Marx criticised and 
rejected.719  
Vaneigem has recently noted that ‘[f]or me, ideology is thought separated from life’.720 Pithily 
he gestured at Marx’s belief that religious and philosophical ‘ideologies’ were grounded in a 
division of labour that was foundational to class societies: that is, the separation of mental and 
manual labour that was the concomitant of the division between the rulers and the ruled, and 
those that direct and think productive activity, and those that execute and follow such thoughtful 
directions. Thus, at its most elementary, ‘[t]he spectacle is but the result of thought become 
autonomous’.721 This core conceit of Marx’s ideology critique, the becoming ideological of 
ideas in their separation and apparent autonomy from ‘conscious existence’, was partially 
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addressed in the early Situationist conception of ‘situationism’. The group argued in the first 
issue of their journal that ‘situationism’ was an abuse of the meaning of ‘situationist’, and thus 
must surely be senseless: ‘there can be no situationism’ because it would only ‘signify a 
doctrine of the interpretation of existing facts’.722 But they came to realise that such doctrines 
exist, and dominate what passes for intellectual activity, and, indeed, were the very essence of 
what they would come to understand as the dominant form of separated intellectual activity (in 
Marx’s and the SI’s sense of ideology as the separation and opposition of intellectual activity 
from activity as such). Indeed, the travails of becoming ideological were fought first within the 
SI itself, insofar as the group faced both the problem of art, of the attempt to forge a Situationist 
aesthetic on the part of some of its members, not to mention the increasing popularity of the 
idea (as opposed to the practice) of the ‘constructed situation’ as defined by the SI outside of the 
group.  
Associating the critique of ‘situationism’ with both the concept of ‘spectacle’ and the critique of 
the ‘political militant’ allows one to fruitfully understand the continuity between the first and 
second phases of the SI. Debord did not come to SB/PO empty handed. As already noted the 
concept of spectacle was there, as can be seen in its deployment in the work jointly written with 
the Social-Barbarian Daniel Blanchard in 1960. However, the critique of ‘situationism’ is 
perhaps more pointedly a precursor of the recovery of Marx’s ideology critique, insofar as it 
referred to a process that the SI feared from the outset, namely the ossification of the ephemeral 
sense of the constructed situation, and the possibility of the aestheticization of a project that was 
determinedly anti-aesthetic (cf. chapters three and four, above). Nonetheless, the encounter with 
SB/PO should not be underestimated. Some more recent commentators, notably Bernard 
Quiriny, have suggested that Debord took this concept from SB/PO, and the work of Cornelius 
Castoriadis, in particular. However, and as we will see, this claim simply does not hold up. 
Indeed, Quiriny, in suggesting that Debord ‘forged’ his concept of the spectacle under the 
white-hot influence of Castoriadis, not only mangles his sources and dates, he tends to 
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undermine the real influence that Castoriadis’ theories exerted on Debord.723 The question then 
should not be who influenced whom more, as if we are participating in debate with all of the 
verve of a playground dispute. Rather, I intend to throw a light on the hitherto largely 
misunderstood, or more simply ignored, rediscovery and ‘repurposing’ through détournement, 
of Marx’s critique of ideology. 
Some preliminaries toward defining a unified revolutionary program 
The first sustained and constructive encounter between a Situationist and a ‘social barbarian’ 
(Fr. ‘socio-barbare’) was that between Debord and Daniel Blanchard.724 Blanchard’s first 
meeting with Debord followed upon his initial encounter with the SI’s journal, sometime in late 
1959 or early 1960.725 Their meeting would be crucial, in particular for the SI’s move away 
from its more exclusive concern with the question of avant-garde artistic practice and its 
critique. However, the consequences of this meeting would not be solely limited to the SI, 
affecting SB/PO itself in both unforeseen and at the time largely unacknowledged ways. 
Over the course of months, ‘during long talks in bistros, and endless roaming through the city 
streets’, Debord and Blanchard discussed many of the ideas that would appear in their jointly 
authored ‘Préliminaires pour une définition de l'unité du programme révolutionnaire’ 
[Preliminaries toward defining the unity of the revolutionary program], published in July 
1960.726 What was most striking about the Préliminaires… was the way that Debord and 
Blanchard brought the central critical categories of their respective groups into relation with 
each other: ‘The relationship between authors and spectators is only a transposition of the 
fundamental relation between directors and executants.’727 Blanchard and Debord argued that 
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1961.' 
725 Daniel Blanchard, 'Debord, in the Resounding Cataract of Time,' (1995). 
http://www.notbored.org/blanchard.html. In 1961 Debord wrote that his first meeting with Blanchard had 
taken place in 1960 — cf. Debord, 'Lettre à J.-L. Jollivet, 8 décembre 1961,' p. 113. For more details, cf. 
‘Whose spectacle?’, in Appendix three, below. 
726 Blanchard, 'Debord, in the Resounding Cataract of Time'. 
727 Canjuers and Debord, 'Preliminaires pour une definition de l'unite du programme revolutionnaire [20 
juillet 1960],' p. 515 (part I, thesis 7). 
260 
 
the separation of ‘direction’ and ‘execution’ was redolent of the more general cultural 
separation of ‘understanding’ and ‘doing’, in which the comprehension of productive activity is 
functionally reserved for its directors, not its executants.728 Such a division, perforce must lead 
to the destruction of meaning of most productive activity, insofar as the ‘meaning’ of such 
activity now lies outside of work itself (i.e. working in order to gain access to money, the 
primary form of social power in capitalist societies). Because of this emptying out of meaning 
— which we can consider commensurate with the development and spread of ‘Fordist’, mass 
production, assembly line techniques — productive activity was largely ‘rendered absurd’ for 
the producers.729 However, in order to both avoid open and hidden rebellions against this 
absurdity, and to better integrate proletarians into the hierarchy of commodity production, 
‘capitalism […] strives to place the meaning of life in leisure activities and to reorient 
productive activity on this basis’.730 Such leisure activities were considered by the authors to be 
largely ‘artificial’ in the sense that they were determined by the capitalist ‘need’ to better 
integrate the worker into the capitalist work-place and the increasingly asocial ‘terrain of 
consumption’ outside.731 Such ‘compensations’ for meaningless labour were called ‘spectacles’, 
and ‘outside of work, the spectacle is the dominant mode through which men [les hommes] are 
brought into relation with each other’.732 The production of art was given a preeminent role in 
the rule of this ‘spectacle’. On the one hand art was ‘recuperated by capitalism as a means of 
conditioning the population’ via the expansion of cultural production to the end of being 
consumed as a ‘leisure’ activity; on the other hand, the role of the artist, insofar as it appeared to 
embody ‘free creative activity’, served as ‘an alibi for the alienation of all other activities’.733  
Debord and Blanchard’s document remained ambiguous with regard to the relationship between 
‘culture’ and ‘productive activity’. For instance, culture was conceived as both ‘the ensemble of 
                                                     
728 Ibid., p. 511 (part I, thesis 1). 
729 Ibid., p. 512 (part I, thesis 3). Note that such ‘techniques’ based on the decomposition and division of 
labouring processes was not limited to solely factory style production, but were being taken up elsewhere. 
The ‘classic’ example of such was the development and spread of bureaucratic ‘white collar’ work in the 
post-war world.  
730 Ibid., p. 514 (part I, thesis 6). 
731 Ibid. 
732 Ibid., p. 515 (part I, thesis 7). 
733 Ibid., p. 516 (part I, thesis 8). 
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means [instruments] by which a society thinks itself and shows itself to itself’, and ‘the 
organisation of everything beyond the immediate necessities of [society’s] reproduction’.734 
Such a conception is redolent with the orthodox separation of the ‘economic base’ and the 
‘ideological superstructure’, a conception moreover that Debord and the SI would clearly 
eschew in the coming years (cf. chapter six, above).735 However, such a separation was already 
problematised by the authors, to the extent that they conceived of the ‘spectacle’ (and the 
production of the spectacle) as increasingly determinate of productive activity generally. Thus, 
the ‘spectacle’ was conceived as a result of productive activity being ‘emptied […] of all 
meaning for itself’, which is to say meaning for the producers as opposed to the capitalist 
meaning which is the source of this emptying out (i.e. the capitalist meaning derived from the 
pursuit of profit).736 However, the ‘spectacle’ was also conceived of as a source of this process, 
insofar as the progressive decomposition of productive activity into the ‘stable division between 
directors and executants’ was akin to what Georg Lukács described as the domination of the 
‘contemplative attitude’ in commodity production.737 Work, insofar as it was ‘reduced to pure 
execution’ tended to be posed as a spectacular object of contemplation rather than as an activity 
in which the producer was embedded and ‘realised’ their own, autonomously determined life 
projects.738 Perhaps the lack of clarity over the causal role of the ‘spectacle’ in their document 
—  i.e. the tendency to make spectacular relations a consequence of the reduction of work to 
mere execution — was what prompted Debord to latter comment that ‘it is a little weak on 
several points’, due to it being ‘the exposition of what, it seemed to us, must be accepted by all’ 
(i.e. by both the SI and SB/PO).739 As we will see, it was Debord’s agreement with Lukács and 
Marx over the reduction of productive activity under capitalism to largely a ‘contemplative 
                                                     
734 Ibid., p. 511 (part I, thesis 1). 
735 It also bears comparison to Marx’s conception of the “realms” of freedom and necessity; though for 
Marx, these “realms” were not so much practically separated as they were analytically. Cf. chapter five, 
above, and the section, ‘An excursus on ideology’, in this chapter, below.  
736 Canjuers and Debord, 'Preliminaires pour une definition de l'unite du programme revolutionnaire [20 
juillet 1960],' p. 514 (part I, thesis 6). 
737 Ibid., p. 511 (part I, thesis 1). Cf. Georg Lukács, 'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat,' 
in History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, London: The Merlin Press, [1923] 
1983. 
738 Canjuers and Debord, 'Preliminaires pour une definition de l'unite du programme revolutionnaire [20 
juillet 1960],' p. 512 (part I, thesis 3). 
739 Debord, 'Lettre à J.-L. Jollivet, 8 décembre 1961.' 
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attitude’ (contemplative of the object of labour, and thus also of labour as objective activity 
itself) that was at the base of the theoretical dispute between the SI and SB/PO — and 
Castoriadis in particular — in the coming years. 
On the basis of this theoretical ‘transposition’, Blanchard and Debord hoped to spark a fruitful 
interchange between the groups with an eye to the reconstitution of a revolutionary movement. 
Thus, the second part of their document focused on what would constitute such a new 
movement, in particular drawing upon the experimental practices of the artistic avant-gardes in 
order to reinvigorate the political avant-garde.740 However, even though it was intended as ‘a 
platform of discussion’ between the SI and SB/PO, Blanchard and Debord’s document appeared 
to have little immediate impact within SB/PO.741 Debord would later say that ‘it seems to me 
that they only began to read it [i.e. the Préliminaires…] in P[ouvoir] O[uvrier] only ten months 
after’ its publication — which is to say, around two months after Debord resigned in May 
1961.742 Debord’s resignation from SB/PO was almost certainly more important than his 
participation in their activity between autumn 1960 and May 1961, at least in terms of the 
effects which resulted from his membership. For instance, a small coterie of younger members 
of SB/PO formed a faction in broad sympathy with the SI, some of whom even split from 
SB/PO briefly on this basis.743 However, this was by far the least interesting and perhaps most 
                                                     
740 Canjuers and Debord, 'Preliminaires pour une definition de l'unite du programme revolutionnaire [20 
juillet 1960],' p. 518 (part II, thesis 4). 
741 I.S., 'Renseignements situationniste [5],' p. 11; Debord, 'Lettre à J.-L. Jollivet, 8 décembre 1961,' pp. 
113-14. As Debord believed at the time, and as Blanchard would later admit, the latter’s absence 
undermined the advocacy and defence of the document within SB/PO. ‘Your absence has surely made it 
harder to have discussions that are essential’ — Debord, 'Lettre à Daniel Blanchard, 13 juin 1961.' ‘I left 
quickly after the publication of our common text. […] I know this is one of the grievances that Debord 
had toward me: I had not sufficiently defended the text in the group. […] It’s true that I had not been 
ardent enough to defend it ...’ — Blanchard in Helen Arnold et al., 'Entretien avec quelques anciens 
membres de Socialisme ou Barbarie ', ed. Frédéric Thomas (Dissidences : le blog: 
http://dissidences.hypotheses.org/5691, Septembre 2014). 
742 Debord, 'Lettre à J.-L. Jollivet, 8 décembre 1961,' p. 113. Blanchard has recently commented that the 
document ‘was read but not necessarily discussed’ within the SB/PO group. Blanchard, in Arnold et al., 
'Entretien avec quelques anciens membres de Socialisme ou Barbarie '. Blanchard believed that the 
document was not only important for the SI, but in itself opened onto issues well in advance of their later, 
more popular consideration in 1968: ‘The idea [of the text] was not to the put the cultural thematic at its 
centre, but of justly showing the articulation of this theme along with the criticism of society, including 
[that of] work and organisation ... It was not for nothing that it happened at that time, because it opened 
upon, well before '68, all the questions that we would speak of then: education, the role of women, youth, 
architecture, urbanism’ (ibid.).  
743 Gottraux, «Socialisme ou Barbarie» : Un engagement politique et intellectuel dans la France de 
l’après-guerre, pp. 224-25. 
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confusing effect, one which is still treated by some critics as a result of Debord’s allegedly 
destructive passage through SB/PO.744 Of more interest, for our concerns, is the mutual 
influences exerted: of SB/PO upon the SI, and the less acknowledged positive influence of the 
SI upon SB/PO. As other critics have pointed out, SB/PO’s theory of bureaucratic state 
capitalism and their critique of the transformation of work into largely meaningless direction 
and execution proved important for the SI’s development of the theory of spectacle.745 
Additionally, SB/PO’s championing of workers councils helped the SI throw of the last vestiges 
of their loose fidelity to Trotskyism.746 However, the influence that the SI exerted on SB/PO has 
been lost amidst mutual recriminations that flew in the wake of Debord’s resignation.    
Debord’s encounter with SB/PO proved crucial to the development of the theory of the 
spectacle. In the year after he co-authored the article with Blanchard the theory was 
considerably developed from its rudimentary origins. Nonetheless, Debord encountered 
Blanchard and SB/PO with the concept of the spectacle, one in which the he was struggling to 
understand the role of art played — and in particular, what then passed for the ‘avant-garde’ in 
art — in the development of the new leisure industries increasingly pitched at a working-class 
                                                     
744 For instance, one of the chief ‘pro-Situationists’ in SB/PO, André Girard, believed that he and his 
faction were ‘conned’ by Debord. After Debord resigned, Girard and some other members also left, 
though unlike Debord they each ‘sent a very violent post […] to denounce the sterility of the [SB] group’, 
in what they believed to be Situationist style (Girard, cited in Gottraux [1997], p. 225). However, and 
despite Girard’s claims, there is little evidence to indicate that Debord or any of the rest of the SI 
supported either the method of their gesture against SB, or the constitution of a Situationist inspired 
oppositional faction within SB. Indeed, there is much evidence to demonstrate that Debord left SB 
amicably, and did not approve of Girard and his coterie’s propaganda of the deed. Cf. Debord, 'Lettre à 
Daniel Blanchard, 13 juin 1961.'; Debord, 'Lettre à J.-L. Jollivet, 8 décembre 1961.'; and in particular, 
Debord, 'Lettre à Attila Kotányi, 12 juillet 1961.' Nonetheless, Debord’s former collaborator, Daniel 
Blanchard, has written that ‘[a]pparently, he [Debord] had attempted to foment a revolt among the 
younger members, mostly students’ (Blanchard, 'Debord, in the Resounding Cataract of Time'.). 
However, as Blanchard admits, he was not present for this alleged plot, having been absent from France 
for an extended period (ibid.). Interestingly, a member of SB who was present at the time of Debord’s 
resignation, Pierre Guillaume, has noted that Debord showed no ‘aggressivity’ [sic.] toward SB when he 
resigned. Additionally, Guillaume noted that ‘a bid by Richard Dabrowsky to create a “situationist trend” 
in the group, [was] completely disapproved [of] by Debord’. Pierre Guillaume, 'Debord,' (orig.) La Vieille 
Taupe No. 1, Spring 1995 (1996). http://www.notbored.org/guillaume.html. 
745 Cf. Not Bored’s three articles on the relationship between SB, and, in particular, Cornelius Castoriadis 
and the SI: ‘Workers' Councils, Cornelius Castoriadis and the S.I.’ (1996), ‘Cornelius Castoriadis, 1922 
to 1997’ (1998), and ‘Strangers in the Night. . .’ (1999). Also cf. Stephen Hastings-King, 'L'Internationale 
Situationniste, Socialisme ou Barbarie, and the Crisis of the Marxist Imaginary,' SubStance 28, Number 3, 
no. 90 (1999). 
746 Martos, Histoire de l'internationale situationniste, p. 143. 
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audience.747 Thus, we can find in the founding document of the SI (published June 1957) that 
Debord wrote of the ‘a battle of leisure taking place before out eyes’ upon the ‘modern ruins of 
the spectacle’:  
To this day, the ruling class succeeds in using the leisure [time] the revolutionary 
proletariat wrested from it, by developing a vast industrial sector of leisure [activities] 
that is an incomparable instrument for stupefying the proletariat with the by-products of 
the mystifying ideology and tastes of the bourgeoisie.748  
Here, the primary association of ‘spectacle’ was with the burgeoning ‘cultural spectacle’, by 
means of which the instrumentalities of capital further insinuated time away from work with the 
commodity-form. In contrast, the ‘artistic spectacle’ of the ‘neo’ avant-gardes, and others, was 
striking in its poverty of material means; nonetheless, it was still ‘spectacular’ to the extent that 
it did not fundamentally challenge the passivity of the ‘actor/spectator’ relationship, with its 
array of repetitive, and ‘isolated and fragmentary’ artistic practices that constituted an 
increasingly poor attempt to ‘directly intervene in the ambience of […] life’.749 The Situationist 
hypothesis was presented, thus, as the answer to ‘spectacle’ — artistic and industrial. Debord 
from the outset associated these spectacles with the ‘alienation of the old world’, i.e. the 
alienation of capitalist subject as labour-power for sale. As he wrote in 1957, 
[t]he construction of situations begins beyond the modern ruins of the spectacle. It is 
easy to see to what extent the principle of the spectacle — non-intervention — is 
attached to the alienation of the old world. Conversely, we see that the most valuable 
revolutionary research in culture seeks to break the psychological identification of the 
spectator with the hero, in order to draw this spectator into activity, by provoking their 
capacities to overturn their life.  The situation is thus made in order to be lived by its 
constructors. The role of the “public” (if not passive nevertheless only given a walk-on 
                                                     
747 We will look at the bizarre counter-claim of Bernard Quiriny regarding Debord’s supposed plagiarism 
of Castoriadis, below (a claim, sadly, sparked by Castoriadis himself in the 1980s). 
748 Debord, 'Rapport sur la construction des situations et sur les conditions de l'organisation et de l'action 
de la tendance situationniste internationale [1957],' p. 324. 
749 I.S., 'Les souvenirs au-dessous de tout,' p. 3. 
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part) must always be diminished, while increasing the part of those who should not be 
called actors, but rather “livers” [viveurs], in a new sense of the term.750 
Representation as materialised idea and ideology 
In February 1961 Debord circulated within SB/PO (and presumably the SI) an article entitled 
‘Pour un jugement révolutionnaire de l’art’ (For a revolutionary judgement of art). His article 
was a response to a review of Jean-Luc Godard’s film À bout de souffle (Breathless), written by 
SB/PO member Sébastien de Diesbach — under the pseudonym S. Chatel — and published in 
Socialisme ou Barbarie no. 31. Debord’s central point against Diesbach was that he left his 
criticism at the level of the explicit ‘subject matter’ while ignoring the spectacular role of the 
film in a spectacular society. For Diesbach the question appeared to be only one of 
representation, i.e. that Godard’s film was a better representation of the life of working class 
youth, and even of modern life more generally, amid a veritable filmic ocean of ‘more or less 
grotesque and mystified image[s] of society’.751 However it was Diesbach’s vague conclusion 
that films such as Godard’s could meaningfully play a part in the revolutionary contestation and 
transformation of present society that Debord found most objectionable. For instance, Diesbach 
argued that because a ‘fraction of the population’ could recognise itself in À bout de souffle, the 
possibility was opened for this audience to ‘use the images which pass on the screen for its own 
needs’.752 Debord, the practitioner of filmic détournement, certainly did not dispute the 
possibility of using films in the abstract. However, he accused Diesbach of both a lack of clarity 
and naivety.753 Missing from Diesbach’s account is any sense of what ‘needs’ would be satisfied 
thus, or that his suggestions were anything more than an ‘idyllic vision of people equally free to 
admire or criticize themselves by recognizing themselves in characters on screen’, considering 
                                                     
750 Debord, 'Rapport sur la construction des situations et sur les conditions de l'organisation et de l'action 
de la tendance situationniste internationale [1957],' pp. 325-26. 
751 S. Chatel [Sébastien de Diesbach], '« À bout de souffle » de Jean-Luc Godard,' Socialisme ou 
Barbarie, no. 31 (Décembre 1960 - Février 1961), pp. 104, 106. 
752 Ibid., pp. 106-07; Debord, 'Pour un jugement révolutionnaire de l’art [février 1961],' p. 561 (thesis 6). 
753 ‘The essential fact is this: for the first time since films were made in France, a fraction of the 
population finds itself in a film, and can therefore, thanks to this, look at itself, admire itself, criticize or 
reject itself, in any case use some images that pass on the screen for its own needs’ – Chatel [Diesbach], 
'« À bout de souffle » de Jean-Luc Godard,' pp. 106-07. Diesbach’s claim that À bout de soufflé 
constituted the ‘first time’ that such recognition was possible was almost certainly hyperbolic.  
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the reality of film production and consumption.754 Short of a ‘revolutionary modification of the 
present forms of culture’, such ‘criticism’, as suggested by Diesbach, appeared to be little more 
than an already ineffectual moment of commodity-consumption encompassed by the existing 
‘division of labour between uncontrollable specialists who present to the people an image of 
their life, and the people who have to recognise themselves there more or less clearly’.755 
For Debord the revolutionary criticism of culture, as opposed to a criticism which does not call 
into the question the fundamentally spectacular nature of culture and social life more general, 
‘can be nothing less than the supersession of all aspects of the aesthetic and technological 
apparatus that constitutes an ensemble of spectacles separated from life’. 756 Here, the idea of 
‘spectacles separated from life’ is the evidence of the emergence of Marx’s criticism of 
ideology. For Debord, like Marx, the question was not one of a true life versus the false 
spectacle, but rather the spectacular falsification of life to the extent that these images appear 
suspended above it, or apart from it. The film as it exists in capitalist societies, is not only 
embedded in spectacular relations (of filmic ‘heroes’ and largely passive ‘spectators’), but 
presupposes such relations, and perforce reinforces such relations. One then does not simply 
take over capitalist industries as they exist, but rather transforms them on the basis of the 
transformation of the capitalist social relation itself. Similarly, to détourn elements of pre-
existing culture is to call into question their previous existence as an apparently coherent, 
singular work. To criticise any product of capitalist culture while bracketing its conditions of 
possibility, notably the spectacular relations in which it is embedded and realised, is to forego a 
criticism that cuts to the root of the matter. Thus, 
[i]t is not in its surface significations that we should look for a spectacle’s relation to the 
problems of the society, but at the most profound level, at the level of its function as 
spectacle.757 
                                                     
754 Debord, 'Pour un jugement révolutionnaire de l’art [février 1961],' p. 561 (thesis 6). 
755 Ibid. 
756 Ibid., p. 558 (thesis 2). 
757 Ibid. 
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The idea of the spectacle operating at a more profound level than, for example, the mere 
appearance of the film-commodity, was enunciated in an early Situationist foray against the 
contemporary ‘cinematic spectacle’, in the first issue of Internationale Situationniste: 
cinema is the central art of our society, in the sense that its development is sought out 
through a continuous movement of integrating new mechanical technologies. It is 
therefore — not only as an anecdotal or formal expression, but also in its material base 
[infrastructure] — the best representation of an era of anarchically juxtaposed 
interventions (not articulated, [but] merely added).758 
There are two main lines of criticism implicit in the foregoing (both of which are explicitly 
brought up in the critique of Diesbach and Godard). The first is that we can critically isolate and 
analyse the content and form of films; however, the form qua an expression of the social and 
technical relations of capitalism is perhaps a better ‘representation of an era’ than its explicit 
content. As we have seen, Debord argued against such an isolation at the cost of the richness 
and efficacity of the criticism. Thus, we can also pose that the nature of the content of the film is 
not simply accidentally related to the more profound analysis of a film’s ‘function as spectacle’; 
indeed, we can only begin to understand the success or failure of the content insofar as we pay 
attention to the film as both a particular film and as an instance of film as capitalist 
technology.759 In Préliminaires…, Debord and Blanchard had argued that the hierarchical 
relations of director and executant did not end at the factory gate or office entrance, but rather 
existed as spectacular relations throughout capitalist culture. Thus, to treat Godard’s film as 
Diesbach did, while bracketing its conditions of possibility and its ongoing existence as a 
spectacle among spectacles, was to run the risk of ‘introduc[ing] reformist illusions about the 
                                                     
758 Internationale Situationniste, 'Avec et contre le cinéma,' Internationale Situationniste, no. 1 (Juin 
1958), p. 8. 
759 In 'Avec et contre le cinéma', the Situationists posed that the cinema had yet to witness the widespread 
appearance of ‘formally destructive works, concurrent with what has been accepted for twenty or thirty 
years in literature and the plastic arts’ (ibid., p. 9). However, they would favourably note a little over a 
year later that Alain Resnais’ Hiroshima mon amour signalled just such an ‘appearance in “commercial” 
cinema of the self-destruction that dominates all modern art’ (I.S., 'Le cinema après Alain Resnais,' p. 9). 
What excited the Situationists most about Hiroshima mon amour, was that like the formal dissolution 
they identified as the most striking trait of modern art, ‘the spectacle is the mise en scène of its own ruin’ 
(ibid., p. 10). That is to say, the formal decomposition signalled simultaneously the possibility of the 
alternative use of cinema, a use necessarily beyond its capitalist form.  
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spectacle, as if one day it might be ameliorated from within, improved by its own specialists, 
under the supposed control of a better informed public opinion’.760  
Debord wagered that the representation of human practices tends, under conditions of the 
‘commodity-spectacle’, to become ideological in the fashion that Marx identified, i.e. that they 
come to be posed in opposition to (and often as superior to) the activities they purport to 
represent.761 Of course, the process by which such representations assume this ‘ideological’ or 
‘spectacular’ mode is not in itself a necessary moment of representations per se, but rather are 
related to the way such acts are submitted to the existing hierarchies and divisions of capitalism. 
The film as an ideological representation is false to the extent that implicit in the production and 
consumption of the film is a division of labour that is largely dissimulated in its presentation as 
a film commodity. Thus, films are false to the extent that they are products caught up in social 
relations that falsify and dissimulate the truth of the totality of these relations (i.e. relations 
requiring the alienation and exploitation of labour-power). It is not a question of the supposed 
falsehood of mimesis (i.e. of representation as such). In the case of Godard’s À bout de souffle 
(or any similar film in terms of social and historical particulars), its spectacular nature is a 
function of its appearance as a film-commodity for (largely) passive consumption. However, 
even here we should be careful to pay attention to the way the film as commodity shapes the 
production of the film as much as its consumption. Films tend to be considered the work of 
what are identified as the chief creative agents (e.g. the director, the writer, to a lesser extent the 
actors insofar as they realise the script and direction); and indeed, they are, insofar as these 
creative agents’ command and submit the activity of the working crew (or ‘executants’ in 
SB/PO’s vernacular) to their direction. Of course, to criticise film production in this fashion is 
not to make a moral judgement, but rather to draw attention to the spectacular hierarchies which 
exist across different forms of creative practice submitted to the judgement of the marketplace. 
It is to foreground the bureaucratic capitalist nature of the film industry — spectacular to its 
core. Nonetheless, the Situationists raised the possibility of the use of film (or other technical 
mediums) under conditions markedly different from spectacular ones.  
                                                     
760 Debord, 'Pour un jugement révolutionnaire de l’art [février 1961],' pp. 558-59 (thesis 2). 
761 Ibid., p. 558 (thesis 2). 
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In the month Debord circulated his criticism of Diesbach, his film Critique de la séparation was 
released. Debord did not consider his film non-spectacular; and, as we have seen in chapter one, 
he thus rejected the appellation ‘situationist’. At best, he considered it a film that explicitly drew 
attention to its necessarily spectacular nature (necessary, insofar as its production and 
consumption was inescapably embedded in the social relation it criticised). In this sense, it was 
‘pre-situationist’. Indeed, we can consider Critique de la séparation as a practical instantiation 
of precisely the use Debord suggested for film under spectacular conditions, as opposed to 
Diesbach’s search for a truly representative film. Early in Critique de la séparation, the narrator 
states: 
The function of the cinema, whether dramatic or documentary, is to present a false and 
isolated coherence as a substitute for a communication and activity that are absent. In 
order to demystify documentary cinema, it is necessary to dissolve what is called its 
“subject matter” [sujet].762 
‘Falsehood’ for Debord, in this case, is not to be found in representation per se, but rather the 
‘false and isolated coherence’ of the film. This important caveat is often lost, and is later 
emphasised by Situationists against Castoriadis and Godard; i.e. that something is ‘false’ under 
present conditions not because it falsifies an irreducibly grounded ‘reality’, but rather that it is 
caught up in the false representation of its own truth — for instance, the ‘truth’ of a film’s 
existence as a commodity-product bound by particular social and technical relations that are 
effectively effaced in its appearance as a film object. That Diesbach recognised a true 
representation in Godard’s film is undermined precisely by the ‘false and isolated’ coherence of 
the film.763 What is hidden in both his analysis of the film, and the film itself, are the conditions 
of the film’s existence as a film-commodity. Not only the intention of the director, but the social 
and material conditions of the film only appear to the extent that they are represented in the 
                                                     
762 Guy Debord, 'Critique de la séparation [1961],' in Œuvres, Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2006, pp. 541-
42.  
763 I.e. its existence as a discrete film-commodity, the product of deliberation, planning and cooperative 
execution to the end of being circulating and even competing with other commodities in national and 
global markets. 
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film.764 For Debord it is this “hidden” social structure that is revealed by the dissolution of the 
explicit ‘subject matter’.765 What is more, this structure is spectacular. The film exists as 
spectacle in both its explicit existence as a cinematic spectacle, and as the product of spectacular 
productive relations.  
As we saw in chapter five, Castoriadis’ sense of ‘productive activity’ — of poiesis — differed 
markedly from both Marx and Debord’s sense. Indeed, Castoriadis did not recognise Marx’s 
differentiation of ‘free productive activity’ and ‘labour’ as such. For Castoriadis, there simply is 
productive activity, which was more or less free depending upon the struggle over its direction 
                                                     
764 For instance, in Sur le passage de quelques personnes à travers une assez courte unité de 
temps (1959), during a tracking shot along a table the narrator speaks of it as a ‘botched tracking shot’. 
Here the representation is the botched tracking shot itself that is both seen, as the point of view tracks 
along the table, and not seen insofar as the equipment, camera and director are out of shot. Debord, 
gesturing at both the artificiality of the film (‘botched’) and the relative poverty of means (‘botched’) at 
his disposal, is by the latter able to incorporate a limited criticism of this film and cinema as such.  
765 As if to mock the ‘false and isolated coherence’ of films, Debord illustrated the narration at this point 
in the film with a ‘complete circular panoramic of the Plateau Saint-Merri’. ‘What real project has been 
lost?’ the narrator asks at the beginning of the 360° circuit of the demolished block ringed by buildings on 
the Plateau Saint-Merri in the Beaubourg district at the heart of the 4th arrondissement. In Debord’s film 
the panoramic sequence posed the use and abuse of this now demolished space. It was as if the interior of 
the arrondissement itself had been dissolved, a part of the greater relocation of the Les Halles markets 
nearby, the emptying out of Paris that Debord and others decried. The camera takes in everything and yet 
nothing much, a couple getting into their car, a kid on a bike, some kids wandering around, some other 
people crossing the plateau. A space opened in the midst of the city is used pitifully, mostly as a parking 
lot. You can imagine some of the kids playfully using the space, but Debord doesn’t show this, just an 
ephemeral, boring moment framed by the circular movement of the camera and the cameraman. In the 
distance a modernist building sits on the Rue de Beaubourg, simultaneously awkward and peacefully 
absorbed into the warren of streets and shops. As the point of view slowly spins the narrator speaks of 
‘the rules of the cinematic spectacle’, the dissatisfaction with life that is the real wellspring of the 
‘satisfying products’ which constitute the ‘false coherence’ of films. Accompanying the image and 
narration are the following subtitles détourned from Dante’s Inferno: ‘Midway upon the journey of our 
life… I found myself within a forest dark… for the straightforward pathway had been lost’. Viewing this 
sequence from the perspective of the post-1970s, we can only be struck by an extra coat of melancholia 
layering this recorded moment from 1960 or 1961. Late in Critique de la séparation the narrator says, 
‘Memory must be destroyed in art. To ruin the conventions of its communication. To demoralise its fans. 
What a work!’ — indeed! Here is ground zero of Baudrillard’s ‘Beaubourg-effect, […] a machine for 
making emptiness’. The Plateau Saint-Merri upon which Debord filmed would become the sight of the 
spectacular display of so many products of the historical avant-garde that the SI claimed to both inherit 
and surpass: namely the Pompidou Centre, that ‘incinerator absorbing all the cultural energy and 
devouring it’ (Baudrillard). Considering this sequence in Debord’s film, the Pompidou Centre would also 
ironically mark the recuperation of the architectural style of the Situationists — or at least a parody of 
Constant’s yellow sector in New Babylon — here used as the sarcophagial container and catalogue of art 
works and books, and so only incidentally a place of play or encounter under the watchful eye of 
Gendarmes. Present-day Beaubourg is an unintended testament to Debord’s suspended and incomplete 
work of the creative destruction of art; or, as Baudrillard can be made to say by extracting the rational, 
Situationist kernel within: a monument to total alienation, to spectacle and to the spectacularisation of 
culture. (Cf. Debord, 'Critique de la séparation [1961],' pp. 541, 542, 550-51; Jean Baudrillard, 'The 
Beaubourg Effect: Implosion and Difference,' in Simulacra and Simulation, Ann Arbor: The University 
of Michigan Press, [1981] 1994, p. 61, 63). For a different interpretation of this sequence cf. Tom 
McDonough, 'Calling from the Inside: Filmic Topologies of the Everyday,' Grey Room, no. 26 (Winter 
2007), pp. 18-20.  
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and execution. Diesbach, in his review of Godard, operated within a similar outlook. He 
believed that the problem with culture, and filmic culture in particular, was one of direction and 
execution. Just as Castoriadis could imagine the self-management of productive activity as it 
presently existed in capitalist societies, even to the extent that he believed that the struggle 
against capitalist productive activity constituted the positive content of this self-management 
(rather than an intimation of its negation, as Debord and the SI would have it), so Diesbach 
imagined the spectacular representation of everyday life — albeit the more ‘true’ version of 
Godard’s — as already, in anticipation, moving beyond its appearance as an alienated product 
of an alienated reality. However, and as Debord would mordantly note against Diesbach, ‘[t]he 
revolution’ — and for that matter revolutionary criticism under present conditions — ‘is not 
“showing” life to people, but rather living itself’.766 Debord’s wager was that the truth or falsity 
of the film qua representational content was the least interesting approach for revolutionary 
criticism. In any case, as Debord noted, ‘even if Godard presents people with an image of 
themselves in which they can undeniably recognise themselves […], he presents them all the 
same with a false image in which they recognise themselves falsely’.767 To be clear, the ‘false 
image’ is not immanent to the representational form of the image, i.e. a brutal fact of mimesis. 
The image is falsified to the extent that it appears only in its fetishized form, i.e. as this image in 
this film, in which the conditions of production and consumption are effectively dissimulated in 
the commodity-form itself. In order for criticism to be revolutionary, to attain the level of the 
social totality, one cannot leave the object of criticism at the level of the explicit content while 
ignoring the spectacular form. Debord argued, thus, that people ‘recognise themselves falsely’ 
in ‘a false image’, insofar as such recognition remains at the level of the representation of life, 
of which the latter — the representation of life — is more properly understood as being 
encompassed by living itself. This is the ‘secret’ of ideology; i.e. that the ideological is the 
production of ideas, images, etc., as if they were autonomous, as if they could be posed 
separately to the life and social conditions in which they are embedded and expressions of.  
                                                     
766 Debord, 'Pour un jugement révolutionnaire de l’art [février 1961],' p. 561 (thesis 7). 
767 Ibid., p. 561 (thesis 6). 
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Some years later, the SI would respond to Godard’s enunciation of precisely the claim that the 
SI are often lumbered with — i.e. that image is false by virtue of its mimetic qualities. In the 
twelfth issue of Internationale Situationniste, in response to Godard’s statement in his short film 
L’Amour, that ‘the revolution cannot be put into images’ because ‘the cinema is the art of 
lying’, the Situationists wrote that ‘[t]he cinema has been no more an “art of lying” than all the 
rest of art’.768  That is to say, representational activity is not false by virtue of its form, but rather 
by virtue of the spectacular use to which such forms are put. Debord took this question up in 
The Society of the Spectacle, in which he would say — in anticipation perhaps of the common 
misinterpretation of the ‘spectacle’ as merely the false, representational ‘doubling’ of life — 
that the spectacle ‘is not a supplement of the real world, an added decoration’.769 Rather, ‘in its 
totality, [it] is simultaneously the result and project of the existing mode of production’.770 Thus, 
it should not be ‘understood as an abuse of the world of vision, [or] the product of technics of 
the mass distribution of images’ but rather as a ‘part of society’, even as it is ‘present[ed] 
simultaneously as society itself, a part of society, and as the instrument of unification’.771 For 
Debord, what is most egregious regarding the spectacle is not that ‘representations’ as such are 
false; rather it is a question of falsification — i.e. that the spectacle of images in capitalism can 
be presented as the exhaustive truth of a social relation of which they comprise only a part. In 
this sense, true and false images can be considered spectacular to the extent that engagement 
with them is rendered largely passive, i.e. one consumes the image, and has no real control over 
either its production or mode of presentation. Here is the core insight of the critique of the 
spectacle, and what links it to the early Situationist critique of ‘passivity’ and ‘non-
intervention’. The spectacle falsifies, but not because the spectacular image is merely false.772 
                                                     
768 Internationale Situationniste, 'Le cinéma et la révolution,' Internationale Situationniste, no. 12 
(Septembre 1969), p. 104. 
769 Debord, La Société du Spectacle, thesis 6. 
770 Ibid. 
771 Ibid., theses 5, 3. 
772 It is perhaps not too much to suggest that Debord’s critique of spectacular representation, can be 
related to the conception of art as ‘anti-situationist’. In this sense, it is not a question of rejecting 
representation, or art, as such, but rather one of how best to use such representations under conditions of 
commodity-production. In short, how best to critical appropriate them as moments of revolutionary 
contestation. Cf. chapters one, three and four above. 
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An excursus on ideology 
[W]e know that an ideology in power makes all partial truth                          
become an absolute lie...  
— Guy Debord, 1965773  
We must hold onto the idea that the problem for Debord was not representation per se, but 
rather the use to which representations are put. Without doubt, the idea that the spectacle is 
‘false’ or ‘unreal’ was contained within Debord’s conception. However, such falsehood or 
unreality was not considered as an absolute. Insofar as the capitalist spectacle is presented as the 
exhaustive truth of capitalist society, it is false. For the SI, the important question was one of 
participation versus the spectacle’s principle of ‘non-intervention’; the spectacle falsified the 
‘real’ only to the extent that it held out the false promise of participating in a decision already 
taken, i.e. of the capitalist premises and results of consumption and production. 
I have already briefly mentioned the way the SI, and the concept of the spectacle, has been 
illegitimately conflated with the orthodox Marxist conception of ‘ideological superstructure’, in 
the work of Jean Baudrillard and Jean-Luc Nancy. A similar argument is made by Jacques 
Rancière. He even argues that Debord returned to a pre-Marxians problematic, in simply taking 
over the positon of Feuerbach’s criticised by Marx. However, Rancière appears to be confused 
by Debord’s détournement of Feuerbach in The Society of the Spectacle; i.e. Debord doesn’t so 
much merely cite Feuerbach as improve him, as per Isidore Ducasse’s suggestions for 
progressive plagiarism. Rancière writes that ‘[t]he “contemplation” denounced by Debord is 
contemplation of the appearance separated from its truth; it is the spectacle of the suffering 
produced by that separation’.774 However, Debord’s concept of the spectacle bears a closer 
family resemblance to Marx’s critique Feuerbach, rather than the latter’s critique of religion, as 
Rancière asserts. Debord did not conceive of the spectacle as the ‘appearance’ separated from 
its truth; rather he argued that the spectacle was a produced falsehood, a part of social-
                                                     
773 Guy Debord, 'Lettre à Branko Vucicovic, 27 novembre 1965,' in Correspondance volume III janvier 
1965 - décembre 1968, ed. Patrick Mosconi, Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2003, p. 89; Internationale 
Situationniste, 'L'idéologie du dialogue,' Internationale Situationniste, no. 10 (Mars 1966), p. 69. 
774 Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, p. 7. 
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productive life that is presented as equivalent to, or in the place of the entirety of social life. 
Rancière in effect implies that ‘appearance’ is conflated by Debord with ‘representation’, and by 
posing such ‘appearance’ in separation Debord does not proceed any further than Plato’s sense 
of ‘mimesis’. As we will see below, this is in essence Feuerbach’s critique of religion. Debord 
did not consider ‘representation’ in this way, as inevitably false simply because it is a mimetic 
illusion. In fact, the question of mimesis was of little interest to Debord; he considered the 
representation of life as a moment of real, “material”, social reality. What he tried to 
problematise was when representations were effectively posed autonomous to, and even 
superior to the life so represented, as in the commodity-spectacle. In a word, Debord criticsed 
the becoming ideological of representations, not representation per se.  
Ideology critique has often been reduced to the idea of ‘false consciousness’, a reduction, 
moreover, that emphasises ideology simply as false consciousness in the most vulgar sense. 
Embedded in this sense of ideology is the orthodox conception of economic ‘base’ and 
ideological ‘superstructure’, in which the latter — the realm of ‘consciousness’ and ‘culture’ — 
is the repository of false consciousness regarding the ‘base’ (at least, insofar as we are talking 
about a capitalist superstructure and so-called ‘bourgeois ideology’). Consequently, the 
economic base is posed as the ‘truth’ obscured by the false ‘ideological superstructure’ (in the 
sense of bourgeois consciousness obscuring and falsifying the truth of the centrality of labour). 
However, as we have seen in chapters five and six, such a conception has serious problems. 
First, we find that Marx’s negative critique of capitalist labour is effaced in favour of posing 
labour as the positive ‘truth’ to be recovered beyond its ideological falsification. Similarly, the 
negative critique of ideology is lost in favour of a positive theory of base and superstructure, 
that tends to hypostatise these critical categories in a dubious ontology. As has been pointed out, 
such a ‘naively metaphysical’ conception poses consciousness, ideas and culture as a 
‘reflection’ of the material base, that tends to reproduce a sort of substance dualism even while 
laying claim to a monist materialist outlook.775 Indeed, so widespread was this ‘orthodox’ 
                                                     
775 Karl Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy, trans. Fred Halliday, London: New Left Books, [1923/30] 
1970, p. 83. 
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conception, that erstwhile critics of it nonetheless accepted it as irreducibly ‘Marxian’. Thus, 
when Jean Baudrillard came to criticise the SI, he argued that,  
[e]ven the situationists, without doubt the only ones to have attempted to free [dégager] 
the new radicality of political economy in their “society of the spectacle”, still refer to 
the “infrastructural” logic of the commodity — from whence [comes] their fidelity to 
the proletarian class. 776  
Baudrillard’s point here was to argue that the purely representational logic of the commodity, 
what he considered a signifying logic cut free from a signified ‘ground’ or given, was only 
partially captured in the concept of the ‘spectacle’. However, and perhaps unwittingly, 
Baudrillard lumbered the SI with an orthodox, positive conception of base (i.e. ‘infrastructure’) 
and superstructure, in which the ‘proletariat’ played the role of the signified ‘truth’ — insofar as 
such a ‘truth’ is commensurate with the irreducibility of ‘labour-power’ — ‘behind the 
spectacular organisation’ of this labour-power.777 Baudrillard believed that the ‘spectacle’ of the 
Situationists was simply commensurate with the falsehood consequent upon the domination 
imposed on labour (or labour-power) by commodity production. The concept of the spectacle is 
reduced to being little more than a false ‘reflection’ of the truth of the economic ‘infrastructure’, 
and thus in its essentials simply a redescription of the orthodox conception of ideology. 
However, such an assessment does not bear up under scrutiny. First, as discussed in chapter 
five, the SI from the outset tended to share Marx’s negative assessment of labour, vis-à-vis his 
more general conception of ‘free, productive activity’ (i.e. that even before their more 
thoroughgoing engagement with Marx’s work on alienation and alienated labour, the SI had 
reached a similar negative assessment of labour). And secondly, and as already partly 
demonstrated above, the idea of the ‘spectacle’ was never simply the falsification of an 
unalloyed truth. Indeed, and as we will see, Marx never reduced consciousness or ideas to 
‘ideology’; rather he argued that under the conditions of capitalism (and hierarchical class 
                                                     
776 Jean Baudrillard, Le miroir de la production, ou l'illusion critique du matérialisme historique, 
Tournai: Casterman, 1973, pp. 101-2 (Poster 1975 trans. p. 120-1). 
777 Ibid., p. 102. 
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societies more generally), ideas and consciousness tended to be practically reduced to ideology. 
As Karl Korsch would phrase it, against Marxist orthodoxy, 
it never occurred to Marx and Engels to describe social consciousness and intellectual 
life merely as ideology. Ideology is only false consciousness, in particular one that 
mistakenly attributes an autonomous character to […] partial phenomena of social 
life.778 
Here, Korsch captured the essence of ideology critique; not the orthodox sense of the false, or 
illusory representation of reality, but rather the ideological attribution of ‘an autonomous 
character to […] partial phenomena’. In this sense, such consciousness is ‘false’ precisely 
because of its partiality, rather than whether or not its object is illusory.779 Thus, we can also 
understand, by the reckoning of the Situationists, that even ‘true’ ideas and representations can 
be rendered false insofar as they are spectacularised. For instance, Marx believed that 
ideologies contain true ideas, and even reveal truths. Marx considered the work of classical 
political economists, such as Smith and Ricardo, to be ideological in the sense of illegitimately 
universalising a partial understanding of social life (notably an ‘economic’ understanding), 
despite the important scientific work they achieved in revealing human activity — under the 
concept of ‘labour’ — as the source of capitalist wealth. Let us turn to Marx to gain a better 
understanding of his concept ‘ideology’.780 
                                                     
778 Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy, p. 73. 
779 Note, Korsch, like Debord, used the term ‘false consciousness’. However, rather than trivially 
contrasting it with so-called ‘true consciousness’ (or implying the latter by its use), Korsch attempted to 
recover Marx’s sense by delimiting the idea of ‘false consciousness’ to the practice of ‘mistakenly 
attribute[ing] an autonomous character to […] partial phenomena of social life’ (ibid.). In this sense, what 
is false about false consciousness, is the mistaken attribution, rather than consciousness as such.   
780 Korsch would come to play a significant role in the development of the Situationist détournement of 
‘ideology’, insofar as he outlined just such a recovery of the original sense of ‘ideology criticism’ against 
Marxist orthodoxy, in his 1923/1930 work, Marxism and Philosophy. However, prior to 1964 — the year 
this work appeared in French translation — Korsch’s more considered argument appeared to be largely 
unknown to Debord (apart from passing references to his perspective in two, exceedingly brief 
translations of Korsch that appeared in 1959 — cf. Karl Korsch, Kostas Axelos, and Maximilien Rubel, 
'Les thèses de Karl Korsch,' Arguments, no. 16 (4e trimestre 1959). Korsch’s work would become crucial 
to Debord, and, in large part, the fourth chapter of Debord’s The Society of the Spectacle constitutes a 
continuation and elaboration of Korsch’s attempt to use Marx’s method to criticise Marxism as an 
ideology. Indeed, Korsch is more often than not overlooked when considering the influences that shaped 
Debord, being downgraded or ignored in favour of Lefebvre or Lukács. For instance, Korsch barely 
appears in Jappe’s excellent critical biography, Guy Debord, something Jappe acknowledged as an 
unfortunate lacuna in subsequent editions of his work. Korsch’s commitment to an anti-Leninist 
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I have already dealt with Marx’s argument regarding the supersession of philosophy. In chapter 
six, we have seen how Marx, in 1843, hit upon the argument that the ‘theoretical’ and ‘practical’ 
wings of the Young Hegelians, despite their apparent opposition, mirrored each other with 
regard to their partial perspectives. At this point, Marx argued that the former wanted to realise 
philosophy without abolishing it, whereas the latter wanted to abolish philosophy without 
realising it. Marx’s point was to draw out what he would soon call the ideological aspect of both 
of these perspectives. The theorists imagined that the ‘inert mass’ of humanity ‘has value only 
as the antithesis of the intellect’, whereas the practical party forgot that the ideas it charged with 
being illusory, nonetheless were ‘real living germ[s]’ which played a part in the practical 
struggles of political, economic and everyday life more broadly considered.781 Marx’s argument 
was an important response to the practical instantiation of a sort of substance dualism on the 
part of the idealistic ‘theorists’ and the materialist ‘practitioners’; i.e. that causal efficacy lay 
either with ideas or sensuous, ‘objective’ reality.  
Marx took on a related argument, in On the Jewish Question, regarding the real manifestation of 
partial, perspectives in the guise of the universalism associated with the bourgeois conception of 
politics and the state. In its essence, Marx conceived of such a conception and practice as the 
illegitimate projection of the bourgeois worldview — replete with its ideas of the individual and 
private interests — into the political firmament of states and citizenry. His critique of partiality 
resolved into two main thread: on the one hand, the projection of the bourgeois conception of 
social reality into a political universalism of property rights and obligations; on the other hand, 
the decomposition of the unity of everyday life (i.e. in its political, economic and other aspects) 
into apparently independent ‘realms’ of political and civil life. By Marx’s reckoning such 
partiality and division was both fictitious in the claims made for them (particularly in the 
                                                                                                                                                           
interpretation of Marx, a more anarchistic ‘left communism’, and ultimately the rejection of Marxism 
entirely, brings him closer to Debord’s perspective than either Lefebvre or Lukács — both somewhat 
ambiguous ex-Stalinists. The full force of Korsch’s influence upon Debord et al., lies outside of the 
period under consideration, so I have unfortunately had to put his considerable work aside for the time 
being. A more considered investigation of the relationship between Korsch and Debord awaits to be 
undertaken.  
781 Marx, 'Letter to Ludwig Feuerbach, 11 August 1844,' p. 356; Marx, 'Contribution to Critique of 
Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction [1843-44],' pp. 180, 181. See also chapter five above, under the 
subheading ‘The realisation and suppression of philosophy’. 
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universalising claims of bourgeois political and civil life) but nonetheless brutally factual, 
insofar as such claims were the ‘real living germs’ embedded in practice, and most importantly 
contested in practice. Indeed, in his critique of the political ‘universalism’ of the bourgeoisie we 
can find an exemplar of what Marx would soon criticise as ‘ideology’.  
It is in the Theses on Feuerbach and The German Ideology that Marx’s critique of the Young 
Hegelians reached its conclusion. In this sense, his ‘ideology critique’ was bound up with an 
attempt to salvage what he considered the superior moments of both wings of this movement, 
i.e. his typification of the ‘German Ideology’ was intertwined with his project of realising and 
abolishing philosophy. Thus, Marx’s materialism should not simply be seen in the vulgar 
Marxist sense that Marx moved from an idealist to a materialist perspective. Rather, in 
developing his ideology criticism, Marx attempted to understand intellectual life as a moment of 
practical, ‘sensuous’, material life. 
In the Theses on Feuerbach Marx’s main concern was to demonstrate the insufficient nature of 
Feuerbach’s ‘objective’ materialism. Marx argued that by posing a primarily contemplative 
materialist perspective, Feuerbach reinforced the idea of an irreconcilable separation of thought 
and ‘sensuous’ reality. According to Marx, Feuerbach, in an attempt to disabuse readers of the 
illusory world of religion, argued that one can only contemplate an object word of ‘things, 
reality, sensuousness’.782 However, in making this argument he not only bracketed the 
intellectual contemplator from the object contemplated, but worst still he effectively bracketed 
human ‘sensuous human activity, practice’ as such from counting as ‘objective activity’.783 That 
is, Feuerbach discounted the practical, human aspect of the object world. Such a move was 
unacceptable to Marx, because it misapprehended the significance of human practice as self-
transformative, i.e. intertwined not only with the transformation of the object world, but also of 
human activity itself as an object of transformative practice. 
Marx argued that Feuerbach, unintentionally, ended by mimicking the religious perspective he 
claimed to reject, his ‘doctrine’ effectively ‘divide[ing] society into two parts’, of which one 
                                                     
782 Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach [1845],' p. 3 (thesis 1). 
783 Ibid. 
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was implicitly superior to the other: on the one hand the ‘sensuous’, ‘object’ world; on the other 
hand, the ‘subjective’, “realm” in which the ‘theoretical attitude’ which opens upon the object 
world vies with the merely illusory realm of ‘chimeras, […] ideas, dogmas [and] imaginary 
beings’.784 Feuerbach’s division is confusing, because he emphasised the object world at the 
expense of the subjective world of theory and ideas, and yet he also believed that the 
‘theoretical attitude’ was the ‘only genuinely human attitude’.785 However, Feuerbach’s 
inversion of Hegel only demonstrated the symmetry of his ideas with those which he purported 
to criticise. Thus, even though Feuerbach denied an independent existence for ideas, he 
nonetheless identified activity as the province of the intellectual contemplation of the object; i.e. 
in the case of religious contemplation, false; in the case of scientific contemplation, true. 
However, in doing so Feuerbach did not resolve the upside-down vision of idealism, rather he 
merely “materialised” its ideal bifurcation, placing activity on one side of the ledger and the 
object contemplated on the other. In this way, intellectual activity became responsible for both 
the illusion of ideas (as religious ideas and other metaphysical fancies) and the correction of 
these illusions; either way, intellectual activity lay beyond the object world Feuerbach posed as 
the misrepresented material of reality. By Marx’s reckoning, such ‘material’ in Feuerbach’s 
hands became idealised itself, bearing little relationship to the human and natural reality 
purportedly contemplated and represented.  
If we turn to Marx’s critique of Feuerbach’s criticism of religious ideology, we can better see 
how Feuerbach focused on the ideological moment at the expense of the real conditions of the 
ideological — not unlike what Debord accused Diesbach of with regard to his review of 
Godard.  
For Marx, Feuerbach’s starting point of ‘religious self-estrangement and the duplication of the 
world into a religious world and a secular one’ ran the risk of misapprehending both the nature 
of ‘religious self-estrangement’ and its relationship to the ‘secular world’ of objects.786 Marx 
proposed instead that more was needed than merely ‘resolving the religious world into its 
                                                     
784 Marx and Engels, 'The German Ideology [1845],' p. 23. 
785 Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach [1845],' p. 3 (thesis 1). 
786 Ibid., p. 4 (thesis 4). 
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secular basis’; rather one needed to understand how the ‘secular basis’ apparently ‘lifts off from 
itself and establishes itself as an independent realm in the clouds’.787 And to do this it was 
necessary to reckon with ‘the inner strife and intrinsic contradictoriness of this secular basis’.788 
Marx offered thus a decidedly different ‘inversion’ of Hegel’s idealistic system than 
Feuerbach’s, in which ideas were not resolved into mere reflections of a secular basis, or simply 
dismissed as illusory, but rather understood as themselves moments of the constitution and 
resolution of ‘the inner strife and intrinsic contradictoriness of this secular basis’.789 That is to 
say, that ideas (and, perforce, consciousness) were moments of subjective practice understood 
objectively, i.e. as objects of practice and reflection. In this way Marx did not dismiss ideas or 
consciousness as causally efficacious — as some orthodox Marxists imagine — but rather drew 
attention to the need to explain consciousness with regards to not only its material conditions of 
being, but consciousness as constitutive moment of such, vis-à-vis subjective, human 
practice.790 As he would later phrase this perspective,  
[i]t is, in reality, much easier to discover by analysis the earthly kernel of the misty 
creations of religion than to do the opposite, i.e. to develop from the actual, given 
relations of life the forms in which these have been apotheosized.791  
                                                     
787 Ibid. 
788 Ibid. 
789 Ibid. 
790 For instance, in the 1873 afterword of Capital Vol. 1, Marx wrote, contra Hegel, that ‘the ideal is 
nothing but the material world reflected in the mind of man, and translated into forms of thought’. 
However, pace Lenin’s interpretation of Marx’s reflective ‘materialism’, we cannot understand it without 
reckoning with Marx holding on to the idea of the objectivity of subjective human practice. Thus, a few 
paragraphs after his declaration regarding ideas, Marx wrote, ‘[i]n its mystified [Hegelian] form, the 
dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and glorify what exists. In its 
rational [Marxian] form it is a scandal and an abomination to the bourgeoisie and its doctrinaire 
spokesmen, because it includes in its positive understanding of what exists a simultaneous recognition of 
its negation, its inevitable destruction; because it regards every historically developed form as being in a 
fluid state, in motion, and therefore grasps its transient aspect as well; and because it does not let itself be 
impressed by anything, being in its very essence critical and revolutionary’. That Marx associated the 
‘critical and revolutionary’ with human practice goes without saying; to attribute to him a purely objective 
conception of such ‘negation’ and ‘destruction’, is surely nothing but ‘a scandal and an abomination’. 
Marx, 'Postface to the Second Edition [1873],' pp. 102, 103. 
791 Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1, p. 493, fn. 4 (continued). That even at this late 
date Marx had not completely given up on the critique of ideology, can be gathered not only from this 
quote, but perhaps even more clearly from the immediately following sentences: ‘The latter method is the 
only materialist, and therefore the only scientific one. The weaknesses of the abstract materialism of 
natural science, a materialism which excludes the historical process, are immediately evident from the 
abstract and ideological conceptions expressed by its spokesmen whenever they venture beyond the 
bounds of their own speciality’ (ibid., my emphasis). 
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That Feuerbach had in effect attempted ‘to do the opposite’, resulted in a positivist affirmation 
of precisely the ‘the inner strife and intrinsic contradictoriness’ that Marx argued was at heart of 
the ideological practice and projection of ‘this secular basis’. Here we find the kernel of Marx’s 
method, in his early work as much as his mature. One explains the abstractions of concrete life 
by beginning with the latter; however, it is important to note, in this case, that the abstractions 
of concrete life are a moment of this life itself. That is, they are the ideational forms — true and 
false. The danger Marx identified in Feuerbach’s method, is that it positively valorises the 
concrete in an abstract fashion, i.e. as the concrete, as opposed to the abstract, without paying 
attention to either the real transformations of the ‘concrete’ (crucially, in this regard, via human 
agency), and thus the role of human agency and human abstractions as constitutive moments of 
the concrete. Indeed, Feuerbach misapprehended not only the practical nature of these 
ideological projections (in the sense of being the results of past human practice embedded in 
present practice) but he was unable to reconcile human practice itself with his vision of an 
ideologically falsified object world. Marx accused him of holding to an idealised vision of the 
secular world, one expunged of its historical transformations through human practice.792 Thus, 
not only was he unable to recommend the role played by the human transformation of the object 
world, Feuerbach was also unable to comprehend the real deficiencies of this world, insofar as 
Marx criticised them as the result of the hierarchical division and exclusionary principles of 
ruling classes, and the struggles against such divisions. Thus, Feuerbach could ‘not grasp the 
significance of “revolutionary”, […] “practical-critical” activity’ (i.e. activity that 
comprehended the world and changed it), precisely because he could not conceive of ‘[t]he 
coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change […] as 
revolutionary practice’.793  
                                                     
792 Feuerbach ‘posits “Man” instead of “real historical man”. […] He does not see that the sensuous world 
around him is not a thing given direct from all eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of 
industry and of the state of society; and, indeed [a product] in the sense that it is an historical product, the 
result of the activity of a whole succession of generations, each standing on the shoulders of the preceding 
one, developing its industry and its intercourse, and modifying its social system according to the changed 
needs’. Marx and Engels, 'The German Ideology [1845],' p. 39. 
793 Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach [1845],' pp. 3, 4 (theses 1, 3). 
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In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels posed that, ‘[t]he production of ideas, of 
conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the 
material intercourse of men — the language of real life’.794 However, with the rise of semi-
permanent and then permanent ‘divisions of labour’, abstract hierarchies based upon practices 
began to be introduced into everyday life. Not least, the opposition of the ‘mental’ and the 
‘manual’:   
[The] [d]ivision of labour only becomes truly such from the moment when a division of 
material and mental labour appears. The first form of ideologists, priests, is coincident. 
From this moment onwards consciousness can really flatter itself that it is something 
other than consciousness of existing practice, that it really represents something without 
representing something real; from now on consciousness is in a position to emancipate 
itself from the world and to proceed to the formation of “pure” theory, theology, 
philosophy, morality, etc.795   
For Marx, the establishment of a division of labour in which the conscious direction of this 
labour was largely alienated from its execution (to use SB’s vernacular) was the key to not only 
the establishment and reproduction of hierarchical class societies, but the becoming ideological 
of intellectual activities, as such. It is this sense of consciousness as ‘something other than 
consciousness of existing practice’, as ‘really represent[ing] something without representing 
something real’, as ‘pure’ as opposed to the corruption of the profane, that is essential to Marx’s 
sense of what counts as ‘ideology’ or an ‘ideological reflex’; i.e. that consciousness, intellectual 
activity or the results of such activity are not simply ideological, but rather become ideological, 
under particular conditions. In a similar sense to the critique of ‘representation’ posed above, 
such a conception does not reduce ideas or consciousness to the state of ‘ideology’ or a 
component of ‘ideological superstructures’ (as Marxist orthodoxy does), but rather posed the 
conditions of the formal becoming ideological of intellectual practice.  
                                                     
794 Marx and Engels, 'The German Ideology [1845],' p. 36. 
795 Ibid., p. 44-5. 
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Indeed, and as we have seen contra Feuerbach and ‘German philosophy which descends from 
heaven to earth’, by Marx’s lights one must ‘ascend […] from earth to heaven’ in order to 
understand that ideas become ideological insofar as they are presented in opposition to, or 
divorced from the historical and social conditions of being.796 This ‘ascent’ does not, however, 
discount either the importance of ideas or their role in conscious practice, but rather insists that 
we begin on the basis of their earthly, rather than otherworldly, presence. If we ‘ascend’ from 
the ‘real life-process’ of individuals, we find that their ‘ideas’, ‘real or illusory’, ideological or 
not, are the ‘conscious expression […] of their real relations and activities’.797 Thus by 
considering first ‘consciousness taken as the living individual’, and secondly ‘consciousness 
solely as’ the consciousness of these ‘real living individuals themselves’, the results of such 
consciousness — i.e. ideas — ‘no longer retain the semblance of independence’.798 Marx 
infamously used the image of a camera obscura to illustrate the ‘upside-down’ appearance of all 
ideology, i.e. those conceptions that descend from the heaven of ideas rather than ascend from 
‘real living individuals themselves’. Ideology is ‘inverted’ only in the sense that it takes the 
ideal as its starting point, rather than the conscious, ‘active life-process’ broadly conceived. 
‘Morality, religion, metaphysics, and all the rest of ideology […] have no history, no 
development’ of their own apart from that of ‘men, developing their material production and 
their material intercourse, [who] alter, along with this their actual world, also their thinking and 
the products of their thinking’.799 In this sense ideas (and consciousness) are both products and 
premises of such development, irreducibly a moment of the ‘material life-process, which is 
empirically verifiable and bound to material premises’.800 Thus, when Marx wrote ‘[i]t is not 
consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness’, he did not trivially 
mean that consciousness was the conditioned and life the conditioning, i.e. in the sense which 
he critically identified in Feuerbach and rejected. Rather, he rejected an independent and 
                                                     
796 Ibid., p. 36. 
797 Ibid., p. 36, fn. *. 
798 Ibid., p. 37. 
799 Ibid., pp. 36, 37. 
800 Ibid., p. 36. 
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autonomous determination of consciousness and ideas. Here, then, is the core of Marx’s sense 
of the ‘ideological’.801 
The rejection of the ideology of the political militant 
On the 5th of May 1961 Debord submitted a resignation letter ‘to the participants in the national 
conference of Pouvoir ouvrier’.802 For Debord, what was peculiar about SB/PO was that despite 
its pioneering theoretical critique of the ‘directors and executants’ of bureaucratic state 
capitalism outlined in the Socialisme ou Barbarie journal, not to mention its demands for new 
forms of revolutionary self-organisation, the group had as yet been unable to organise a political 
                                                     
801 That Marx never gave up on his early, critical notion of ideology can be demonstrated by the singular 
notion of the ‘commodity-fetish’ in Capital, albeit a notion largely sidelined by Marxist orthodoxy in the 
century after. In Capital, the ‘mystical character’ of the commodity, chiefly its possession of a quality that 
appear to be ‘supra-sensible or social’ (namely its ‘ability’ to be exchanged with equivalent values), was 
explained by reference to ‘the fact that the commodity reflects the social characteristics of men’s own 
labour as objective characteristics of the products of labour themselves’ (Capital, pp. 164-5). Marx asked: 
‘Whence, then, arises the enigmatic character of the product of labour, as soon as it assumes the form of a 
commodity?’ And he answered: ‘Clearly, it arises from this form itself’ (Capital, p. 164). In a telling 
passage, Marx compared the commodity-fetish to the act of seeing, reminiscent of the passage on 
ideology as akin to a camera obscura in The German Ideology. In the case of the former, ‘the impression 
made by a thing on the optic nerve is perceived not as a subjective excitation of that nerve but as the 
objective form of a thing outside the eye’ (Capital, p. 165). That is to say, the subjective dimensions of 
the object-impression are not only effectively bracketed in the act of seeing, but this act is also reduced — 
as Feuerbach believed — to the object itself. As William Blake one wrote, ‘we are led to believe a lie, 
when we see with not through the eye’ (Auguries of Innocence). Or, as the ‘young’ Marx may have put it, 
the commodity is only conceived as a ‘thing’, ‘only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but not 
as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively’ (Theses on Feuerbach, thesis 1). However, the 
older Marx cautioned against considering the commodity-fetish a purely material or physical relation (i.e. 
considering the commodity as an object possessing qualities additional to its physical qualities), unlike 
that which existed between the perceiving eye, the reflected light and the external object. The commodity 
is at once a physical object and, mysteriously, a ‘supra-sensible’ thing, much like a god or other so-called 
‘objects’ of religious practice. However, as Marx said of these objects, they are nonetheless ‘real’ insofar 
as they are embedded in real practices, are the ‘objects’ of real, sensuous practices, that nonetheless make 
false claims about the objectivity of their ideas. Thus, the mystery of the commodity, and the commodity 
fetish: ‘the commodity-form, and the value-relation of the products of labour within which it appears, 
have absolutely no connection with the physical nature of the commodity and the material [dinglich] 
relations arising out of this. It is nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves which 
assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an 
analogy we must take flight into the misty realm of religion. There the products of the human brain 
appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own, which enter into relations both with each 
other and with the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men's hands. I 
call this the fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour as soon as they are produced as 
commodities, and is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities’ (Capital, p. 165). 
802 ‘Debord took part [in the conference] as per normal, breaking little into the debate, but properly when 
he did. Then, in the end, he announced calmly and firmly to Chaulieu (alias Cardan, alias Castoriadis, 
which is his real name), then to Lyotard and then to all, his intention to resign. All attempts by Chaulieu 
to make him reconsider his decision, this evening and the next day, remained in vain. Chaulieu displayed 
all the treasures of seduction he could; he outlined great perspectives: “if only the group's bureaucratic 
and retrograde defects were transformed, etc., etc.” Debord was listening, without a word. When Chaulieu 
had finished, he only said, “Yes ... but ... I don't feel I'm up to this task,” and also, “It must be very 
exhausting [to build a revolutionary organisation].” And Debord came to the following meeting at “le 
Tambour” cafe, gave his official resignation, payed his contribution for the earlier month and the current, 
and said in a few words that he appreciated that the group existed, but that for himself he had no will to be 
involved in it! He thanked us for all he had learned. And disappeared.’ Guillaume, 'Debord'. 
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expression adequate to its ‘frank self-criticism’.803 Debord attributed this chiefly to the ‘mistrust 
toward any sort of novelty’ in the group’s ‘external work’, singularly manifested in the survival 
within SB/PO of ‘the conception of specialised revolutionary activity, thus of militant 
specialists’ — aka ‘political militants’.804 Despite admirably lacking a permanent bureaucratic 
apparatus — present in organisations like the large, Stalinist French Communist Party (and even 
some of the smaller Trotskyist groups) — the group had nonetheless produced on the basis of its 
adherence to the ‘conception of specialised activity, thus of militant specialists’, an ‘unavowed 
division’ loosely based upon age, but ‘even less useful’: that ‘between teachers and students’.805 
In Debord’s account, the younger ‘rank and file militants’ [militant de base] of the group, 
tended to be the group’s ‘executants’, who carried out the basic tasks of the group, while the 
thinking and direction of the group was left in the hand of those militants apparently more 
qualified.806 And so, in an organisation in which the ‘division of society into directors and 
executants is almost abolished […] it reappears under its corollary aspect of division between 
“actors” and spectators’.807 
In a paper presented to Henri Lefebvre’s research group into everyday life in May 1961, Debord 
began by saying that the ‘study of everyday life would be a perfectly ridiculous enterprise, first 
and foremost condemned to never being able to grasp its object, if one did not explicitly propose 
to study this everyday life with the aim of transforming it’.808 The broader point Debord went on 
to make was that despite the perspectives or prejudices of the researchers involved, the study of 
                                                     
803 Debord, 'Aux participants à la conférence nationale de Pouvoir ouvrier (5 mai 1961),' p. 82. 
804 Ibid., pp. 82, 83. 
805 Ibid., p. 83. 
806 André Girard recalled of Debord’s brief membership that ‘[h]e began not by being spoken of, but by 
carrying out the tasks of a rank and file militant, like operating the mimeograph [la ronéo]’ (Gottraux, 
«Socialisme ou Barbarie» : Un engagement politique et intellectuel dans la France de l’après-guerre, p. 
224, fn. 96). We can assume, then, that Debord’s critique of the division within SB/PO was based 
primarily upon his own experience of the division, as well as his observation of its operation throughout 
the group. Indeed, anyone who has been a member of a militant organisation like SB/PO can speak to 
such internal divisions, in which younger, ‘less experienced’ members sell most of the papers, photocopy 
most of the leaflets and posters, past-up most of the posters, and sit dutifully in meetings while the usually 
older, ‘more experienced’ members engage in rhetorical combat in the meetings and pages of the groups’ 
publications. Of course, there is a sort of ‘progression’ from the base to the commanding heights of the 
organisation, just so long as one is willing to accept this division without qualification. I will only add, 
that in the case of criticising the division within politically ‘militant’ far-left organisations like SB, is 
made here on the basis of my participation in two Trotskyist inspired organisations, over almost a decade 
in the last years of the twentieth century. 
807 Debord, 'Aux participants à la conférence nationale de Pouvoir ouvrier (5 mai 1961),' p. 83. 
808 Debord, 'Perspectives de modification conscientes dans la vie quotidienne,' p. 20. 
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everyday life was necessarily a part of the object of study. Thus, such a study should raise the 
role of the researcher; and indeed, this role, like everyday life itself, should be an object of study 
only insofar as it was simultaneously an object of transformation. Here, we can find resonances 
with Marx’s criticism of Feuerbach. The idea that such ‘roles’ could not, nor should not be 
isolated from the object under consideration (and potential transformation) resonated with the 
growing importance of the critique of ideology. Embedded in Debord’s critique of the role of 
the researcher was an argument that he deployed against the theorists and leaders of political 
groups like SB/PO. Despite the real limitations that such revolutionary groups faced, their 
marginality and relative material poverty, it was still not enough that the role of the militant-
director (and its corollary, the militant-executant), was not criticised, particularly when such a 
role patently reinforced an attitude to activity which impeded revolutionary criticism.  
Towards the end of his presentation to Lefebvre’s research group, Debord raised the question of 
‘the alienation of revolutionary politics itself’.809 For Debord, such alienation arose from the 
specialisation of politics, a specialisation not limited to ‘mainstream’ bourgeois politics. Perhaps 
the obvious example was the large, Stalinist French Communist Party; however, Debord 
considered the explanation for the latter’s alienation as ‘unfortunately more gross’.810 Rather, he 
warned of ‘the possibilities of alienation always re-emerging within the very struggle conducted 
against alienation’ (for instance, as we have seen among the artist members of the SI, in chapter 
three and four, above).811 To this end he emphasised the need to recognise its emergence at the 
‘highest level of research’ (including Lefebvre’s research group as an example of the 
‘philosophy of alienation in its entirety’).812  However, his target encompassed also those 
distinctly anti-Stalinist groupings such as Socialisme ou Barbarie, and, perforce, his own 
Situationist International. Thus, Debord dismissed both ‘revolutionary part[ies] on the 
traditional model’ and ‘avant-garde cultural movements, even [those] having revolutionary 
                                                     
809 Ibid., p. 26. 
810 Ibid. For the SI, as for most of the ultra-left, Stalinism was not an example of revolutionary politics, 
but rather its defeat. 
811 Ibid. 
812 Ibid. 
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sympathies’.813 Rather, it must be ‘the task of a revolutionary organisation of a new type’, 
namely one which would recognise and accept the need to contest alienation (in Marx’s sense of 
the term) within itself as much as within capitalist culture at large.814  
The main thrust of Debord’s criticism was that the real existence of alienated relations within 
SB/PO itself was not something to be endured until the day of revolutionary liberation, but 
rather that it must be as much a target of criticism and projected overcoming as the rest of 
capitalist society. Thus, Debord dismissed those of the ‘wait-and-see attitude’ [attentisme] 
within SB/PO, who imagined that if only the group could grow numerically (i.e. quantitively) 
the real problems that it faced with regard to its organisational culture would be magically 
transformed (i.e. qualitatively changed).815 Instead, Debord counselled the immediate 
confrontation of this problem, whose day of reckoning could not be forever delayed because ‘on 
this side of the qualitative leap, time does not work for the organization, but against it’.816 In this 
sense Debord’s demand was neither a call for the (impossible) elimination of these alienating 
and alienated relations within the group, nor their simple acknowledgment. Rather, his argument 
was for a new revolutionary organisation that accepted its ‘ground’ as the problems of everyday 
life, of the struggle against alienation on the basis of alienation, wheresoever it arose.  
… and the recovery of ideology critique 
If we accept that the object of Marx’s ideology critique was the false autonomy of ideas, rather 
than false ideas as such, we can recognise the homology between his critique and Debord’s 
critique of representation outlined above. Indeed, this conception of ideology critique became 
central to Debord’s concept of spectacle. In The Society of the Spectacle, Debord would write 
that,  
                                                     
813 Ibid., p. 27. 
814 Ibid. 
815 Debord, 'Aux participants à la conférence nationale de Pouvoir ouvrier (5 mai 1961),' p. 85. The idea 
of quantitative growth giving way to qualitative transformation, taken from Frederick Engels’ schematic 
explanation of ‘dialectical’ change, is frequently deployed as a formula, more magical in its invocation 
than explanatory, among the Marxist far-left.  
816 Ibid. Here Debord returned the notion of ‘qualitative change’ vis-à-vis capitalist society to its proper 
meaning, i.e. of revolutionary transformation of the social relation.   
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in the essential movement of the spectacle […] we recognise our old enemy […] the 
commodity. […] It is the principle of commodity fetishism, the domination of society by 
“sensuous things that are at the same time supra-sensible”, that is absolutely realised in 
the spectacle, in which the sensible world finds itself replaced by a selection of images 
which exist above it, while at the same time are recognised as the sensible par 
excellence.817  
The resonances here with Marx’s critique of ideology, and in particular his criticism of 
Feuerbach’s contemplative materialism, are palpable. Debord drew, in essence, a relationship of 
identity between Marx’s early conception of ‘ideology’, and his later conception of the 
‘commodity-fetish’, by speaking of the spectacle as ‘ideology materialised’: 
In the conflictual course of its history, ideology is the basis of the thinking of a class society. 
Ideological facts have never been simple chimeras, but [rather] the deformed consciousness of 
realities, and as such real factors exercising in turn real deforming action; especially since the 
materialisation of ideology brought about by the concrete success of autonomised economic 
production — in the form of the spectacle — practically confuses social reality with an ideology 
which can tailor all of reality on its model.818 
By August 1961 the SI were beginning to more clearly incorporate ‘ideology critique’ into their 
work. For instance, in the sixth issue Vaneigem and Kotányi would write:  
Urbanism does not exist; it is only an “ideology” in Marx’s sense [of the word]. 
Architecture really exists, like Coca-Cola: it is a production coated with ideology, but 
[nonetheless] real, falsely satisfying a falsified need. Whereas urbanism is comparable 
to the advertising displayed around Coca-Cola — pure spectacular ideology. Modern 
Capitalism, which organises the reduction of all social life to spectacle, is incapable of 
                                                     
817 Debord, La Société du Spectacle, theses 35, 36. Debord cites here Marx, from the section in Capital on 
the ‘commodity-fetish’. Cf. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1, p. 165. 
818 Debord, La Société du Spectacle, thesis 212.  
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presenting another spectacle than that of our own alienation. The dream of urbanism is 
its masterpiece.819 
Certainly, the authors grappled here, imperfectly no doubt, with perhaps the most difficult 
aspect of ideology criticism, i.e. that it is the false autonomy of ideas, rather than false ideas as 
such. Nonetheless, the apparent autonomy of ideology from the real conditions of everyday life, 
really falsify such conditions. Bound up with real architectural production, urbanism is 
presented as the ‘pure spectacular advertising’ which in effect sells the real alienation embodied 
in present-day architecture.820 
In the lead editorial article of the same issue, the SI spoke with their recent encounter with 
SB/PO. As in Debord’s letter of resignation, the critique of the ‘militant’ and of ‘specialised 
politics’ was central. By the SI’s reckoning, ‘the greatest difficulty encountered by groups 
seeking to create a new type of revolutionary organisation is the task of establishing new types 
of human relationships within the organisation itself’.821 The SI typified the repeated calls made 
by groups like SB/PO for the ‘participation of all’ as largely ‘abstract and moralistic’ 
considering the real experience of most members being reduced to the role of spectating those 
‘most qualified’ in ‘specialised’ political activity. Thus, in the heart of a group aspiring to 
organise a revolutionary contestation, were ‘the relations of passivity of the old world 
reconstituted’.822 Instead, the SI posed that,  
[t]he creativity and participation of people depends on a collective project which 
explicitly concerns all aspects of real life [vécu]. This is also the only way to “enrage 
the people”, by exposing the enormous contrast between their present poverty and the 
possible construction of life.823 
                                                     
819 Attila Kotányi & Raoul Vaneigem, 'Programme élémentaire du bureau d’urbanisme unitaire,' 
Internationale Situationniste, no. 6 (Août 1961), p. 16. 
820 The SI would later mordantly comment on the ‘captive nature’ embodied in the landscaped ‘reserves 
[…] magnanimously reconstituted by the urbanists’ in large working class housing developments like 
those at Sarcelles, as the false attempt to address the real problem of urban alienation. Internationale 
Situationniste, 'L'absence et ses habilleurs (suite),' Internationale Situationniste, no. 9 (Août 1964), p. 11. 
821 I.S., 'Instructions pour une prise d'armes,' p. 3. 
822 Ibid. 
823 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
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Failing this, revolutionary organisations risked becoming a sort of therapeutic ghetto as 
‘conventional and ultimately as passive as those holiday villages that are the specialised terrain 
of modern leisure’.824 Instead of drawing their organisational ‘poetry from the past’ — and, 
moreover a failed and recuperated past — revolutionaries must rather conceive of their work in 
the present as already engaged in the construction of a yet to be realised future beyond 
alienation.825 Of course such a vision of the revolutionary end informing the present means of 
revolutionary contestation was based upon the critical appropriation of present alienation; thus 
the SI’s conception of the future in the present was grounded in building a collective project 
capable by itself of exposing ‘the enormous contrast between [people’s] present poverty and the 
possible construction of life’.826 This returns us to the question of the Situationist hypothesis, i.e. 
the realisation and supersession of art.  
The following year, shortly after the final break with the artists, the group declared that ‘we 
must recover the Marxian critique of the role of ideologies’.827 Such a recovery was posed 
clearly in opposition to what the SI considered the ideological impasse groups like SB/PO had 
reached: 
The rebellious minorities who survived, in obscurity, the crushing of the classical 
workers’ movement […] saved the truth of this movement, but as an abstract truth of 
the past. […] The formation of new organizations depends on a more profound 
criticism, translated into action. It is a question of breaking completely with ideology, in 
which the revolutionary groups believe that they possess real qualifications [des titres 
positifs] guaranteeing their function […].828 
The preservation of the ‘the truth of this movement’, insofar as it remained the preservation of 
the theory and ‘abstract truth of the past’, could not avoid the risk of becoming ideological. 
Indeed, this is the chief lesson we can draw from Marx’s ideology critique and Debord and the 
                                                     
824 Ibid., p. 4. 
825 Ibid. 
826 Ibid. Suffice to say, such ‘poverty’ (misère) was conceived in the realm of the poor, and irrationally 
constricted use of life amidst rapidly expanding commodity production. 
827 I.S., 'Les mauvais jours finiront,' p. 16. 
828 Ibid., 14-16. 
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SI’s attempt to update it. Even ‘true’ ideas become ideological to the extent that they are 
abstracted from their conditions of possibility, stripped of their ‘sensuous’ entailment, and 
reduced to the merely theoretical (as opposed to the sensuously theoretical, as Marx may have 
put it). Certainly, this is the core claim of Karl Korsch against Marxism, i.e. that Marx’s 
critique, to the extent that it was elaborated apart from the revolutionary situation from which it 
emerged, risked ideologization despite the best efforts of Marx himself. 
Before finishing with the question of ideology and the rediscovery of its original, critical thrust 
by Debord, I want to briefly assay the possibility that this rediscovery was made under the 
influence of Cornelius Castoriadis and SB/PO. I raise this for two reasons: firstly, because 
Castoriadis made a similar ‘recovery’ of the original sense of ideology in his 1964-65 work, 
‘Marxisme et théorie révolutionnaire’; and secondly, because Debord has been accused of 
plagiarising his concept of spectacle from Castoriadis.829 Indeed, even Castoriadis infamously 
accused Debord of such in 1986.830 The claim is fairly easy to dispute. What is remarkable 
about both Castoriadis’ assertion, and those academics who have repeated and elaborated 
Castoriadis’ claim — notably Bernard Quiriny (2003) — is that not only do they ignore that 
Debord’s first formulation of the concept predated his meeting with the Social Barbarian Daniel 
Blanchard by more than two years; more pertinently the work of Castoriadis’ which he was 
supposed to have plagiarised was published more than two years after the Report on the 
Construction of Situations (1957), i.e. in October 1959. For more details on this unfortunate 
episode in “scholarship”, see the brief article ‘Whose Spectacle’ in the appendices, below.  
Nonetheless, in his telling aside on Debord’s purported “plagiarism”, Castoriadis described his 
concept of spectacle in almost an identical fashion to Baudrillard, Nancy and Rancière, i.e. as 
‘appearance of the simulacrum [présentation du simulacre]. The image in place of the truth’.831 
However unlike these critics of Debord, Castoriadis postively affirmed the Platonic sense of his 
notion of ‘mass media […] simulacrum’. However, by phrasing it thus, Castoriadis 
                                                     
829 Cf.  
830 Cf. Cornelius Castoriadis, 'Seminar of April 30, 1986 - Questions,' in On Plato's Statesman, ed. David 
Ames Curtis, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2002. 
831 Ibid., p.169, 170. Translation modified. Castoriadis cited in Quiriny, 'Socialisme ou Barbarie et 
l’Internationale situationniste : notes sur une « méprise »,' p. 57. 
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inadvertently revealed his misapprehension of Debord’s concept, and perhaps more pointedly 
his largely orthodox conception of ideology.  
If we consider that Castoriadis posed his ‘simulacrum’ in explicitly Platonic terms, and the 
extent to which I have attempted to demonstrate the non-mimetic nature of ‘spectacle’ under the 
hand of Debord, it is further interesting to note that Castoriadis’ understanding of ‘ideology 
critique’ lagged behind the Situationists. Certainly, Castoriadis came to understand that 
‘ideology’ had a different sense from the positivistic notion of ideology in orthodox Marxism 
during the 1960s. However, there is no indication in Castoriadis’ writing that he differentiated 
between the orthodox conception of ‘ideology’ and Marx’s sense of ‘ideology critique’ before 
he wrote his long farewell to Marxism, ‘Marxisme et théorie révolutionnaire’ (1964-65). It was 
in the first part of this article, published in April 1964, that Castoriadis first spoke of ‘Marxism 
[…] becom[ing] an ideology in the very sense that Marx gave to this term’.832 However, before 
this insight, Castoriadis appeared to share the orthodox Marxist perspective on ‘ideology’. Thus, 
he previously conflated ideology and culture in an orthodox fashion, in the sense of conceiving 
of ideology as commensurate with the so-called ‘superstructural’ realm of culture.833 He spoke 
of Marxism — favourably — as a ‘revolutionary ideology’ and as ‘the ideological expression of 
the proletariat’s activity’, in the sense of it being its intellectual expression.834 When turning to a 
more thoroughgoing criticism of Marxism, Castoriadis considered the ‘ideological 
degeneration’ consequent upon the incorporation of working-class political and economic 
organisations into the bureaucratic capitalist state, as evidence of the absence of ‘any 
revolutionary ideology or even simply a working-class ideology present on a society-wide scale 
(i.e., not just cultivated in a few sects)’.835 Indeed, when Castoriadis began to take up what we 
would recognise as a perspective redolent of an ‘ideology critique’ around 1963 — coincident 
with the call for a ‘new orientation’ and then split in SB/PO — he still confused ‘ideology’ with 
                                                     
832 Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, p. 11; Paul Cardan [Cornelius Castoriadis], 
'Marxisme et théorie révolutionnaire [part I],' Socialisme ou Barbarie, no. 36 (Avril - Juin 1964), p. 4.  
833 Castoriadis, 'On the Content of Socialism, II [1957],' p. 148. 
834 Castoriadis, 'Proletariat and Organisation, I [1959],' p. 213; Castoriadis, 'Modern Capitalism and 
Revolution [1960-61],' p. 232. 
835 Castoriadis, 'Modern Capitalism and Revolution [1960-61],' p. 295. 
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its orthodox sense.836 Of course, Castoriadis’ confusion does not mark him out from most other 
contemporaries, whether ‘orthodox’ or ‘heterodox’. But what is important regarding the 
foregoing, is that there is no evidence that Castoriadis considered ‘ideology critique’ in the way 
Debord and the SI began to engage and enunciate such from around 1961. Considering the 
centrality of Marx’s ideology critique in the turn from theorising the spectacle as applicable to 
the cultural spectacle to a theory with a more general important (albeit incorporating the earlier 
critical sense of ‘spectacle’), it is hard see how Castoriadis developed the belief that Debord 
plagiarised his notion of the ‘appearance of simulacrum’. Of course, if we consider the patent 
advance Debord had on Castoriadis regarding the recovery of ideology criticism, we can ponder 
the extent to which Castoriadis was possibly the plagiariser of Debord. 
Conclusion 
In the early 1960s among French Marxists — orthodox and heterodox — ‘ideology’ was largely 
understood under the ‘neutral concept of ideology’.837 This meant that ‘ideology’ was used in a 
fashion similar to the early 19th century originators of the term (eg. Destutt de Tracy) rather 
Marx’s critical appropriation of it (one might even say détournement). In the former sense, 
‘ideology’ is a ‘neutral’ term insofar as it is a descriptor for ‘a system of ideas or way of 
thinking pertaining to a class or individual’.838 Thus one could speak of ‘bourgeois ideology’, 
‘socialist ideology’, ‘proletarian ideology’, ‘feminist ideology’, etc. The ‘neutral concept of 
ideology’ was perhaps most forcefully put by Lenin, even though he was restating an idea that 
was already prevalent within Marxist orthodoxy. However, the force of Lenin’s conception was 
precisely the significance attributed to it on the back of the success of the October 1917 
revolution and the ‘Bolshevisation’ of much of the communist workers’ movement in its wake. 
Consequently, Lenin’s conception was read as a more or less accurate reading of Marx’s 
conception, which reduced ‘ideology’ to a descriptor for ideas in opposition to the ‘material’ 
economic base, thus leading ‘to the identification of ideology and “ideas” and therefore 
                                                     
836 Castoriadis, 'For A New Orientation [1962],' pp. 9, 10, 11; Cornelius Castoriadis, 'Recommencing the 
Revolution [1963],' in Cornelius Castoriadis Political and Social Writings Volume 3, 1961-1979, ed. 
David Ames Curtis, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1993, p. 30. 
837 Rehmann, Theories of Ideology: The Powers of Alienation and Subjection. 
838 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Volume 1, A-M, Fifth ed. s.v. "Ideology." 
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overlooking the materiality […] of the ideological’.839 As we have seen, this was in marked 
contrast to Marx’s use of the term.  
Significantly, the SI helped in the recovery of the original sense of ‘ideology criticism’, a 
recovery moreover that has become more readily accessible since their time. And yet such a 
recovery has become eclipsed by the understandable rejection of Marxism. More often than not, 
Marx was thrown out with the old Marxist garbage, a fate unfortunately anticipated in the often-
illuminating work of Cornelius Castoriadis. Castoriadis’ heterodox precedent of conflating 
Marx and Marxism, related to his inability to throw off his orthodoxy in this case, has been 
unfortunately, and farcically, repeated ad nauseum — and with much less nuance or 
justification.   
The Situationist recovery of Marx’s concept of ideology became central to Debord’s elaboration 
of the concept of the spectacle. However, such a recovery is largely overlooked or simply 
ignored, insofar as it is conceived as the reiteration or reassertion of Marxism. The exemplar of 
this is Jean Baudrillard, whose belief that the spectacle was simply a redescription of the 
orthodox Marxist conception of the ‘ideological superstructure’, is remarkably persistent.840 
Unfortunately, Baudrillard’s brief, and largely unjustified criticism (at least in terms of a distinct 
lack of citation) is often repeated without any serious examination of his claim. Certainly, the SI 
did hold to a largely orthodox exception of ‘base/superstructure’, as can be seen in their earlier, 
pre-1961 work. But, as I have demonstrated, even this was problematised with regard to the 
cultural spectacle which was, by turns, conceived as both infra and superstructural. Around 
1961, the critique of ideology, in Marx’s original sense, began to emerge in the work of the SI. 
At this point the group was at a crossroads. On the one hand, it was throwing off its residue 
attachment to artistic practice. On the other hand, Debord’s brief membership of the SB/PO 
group was coming to an end. Indeed, it was the encounter with SB/PO, that proved crucial to 
                                                     
839 Rehmann, Theories of Ideology: The Powers of Alienation and Subjection, p. 9. In this sense Louis 
Althusser is a good Leninist; his idea of ideology being the ‘imaginary relation to real relations’ is an 
unsuccessful attempt to overcome the dualism inherent in Lenin’s account, by redescribing ‘ideas’ (i.e. 
‘ideology’) as an ‘imaginary’ reflection of the ‘real’.   
840 Cf. Baudrillard, The Mirror of Production, pp. 120-21; Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and 
Death, trans. Iain Hamilton Grant, London: Sage Publication Ltd, [1976] 2006, chapter 1, passim.  
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this re-emergence, but not in the sense that some critics have argued (for instance, as the largely 
one-way influence of SB/PO upon the SI). The theoretical debt the SI owed to SB/PO was 
significant and clearly identifiable. However, as we have seen, the SI encountered SB/PO with 
two significant criticisms already under development: the concept of the ‘spectacle’ and the 
critique of ‘situationism’. Both of these notions would prove important to the (re)discovery and 
incorporation of Marx’s early sense of the critique of ideology into the SI’s practice — 
particularly the concept of ‘spectacle’.  
Debord’s détournement of Marx was, firstly, a significant elaboration of the latter’s critical 
conception of ideology, encompassing Marx’s latter conception of the commodity-fetish as, 
essentially, the recasting of his earlier ideology critique in the light of his mature critique of 
commodity wealth. Secondly, Debord used these theories in his attempt to understand the 
considerable development of visual representation in modern capitalism as the intensification 
and even ‘materialisation’ of ideology. As we have seen above, the concept of the spectacle at 
the time of his article written with SB/PO member Daniel Blanchard in 1960, was still largely 
commensurate with the earlier Situationist idea of the ‘cultural spectacle’, and Castoriadis’ 
notion of the privatisation of working class life outside of work and the capitalist process of 
production. However, by the time of his critique of Diesbach’s review of Godard, Debord was 
rapidly moving toward the problematisation of representation under the reign of the commodity-
form — not as the immanent falsehood of representation (most lamentably enunciated by 
Godard himself) but rather as the false or falsifying use of representational forms. What was 
perhaps most significant, at least in terms of the longevity of the relations between the SI and 
SB/PO, was the way Debord associated this critique ultimately with the use of representational 
forms within SB/PO itself, in particular the uncriticised split between those political militants 
who directed and thought the activity of the group, and those political militants who executed 
these directions and consumed such thinking. As Debord, Vaneigem et al., discovered, Marx’s 
critique of the division of intellectual and manual labour, instantiated in class society more 
generally considered, but brought to a sort of miserable perfection under the commodity-
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spectacle, was the real impasse facing revolutionaries, whether moving toward the idea of 
supersession from the perspective of the artistic or political avant-gardes.  
To return to where I began. The ‘Hamburg Theses’ can be considered an attempt to embody this 
perspective, insofar as it was both espoused in the Situationist hypothesis, and transformed 
under the impact of the progression of the debates on art and the encounters with political 
militancy. These ‘Theses’ can be considered as both the objectification of Situationist activity, 
in the sense of its “composition”, and even as the non-spectacular representation of this 
activity, insofar as there was little or no residue left over to be reified as a commodity-
representation (or the potential for such). Nonetheless, the ‘Hamburg Theses’ could and have 
been falsified, as we have seen in chapter one. However, they have so far resisted the 
burgeoning market in Situationist collectibles. And, insofar as they stand as an exemplar of a 
practice that brooks no hierarchical divisions, in terms of direction or execution, they remain a 
singular exemplar of the type of radical practice that is required in the (re)constitution of a 
revolutionary movement.   
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Conclusion: Leaving the nth century… 
Other horrible spectators will come; they will begin from the horizons where 
the Situationists succumbed! — détourned phrase, c. 2017 
Apart from the work of revolutionary contestation — which is no work at all — the key “work” 
of the Situationist International was the ‘Hamburg Theses’. In being this “work”, the ‘Hamburg 
Theses’ was a fitting conclusion of sorts to Malevich’s Suprematist Composition: White on 
White (1918), dissolving the spectator of anti-art in that greater realm of the revolutionary 
critique of everyday. The ‘Hamburg Theses’ cannot be recuperated; certainly, the phrase can be 
bandied around, and made subject to scholarly speculation — as I have done in this thesis. But I 
would argue that this is not a case of recuperation. There are no ‘Hamburg Theses’ to copy; the 
residue left over defeats contemplation as much as mechanical reproduction. At best, we can 
talk about them in their absence, or better yet emulate them in the only way they should be: as 
revolutionary practice.   
In chapter one I discussed the ‘Hamburg Theses’, the mysterious document that was not a 
document. Through an examination of its form and content, and, crucially, the context which 
produced them, I argued that they remain the exemplary “work” of the SI, lost in the alienations 
of time and beyond recuperation. The ‘Hamburg Theses’ were intended as the fulfilment and 
supersession of the artistic and political avant-gardes, ‘the height of avant-gardism’ in Debord’s 
reckoning, the inversion of the cult of emptiness that the Situationists mocked among their 
contemporaries.841 Here the mysteries of supersession were manifested, placed beyond the reach 
of commodity-spectacle, hidden in plain sight. The ‘Hamburg Theses’ were, and remain, 
prolegomena to the realisation of the Situationist hypothesis; a sketch of a possible practice, and 
necessarily concealed in perilous times. The better to keep them from travails of quantification 
in anticipation of the future to come, or not — as the case may be.  
To the extent that I have analysed what little remains of the ‘Theses’, and attempted a partial 
reconstruction, my intention has been one of clarification rather than merely cataloguing or 
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rendering them safe for consumption. What they were not remains their most powerful import: 
not another manifesto, not an opportunity for mere contemplation or consumption. Understood 
thus, the ‘Hamburg Theses’ should figure as an inducement to act, to emulate through 
supersession. Now, we must realise philosophy. 
In chapter two through four, I discussed how the ‘Hamburg Theses’ emerged from the SI’s own 
emergence from and engagement with the artists and artistic avant-gardes of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. By looking at the SI’s practice from 1957 to 1962 I argue that the ‘Hamburg 
Theses’ can be seen as the culmination of active cultural decomposition that Debord criticised. 
In the Situationist sense, they were the détournement of art, philosophy and politics in the 
service of the poetry of everyday life. They were the answer to the question of coherence which 
Debord pursued most single-mindedly through the history of the group from the formulation of 
the Situationist hypothesis. Constant’s interpretation of unitary urbanism imagined the 
framework for a future of play beyond work, but unfortunately bogged down in this imaginary 
as a technical problem. Dim echoes of his perspective propagate through contemporary culture. 
For instance, the “singularitarians” treat humanity as a technical problem, but largely bereft of 
either the poetic sensibility or revolutionary sentiments of Constant. Of the painters, and other 
self-styled “Situationist” artists of the group, most were only capable of a practice that did not 
go beyond the contemporary neo-Dadas, neo-realists and pop-artists that the SI decried as 
exemplars of repetitive decomposition. So many simulacrums of a last hurrah for a truly dead 
art. In answer to their interminable irresolution and tired jokes passed off as assaults on 
bourgeois sensibility, the authors of the ‘Hamburg Theses’ saw off art in the best possible way 
— as realisation and abolition in everyday life. The ‘Hamburg Theses’ were lived as critique 
and contestation — a public secret necessarily available to all.  
In chapters five through six I showed how the ‘Hamburg Theses’, and the practice there 
embodied, also emerged from the SI’s engagement with Marx, with his critical resolution of 
praxis and poiesis as ‘revolutionary practice’. Key to the Situationist détournement of Marx, 
was what they identified as an homology between their critique of cultural decomposition and 
his critique of philosophy, and his proposal thus to supersede philosophy through revolutionary 
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practice — i.e. its realisation and abolition. In his critique of German idealist philosophy, and its 
radicalised Young Hegelian continuation, Marx proposed not only an inversion of the spiritual 
dimensions of this idealism, as Feuerbach did, but rather the recognition that the ‘imaginary 
flowers’ of religion, philosophy and art could be plucked, ‘not so that man shall wear the 
unadorned, bleak chain but so that he will shake off the chain and pluck the living flower’.842 
For Marx, the ideologies of living were not mere falsehoods, but rather real distortions of this 
life, the premises and products of the hierarchal divisions of production, and of the rulers and 
the ruled. ‘Poetry, in the Situationist sense’, or ‘revolutionary practice’ as Marx called it, was 
the solution to these separations; indeed, by his lights and theirs, the objective dimensions of 
subjectivity are implicit in even the most alienated practice. The question for the SI, then, was 
not one of merely doing away with the alienated representations of life, dismissing them like so 
many phantoms or spectres, but rather how one dissipates these really existing illusions by 
realising all that they actually promise and forbid beyond their alienated objectivity. 
In chapter seven, I continued the examination of the importance of Marx, by way of Debord’s 
engagement with Socialisme ou Barbarie, and the détournement and recovery of Marx’s 
ideology criticism in the Situationist concept of the spectacle. Without doubt, the Situationists 
found much that was amenable to their critique of everyday life among the comrades of 
Socialisme ou Barbarie; but they also found the very structures that befuddled their own 
organisation. The ‘serious’ theoretical labours of Socialisme ou Barbarie bore a family 
resemblance to the technical problems of Constant and the pratfalls and repetitive slapstick of 
the artist-Situationists; the ‘social-barbarians’ also failed to confront the spectacular nature of 
their practice, essentially leaving intact capitalist divisions and hierarchies of labour, 
uncriticised and fatally accepted as unavoidable this side of the revolution. Indeed, in this sense 
the encounter with Socialisme ou Barbarie was as pivotal as the final confrontation with many 
of the artists in the SI — perhaps more so. Socialisme ou Barbarie proved to be an example of 
the possibility of developing a critical perspective beyond the bureaucratic conceptions of 
orthodox Marxism, much like the early SI was an example of the possibility of outlining a 
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perspective beyond the repetitive “avant-gardes” of the 1950s. Where they both failed was 
related to their incapacity to subject their own practice to the same critical insight reserved for 
the “external” world of capitalist hierarchy and alienation. Unfortunately, those social-
barbarians who agreed with Debord, proved incapable of rising to the challenge of transforming 
Socialisme ou Barbarie into a revolutionary organisation.  
All of this shows that the concern for the SI of finding a practice that was, by turns, informed by 
the artistic and political avant-gardes, was played out from the beginning of the group, and 
formed an important part of the search for coherence throughout its first and second phases, 
even if this coherence proved elusive until the pivot of the ‘Hamburg Theses’, and the break of 
1962. Thus, even though we can — and must — take note of, and even sometimes emphasise, 
the breaks of the SI, we need to pay more attention to the continuity through the Situationist 
hypothesis and the more developed concept of the spectacle by way of the ‘Hamburg Theses’.  
By understanding this continuity, we come to a better understanding of the concept of spectacle, 
how it emerged from its more rudimentary form in the early Situationist hypothesis, and moved 
to a position of being the central critical focus of the SI. Thus, my thesis is an account of the 
coming to be of the concept of spectacle, insofar as the ‘Hamburg Theses’ are a misplaced key 
to the transformation of the Situationist hypothesis from being primarily a critique of the artistic 
spectacle to a critique of the commodity spectacle.  
Understanding the emergence of a more nuanced sense of spectacle from an earlier, more 
‘orthodox’ conception, means that we can avoid the mistakes of those critics, such as Jean 
Baudrillard, Jean-Luc Nancy and Jacques Rancière, who tend to understand the concept of the 
spectacle — in the form in which it is presented in The Society of the Spectacle (1967) —  as a 
Feuerbachian gesture, conflating it with the orthodox conception of ‘ideological 
superstructures’. Similarly, we can avoid reducing it to merely a criticism of the cultural 
spectacle, of the so-called ‘ideological superstructure’, such as we find in McKenzie Wark, Tom 
McDonough et al. Indeed, this perspective is similar to those that criticise the SI for its 
purported Platonism; however, unlike Nancy, Rancière, et al., the art-centric critics positively 
valorise this purported Platonism, rather than rejecting it. Finally, we can avoid the dead end of 
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seeing in the spectacle merely a re-write of a Marxist political critique, rather than the critique 
of political alienation, Marxist or otherwise. Instead, we can draw attention to the way the 
Situationists, particularly after 1961, understood their project. As realisation and abolition of the 
political and artistic avant-gardes, as revolutionary contestation and supersession.  
In 1963, in the brochure accompanying the Situationist exhibition, Destruction of RSG-6 (itself 
clear proof that the production of art did not suddenly end in the SI in 1962), Debord wrote of 
the Situationist project as constituting the ‘supersession of art’ (dépassement de l’art). 
Considering the importance that the SI placed on this notion, and the entailed recovery of 
artistic, political and philosophical ‘research’, Debord wrote, 
one should understand that when we speak of a unified vision of art and politics, this 
absolutely does not mean that we are recommending in any way a subordination of art 
to politics. For us, and for all those who have begun to regard this era in a demystified 
manner, there is no longer any modern art, in exactly the same way there is no longer a 
constituted revolutionary politics, anywhere [in the world], since the end of the 1930s. 
Today, their return can only be their supersession, that is to say, the realisation of 
precisely what had been their most fundamental demands.843  
The positive negation of art and politics, that is their supersession through the revolutionary 
transformation of capitalism, remains ‘unrealised’. Nonetheless, and in contrast to the world the 
Situationists confronted before 1968, the world after 1968 has moved to undermine such 
contestation by conceding many of the demands of the SI, but in a solely spectacular fashion. 
As Debord would mordantly note in the document that saw the close of the SI, after the eruption 
of 1968 ‘the language of power has become wildly reformist’.844 Thus, the simulation of their 
critique of everyday life — perhaps we can call it a realised ‘situationism’ — appeared in the 
wake of 1968, by way of the recuperation and insinuation of Situationist “inspired” practices, 
carved-up and sold back to us as a means of “resolving” the ‘work-life balance’. But, in truth, 
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there is no justice to be found in such an impossible performance; work is not so much balanced 
as submitted to. Similarly, there is little “self-actualisation” or realisation to be found in today’s 
ghettoes of leisure and hobbies, any more than there were in the less complex, more obviously 
“plastic” varieties the SI confronted before the late 1960s. To détourn an old anti-war slogan 
from the First World War, there is a worker on either end of a commodity. This is even more so 
the case today, than in the 1960s, even if these often paltry “weapons” have proliferated and 
further submitted us to the rule of the commodity-form. Nonetheless, we can still détourn them 
and turn them on the bosses and cops that keep us in our place, even those that reside within us.  
* 
We will not work on the spectacle of the end of the world, but for the end of the world  
of the spectacle. — Situationist International, 1959 
In Jorge Luis Borges’ The Library of Babel, every book that ever will be written can be found, 
no matter how meaningless. Indeed, I would dare say that Dada-like gibberish fills up the bulk 
of its infinite series, (even if by speaking of the bulk of the infinite I have merely added to this 
noisy gibber). No doubt the ‘Hamburg Theses’ would turn up endlessly in its references and 
catalogues. But on none of its impossible shelves would you find a copy. The ‘Hamburg 
Theses’, cannot be encompassed in a Borgesian list. It is not a machine of production, or a 
conceptual trick like one of Raymond Queneau’s poem-engines, grinding out its pointlessness 
over the centuries. The ‘Hamburg Theses’ is a lost fable that is truly lost, a singular rumour of 
its disappearance.  
A few days after the expulsion of the bulk of the artists from the SI, Debord wrote to Raoul 
Vaneigem that, ‘we agreed not to write the “Hamburg Theses”, so as to impose all the better the 
central meaning of our entire project in the future. Thus, the enemy cannot feign to approve it 
without great difficulty.’845 To the unwary the ‘Hamburg Theses’ were a sort of trap, at once 
strangely present and beyond the reach of the most determined of researchers. For the SI, in 
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opposition to contemporary artistic and political practice, the practice of being a revolutionary 
was necessarily more important than the results of such a practice. Which is to say, to the extent 
that such practices become objectified as so many ‘works’, ‘manifestoes’, ‘theses’, etc., is the 
extent to which the apparent results of such activity can be separated from the process of their 
production and alienated as cultural commodities. In the refusal to set down the ‘Hamburg 
Theses’ for all time, the SI took a stand against the increasing complicity — consciously or not 
— of critical intellectuals in the development and consolidation of the commodity-spectacle. 
To shape our evanescent lives, make our ephemeral gestures count for more than so many 
passing spectacles among the spectacle — this is one of the demands of the ‘Hamburg Theses’. 
The original Situationist project reached its ambiguous conclusion in 1968 and its immediate 
aftermath. Debord would later compare it to a doomed charge, the Light Brigade of 
revolutionary contestation.846 As the ranks were cut down the careening pace carried them on 
until no one was left on the field. Only the memory of this assault remained. The question today 
is not one of repeating the Situationists, but rather the supersession of the past to which we must 
leave them, and from which they desired more than most to escape. The Situationists spoke of 
leaving the twentieth century behind. They also marked their ground upon the unresolved 
contradictions of the nineteenth century. Just as Marx said that the coming revolution cannot 
draw its poetry from the past, but rather from the future, we must continue to make this call as 
surely as we remain stuck in the problematic inherited from Marx’s present — the 
intensification and extension of industrialism and its alleged ‘post-industrial’ workhouses. 
Today, we must leave not just the nineteenth and twentieth, but all the centuries that mark us 
with the signs of our self-made incarceration throughout time and space. 
*** 
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Appendix one: The Hamburg Theses of September 1961 
 
The Hamburg Theses of September 1961 
(Note to serve in the history of the Situationist International)847 
The “Hamburg Theses” [“Thèses de Hambourg”] surely constitutes the most mysterious of all 
the documents that emanated from the SI; among which many have been widely reproduced, 
while others have been distributed discretely. 
The “Hamburg Theses” were evoked several times in situationist publications, but a single 
citation was never given. For example, in Internationale Situationniste no. 7, pages 20, 31 and 
47; plus indirectly in I.S. no. 9, page 3 (in the title of the editorial “Now, the SI”); and also in 
the still unpublished contributions of Attila Kotányi and Michèle Bernstein to the debate 
concerning A. Kotanyi's programmatic propositions in 1963. The “Theses” are mentioned 
without commentary in the “table of works cited” (page 99) of Raspaud and 
Voyer’s L’Internationale situationniste (protagonistes, chronologie, bibliographie) [1972]. 
In fact, the “Theses” were some conclusions, voluntarily kept secret, of a theoretical and 
strategic discussion that concerned the entirety of the conduct of the SI. This discussion took 
place during two or three days at the beginning of September 1961, in a series of randomly 
chosen bars in Hamburg, between G. Debord, A. Kotányi and R. Vaneigem, who were 
travelling thus on the return trip from the Vth Conference of the SI, which took place in 
Göteborg from the 28th to the 30th of August.848 Alexander Trocchi, who was not present in 
Hamburg, would subsequently contribute to the “Theses.” Deliberately, with the intention of 
leaving no trace that could be observed or analysed from outside of the SI, nothing concerning 
this discussion and what it had concluded was ever written down. It was then agreed that the 
simplest summary of its rich and complex conclusions could be expressed in a single phrase: 
“Now, the SI must realise philosophy.” Even this phrase was not written down. Thus, the 
conclusions were so well hidden that they have remained secret up until the present. 
The “Hamburg Theses” have had a considerable importance, in at least two respects. First, 
because they mark the most important choice made [qu’elles datent la principale option] in the 
history of the SI. But also as an experimental practice: from the latter point of view, the 
“Theses” were a striking innovation in the succession of artistic avant-gardes, who hitherto had 
all given the impression of being eager to explain themselves. 
The summarised conclusions evoked a celebrated formula of Marx in 1844 (in his Contribution 
to the Critique of Hegel Philosophy of Right [— Introduction]). At that moment, it meant that 
we should no longer pay the least importance to any of the conceptions of revolutionary groups 
that still survived as heirs of the old social emancipation movement destroyed in the first half of 
our century; and therefore that we should instead count on the SI alone to relaunch as soon as 
possible a time of contestation, by revitalising all of the starting points which were established 
in the 1840s.849 Once established this position did not imply the coming rupture with the artistic 
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“right” of the SI (who feebly wanted to continue or only repeat modern art), but rendered it 
extremely probable. We can thus recognise that the “Theses of Hamburg” marked the end of the 
first era of the SI — that is research into a truly new artistic terrain (1957-61) — as well as 
fixing the departure point for the operation that led to the movement of May 1968, and what 
followed.  
On the other hand, considering only the experimental originality (that is to say the absence of 
any written “Theses” [rédaction des « Thèses »]) the subsequent socio-historical application of 
this formal innovation is equally remarkable — of course only after it had been subjected to a 
complete reversal. In fact little more than twenty years later you could see that the process had 
encountered an unusual success in the highest bodies of many States. We now know that truly 
vital conclusions — [whose authors are] loath to inscribe them on computer networks, tape 
recordings or telex, and even wary of typewriters and photocopiers — often having been drafted 
in the form of handwritten notes are simply learned by heart. The draft is immediately 
destroyed. 
This note was written specifically for the Thomas Y. Levin, who so tirelessly raced around the 
world to find traces of the effaced art of the Situationist International, as well as its various 
other historic infamies. 
Guy Debord 
November 1989 
________________________________________ 
‘After the closing of the final session, the Conference ended in a much more constructive 
celebration, for which, unfortunately, there is no record [procès-verbal]. This celebration wound 
down into a drift [dérive] departing across the Sound, continuing on to the port of Frederikshavn 
— and for others extending on to Hamburg.’  — Internationale Situationniste. 'La Cinquième 
Conférence de l’I.S. à Göteborg.' Internationale Situationniste, no. 7 (Avril 1962), pp. 25-31. 
  
                                                                                                                                                           
‘therefore that we should instead no longer count on the SI alone to relaunch as soon as possible a time of 
contestation’. I had used such renderings unquestioning (for instance in my article ‘Three Situationists 
walk into a bar: or, the peculiar case of the Hamburg Theses’, Axon: Creative Explorations, no. 8), and 
indeed the fault of this use lies only with myself. Thanks to Tom Bunyard, I was alerted to my error. 
Nonetheless, I have not been able to shake off completely the ambiguity of this sentence. It makes sense 
that after deciding ‘that we should no longer pay the least importance to any of the conceptions of the 
revolutionary groups that still survived’, the SI would ‘count on’ itself ‘alone to relaunch as soon as 
possible a time of contestation’ [my emphasis].  I believe that my confusion in this regard was produced 
by the corollary belief that the SI also began to see its project as emerging directly from the lived 
experience of alienated, everyday life — i.e. that ‘Situationist theory is in people like fish are in water’ — 
I.S., 'Du rôle de l’I.S.,' p. 17. Thus I thought it was reasonable that the SI would no longer count on itself 
alone. However, upon reflection, this conclusion makes no sense; further, the comment of Debord was 
pointedly aimed at what he perceived as the failure of other ultra-left groups like Socialisme ou Barbarie 
and to a lesser extent the Arguments group. 
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Appendix two: The Next Step 
 
The Next Step (L’étape suivante)850 
Attila Kotányi 
(Second version, March 1963) 
After intensive discussions which took place between 10 and 18 October 1961 in Hamburg, we 
came to the general conclusion that: 
1. Specialists of thought, logic, language and artistic language of dialectics and philosophy, had 
basically abandoned or had not inherited the main themes, results, historical ambitions of 
boldness in the critical, methodical hopes, dreams and wishes of their predecessors; 
2. For these reasons, we were forced to adopt the following hypothesis: in every man in 
industrialized countries, one can discover in one form or another, an obvious desire for an 
interesting daily life and criticism - formulated by us - its staging, although this aspiration and 
this criticism is largely suppressed. 
We cannot say that before October 1961 we felt isolated, as this may seem normal to other 
avant-garde groups. We spent those years in good company, at positions away from world 
experts (see paragraphs 1-7 of the Situationist International magazine), having been neither 
more nor less that perspective, for example, isolated artist, that is to say, the prospect of one day 
finding a wider echo. In October 1961, the level of expectation of our outlook rose sharply, as 
we have known and recognized our "isolation" as a moment contained in all forms of 
experience. (Moment: crisis meeting or second?) 
The next step in the SI is to draw a clear conclusion from this sudden transformation of 
probability. 
The conclusion we have drawn: if so, despite any appearance and any proof to the contrary, our 
existence is provable, then we must demonstrate it and we attach ourselves to. 
  
                                                     
850 Translated by Anthony Hayes 
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Appendix three: Whose spectacle?  
 
Infamously, Cornelius Castoriadis accused Debord, in 1986, of stealing the concept of the 
spectacle: 
As for the mass media, and to remain within the Platonic vocabulary, I would file them 
under the heading: appearance of the simulacrum [présentation du simulacre]. The 
image in place of the truth. This is now something well established. I myself argued all 
that as early as 1959, in a text on modern capitalism [i.e. ‘Modern Capitalism and 
Revolution] […] [w]hat comrade Debord Frenchified and plagiarised when talking 
about the “society of the spectacle”.851 
Perhaps what first emerges from the foregoing, considering our discussion of Debord’s concept 
above, is that Castoriadis holds precisely to a concept of mimetic falsehood, unlike Debord. 
However, we will put that aside for the moment in order to consider Castoriadis’ claim. 
Castoriadis dated his conception of the mass media, i.e. the ‘appearance of the simulacrum’, 
from ‘as early as 1959’. However, if we examine Castoriadis’ work, the term ‘simulacrum’ 
[simulacre] does not appear before 1963. When it did appear, Castoriadis used it in his 
recapitulation of his conception of the modern ‘depoliticization’ and ‘privatization’ of the 
working class:  
This privatization [privatisation] of the working class and even of all other social strata 
is the combined result of two factors: on the one hand, the bureaucratization of parties 
and unions distances these organizations from the mass of laboring people; on the other, 
rising living standards and the massive proliferation of new types of consumer objects 
and new consumer life-styles provide them with the substitute for and the simulacrum 
of reasons to live [le simulacre de raisons de vivre]. This phase is neither superficial nor 
accidental. It expresses one possible destiny of present-day society. If the term 
barbarism has a meaning today, it is neither fascism nor poverty nor a return to the 
Stone Age. It is precisely this “air-conditioned night mare,” consumption for the sake of 
consumption in private life, organization for the sake of organization in collective life, 
as well as their corollaries: privatization, withdrawal, and apathy as regards matters 
shared in common, and dehumanization of social relationships.852 
Castoriadis conceived of the ‘privatisation’ of the working class as related to their ‘de-
politicisation’, i.e. the ‘apathy or indifference to political matters’ of the working class was a 
direct result of the ‘the bureaucratization of parties and unions’ and ‘the massive proliferation of 
new types of consumer objects and new consumer life-styles’.853 Castoriadis considered such 
‘de-politicisation’ as ‘characteristic of all modern countries for the past fifteen years’ (i.e. since 
the end of the Second World War); a factor, moreover, whose significance held important 
                                                     
851 Castoriadis, 'Seminar of April 30, 1986 - Questions,' p.169, 170. Translation modified. Castoriadis 
cited in Quiriny, 'Socialisme ou Barbarie et l’Internationale situationniste : notes sur une « méprise »,' p. 
57. 
852 Castoriadis, 'Recommencing the Revolution [1963],' pp. 46-47. Translation modified; Socialisme ou 
Barbarie [Cornelius Castoriadis], 'Recommencer la révolution,' Socialisme ou Barbarie, no. 35 (Janvier - 
Mars 1964), pp. 27-28. 
853 Castoriadis, 'Modern Capitalism and Revolution [1960-61],' p. 231; Paul Cardan [Cornelius 
Castoriadis], 'Le mouvement révolutionnaire sous le capitalisme moderne [part I],' Socialisme ou 
Barbarie, no. 31 (Décembre 1960 - Février 1961), p. 57; Castoriadis, 'Recommencing the Revolution 
[1963],' p. 46. 
310 
 
ramifications for both political practice and Marxism.854 We can recognise here a certain 
resonance with what Debord conceptualised, in the article co-written with the Social-Barbarian 
Daniel Blanchard, as ‘the spectacle’ through which the relations between people are dominated 
‘outside of work’.855 However, I am not concerned here with whether or not Debord either 
derived the idea of a spectacle beyond work, or enriched his concept of the spectacle via a 
reading of Castoriadis. Without doubt, Debord benefited from an engagement with Castoriadis 
and SB/PO. And, indeed, Castoriadis had been working on his entailed concepts of 
‘privatisation’ and ‘de-politicisation’ since at least 1959. However, as we have seen above, 
Debord had begun to conceptualise the spectacle as a crucial aspect of modern society from at 
least 1957, when he wrote of the ruling classes development of ‘a vast industrial sector of 
leisure [activities] that is an incomparable instrument for stupefying the proletariat with the by-
products of the mystifying ideology and tastes of the bourgeoisie’.856  
The significance of Debord’s observation here lay with his early conceptualisation of the 
‘spectacle […] of non-intervention’, rather than his observations of the development of ‘leisure’ 
activities. In the late 1950s more and more leftist thinkers were turning toward the criticism of 
the patently new phenomenon of the mass market in commodities aimed at a working class in 
their leisure away from work. What differentiated the SI and SB/PO from the majority of such, 
was their largely negative conceptualisation of this phenomenon; that it constituted a loss of 
possibility not an enrichment, even as the vast wealth and technical array itself appeared to 
demonstrate the possibility of its opposite — a world beyond wage-labour and capitalist 
hierarchy. Thus, and in stark contrast to those critics that only saw the satisfaction of needs, 
Castoriadis and Debord saw the way modern capitalism provoked needs rather than satisfied 
them. As Debord and Blanchard put it in 1960,  
capitalist consumption imposes a movement of the reduction of desires through the 
regularity of the satisfaction of artificial needs, which remain needs without ever having 
been desires — authentic desires being constrained to remain at the stage of their non-
realisation (or compensated in the form of spectacles).857 
To return to Castoriadis’ 1986 claim. Apart from a certain symmetry and mutual influence 
marked by Debord and Blanchard’s 1960 article, there is no clear evidence that Castoriadis 
spoke of ‘the simulacrum of reasons to live [le simulacre de raisons de vivre]’ before 1963. 
Indeed, this term, deployed as it is with regard to ‘the massive proliferation of new types of 
consumer objects and new consumer life-styles’, is striking for its resemblance to the 
Situationist critique of ‘consumer objects and […] lifestyles’.858 For instance, during the early 
months of Debord’s membership of SB/PO, the group would write that, 
Abundance, as [a] human future, cannot be an abundance of objects, even of past 
“cultural” objects or ones created on that model, but [rather] an abundance of situations 
(of life and dimensions of life). Within the current framework of consumerist 
propaganda, the fundamental mystification of advertising is to associate ideas of 
happiness with objects (televisions, or garden furniture, or automobiles, etc.), 
                                                     
854 Castoriadis, 'Modern Capitalism and Revolution [1960-61],' pp. 231-32. 
855 Canjuers and Debord, 'Preliminaires pour une definition de l'unite du programme revolutionnaire [20 
juillet 1960],' p. 515 (thesis 7). 
856 Debord, 'Rapport sur la construction des situations et sur les conditions de l'organisation et de l'action 
de la tendance situationniste internationale [1957],' p. 324. 
857 Canjuers and Debord, 'Preliminaires pour une definition de l'unite du programme revolutionnaire [20 
juillet 1960],' p. 514 (part I, thesis 6). 
858 Castoriadis, 'Recommencing the Revolution [1963],' p. 46. 
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furthermore breaking the natural link these objects can maintain with others, in order to 
make them, above all, constitute a material environment with “status” [haut standing]. 
[…] [W]hen advertising is dealing with a real passion, it is only adverting a 
spectacle.859 
Here, we can already detect the critique of ‘situationism’ giving way to the critique of ideology. 
However, the contrast of an ‘abundance of situations’ with an ‘abundance of [commodity] 
objects’ is striking. Even more is the prescient description of ‘a material environment with 
“status” [haut standing]’ that is nothing more than an ‘imposed image of happiness [that] also 
constitutes the explicitly terrorist nature of advertising’.860 In the same month the SI published 
this, the first part of Castoriadis’ ‘Modern Capitalism and Revolution’ was published in 
Socialisme ou Barbarie. Of course, Castoriadis’ article (or at least the first two parts) had been 
available in an Internal Bulletin published in 1959 and 1960. We can consider Debord, a 
member of SB/PO from the ‘summer of 1960’, as having access to this Bulletin’s (if not before 
via Daniel Blanchard). Without doubt, we are struck by the similar concerns of Castoriadis and 
the SI, but also the difference of expression: 
In its present stage, bureaucratization has extended far beyond the spheres of 
production, the economy, the State, and politics. […] Consumption has become the 
object of an ever more refined and intensive practice of manipulation. […] Even leisure 
is becoming bureaucratized. An increasing degree of bureaucratization in the world of 
culture is inevitable in the present context. Even if the “production” of culture has not 
become an organized, collective activity, its promotion and propagation have become so 
to an immense degree (the press, publishing, radio, cinema, television, etc.).861  
Castoriadis and the SI were speaking of similar processes.862 The SI highlight the ‘terrorism’ of 
advertising (an idea later taken up by Jean Baudrillard) in its construction of a ‘material 
environment’ of ‘status’ associated with consumption — what the SI identify as a ‘spectacle’, in 
a fashion redolent of Marx’s sense of ideology. In Castoriadis it is the idea of 
‘bureaucratisation’ beyond the sphere of production, of leisure, and of culture. However, at this 
point there is no sense in Castoriadis of its ideologization, of the spectacularisation of life in 
advertising and culture more widely considered. However, this would come, and I believe under 
the direct influence of SB/PO’s encounter with the SI. 
                                                     
859 Internationale Situationniste, 'La frontière situationniste,' Internationale Situationniste, no. 5 
(Décembre 1960), pp. 7-8. The SI would reprint this quote under the title ‘Consumption and the spectacle 
of its presentation’ (La consommation et sa mise en spectacle). Above the title and the quote, an ad for 
alcoholic cider was illustrated with the image of young heterosexual couples at a party, dancing, listening 
to music, talking, all smiling, with the title ‘Yes, that’s right, they are drinking Cider Doux’. Cf. 
Internationale Situationniste, 'Critique de l'urbanisme,' Internationale Situationniste, no. 6 (Août 1961), p. 
10. 
860 I.S., 'La frontière situationniste.' 
861 Castoriadis, 'Modern Capitalism and Revolution [1960-61],' p. 272. Paul Cardan [Cornelius 
Castoriadis], 'Le mouvement révolutionnaire sous le capitalisme moderne (suite) [part II],' Socialisme ou 
Barbarie, no. 32 (Avril-Juin 1961), p. 101. 
862 In the same issue, the SI used a quote from Castoriadis first published, coincidently, the same month 
the SI was formed (July 1957). Illustrating the quote, was a page from Debord and Asger Jorn’s 
Memoires, a work of painting and détournement. The insinuation is that Memoires has become, insofar as 
it is a ‘past “cultural” object’, another commodity in the commodity-spectacle. However, even the 
recuperation of the most apparently benign object dissimulates the antagonistic reality of its production: 
‘Those who look only at the surface of things see only a commodity as a commodity. They don't see in it 
a crystallized moment of the class struggle. They see faults or defects, instead of seeing in them the 
resultant of the worker's constant struggle with himself. Faults or defects embody the worker's struggles 
against exploitation’ Castoriadis, 'On the Content of Socialism, II [1957],' p. 116. 
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Echoing Castoriadis’ 1986 claim, Bernard Quiriny has more recently argued that Debord 
‘forged’ his concept of the spectacle as a direct result of his encounter with SB/PO and 
Castoriadis.863 His prime source is Christophe Bourseiller’s gossipy 1999 biography, in which 
Bourseiller writes that Debord first wrote on the concept of ‘spectacle’ in an article published in 
the December 1959 issue of Internationale Situationniste.864 On this basis, and using Daniel 
Blanchard’s 1995 published memories of his meetings with Debord, in which Blanchard said he 
met Debord in the ‘autumn of 1959’, i.e. before the December 1959 publication with the article 
on the concept of ‘spectacle’, Quiriny argues that Debord ‘forged’ his concept of ‘spectacle’ as 
a direct result of Castoriadis’ influence (and, in particular, the publication of the first part of the 
draft of ‘Modern Capitalism and Revolution’ in October 1959).865 Additionally, Quiriny notes 
that Castoriadis used the term ‘spectacle’, in a Debordian sense, in ‘Modern Capitalism and 
Revolution’. Even though he notes that Castoriadis did not ‘explicitly employ’ the term in his 
October 1959 draft, nonetheless ‘it is quite probable that it is through contact with S[ocialisme]. 
ou B[arbarie]. and Castoriadis that Guy Debord “discovered” the concept [of spectacle]’, and 
thus ‘to Castoriadis […] he owes the intuition of the concept which was the fortune of his 
thought —  that of the “spectacle”.’866   
First, Bourseiller is wrong about the first appearance of the concept of ‘spectacle’ in Debord’s 
work. As we have seen, Debord elaborated upon the ‘spectacle’ in his June 1957 published 
Report on the Construction of Situations.867 Further, the ‘spectacle’ in the sense of the ‘principle 
of […] non-intervention’ outlined in the 1957 Report…, appeared in at least four articles across 
the first two issues of Internationale Situationniste (June and December 1958).868 Certainly, the 
concept is developed rapidly in the midst of Debord’s contact with SB/PO over 1960 and 1961, 
in contrast to the articles between 1957 and 1959. Nonetheless, to believe that it was 
‘discovered’ or intuited as a result of contact with Castoriadis after October 1959 is simply 
false. Secondly, it is hard to say exactly when Blanchard met Debord. In Blanchard’s 1995 
reminiscences, he wrote that he first came across the third issue of the Internationale 
Situationniste in the ‘autumn 1959’.869 However, there are internal inconsistences with his 
account. For instance, he confuses the content of the fourth issue of the journal, published in 
June 1960, with the third published in December 1959.870 Debord, writing in a letter in 1961, 
told his correspondent that Blanchard had ‘made contact with the SI in Paris […] last year’ — 
i.e. 1960. 871 If we consider that Debord and Blanchard published their collaborative work in 
July 1960, then it is safe to assume that Blanchard most likely first stumbled upon the third 
                                                     
863 ‘In fact, it is not improbable that it was the contact with social-barbarian conceptions that Debord 
“forged’ this idea – to reuse a word of Bourseiller.’ (Quiriny, 'Socialisme ou Barbarie et l’Internationale 
situationniste : notes sur une « méprise »,' p. 49.). Quiriny uses ‘forgé’ (forged) whereas Bourseiller 
actually speaks of Debord as a “forgeron”, i.e. as a “blacksmith” (Bourseiller, Vie et mort de Guy Debord 
1931-1994, p. 166). No doubt Quiriny was keen to evoke the English associations with ‘forged’, i.e. that 
the Debord’s elaboration is merely a copy of Castoriadis’ work. 
864 Bourseiller, Vie et mort de Guy Debord 1931-1994; Quiriny, 'Socialisme ou Barbarie et 
l’Internationale situationniste : notes sur une « méprise ».' 
865 Blanchard, 'Debord, in the Resounding Cataract of Time'; Castoriadis, 'Modern Capitalism and 
Revolution [1960-61],' translator's note, p. 226. 
866 Quiriny, 'Socialisme ou Barbarie et l’Internationale situationniste : notes sur une « méprise »,' pp. 51, 
49. 
867 Debord, 'Rapport sur la construction des situations et sur les conditions de l'organisation et de l'action 
de la tendance situationniste internationale [1957],' p. 325. 
868 Cf. I.S., 'Avec et contre le cinéma.'; I.S., 'Problèmes préliminaires à la construction d’une situation.'; 
I.S., 'Les souvenirs au-dessous de tout.'; I.S.,'Sur nos moyens et nos perspectives.' 
869 Blanchard, 'Debord, in the Resounding Cataract of Time'. 
870 ‘looking through this perfectly singular booklet, I discovered […] the illustrated description of a 
fantastic place called the “Yellow City”.’ ibid. 
871 Debord, 'Lettre à J.-L. Jollivet, 8 décembre 1961,' p. 113.  
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issue of Internationale Situationniste over the summer of 1959-60 (no earlier than December 
1960). This clearly puts the published discussion of the concept of the ‘spectacle’ before 
Debord’s meeting with Blanchard.872  
However, it is Quiriny’s third assertion that is most extraordinary. In fact, despite Quiriny 
believing that is adds to his evidence against Debord and ‘his’ concept, it reveals rather the 
extent to which Debord influenced Castoriadis. Recall that Quiriny, drawing upon Bourseiller’s 
faulty dating of the first instance of ‘spectacle’ in Debord’s work to December 1959, puts 
forward the possibility that Debord ‘forged’ this concept upon a reading of Castoriadis’ October 
1959 draft of his article ‘Modern Capitalism and Revolution’. Here is a part of Castoriadis draft, 
which Quiriny quotes in defence of his assertion: 
modern capitalist society […] succeeds in destroying the socialisation of individuals as 
political socialisation. A society in which the individuals perceive themselves more and 
more as private individuals and behave as such; […] A society in which the “public 
thing” or more exactly the “social thing” is seen not only as strange or hostile, but as 
escaping our action; which thus throws men back to the “private life” or to a “social 
life” in which society as such is not put in question. […]873 
Certainly, this passage is of a piece with Castoriadis’ conceptions of ‘de-politicisation’ and his 
latter notion of ‘privatisation’ — two conception that were patently influential upon Debord. 
Quiriny notes that Castoriadis did not use the term ‘spectacle’ in this draft, however he proceeds 
to argue that on the basis of Castoriadis’ use of the term in a ‘considerably augmented’ version 
of the argument found in the draft, one can reasonably believe that the concept of spectacle is 
not only identical with Castoriadis’ notions of ‘privatisation’ and ‘de-politicisation’, but that 
Debord concept of ‘spectacle’ is little more than a ‘forged’ plagiarism of Castoriadis’. Here is 
the quote from the later ‘Modern Capitalism and Revolution’ that Quiriny quotes in order to 
underline his thesis:  
The spectacle […] thus becomes the model for contemporary socialisation, in which 
each person is passive in relation to the community and no longer perceives the other as 
a possible subject of exchange, communication, and cooperation, but only as inert body 
limiting his own movements.874 
If we accept that Quiriny’s claim regarding Debord’s ‘discovery’ of the concept of the spectacle 
in SB/PO and Castoriadis’ is false, then what can we make of the foregoing? Perhaps it is a case 
of Castoriadis’ unwitting duplication of the use of ‘spectacle’ in a context remarkably similar to 
Debord’s use of the term? If we examine a further scholarly error of Quiriny’s we come closer 
to the more likely truth: that Debord exerted an influence on Castoriadis. Quiriny believed that 
                                                     
872 In any case, even Blanchard admits a certain hesitancy in his recollection: ‘That is what I experienced 
on the day, in autumn 1959, when I first glanced through an issue - number 3, I think’. Blanchard, 
'Debord, in the Resounding Cataract of Time'. My emphasis.  
873 Castoriadis cited in Quiriny, 'Socialisme ou Barbarie et l’Internationale situationniste : notes sur une « 
méprise »,' p. 50. 
874 Castoriadis, cited in ibid. Note the difference in David Ames Curtis translation of this passage: ‘The 
show [spectacle], a performance by a specialized individual or group before an impersonal and transitory 
public, thus becomes the model for contemporary socialization. Each person is passive in relation to the 
community and no longer perceives the other as a possible subject of exchange, communication, and 
cooperation, but only as inert body limiting his own movements.’ Castoriadis, 'Modern Capitalism and 
Revolution [1960-61],' p. 294; Paul Cardan [Cornelius Castoriadis], 'Le mouvement révolutionnaire sous 
le capitalisme moderne (fin) [part III],' Socialisme ou Barbarie, no. 33 (Décembre 1961 - Février 1962), 
p. 73. 
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Castoriadis’ use of ‘spectacle’ appeared when ‘Modern Capitalism and Revolution’ was 
published in December 1960.875 However, here too he is wrong. The passage in question 
appeared in the third part of ‘Modern Capitalism and Revolution’, which was published in 
December 1961 in issue number 33 of Socialisme ou Barbarie.876 The dating in this case is 
extremely important, and for two reasons. First Debord had come and gone from the official 
orbit of SB/PO by December 1961, whereas in December 1960 he was still a member. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, is the context of the appearance of the term ‘spectacle’ 
in the third part of Castoriadis’ article. Directly before the quote cited above Castoriadis wrote: 
[…] popular festivals, a creation of humanity from time immemorial, tend to disappear 
as a social phenomenon in modern societies. They now survive only as spectacle, a 
physical conglomeration of individuals no longer positively communicating with each 
other, but merely coexisting through their anonymous and passive, juxtaposed relations. 
In such events only one pole of people is active nowadays: Its function is to make the 
event “live” for the others, who are just onlookers.877  
What is striking about this quote is its Situationist style. Indeed, it resembles Debord’s 1957 
comments on the need for people to become ‘livers’ rather than merely occupying ‘passive’, 
‘walk-on’ parts. Considering that it appeared after Debord’s brief membership and almost two 
years after the initiation of closer relations between Debord, other Situationists and SB/PO, not 
to mention more than a year after Debord and SB/PO member Blanchard published a document 
outlining just such a theory of the spectacle, one must wonder about the Situationist influence 
upon Castoriadis and SB/PO. That is to say that there was no doubt a fruitful and productive 
interchange between SB and the SI rather than a merely one way influence in either direction.  
Perhaps even more interesting than this is the paragraph immediately afterward, in which 
Castoriadis wrote, 
It was in no way accidental that observers of the Belgian strikes in Wallonia, in January 
1961, were so struck by the genuinely festive appearance of the country and of the 
people in their conduct, despite being in a state of need and despite the difficult struggle 
they were in the midsts [sic.] of.878  
This passage helps to date its composition, i.e. after the Belgian General Strike over the Winter 
of 1960-61, and thus after both the 1959 draft and the appearance of the first part of the article 
in Socialisme ou Barbarie no. 31 in December 1960. However of more immediate interest is the 
fact that Debord participated directly, alongside of Castoriadis and others in an SB/PO solidarity 
trip to Belgium during the strike.879 Additionally, the Situationists André Frankin and Attila 
Kotànyi were based in Belgium during the strike, and were in contact with, and became 
members of the SB affiliated group Pouvoir Ouvrier Belgique.880 So it is perhaps not too much 
                                                     
875 Quiriny, 'Socialisme ou Barbarie et l’Internationale situationniste : notes sur une « méprise »,' p. 51. 
876 Cardan [Castoriadis], 'Le mouvement révolutionnaire sous le capitalisme moderne (fin) [part III],' p. 
73.  
877 Castoriadis, 'Modern Capitalism and Revolution [1960-61],' p. 294; Cardan [Castoriadis], 'Le 
mouvement révolutionnaire sous le capitalisme moderne (fin) [part III],' pp. 72-3. 
878 Castoriadis, 'Modern Capitalism and Revolution [1960-61],' pp. 294-95. 
879 It is also possible that Debord, as a participant of the SB trip to Belgium during the strike, contributed 
information to the special issue of Socialisme ou Barbarie on the strike, number 32 (April 1961).  
880 Cf. Debord’s letters to André Frankin dated 24 January, 4 February, 19 February, 18 March and 30 
May, 1961 (Guy Debord, Correspondance volume II septembre 1960 - décembre 1964, Paris: Librairie 
Arthème Fayard, 2001.). Debord and the other Situationists came into contact with Robert Dehoux of 
Pouvoir Ouvrier Belgique. Dehoux was also the editor of the journal Alternative which had published 
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to imagine that Castoriadis’ references to ‘festival’, ‘spectacle’ and the ‘festive appearance’ of 
parts of Belgium during the strike was bound up with the participation and indeed influence of 
Situationists during these events. That the possibility of such a relationship was not investigated 
by Quiriny is surely more evidence against his idea of Debord’s ‘discovery’ and ‘intuition’ of 
the concept of ‘spectacle’. 
To bring this extended examination of the pitfalls of the scholarship on the SI and SB/PO’s 
relations, let us return to where we began. Castoriadis is on the record saying that Debord’s 
concept of ‘spectacle’ was merely ‘Frenchified and plagiarised’ from his patently Platonic 
concept ‘the appearance of the simulacrum [présentation du simulacre]’.881 However, I have 
found no evidence of this being the case. Certainly, I have found the influence that Castoriadis 
notion of ‘de-politicisation’ and ‘privatisation’ exerted on Debord — or at least the symmetry 
and similarity between Castoriadis’ elaboration of these concepts and Debord’s conception of 
the ‘spectacle’ of consumption ‘outside of work’.882 Indeed, Castoriadis’ turn to speaking of ‘the 
simulacrum of reasons to live [le simulacre de raisons de vivre]’ in 1963, alongside of what I 
believe to be the obvious Situationist influence upon his use of the term ‘spectacle’ in 1961, 
poses the question of the extent of the Situationist influence upon Castoriadis and SB/PO.883 
Indeed, despite the obvious influence of SB/PO upon the SI, the numerous citations of 
Castoriadis and other ‘Social-Barbarians’ in the pages of Internationale Situationniste, neither 
Castoriadis nor the official organs of SB/PO ever acknowledged the existence of the SI, let 
alone their influence. One wonders what drove Castoriadis to make the preposterous claim that 
he did in 1986.  
If we consider that Castoriadis posed his ‘simulacra’ in explicitly Platonic terms, and the extent 
to which I have attempted to demonstrate the non-mimetic nature of ‘spectacle’ under the hand 
of Debord, it is further interesting to note that Castoriadis’ understanding of ‘ideology critique’ 
lagged behind the Situationists. Certainly, Castoriadis came to understand that ‘ideology’ had a 
different sense from the positivistic notion of ideology in orthodox Marxism during the 1960s. 
However, there is no indication in Castoriadis’ writing that he differentiated between the 
orthodox conception of ‘ideology’ and Marx’s sense of ‘ideology critique’ before he wrote his 
long farewell to Marxism, ‘Marxism and Revolutionary Theory’ (1964-65). Indeed, it was in the 
first part of this article, published in April 1964, that Castoriadis first spoke of ‘Marxism […] 
becom[ing] an ideology in the very sense that Marx gave to this term’.884 Before this, 
Castoriadis appeared to share the orthodox perspective of ‘ideology’. Thus, he conflated 
ideology and culture in an orthodox fashion, in the sense of conceiving of ideology as 
commensurate with the so-called ‘superstructural’ realm of culture.885 He spoke of Marxism — 
favourably — as a ‘revolutionary ideology’ and as ‘the ideological expression of the 
                                                                                                                                                           
Raoul Vaneigem. And it was during the same period, January 1961, that Debord and Vaneigem came into 
contact shortly thereafter leading to Vaneigem’s membership of the SI. Without doubt the SI’s 
involvement with SB during the Belgian strike was close. In a, Debord noted that ‘three Situationists are 
in the Belgian Pouvoir Ouvrier group’ — presumably Frankin, Kotányi and Vaneigem (Debord, 'Lettre à 
Daniel Blanchard, 13 juin 1961,'). Later that year in a letter to J. L. Jollivet, he noted that ‘the last 
Situationists have withdrawn from P[ouvoir] O[uvrier] B[elgique] in November [1961]’ (Debord, 'Lettre 
à J.-L. Jollivet, 8 décembre 1961.').  
881 Castoriadis, 'Seminar of April 30, 1986 - Questions,' p. 169. 
882 Canjuers and Debord, 'Preliminaires pour une definition de l'unite du programme revolutionnaire [20 
juillet 1960].' 
883 Castoriadis, 'Recommencing the Revolution [1963].'; Socialisme ou Barbarie [Castoriadis], 
'Recommencer la révolution,' p. 27. 
884 Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, p. 11; Castoriadis], 'Marxisme et théorie 
révolutionnaire [part I],' p. 4.  
885 Castoriadis, 'On the Content of Socialism, II [1957],' p. 148. 
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proletariat’s activity’, in the sense of it being its intellectual expression.886 When turning to a 
more thoroughgoing criticism of Marxism, Castoriadis considered the ‘ideological 
degeneration’ consequent upon the incorporation of working-class political and economic 
organisations into the bureaucratic capitalist state, as evidence of the absence of ‘any 
revolutionary ideology or even simply a working-class ideology present on a society-wide scale 
(i.e., not just cultivated in a few sects)’.887 Indeed, when Castoriadis began to take up what we 
would recognise as a perspective redolent of an ‘ideology critique’ around 1963 — coincident 
with the call for a ‘new orientation’ and then split in SB/PO — he still confused ‘ideology’ with 
its orthodox sense.888 Of course, Castoriadis’ confusion does not mark him out from most other 
contemporaries, whether ‘orthodox’ or ‘heterodox’. But what is important regarding the 
foregoing, is that there is no evidence that Castoriadis considered ‘ideology critique’ in the way 
Debord and the SI began to engage and enunciate such from around 1961. Considering the 
centrality of Marx’s ideology critique in the turn from theorising the spectacle as applicable to 
the cultural spectacle to a theory with a more general important (albeit incorporating the earlier 
critical sense of ‘spectacle’), it is hard see how Castoriadis developed the notion of his 
proprietary claim; it is even harder to believe this, when we consider that his Platonic notion of 
‘simulacrum’ bears little relation to a core conceit of Debord’s concept from 1961 — i.e. 
Marx’s sense of ‘ideology critique’. 
 
  
                                                     
886 Castoriadis, 'Proletariat and Organisation, I [1959],' p. 213; Castoriadis, 'Modern Capitalism and 
Revolution [1960-61],' p. 232. 
887 Castoriadis, 'Modern Capitalism and Revolution [1960-61],' p. 295. 
888 Castoriadis, 'For A New Orientation [1962],' pp. 9, 10, 11; Castoriadis, 'Recommencing the Revolution 
[1963],' p. 30. 
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libre, 1972. 
 
333 
 
Jan Rehmann. Theories of Ideology: The Powers of Alienation and Subjection. Leiden: Brill, 
2013. 
 
Georges Ribemont-Dessaignes. 'History of Dada (1930).' In The Dada Painters and Poets: An 
Anthology, edited by Robert Motherwell, pp. 99-120, 1981. 
 
Simon Sadler. The Situationist City. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1999. 
 
Guy Debord & Gianfranco Sanguinetti. 'Thèses sur l’Internationale situationniste et son temps 
[1972].' In Guy Debord : Œuvres, pp. 1088-1133. Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2006. 
 
Stevphen Shukaitis. Imaginal Machines: Autonomy & Self-Organization in the Revolutions of 
Everyday Life. London: Minor Compositions, 2009. 
 
Internationale situationniste. International situationniste: Édition augmentée. Paris: Librairie 
Artheme Fayard, 1997. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Sur l’exclusion d’Attila Kotànyi [1963].' In Guy Debord : 
Œuvres, pp. 663-67. Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2006. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Critique de l'urbanisme.' Internationale Situationniste, no. 6 (Août 
1961), pp. 5-11. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Instructions pour une prise d'armes.' Internationale Situationniste, 
no. 6 (Août 1961), pp. 3-5. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'programme élémentaire du bureau d’urbanisme unitaire.' 
Internationale Situationniste, no. 6 (Août 1961), pp. 16-19. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Renseignements situationniste [6].' Internationale Situationniste, 
no. 6 (Août 1961), pp. 38-41. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'L'absence et ses habilleurs (suite).' Internationale Situationniste, 
no. 9 (Août 1964), pp. 10-12. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Le questionnaire.' Internationale Situationniste, no. 9 (Août 
1964), pp. 24-27. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Les mois les plus longs.' Internationale Situationniste, no. 9 (Août 
1964), pp. 30-37. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Maintenant, L'I.S.' Internationale Situationniste, no. 9 (Août 
1964), pp. 3-5. 
 
334 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Du rôle de l’I.S.' Internationale Situationniste no. 7 (Avril 1962), 
pp. 17-20. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Géopolitique de l’hibernation.' Internationale Situationniste, no. 7 
(Avril 1962), pp. 3-10. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'La Cinquième Conférence de l’I.S. à Göteborg.' Internationale 
Situationniste, no. 7 (Avril 1962), pp. 25-31. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Les mauvais jours finiront.' Internationale Situationniste, no. 7 
(Avril 1962), pp. 10-17. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Renseignements situationniste [7].' Internationale Situationniste, 
no. 7 (Avril 1962), pp. 49-54. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Les souvenirs au-dessous de tout.' Internationale Situationniste, 
no. 2 (Décembre 1958), pp. 3-4. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Sur nos moyens et nos perspectives.' Internationale Situationniste, 
no. 2 (Décembre 1958), pp. 23-6. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Corrections pour l'adoption des onze points d'Amsterdam.' 
Internationale Situationniste, no. 3 (Décembre 1959), pp. 27-28. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Discussion sur un appel aux intellectuels et artistes 
révolutionnaires.' Internationale Situationniste, no. 3 (Décembre 1959), pp. 22-4. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'L’urbanisme unitaire à la fin des années 50.' Internationale 
Situationniste, no. 3 (Décembre 1959), pp. 11-16. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'La troisième conférence de l'I.S. à Munich.' Internationale 
Situationniste, no. 3 (Décembre 1959), pp. 19-22. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Le cinema après Alain Resnais.' Internationale Situationniste, no. 
3 (Décembre 1959), pp. 8-10. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Le détournement comme négation et comme prélude.' 
Internationale Situationniste, no. 3 (Décembre 1959), pp. 10-11. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Le sens du dépérissement de l’art.' Internationale Situationniste, 
no. 3 (Décembre 1959), pp. 3-8. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'La frontière situationniste.' Internationale Situationniste, no. 5 
(Décembre 1960), pp. 7-9. 
335 
 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'La quatrième conférence de l’I.S. a Londrès.' International 
Situationniste, no. 5 (Décembre 1960), pp. 19-23. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'La quatrième conférence de l’I.S. à Londres.' Internationale 
Situationniste, no. 5 (Décembre 1960), pp. 19-23. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Renseignements situationniste [5].' Internationale Situationniste, 
no. 5 (Décembre 1960), pp. 10- 13. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'L'Operation Contre-Situationniste Dans Divers Pays.' 
Internationale Situationniste, no. 8 (Janvier 1963), pp. 23-29. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'L’I.S. vous l’avait bien dit !' Internationale Situationniste, no. 8 
(Janvier 1963), p. 18. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Programme préalable au mouvement situationniste.' 
Internationale Situationniste, no. 8 (Janvier 1963), p. 42. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Amère victoire du surréalisme.' Internationale Situationniste, no. 
1 (Juin 1958), pp. 3-4. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Avec et contre le cinéma.' Internationale Situationniste, no. 1 
(Juin 1958), pp. 8-9. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Définitions.' Internationale Situationniste, no. 1 (Juin 1958), pp. 
13-14. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Le bruit et la fureur.' Internationale Situationniste, no. 1 (Juin 
1958), pp. 4-6. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Problèmes préliminaires à la construction d’une situation.' 
Internationale Situationniste, no. 1 (Juin 1958), pp. 11-13. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Renseignements situationniste [4].' Internationale Situationniste, 
no. 4 (Juin 1960), pp. 12-15. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Sur l’emploi du temps libre.' Internationale Situationniste, no. 4 
(Juin 1960), pp. 3-5. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Décomposition et récupération.' Internationale Situationniste, no. 
10 (Mars 1966), pp. 59-60. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'L'idéologie du dialogue.' Internationale Situationniste, no. 10 
(Mars 1966), pp. 68-70. 
336 
 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Socialisme ou Planète.' Internationale Situationniste, no. 10 (Mars 
1966), pp. 77-79. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Le cinéma et la révolution.' Internationale Situationniste, no. 12 
(Septembre 1969), pp. 104-105. 
 
Internationale Situationniste. 'Le commencement d'une époque.' Internationale Situationniste, 
no. 12 (Septembre 1969), pp. 3-34. 
 
Howard Slater, 'Divided We Stand - An Outline of Scandinavian Situationism' 
http://scansitu.antipool.org/2001.html. 
 
Gruppe Spur. SPUR 5: Spezialnummer über den unitären Urbanismus,  (Juni 1961). 
 
Frances Stracey. Constructed Situations: A New History of the Situationist International. 
London: Pluto Press, 2014. 
 
Andrea S. Thomas. Lautréamont, Subject to Interpretation. Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi B.V., 
2015. 
 
Attila Kotányi & Raoul Vaneigem. 'Programme élémentaire du bureau d’urbanisme unitaire.' 
Internationale Situationniste, no. 6 (Août 1961), pp. 16-19. 
 
Raoul Vaneigem. Raoul Vaneigem: Self-Portraits and Caricatures of the Situationist 
International [2014]. Translated & détourned by Not Bored from the French Rien n’est 
fini, tout commence [2014], 2015. http://www.notbored.org/caricatures.pdf. 
 
Raoul Vaneigem. The Revolution of Everyday Life. Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith. 
Oakland: PM Press, [1967] 2012. 
 
Raoul Vaneigem. 'Commentaires contre l'urbanisme.' Internationale Situationniste, no. 6 (Août 
1961), pp. 33-7. 
 
Raoul Vaneigem. 'Banalités de base (I).' Internationale situationniste, no. 7 (Avril 1962), pp. 
32-41. 
 
Raoul Vaneigem. 'Banalités de base (II).' Internationale Situationniste, no. 8 (Janvier 1963), pp. 
34-47. 
 
Internationale Situationniste [Raoul Vaneigem]. 'Domination de la nature, idéologies et classes.' 
Internationale Situationniste, no. 8 (Janvier 1963). 
 
337 
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